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SUMMMARY 
In this dissertation, I critically evaluate the VAT treatment of common partnership transactions that are 
encountered during the life of a partnership. Of great significance, is that at common law a partnership 
is not regarded as a person, but for VAT purposes it is treated as a separate person. This creates a 
strong dichotomy between the general legal nature, and the VAT character of a partnership transaction. 
The partnership and the VAT law dichotomy, is an important theme that runs through most of the thesis. 
Only once I have established the nature of the transaction for VAT purposes – whether in keeping with 
or differing from the common law – do I apply the relevant provisions of the VAT Act to determine the 
VAT implications of the transaction. An important general principle is that what is supplied or acquired 
by the body of persons who make up the partnership, within the course and scope of its common 
purpose, is for VAT purposes, supplied or acquired by the partnership as a separate person. 
 
I conclude that there are difficulties and uncertainties regarding the application of the provisions of the 
VAT Act to various partnership transactions. For the sake of certainty and simplicity, I propose 
amendments to the current provisions that are relevant to partnership transactions, and also propose 
additional provisions. The proposed amendments seek to align with the purpose of the VAT Act and 
the principles upon which it is based, and also to adhere to internationally accepted principles for a 
sound VAT system. I also pinpoint those aspects of the VAT Act that can be clarified by the SARS in 
an interpretation statement. 
 
I further identify issues that require more research, eg issues arising from a partnership’s participation 
in cross-border trade. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Partnerships are difficult to tax.1 In terms of the common law, a partnership is not a legal entity separate 
and distinct from its partners.2 The rights of a partnership are accordingly vested in, and the liabilities 
are binding on, the individual partners.3 As a result, when a partnership makes a supply or an 
acquisition, each member of the partnership makes that supply or acquisition, resulting in a potential 
output tax liability and an input tax credit for each member. In my view, this is problematic for the 
application of VAT, as it is of course more difficult to assess each individual partner for the partnership’s 
VAT liability, as opposed to assessing the partnership as a single entity. The assessment of an 
individual partner is even more difficult if he4 is a member of multiple partnerships.5 
 
Furthermore, any change in membership terminates the partnership. If the remaining partners agree to 
continue the business of the partnership, a new partnership is created.6 This characteristic, particularly 
for partnerships which experience frequent membership changes, coupled with the fact that partners 
are individually liable, have the effect that when the composition of a partnership changes, the VAT 
liability of each individual partner must be recalculated before and after the change.7 In addition, even 
if the VAT is assessed at partnership level, instead of assessing the individual partners, considerable 
administrative time would be spent registering, deregistering, and re-registering changing partnerships.8 
 
It is clear that the application of VAT to partnerships could be administratively onerous, especially in 
the absence of special provisions intended to facilitate the process. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
special provisions were inserted in the VAT Act9 to make the application of VAT to partnership 
 
1 See Tait Value Added Tax 366. 
2 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” in Kühne M (ed) Law of South Africa vol 19 para 281; Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 15; Du Bois Wille’s Principles 1007. 
3 Muller en ‘n Ander v Pienaar [1968] 3 All SA 290 (A) 295 (hereafter Muller 1968); Ramdhin et al ibid at para281; Williams 
ibid. 
4 The terms ‘he’ and ‘his’ are used as gender neutral terms and do not exclude any other gender. 
5 Tait Value Added Tax 366. 
6 See paras 4.2 and 4.3 below. 
7 Tait Value Added Tax 366; ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2003/13 “Goods and services tax: General law 
partnerships” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?DocID=GST/GSTR200313/NAT/ATO/00001&PiT=99991231235958 (date of 
use: 31 December 2018) (hereafter GSTR 2003/13) para 163. 
8 Ibid. 
9 All subsequent references to legislative provisions are to provisions in the VAT Act unless otherwise indicated. 
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transactions less problematic. A partnership is, for example, importantly deemed to be a person for VAT 
purposes.10 ‘Person’ is defined in the VAT Act11 as including, inter alia, an unincorporated body of 
persons. A partnership is an unincorporated body of persons.12 Moreover, section 51 contains certain 
deeming provisions, and sets out specific rules applicable to partnerships that carry on an enterprise. 
 
Although these provisions are clearly aimed at simplifying the application of VAT to partnerships, they 
do not come without interpretation difficulties. This is illustrated by the many diverse views and 
uncertainties internationally on the application of similar deeming provisions to common partnership 
transactions as evidenced by the discussion below. Moreover, that these provisions are deeming 
provisions, in my view, presents an inherent difficulty because the appropriate effect of a deeming rule 
which creates a legal fiction is generally problematic.13 
 
When applying the provisions of the VAT Act to a partnership transaction, it is important to consider 
whether the VAT character of the transaction differs from its common-law character. Much of the 
discussion, therefore, centres round the interrelationship between the ‘common-law character’ and the 
‘VAT character’ of a particular partnership transaction arising from the deeming provisions.14 
 
In Chapter Two I discuss the nature and the formation of a partnership. I consider whether supplies and 
acquisitions are made between a partnership and its members (ie, the partners), and if so, what the 
VAT implications of these transactions are. Each partner receives a partner’s share when concluding 
the partnership agreement.15 A question arising is whether the partners’ shares are ‘supplied’ to the 
partners, so generating a possible output tax liability. 
 
 
10 Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 7.3.10; Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 1 person-2. 
11 Section 1(1). 
12 In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Epstein [1954] 4 All SA 7 (A) 13, for example, the court assumed that the 
respondent’s ‘association’ with a certain Hendrickse and Company was a partnership. According to Williams, and 
Ramdhin et al, a partnership is an ‘association of persons’. See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 15; 
Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 281. See also Bamford Law of Partnership 1. An ‘association’ is defined as “an 
unincorporated society; a body of persons united and acting together without a charter, but upon the methods and forms 
used by incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise”. See The Law Dictionary Featuring Black’s 
Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2 ed available at https://thelawdictionary.org/operation-of-law/ (date of use: 
13 April 2018). Claassen defines an ‘association’ as “an organised body of persons who have joined together under some 
contract, statute, regulations or rules, for the purpose of carrying out some common object.” See Claassen Dictionary of 
Legal Words 21. Based on the above, I argue that an ‘association of persons’ is the same as an ‘unincorporated body of 
persons’ as envisaged in the definition of ‘person’. As a partnership is an ‘association of persons’, it is an ‘unincorporated 
body of persons’. 
13 Kandev & Lennard 2012 Canadian Tax Journal 287. 
14 See Arsenault M & Kreklewetz R “Partnerships” 50. 
15 See paras 2.6.4 and 2.8 below. 
3 
 
One of the essentialia of a partnership agreement is that each partner must make some contribution to 
the partnership.16 Partner contributions give rise to numerous VAT issues, for example, whether 
partners can make supplies to the partnership, and if so, whether such contributions could, potentially, 
be subject to VAT. Furthermore, I argue that in contributing labour to the partnership, the partner acts 
as agent on behalf of the partnership.17 This begs the question of how a partner’s power as an agent 
impacts on the partners’ and the partnership’s position for VAT purposes. 
 
I also consider whether the VAT on costs incurred by a partnership or an individual partner upon the 
establishment of a partnership, is deductible as input tax. 
 
In Chapter Three I consider transactions related to the operation of a partnership. The partnership 
concludes diverse transactions in the course of its operations with its partners and third parties, 
including with a partner acting as a third-party supplier. I deal with the potential difficulty in, and the 
importance of, distinguishing between a payment made by the partnership as consideration for a 
partner’s supply, a distributive share of profits, and the VAT implications of these payments. 
 
I argue that, in light of its status as a person,18 a partnership can make supplies and acquisitions, and I 
consider the nature of the property that can be the subject of such a supply and acquisition. I also 
examine the different capacities in which a partner may make acquisitions for the partnership business, 
and the mechanisms available to a partnership, including section 18(4)(b), to claim a related tax 
deduction. The determination of the purpose of a partnership is important as a partnership is entitled to 
an input-tax deduction if the goods or services are acquired for the ‘purpose’ of making taxable 
supplies.19 Despite a partnership not being a natural person, I explore how a partnership’s purpose can 
be established. 
 
I further discuss the VAT implications of partnership distributions to partners, whether in cash or 
in specie, and from different sources of partnership property, including profits and contributed capital. 
Instead of transferring the ownership of property, the partnership may permit a partner to use 
partnership property for private purposes, which can result in VAT abuse considering that the 
partnership may have deducted input tax for that property. 
 
In Chapter Four I consider the dissolution of a partnership, where the dissolved partnership’s enterprise 
is continued by a new partnership. This can lead to a fair number of VAT consequences, especially with 
 
16 See para 2.3 below. 
17 See para 2.6.2 below. 
18 See para 2.3 below. 
19 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
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regard to the transfer of the partnership property to the new partnership, and the sale and acquisition 
of partners’ shares. I consider what exactly is disposed of or acquired in the case of the sale or 
acquisition of a partner’s share. 
 
Section 51(2), which deems the dissolved and the new partnership to be a single partnership, subject 
to its meeting certain requirements, impacts significantly on the VAT and transfer duty implications of 
the transfer of partnership property, especially immovable property, from the dissolved to the new 
partnership. I also examine the application of section 11(1)(e), in terms of which the supply of the 
partnership enterprise from the dissolved to the new partnership can be zero rated where section 51(2) 
does not apply. 
 
The partnership would, in all likelihood, incur costs in its transition from the dissolved to the new 
partnership, which raises the issue of the deductibility of the VAT on those costs. 
 
Section 8(25) provides specific relief to vendors who qualify for the group-relief measures under the 
IT Act. In the 2015 Budget Tax Proposals, it was proposed that this relief not only apply to groups of 
companies, but that it be extended to unincorporated entities.20 In my discussion of section 8(25) I 
consider, inter alia, the wisdom of extending this provision to partnerships. 
 
In Chapter Five, I deal with the dissolution of a partnership and the VAT treatment of the changes during 
this phase – eg, the cessation of the partners’ agency powers after dissolution, the partners’ loss of 
their partners’ shares, and the partners’ acquisition of certain rights post-dissolution. I also consider the 
impact of a partnership’s dissolution on a partnership and a partner’s indebtedness. 
 
I examine the VAT implications of the death of a partner, which are unclear without specific provisions 
regulating such an occurrence. 
 
After dissolution the partnership is liquidated, its creditors are paid, and its remaining assets are 
distributed to the partners.21 I reflect on the VAT on these, and other related transactions that typically 
occur during this phase. 
 
In Chapter Six I consider different options to, inter alia, create greater certainty and simplicity in the VAT 
treatment of common partnership transactions, including legislative changes and interpretation 
statements by the SARS dealing with the more complex issues. 
 
20 National Treasury Republic of South Africa Budget Review 2015 25 February 2015 Annexure C: Additional Tax 
Amendments 148. 
21 See para 5.3.1 below. 
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1.2 Research approach 
 
I address the various issues by interpreting the relevant provisions of the VAT Act, applying the principal 
approaches to the interpretation of statutes and contracts in South Africa. I also examine important 
aspects of the South African partnership and agency law, which are crucial to the discussion. 
 
Relevant case law and academic commentary, both local and foreign, as well as publications of the 
SARS and of foreign revenue authorities, are considered. I also consult the case law and writings of 
comparable and leading VAT/GST jurisdictions, especially those of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the UK.22 The aim is not to undertake a comprehensive comparative survey of another country’s 
law on the topic, but rather to extract valuable lessons for the correct interpretation of the VAT Act as 
regards common partnership transactions, and to propose appropriate legislative amendments. 
 
  
 
22 Note that I discuss European VAT law in various places. It must be noted that the EU VAT model is not a modern VAT. 
Modern VAT systems include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NATURE AND FORMATION OF A PARTNERSHIP 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the two theories on the nature of partnership, and the effect of applying each 
theory in South African law. Importantly, the nature of a partnership in terms of the common law, differs 
from its nature for VAT purposes. In light of this difference, I consider what the approach should be 
when determining the nature of any partnership transaction for VAT purposes and applying the relevant 
provisions of the VAT Act to the transaction.23 
 
Furthermore, I explain whether supplies and acquisitions are made between a partnership and its 
members on formation of the partnership, and if so, what the VAT implications are of these transactions. 
Relevant considerations include: the transactions and activities normally associated with the 
establishment of a partnership; the practical significance of a partnership’s status as a person for VAT 
purposes; and the impact of section 51, which sets out specific rules applicable to partnerships which 
carry on an enterprise. 
 
2.2 The legal nature of a partnership 
 
A partnership is established by an agreement between prospective partners.24 The court in Pezzutto v 
Dreyer,25 confirming the essentialia of a contract of partnership, stated the following: 
Our courts have accepted Pothier’s formulation of such essentials as a correct statement of the law. (Joubert v 
Tarry & Co 1915 TPD 277 at 280/1; Bester v Van Niekerk 1960 (2) SA 779 (A) at 783H-784A; Purdon v Muller 
 
23 The interaction between common law, legislation and court judgments is important. The courts apply both common 
law and statutory law. Statutes must, as far as possible, be interpreted in accordance with common law. (Van Heerden & 
Crosby Interpretation of Statutes 2) As a result, no hierarchy exits between the common law and legislation so that the 
one is superior to the other. The only exception is the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996), 
which is the highest law in the land and all law is, consequently, subject to it (Botha Statutory Interpretation 13 
para 2.2.2.) Common law can, therefore, not per se overrule the provisions in the VAT Act, and vice versa. The VAT Act, 
however, has specific provisions, which I discuss, which regulate the application of VAT to certain partnership 
transactions. These partnerships transactions are, at the same time, also governed by the common law. I am of the view 
that both the relevant VAT provisions and the partnership common law must be considered when drafting VAT legislative 
rules to avoid “bad drafting”. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that VAT is a modern tax that is not always compatible with 
the ancient legal principles of the common law. Accordingly, VAT legislation may, for VAT purposes, alter the way a 
transaction is traditionally treated in terms of the common law by means of deeming provisions or legal fictions. 
24 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 261; Bamford Law of Partnership 1; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.01; Mongalo, 
Lumina & Kader Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.2; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 7. 
25 [1992] 2 All SA 81 (A) (the Pezzutto case). 
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1961 (2) SA 211 at 218B-D). The three essentials are (1) that each of the partners bring something into the 
partnership, whether it be money, labour or skill; (2) that the business should be carried on for the joint benefit of 
the parties; and (3) that the object be to make a profit (Pothier: A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership (Tudor’s 
translation) 1.3.8). A fourth requirement mentioned by Pothier is that the contract should be a legitimate one.26 
 
2.2.1 Two theories on the nature of partnership 
 
There are two theories on the nature of partnership: the entity theory; and aggregate theory. In terms 
of the entity theory, a partnership is a body or entity separate from, and with rights and obligations 
distinct from, its members. Furthermore, a partnership can own property and carry on business. Many 
civil law jurisdictions apply the entity theory.27 
 
In terms of the aggregate theory, a partnership is not recognised as a separate entity, but is regarded 
as merely an aggregate or collection of individuals. Consequently, the partners, rather than the 
partnership, are the owners of partnership property. Any change in its membership terminates the 
identity of the partnership. As a person cannot contract with himself, a partner may be the 
debtor/creditor of his28 partners, but he cannot be the debtor/ creditor of his partnership, or be employed 
by it. English law, and so most other common-law jurisdictions, apply the aggregate theory of 
partnership.29 
 
In order to achieve desired results, courts and legislators in both entity and aggregate jurisdictions, do 
not always adhere strictly to a specific theory of partnership. A partnership may, for example, be treated 
as a separate entity for certain purposes in an aggregate jurisdiction. Conversely, in an entity 
jurisdiction, the separate identity of a partnership may be disregarded in exceptional circumstances.30 
 
2.2.2 Application of two theories causing confusion and uncertainty 
 
As in English law, South African common law applies the aggregate theory. The basic principle or 
general rule, in terms of the common law, is that a partnership is not a legal entity and, therefore, does 
not have legal personality.31 It does not have an existence separate from its partners. This means, as 
 
26 Ibid at 91. 
27 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 279. See also Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 2.20; Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 16. 
28 The terms ‘his’ and ‘he’ are used as gender neutral terms and do not exclude any other gender. 
29 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 279. See also Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 2.20; Scamell & I’anson Banks Lindley 
on the Law of Partnerships 5. 
30 Ramdhin et al ibid. According to Benade et al ibid at para 2.21, none of these theories is followed dogmatically. They 
claim that although a country’s legal system normally subscribes to one of the theories, the other theory is used at times 
when practical considerations or fairness so require. See also Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 16. 
31 See para 1.1. 
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stated above,32 that the rights of a partnership vest in, and the liabilities bind, the individual partners. 
Consequently, a partnership cannot have assets and liabilities. If two or more individuals, in their 
capacities as partners, enter into a contract, the identity of the partnership is always synonymous with 
the identity of the contracting partners.33 
 
The legislator, however, has created exceptions in terms of which a partnership is treated as a separate 
person in particular instances.34 A partnership is deemed to be a person for VAT purposes.35 
 
The law of insolvency creates another exception where a partnership is considered to be a separate 
entity.36 The court held in Michalow NO v Premier Milling Co Ltd,37 for instance, that as far as section 29 
of the Insolvency Act38 is concerned, the estates of the individual partners must be treated as distinct 
from the partnership estate where both the partnership and the private estates are ultimately 
sequestrated.39 
 
According to Ramdhin et al, the application of two distinct concepts of partnership in a single legal 
system may, and has, caused some confusion and uncertainty as to the precise legal nature of a 
partnership in particular circumstances.40 In Michalow,41 the court acknowledged that to treat a 
partnership as a debtor, and consequently as having an estate separate and distinct from the personal 
estates of the partners, is in direct conflict with the common law. The court referred to Johannesburg 
Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees where Solomon J approved the following rule of interpretation adopted 
by the English courts:42 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Muller 1968 at 295; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 281. See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 15, 41. 
34 Ramdhin A et al “Partnership” in Kühne M (ed) Law of South Africa vol 19 2 ed (LexisNexis 2016) paras 281 and 282; 
Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 17-18; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 2.22 and 2.23. 
35 See para 1.1. 
36 Michalow NO v Premier Milling Co Ltd [1960] 1 All SA 551 (W) 556 (hereafter Michalow); Muller 1968 at 294; Strydom v 
Protea Eiendomsagente [1979] 3 All SA 454 (T) 456; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” paras 281 and 287; Henning Perspectives 
on the Law of Partnership para 734; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 2.26 to 2.31; Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 18. 
37 Michalow ibid. 
38 Act 24 of 1936; s 29 provides as follows: 
Every disposition of his property made by a debtor not more than six months before the sequestration of his estate, 
which has had the effect of preferring one of his creditors above another, may be set aside by the Court if 
immediately after the making of such disposition the liabilities of the debtor exceeded the value of his assets, 
unless the person in whose favour the disposition was made proves that the disposition was made in the ordinary 
course of business and that it was not intended thereby to prefer one creditor above another ….  
39 Michalow at 556. 
40 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 279. 
41 Michalow at 554. 
42 Laid down in Reg v Morris 1 CCR 95. 
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[I]t is a sound rule to construe a statute in conformity with the common law rather than against it, except 
where and so far as the statute is plainly intended to alter the course of the common law.43 
 
This rule of interpretation, which has been applied in innumerable South African cases, embodies the 
presumption that the legislature does not intend to alter the existing law more than is necessary.44 
 
The court in Michalow explained that to justify such a drastic departure from the common law, one 
would have to adopt the hypothesis that those who deal with and grant credit to a partnership, do so 
solely in reliance on the partnership assets, and that they must regard the partnership as a separate 
entity. That being so, the court held that the Insolvency Act “plainly intended to alter the course of the 
common law” and to treat a partnership as having a separate estate and as being in the same position 
as any other debtor.45 To hold otherwise would deprive partnership creditors of a safeguard against 
preferences which is extended to all other types of creditor.46 
 
It is clear from Michalow, that a departure from the common-law principle that a partnership is merely 
a collection of individuals, rather than a separate entity, is only justified in any particular circumstance 
if this was plainly intended based on relevant considerations. It is further evident from the judgment that 
the problem of the nature of a partnership in a legal system which applies two distinct concepts of 
partnership, can be complex and requires very careful consideration. 
 
2.2.3 The common law versus the VAT nature of partnership 
 
The deeming of a partnership to be a person or separate entity by VAT/GST legislation against the 
backdrop of general law that applies an aggregate theory of partnership, also raises difficulties of 
interpretation. The difficulty with the use of a deeming rule, is that it imbues a person or a thing with 
features or qualities that he or it does not have,47 without the legislature defining its scope or clarifying 
exactly what its effect is.48In terms of Canadian common law, for example, a partnership is not 
 
43 1909 TS 811 at 823. See also Seluka v Suskin and Salkow 1912 TPD 258 at 265 where the court stated: “It is true that it is 
a canon of construction that an Act must not be presumed to alter the common law, but directly it is clear from the language 
of the statute that the very object of the Act is to alter the common law, then full effect must be given to this object.” 
44 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 159; Botha Statutory Interpretation 45 para 4.6.1. 
45 Michalow at 556. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See CSARS v Marshall NO (816/2015) [2016] ZASCA 158 (3 October 2016) para 25. 
48 In Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Registrar of Asiatics 1911 AD 13 (Chotabhai) the court, 
explaining the nature of the difficulty to which a deeming rule can give rise, stated at 33: 
The use of the word ‘deemed’ was perhaps not a happy one, because that term may be employed to denote merely 
that the person or things to which it relates are to be considered to be what they really are not, without in any 
way curtailing the operation of a Statute in respect of other persons or things falling within the ordinary meaning 
of the language used. If the word were so employed, the result would be artificially to extend the scope of the 
expression referred to, without attempting to define it.’ Para 33 Chotabhai was quoted in CSARS v Marshall NO 
816/2015) [2016] ZASCA 158 (3 October 2016) para 25. 
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considered a separate entity,49 but for GST purposes, it is deemed to be a separate person distinct from 
its partners.50 Arsenault and Kreklewetz, commenting on the application of Canada’s ETA to 
partnerships, submit that the fact that a partnership is not a legal entity probably results in some of the 
most complex GST issues.51 Likewise, in Australia, New Zealand, and England a partnership is not a 
legal entity in terms of general law, but is treated as a separate person for GST/VAT purposes.52 
 
The question which arises is, given that a partnership is deemed a separate person for VAT purposes, 
to what extent does the VAT character of a partnership transaction differ from its common-law 
character?53 This question is relevant to all partnership transactions. 
 
In my view, the correct VAT treatment of a partnership transaction requires a proper understanding of 
the transaction, that is either in keeping with the common law, or differs from the common law, but only 
to the extent that the specific provision(s) of the VAT Act plainly intended to alter the course of the 
common law. 
 
2.3 The effect of deeming a partnership to be a person 
 
The term ‘person’ is of fundamental importance in the application of the VAT Act. A ‘vendor’ is defined54 
as meaning a person who is, or is required to be, registered for VAT, and it is a vendor who may levy 
VAT on supplies55 and deduct the VAT on acquisitions as input tax.56 Moreover, a vendor is a person 
who is compelled to register, or may voluntarily register for VAT, provided that he carries on an 
 
49 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010; Houghton “Partnerships and Unincorporated Business 
Organisations” available at https://www.lawsonlundell.com/media/news/136_ 
PartnershipsandUnincorporatedBusinessOrganizations.pdf (date of use: 16 August 2018). 
50 Section 123(1) of Canada’s ETA; Chabot et al ibid; CRA “Partnership” available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/tax/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed-income/setting-your-business/partnership.html (date of 
use: 15 September 2018). 
51 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 14. 
52 Higgins Law of Partnership 14; Taxpayers Australia Inc Taxpayers Guide 2014-2015 para 24.323; Williams Corporations 
and Partnerships in New Zealand para 775; GSTR 2003/13 paras 21 and 22. GSTR 2003/13 deals with general law 
partnerships. According to the ATO, a ‘general law partnership’ is the relation which subsists between persons carrying on 
a business in common with a view to making a profit, whereas a ‘tax law partnership’ is an association of persons in receipt 
of ordinary income or statutory income jointly (GSTR 2003/13, paras 10 and 11). In my opinion, a ‘general law partnership’ 
is similar to a ‘partnership’ under South African common law. See too Cross New Zealand Master Tax Guide 973 para 23-
110; s 57 of the New Zealand GST Act; Scamell & I’anson Banks Lindley on the Law of Partnerships 5; Hemmingsley & Rudling 
Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.1. In Scotland a partnership is a legal person distinct from its partners. See Hemmingsley 
& Rudling ibid. 
53 See Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 6. 
54 In s 1(1). 
55 Section 7(1)(a) levies VAT, at the standard rate of fifteen per cent, on the supply by a vendor of goods or services in the 
course or furtherance of an enterprise he carries on. 
56 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
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enterprise and the relevant turnover thresholds are exceeded.57 Therefore, before VAT registration can 
take place, there must be a person, and that person must carry on an enterprise. In my view, the 
deeming of a partnership to be a person implies that, for VAT purposes, it is capable of doing what the 
VAT Act empowers a person to do, including, make supplies and acquisitions, carry on an enterprise, 
and register for VAT. I argue, further, that as a partnership is a person, it may register for VAT as a 
single person, rather than registering its members individually, provided that it carries on an enterprise. 
 
Section 51(1)(a) provides that where a body of persons, and by implication also a partnership, carries 
on an enterprise, it is deemed to carry on that enterprise independently of its members. It is evident 
from this provision that, according to the legislature, a partnership is capable of carrying on an 
enterprise. 
 
Section 16(3)(a) provides that the tax payable by a vendor is calculated by deducting the amounts of 
input tax from the sum of output tax. ‘Output tax’, in relation to a vendor, is defined58 as meaning the 
tax charged under section 7(1)(a) in respect of the supply of goods and services by a vendor. ‘Input 
tax’, in relation to a vendor, is defined59 as meaning the tax charged under section 7 and payable by a 
supplier on the supply of goods or services acquired by the vendor for the purpose of making taxable 
supplies. Accordingly, a vendor’s VAT liability – including that of a partnership which carries on an 
enterprise – is generally determined on the basis of its supplies and acquisitions of goods or services. 
These provisions add to the argument that deeming a partnership to be a ‘person’ suggests that, for 
VAT purposes, a partnership is perfectly capable of making and acquiring supplies of goods or services. 
This is notwithstanding that, in terms of common law, a partnership is not the bearer of rights and duties. 
 
The meaning of the word ‘person’ is also useful for a better understanding of the implications of deeming 
a partnership a ‘person’. In De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka,60 the court stated 
that when interpreting a word in a statute, the dictionary meaning of the word can be used as a guide. 
But where the word has more than one meaning, the context in which the word is used is important.61 
The definition of ‘person’ in the VAT Act is not exhaustive in that it is defined as ‘including’ certain 
entities. The ordinary meaning of ‘person’, therefore, falls to be considered. ‘Person’ is defined as 
meaning, inter alia, “an individual (also natural person) or a group of individuals as a corporation (also 
 
57 In terms of s 23(1) a person is required to register for VAT where the total value of his taxable supplies exceeds R1 million 
over a twelve-month period. In terms of s 23(3)(b) and (c) a person may voluntarily register for VAT where the total value 
of his taxable supplies exceeds R50,000 over a twelve-month period. 
58 In s 1(1). 
59 Ibid. 
60 [1980] 3 All SA 447 (T) 452. 
61 Botha Statutory Interpretation 86 para 7.3.4. 
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artificial person), regarded as having rights and duties recognised by the law.”62 By deeming a 
partnership to be a person for VAT purposes, the legislature plainly intended to alter the course of the 
common law, in that being a ‘person’ implies that the partnership has the capacity to acquire rights and 
incur obligations. 
 
In New Zealand, the TRA held in Case N27, that the effect of a partnership being registered for GST, 
is that it is capable of carrying on a taxable activity in making and receiving supplies distinct from 
supplies by or to a member.63 In the case of Australia, the ATO is of the view that as an entity, a general-
law partnership may register for GST, is liable for taxable supplies that it makes, and is entitled to input 
tax credits for its creditable acquisitions.64 According to Chabot et al, in Canada activities (eg, supplying, 
acquiring, consuming, using, etc) performed by members of a partnership in their capacity as partners, 
are considered activities of the partnership rather than activities of the individual partners.65 In the UK, 
a partnership is treated as a ‘taxable person’,66 which is required to charge VAT on taxable supplies67 
and may deduct input tax in relation to acquisitions.68 
 
In terms of the EU Council Directive, a partnership can, for VAT purposes, be ‘any person’, even though 
it may be considered non-existent for corporate income tax purposes.69 Commenting on a partnership’s 
VAT treatment under the Council Directive, van Doesum submits that if a partnership is to be considered 
a ‘person’, it can, from a VAT perspective, be a recipient or supplier of a supply of goods or services.70 
 
One of the essentialia of a partnership agreement is that each partner must make a contribution to the 
partnership, or he must make a binding undertaking that he will make a contribution.71 The question 
 
62 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
63 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,229 at 11. See McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 146. 
64 GSTR 2003/13 para 27; Taxpayers Australia Inc Taxpayers Guide para 24.323. See also McCouat Australian Master GST 
Guide [E-book] Locations 65, 126. 
65 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010. Murray agrees that under the normal workings of Canada’s 
ETA, taxable activities performed by a partner for a partnership would be subject to GST for the partnership. See Murray 
BF ‘Partner Contributions: Deeming Away any Supply to the Partnership’ available at 
http://www.cch.ca/newsletters/TaxAccounting/july2010/Article2.htm (date of use: 4 September 2014); Cherniak CT 
‘Partners/Partnerships Are Tricky With GST/HST’ available at http://tradelawyersblog.com/ (date of use: 17 August 2018). 
66 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.1; HMRC “VAT Registration” available at 
https://www.gov.uk/vat-registration/how-to-register (date of use: 16 August 2018). 
67 Hemmingsley & Rudling ibid at para 47.1. 
68 Ibid at para 34.1. 
69 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 259-71 at 260. 
70 Ibid. 
71 The Pezzutto case at 91; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.23; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law at 5. 
See also Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 263. The contributions are risked in the business and are made for the purpose 
of commencement of the partnership or the carrying on of its business. See Ramdhin et al ibid at para 286; Schlemmer v 
Viljoen [1958] 2 All SA 309 (T) 315. 
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arising is whether a partner can make a supply to the partnership as, being a member of the partnership, 
he would, in effect, be making a supply to himself. 
 
Regarding the position under general law, in Shingadia Bros v Shingadia72 the court accepted the 
validity of a lease between a partner and a partnership.73 The court, however, referred to Whitaker v 
Whitaker & Rowe,74 where such a lease was described by the court as embodying a somewhat 
anomalous relationship. Isaacs, referring to the situation where a partner owns property used by the 
partnership for its business, or where the partnership owns property used by an individual partner, 
submits that it is doubtful whether such contracts can be called true leases. In the one case, he explains, 
the landlord is also one of the tenants, and in the other one of the landlords is the tenant.75 The court in 
Shingadia Bros attempted to clarify the nature of a contract by which a partnership leases partnership 
property to a partner. According to the court, such a contract is arguably a contract by which the other 
partners allow the partner who leases the property, to use their interests in the partnership property in 
consideration of his undertaking to pay the rent into the partnership funds.76 The court’s analysis is 
correct because a partnership, not having legal personality, cannot be a party to a contract. As the 
partnership is not a party to the contract, the anomalous result of a partner in effect contracting with 
himself as a member of the partnership, is avoided. 
 
The question arising is whether the status of a partnership as a person for VAT purposes, adequately 
addresses the concern that a partner who makes supplies to the partnership is effectively making 
supplies to himself. 
 
In the New Zealand High Court case of Taupo Ika Nui Body Corporate v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue,77 a developer built a timeshare resort consisting of units. One of the issues was whether the 
appellant was obliged to charge GST on the administration and maintenance levies it imposed on the 
proprietors of the units. The court held that the determination of this point depended on whether the 
appellant could be seen as an entity separate from the proprietors of the land. If it could, then there 
were supplies between that entity and the proprietors. If it was not, there were no such supplies in that 
the proprietors were merely acting on their own behalf.78 According to the court, once a body is 
recognised as a separate person supplies can be made between that body and its members. 
 
72 Shingadia Bros v Shingadia [1958] 2 All SA 107 (FC) 107. 
73 Ibid at 108. 
74 1931 EDL 122 at 125. 
75 Isaacs I “The law of landlord and tenant” 1960 Acta Juridica 93. 
76 Shingadia Bros v Shingadia [1958] 2 All SA 107 (FC) 111. See also Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 
7.3.8. 
77 (1997) 18 NZTC 13,147 (hereafter, the Taupo Ika Nui case). 
78 Ibid at 13,148. 
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In the New Zealand High Court case of Nelson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,79 the appellant and 
a family trust farmed property in a partnership registered as a person under the New Zealand GST Act. 
The appellant and the family trust owned the farm as ‘tenants in common’ in unequal shares. The 
disputed point was whether in making his share of the farm available to the partnership, the appellant 
was carrying on a taxable activity.80 The court held that for the purpose of determining whether there 
has been a taxable activity, the critical issue is whether the appellant supplied goods to the partnership. 
When the issue is seen from this perspective, the court explained, the legal implications of the 
appellant's role as both co-owner and partner are of incidental interest.81 
 
Therefore, the fact that a partnership is a person and an entity for VAT purposes, makes it irrelevant 
that the supplier of the use of the land to the partnership is also a member of that same partnership. 
That the partnership is a person, answers the question of whether a supply can be made to that 
partnership even if a member of that partnership is the supplier. The issue is whether there is a supply, 
not whether there can be a supply to the partnership in the circumstances. 
 
De Koker and Kruger base their view that a partner can make taxable supplies to the partnership, on a 
different argument. In terms of section 51(1)(b), a partnership’s VAT registration must be effected 
separately from any registration of a member in respect of a different enterprise carried on by that 
member. Consequently, a partnership and a partner, who carry on separate enterprises, must be 
registered separately for VAT. Their submission that the parties’ separate VAT registration implies that 
taxable supplies are possible between them, is in my view correct.82 
 
The ECJ held in the Heerma case83 that a partner who leases immovable property to the partnership of 
which he is a member and which is itself a taxable person, acts independently within the meaning of 
article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive. In terms of article 4(1), a ‘taxable person’ is a person who carries on 
an economic activity independently.84 The court held that in letting the property to the partnership, the 
partner acts in his own name, on his own behalf, and under his own responsibility, even if he is at the 
same time manager of the lessee partnership.85 
 
 
79 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,220 (hereafter the Nelson case). 
80 Ibid at 17,223 para 10. 
81 Ibid at 17,226 para 26. 
82 De Koker & Kruger Value-Added Tax para 12.6. This point is reiterated below in the discussion on the impact of s 51. 
83 Staatssecretaris van Financiën and Heerma Case C-23/98 27 January 2000 para 17. 
84 See the full text of articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Sixth Directive in para 2.6.3 below. 
85 Staatssecretaris van Financiën and Heerma Case C-23/98 27 January 2000 para 18. 
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Van Doesum submits, on the basis of the Heerma case, that as for VAT purposes and under European 
VAT law a partnership is distinguished as an entity distinct from its partners, it is possible for a partner 
to make taxable supplies to its own partnership, and vice versa.86 He argues that where a partner makes 
a contribution in kind to the partnership, for example, by performing work for the partnership, he would 
not be performing a service for the other partners, as would be the position in terms of general law, but 
would rather, for European VAT law purposes, be performing a service to the partnership.87 In my view, 
this statement also reflects the different ways of viewing a partner’s contribution to the partnership under 
South African common law, and in terms of the VAT Act, respectively. 
 
Chabot et al come to the same conclusion, that as a partnership is deemed by Canada’s ETA to be a 
person distinct from its partners, a supply from a partner to the partnership should, for GST purposes, 
be treated as a supply from one person to another person.88 According to Hemmingsley and Rudling, 
in the UK where a partner’s contribution to the partnership is not cash, making the partnership 
contribution may have VAT consequences.89 The consensus in Australia is that taxable supplies can 
be made between a partnership and a partner, for example, on formation of the partnership.90 
 
I argue, therefore, that in terms the VAT Act, a partner can make supplies to the partnership and vice 
versa. 
 
The question then arising is when can it be said that a supply is made by or to a partnership? The word 
partnership means, inter alia, a specific form of association of persons.91 It is, therefore, an association 
or body of persons deemed to be a person for VAT purposes. An association is “a body of people 
organized for a common purpose.”92 I am of the view that what is supplied or acquired by this body of 
 
86 Van Doesum “Contractual Cooperative Arrangements in European VAT” available at http://nl.linkedin.com 
/in/advandoesum 697-8 (date of use: 12 December 2016). 
87 Ibid at 699. 
88 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010. Cherniak confirms that in terms of the Canadian GST 
partners and partnerships are different legal entities for GST purposes, and that partners are required to charge GST in 
respect of supplies of property or a service to the partnership otherwise than in the course of the partnership’s activities. 
See Cherniak CT “Partners/Partnerships Are Tricky With GST/HST” available at http://tradelawyersblog.com/ (date of use: 
17 August 2018).in 
89 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.7, a view supported by HMRC. See HMRC “Consideration: 
Partnership Contributions” available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-consideration/ 
vatsc68000 (date of use: 17 August 2018). 
90 GSTR 2003/13 paras 32, 65-67. According to Taxpayers Australia Inc, as a partnership is an entity for GST purposes, the 
GST Act applies to partnership transactions, in particular dealings between partners and the partnership in a manner that 
does not reflect the general law treatment of those transactions. See Taxpayers Australia Inc Taxpayers Guide para 24.323. 
McCouat holds the view that in terms of the Australian GST an ‘in kind’ capital contribution made by a partner on entering 
into a general law partnership is a supply by the partner, and may be taxable if made as part of carrying on or closing down 
a separate business run by the partner. See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 66. 
91 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 254; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Epstein [1954] 4 All SA 7 (A) at 13. See also 
Bamford Law of Partnership 1 and Mongalo, Lumina & Kader Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.2.1. 
92 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
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persons, who make up the partnership, within the course and scope of its common purpose, is, for VAT 
purposes, supplied or acquired by the partnership as a separate person. 
 
2.4 The impact of section 51 
 
Section 51(1)(a) provides that where a body of persons carries on an enterprise, that body is deemed 
to carry on the enterprise as a person distinct from the members of that body. The partners are, 
therefore, deemed not to be carrying on the enterprise of the partnership, even though, legally, the 
activities making up the enterprise are performed by the partners.93 
 
A partner’s contribution to the partnership cannot be subject to VAT on the ground that it is made in the 
course or furtherance of the partnership’s enterprise, because of section 51(1)(a) which deems the 
enterprise to be carried on by the partnership, rather than by the partners. 
 
Section 51(1)(b) requires that registration of the partnership as a vendor be effected separately from 
any registration of its members in respect of another enterprise carried on by that member.94 The effect 
of section 51(1)(b) is that a partnership is only registered in respect of the enterprise it carries on. The 
partnership is not registered in respect of an enterprise carried on separately by any of its members, 
who should each be registered in respect of his own separate enterprise. A partner’s contribution to the 
partnership can, therefore, potentially be subject to VAT if it is made in the course or furtherance of a 
separate enterprise carried on by the partner. As stated,95 separate VAT registrations imply that there 
can be taxable supplies between a partner and the partnership. 
 
In terms of section 51(1)(c), liability for tax in respect of supplies by the partnership must be determined 
and calculated in respect of the partnership’s enterprise carried on independently by any of its members. 
In simple terms, section 51(1)(c) provides that the VAT liability of this separate enterprise must be 
separately calculated, apart from any enterprise which a member of the partnership might be carrying 
on. In other words, only the output tax and the input tax related to the partnership’s enterprise, must be 
taken into account when calculating the tax payable by the partnership.96 
 
 
93 Section 57(2)(a) of the New Zealand GST Act is similar to s 51(1)(a) of the VAT Act. Section 57(2)(a) provides that “the 
members of [the unincorporated] body shall not themselves be registered or liable to be registered under this Act in relation 
to the carrying on of that taxable activity.” In Case S84 [1996] 17 NZTC 7,526 at 9, the court held that s 57(2)(a) circumvents 
potential registration difficulties which could arise when supplies are made by individual partners on behalf of the 
partnership, by emphasising that only the partnership can be registered for the particular taxable activity. 
94 Section 23 regulates the registration of persons for VAT. 
95 See para 2.3 above. 
96 The tax payable by a vendor is calculated in accordance with the provisions of s 16. 
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In the New Zealand High Court case of Newman & Ors,97 the taxpayers argued that section 57 of the 
New Zealand GST Act merely allows for the registration of unincorporated bodies, and its purpose is to 
simplify accounting for GST. Counsel for the taxpayers gave the following example: 
Rather than requiring every member of the local tennis club to register and account for GST individually, 
the club itself can register (even although it is not a legal entity) and account for GST on behalf of all its 
members.98 
 
In terms of this argument, the registration liability of each member of the unincorporated body must be 
considered separately. Therefore, if each member, individually considered, is not liable to be registered, 
then the unincorporated body is not liable to be registered even if the total value of all the supplies of 
the body exceeds the GST registration threshold. If, however, the unincorporated body is regarded as 
a single person, then the total value of the supplies of the body must be taken into account when 
determining whether that body is liable to register for GST. 
 
The court in the Newman case disagreed with the taxpayers’ argument. Section 51(1)(c) also refutes 
this argument. The partnership does not account for VAT correlated to each partner’s separate share 
in the partnership’s enterprise. Instead, the partnership accounts for VAT on the partnership’s entire 
enterprise because the partnership’s liability for tax is calculated under section 51(1)(c) in respect of 
the enterprise carried on by it independently from any enterprise carried on by any one of the partners. 
 
The Australian GST Act, Canada’s ETA, the New Zealand GST Act, and the UK VAT Act also have 
special rules for partnerships.99 
 
2.5 Date from when a partnership is liable to register for VAT 
 
A partnership is required to register for VAT as from the date on which its taxable turnover as a person 
separate from its members exceeds the compulsory VAT registration threshold.100 The question of 
whether a partnership exists could be a matter of dispute if the turnover of each member, considered 
individually, is under the compulsory registration threshold. The members might claim that there is no 
partnership in order to avoid VAT registration, as well as an outstanding VAT liability on past supplies. 
If, however, the members are found to have been conducting business as a partnership all along, then 
 
97 Newman & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue; Holdsworth & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue; Hair & Ors v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,666 (hereafter the Newman case). 
98 Ibid 15,685 at para 68. 
99 See s 184-5 of the Australian GST Act; s 272.1 of Canada’s ETA; s 57 of the New Zealand GST Act; and s 45 of the UK VAT 
Act. 
100 See s 51(1) read with s 23(1). 
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the back-dating of the partnership’s VAT registration to the date when the partnership was established 
could be warranted. 
 
Whether persons constitute a ‘body of persons’ as envisaged in section 51(1) and should, therefore, be 
registered as a single person, is a question of fact that does not depend on the exercise of a discretion 
of the Commissioner for the SARS. This justifies the back-dating of VAT registration to the date of the 
establishment of the body of persons.101 
 
Section 50A is an anti-avoidance provision aimed at preventing the artificial splitting of the activities of 
a business in order to avoid VAT registration. Section 50A, in contrast to section 51, depends on the 
Commissioner for the SARS exercising his discretion to direct that separate persons be registered as 
a single person. However, section 50A provides that liability to register as a single person is with effect 
from such a decision. The newly-registered single person can, therefore, not be held liable for VAT on 
past supplies as in the case of a section 51 registration. 
 
In the New Zealand Court of Appeal case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chester Trustee 
Services Ltd,102 two trading trusts, the Brook Family Trust (BFT) and the G & I Family Trust (GIFT), 
each had a separate GST registration which accounted for GST on a payments basis, signifying that 
the tax became payable only when a debtor of the trust had paid its invoice. The Commissioner issued 
a notice of his intention to register BFT and GIFT as a single entity for GST purposes, and to assess 
that entity on an invoice basis for undisclosed output tax on certain sales. The Commissioner 
determined that the taxable activity was being carried on by both BFT and GIFT as an unincorporated 
body of persons within the meaning of section 57. The court, agreeing with the Commissioner, held that 
the business was being conducted by what, under section 57, is a different entity that did not have 
permission to account for GST on a payments basis. Registration must, importantly, relate back to the 
date on which that entity became liable to registration.103 
 
 
101 Section 23(4)(b) provides that where a person, who is liable to be registered for VAT, has not applied to be registered, 
that person shall be a vendor with effect from the date on which he first became liable to be registered. In terms of the 
proviso to this provision, the Commissioner for the SARS is, however, given a discretion to register such person from a later 
date depending on the circumstances. 
102 [2002] NZCA 258, [2003] 1 NZLR 395, (2002) 20 NZTC 17,925, (2002) 9 NZCLC 263,016 (14 October 2002) CA111/02. 
103 Ibid at para 29. In Australia and Canada a partnership is liable to register for GST if it makes taxable supplies. See GSTR 
2003/13 para 27; McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 46; Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to 
GST/HST para 10,010; CRA “Partnership” available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/ 
services/tax/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed-income/setting-your-business/partnership.html (date of use: 15 
September 2018). In the UK, VAT registration of persons carrying on business in partnership ‘may be’ in the name of the 
firm. See s 45(1) of the UK VAT Act; Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.2. 
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It is an essentialia of a partnership agreement that the business of the partnership be carried on in 
common.104 I agree with Ramdhin et al’s argument that as in South African law a partnership is 
established by means of an agreement to carry on business, the partnership need not actually 
commence business before it is established.105 In terms of section 23(1), a person may be liable to 
register for VAT provided that he ‘carries on any enterprise’. In my opinion, seeing that a partnership 
may only start to conduct its business from a date after it has been established, the partnership may 
only become liable to register from a date subsequent to its establishment. 
 
2.6 The VAT consequences of a contribution to a partnership 
 
The VAT treatment of a partner’s contribution to the partnership will be considered from the perspective 
both of the partner and of the partnership. From the partner’s perspective, the question is whether the 
contribution is subject to VAT. From the partnership’s perspective, the question is whether the 
contribution is consideration for a supply.106 The VAT Act does not deal specifically with the VAT 
implications of a partner’s contributions to the partnership. 
 
A partner may contribute either money, food, skill, or labour or its equivalent, to the partnership.107 
Movable or immovable property can be contributed either in the form of ownership of the property, or 
merely its use.108 The contributions need not be of the same character, equal value, or the same 
quantity.109 As a rule, no limitations are placed on the nature of the contributions that may be made, 
provided that the contributions have a commercial value.110 
 
‘Goods’ include corporeal movable things and fixed property, but exclude money.111 ‘Services’ are 
defined as anything done – including granting or surrendering a right, or making of a facility or 
advantage available – but exclude a supply of goods or money.112 Considering the nature of a partner’s 
 
104 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 263; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 6. See also Mongalo, Lumina & 
Kader Forms of Business Enterprise para. 2.3.3.3; and Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.22. 
105 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 263. 
106 See Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 263. 
107 Uys v Le Roux 1906 TS 429 at 433; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 263; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.23; 
Mongalo, Lumina & Kader Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.3.1; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 5. 
108 Whiteaway’s Estate v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1938 TPD 482 at 485; Fortune v Versluis [1962] 1 All SA 414 (A) 
at 427; Ramdhin et al ibid. 
109 Ramdhin et al ibid; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.25; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 5. 
110 Benade et al ibid at para 3.24; Ramdhin et al ibid. The court stated the following in the Pezzutto case at 91, ‘ … each 
partner must contribute something ‘appreciable’, i.e. something of commercial value, although such contribution need not 
be capable of exact pecuniary assessment as, e.g., where a partner contributes his labour or skill …’. 
111 See the definition of ‘goods’ in s 1(1). Section 8(11) provides that a supply of the use or right to use any goods under a 
rental agreement, or any other agreement under which such use is granted, is deemed to be a supply of goods. 
112 See the definition of ‘services’ in s 1(1). 
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contribution, and the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘services’, a contribution in kind would most likely 
constitute either goods or services. 
 
A contribution of money is not a supply of goods or services and is, therefore, not subject to VAT as 
money is specifically excluded from the definitions of both terms.113 A contribution of the use of 
money,114 however, could be exempt under section 12(a), read with section 2(1)(f).115 However, it must 
be noted that a partner is not entitled to interest on his capital contributions to the partnership unless 
payment of interest has been agreed upon.116 
 
2.6.1 The making of the contribution in the course or furtherance of an enterprise 
 
A partner’s contribution will be subject to VAT, under section 7(1)(a), if it is made in the course or 
furtherance of an enterprise he conducts. ‘Enterprise’ means, in the case of a vendor, any enterprise 
or activity which is carried on continuously or regularly by a person in the Republic,117 and in the course 
or furtherance of which goods or services are supplied to another person for a consideration.118 An 
activity which involves the making of exempt supplies is deemed not to be the carrying on of an 
enterprise.119 
 
If the contributing partner is a vendor carrying on an enterprise distinct from the partnership enterprise, 
a contribution of goods or services made in the course or furtherance of that enterprise may be either 
taxable or exempt. Whether the contribution is subject to VAT will also depend on whether the partner 
receives a consideration in return.120 This aspect is discussed below.121 
 
The New Zealand Case K55122 was decided on an application of section 8(1) of the New Zealand GST 
Act, which provides that GST is charged on the supply of goods and services by a registered person in 
 
113 See the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘services’ in s 1(1). 
114 In other words, the lending of money. 
115 Section 12(a) exempts the supply of ‘financial services’, which is defined in section 2(1)(f) as meaning the provision of 
credit by which money is provided in return for a sum exceeding the amount of such money. 
116 Bamford Law of Partnership 38; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 37; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 
294. In Jameson v Irvin’s Executors (1887) 5 SC 222 at 251, the court confirmed that in the law of partnership, profits must 
ordinarily be regarded as sufficient compensation for the use of capital or labour, and not interest on capital or salary for 
services rendered. 
117 Or partly in the Republic. 
118 See the definition of ‘enterprise’ in s 1(1). 
119 Proviso (v) to the definition of ‘enterprise’. ‘Exempt supply’ is defined in s 1(1) to mean a supply that is exempt from tax 
under s 12. ‘Taxable supply’ is defined in s 1(1) as meaning any supply of goods or services which is chargeable with tax 
under the provisions of s 7(1)(a), including tax chargeable at the rate of zero per cent under s 11. A ‘taxable supply’ does 
not include an exempt supply. 
120 See s 7(1)(a) read with ‘enterprise’ as defined in s 1(1). 
121 See para 2.6.4. 
122 (1988) 10 NZTC 453. 
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the course or furtherance of a taxable activity carried on by that person. ‘Taxable activity’ is defined in 
section 6(1)(a) of the New Zealand GST Act to mean any activity carried on continuously or regularly 
by a person which involves the supply of goods and services to another person for a consideration. The 
TRA held that if capital assets are used in conducting a taxable activity, the sale of those assets can 
readily be in the course or furtherance of that activity.123 In this case, a clear nexus was held to exist 
between the objector’s farming activities, and the sale of his car which was used principally for those 
activities.124 
 
The definition of ‘taxable activity’ and section 8(1) of the New Zealand GST Act, are worded similarly to 
the definition of ‘enterprise’125 and section 7(1)(a) of the VAT Act. I agree with the view that a contribution 
by a partner of a capital asset in his own enterprise, would likewise be made in the course or furtherance 
of the partner’s enterprise.126 
 
The GST/VAT legislation in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK – as in South Africa – does 
not specifically set out the VAT treatment of a partner’s contribution to the partnership. 
 
In the case of Australia, the ATO and McCouat agree that where a registered partner makes an in-kind 
capital contribution in the course or furtherance of his own enterprise, the in-kind capital contribution is 
a supply that may be taxable.127 The consensus in Canada is that a partner’s contribution of property 
to the partnership is a potentially taxable transaction.128 
 
In the case of New Zealand, it is clear from the Nelson case,129 and from the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal case Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Bayly130 which is discussed below,131 that a partner’s 
contribution to the partnership can be subject to GST. In both these cases the court found that in making 
the use of land which they owned available to the partnership, the partners were carrying on a taxable 
activity. 
 
 
123 Case K55 at 4. See also GSTR 2003/13 para 75. 
124 Case K55 at 5. 
125 See the definition of ‘enterprise’ in s 1(1). 
126 See GSTR 2003/13 para 75. 
127 GSTR 2003/13 para 72; McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 66. An ‘enterprise’ is defined in the 
Australian GST Act as an activity, or series of activities, done, inter alia, in the form of a business or on a regular or continuous 
basis in the form of a lease, for example. See s 9-20(1)(a) and (c). 
128 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 26; Beam, Laiken & Barnett Taxation in Canada para 18,965. Canada’s ETA defines 
‘taxable supply’ as meaning a supply that is made in the course of a commercial activity. See s 123(1). ‘Commercial activity 
of a person’ means, amongst others, a business carried on by the person’. See para (a) of its definition in s 123(1). 
129 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,220. 
130 (1998) 18 NZTC 14,073 (hereafter the Bayly case). 
131 See para 2.6.3 below. 
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In the UK, according to HMRC, a contribution to a partnership comprising services or goods, from a 
partner’s existing business, may, depending on the circumstances, be subject to VAT.132 
 
2.6.2 The partner acting as agent for the partnership 
 
Van Doesum argues that a partner’s contribution to the partnership may simultaneously serve as a 
supply on behalf of the partnership to a third party, and by carrying out that task, as an in-kind 
contribution of labour to the partnership.133 This is in my view correct, especially considering that 
partners have the power to act as each other’s agents.134 In view of the partners’ agency powers, a 
question which arises is how a partner’s power as an agent impacts on the partner’s and the 
partnership’s position for VAT purposes? 
 
As the term ‘agent’ is not defined in the VAT Act, regard should be had to its meaning in common law.135 
According to Silke, an agent is a representative, who has the power to represent another in his legal 
relations with third parties, ie, he has the power, acquired contractually, to create legal rights in favour 
of the person represented, and to create legal obligations binding on the person represented.136 As a 
 
132 XXX Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.7; HMRC “Consideration: Partnership Contributions” 
available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-consideration/vatsc68000 (date of use: 17 
August 2018). The UK follows the KapHag case of the ECJ (ie, KapHag Renditefonds 35 Spreecenter Berlin-Hellersdorf 3. 
Tranche GbR and Finanzamt Charlottenburg Case C-442/01 26 June 2003), which is discussed below (see para 2.8). On the 
basis of the KapHag case, HMRC holds the view that where the partnership contribution does consist of goods or services, 
neither admission into the partnership, nor any consequent share of partnership profits, constitutes consideration 
provided to the new partner for the goods or services that he has contributed. HMRC argues, however, that if the 
incoming partner is a taxable person, he will need to be treated as making a ‘deemed supply’ of goods or services if, inter 
alia, the ‘deemed supply’ criteria in Schedule 4 para 5 to the UK VAT Act are satisfied. See HMRC “Consideration: 
Partnership Contributions” ibid; Hemmingsley & Rudling ibid. Note that in the UK a transaction by a person is within the 
scope of VAT if, amongst others, it is made in the course or furtherance of a business carried on by that person. See 
Hemmingsley & Rudling ibid at para 1.6. 
133 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 263. 
134 The position of a partner acting on behalf of a partnership, was explained in Potchefstroom Dairies and Industries Co Ltd 
v Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co 1913 TPD 506. The court stated that partners are very often styled as agents of each other. 
The court was, however, not prepared to express a view on whether partners are in fact agents seeing that the law of 
agency, as currently understood, was developed much later than the law of partnership. In my view, the argument is that 
when the law of partnership was developed, partners could not have been envisaged as each other’s agents, simply because 
the law of agency did not exist at the time. The court confirmed, however, that partners certainly have the powers of 
agents, and that the broad principles of the law applicable to agents applies to partners. The court explained further that, 
although partners may have the powers of agents, they are far more than agents in that the character of a partner is far 
more complex than merely that of agent. This is so because, in addition to being an agent, a partner has the double 
character of agent and principal in one and the same transaction, and that not for a share only but in each capacity for the 
whole. See Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 8.1.2; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 306; Mongalo, 
Lumina & Kader Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.6.2; Bamford Law of Partnership 50. See also Williams Concise 
Corporate and Partnership Law 39. 
135 This approach is based on the presumption that the legislature does not intend to alter the existing law more than is 
necessary. See para 2.2.2 above. 
136 Silke Law of Agency 2. According to De Wet JC “Agency and Representation” in Kühne M (ed) Law of South Africa vol 1 3 
ed (LexisNexis 2014) para 125, the task to be performed by the agent is the conclusion of a juristic act on behalf of or in the 
name of the principal. 
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result, an agent transacts with third parties on behalf of his principal. Such transactions are the 
principal’s transactions in that they are for his benefit, or render him liable, without any benefit or liability 
attaching to the agent.137 Section 54(1) is in line with the common law, providing that where an agent 
makes a supply on behalf of a principal, that supply shall be deemed to be made by the principal and 
not by the agent. Therefore, where a partner makes a supply to a third party, acting as an agent on 
behalf of the partnership, the supply is that of the partnership and not the partner. 
 
In Case N27138 the court referred to section 57 of the New Zealand GST Act which directs, in 
subparagraph (1)(a), that the individual members of a partnership are not themselves liable to be 
registered under the Act. Seeing that the partnership is to be registered, it is the partnership, rather than 
the individual members, that carries on a taxable activity. As a result, the court reasoned that when a 
person, as a member of a registered partnership, acts in the capacity as a member of the partnership 
and for partnership purposes, the supply by or to that person is deemed to be a supply by or to the 
partnership and not to any or all of its individual members.139 
 
What is key in the judgment, is the court’s confirmation that, because the partnership is the registered 
entity, a supply is deemed to be by or to the partnership “when a person, as a member of a registered 
partnership, acts in the capacity as a member of the partnership, for partnership purpose”.140 I am in 
agreement with the court, provided that the partner acted as agent on behalf of the partnership. It would 
seem, however, that whenever a partner acts in his capacity as a partner and for partnership purposes, 
he acts as agent for the partnership. 
 
The partnership is, likewise, deemed by section 51(1)(a) and (b) to be carrying on the partnership’s 
enterprise, and is required to register separately for VAT in respect of that enterprise. Consequently, 
the supplies and acquisitions of the partner as agent for the partnership are deemed to be those of the 
partnership. The partnership must, therefore, account for output and input tax on the supplies and 
acquisitions made by the partner as agent.141 
 
 
137 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 986; Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890 at 899. The court in Blower v Noorden also stated 
(at 899) that no person dealing with an agent can be held to have intended to contract with him personally, unless the 
terms of the contract make this clear. Silke maintains that the acts of the agent are done in the name of the principal, and 
are deemed to be the acts of the principal himself. See Silke ibid at 11. 
138Case N27 above. 
139 Ibid at 11. Similar sentiments are expressed by Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010, namely that 
anything done by a partner in the partner’s capacity as a member of the partnership is deemed to have been done by the 
partnership in the course of the partnership’s activities, rather than in the course of the activities of the individual partner. 
This, they submit, means that certain activities of a partner are deemed to have been done by the partnership.  
140 Ibid. 
141 See Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 51-2. 
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In Databank Systems Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,142 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held 
that where a principal employs an agent to supply services to a customer on behalf of the principal, 
there will be two contractual relationships. The agent, the court reasoned, will be supplying his services 
as agent to his principal under the contract between them, whilst the principal will be the receiver of 
those services. At the same time the principal is the supplier, through the agent, of services to the 
customer under the contract between the principal and the customer.143 
 
In the UK, HMRC holds the same view, arguing that agents act both in their own right making a supply 
of their services to their principal, and on behalf of the principal in fulfilling their agency function.144 
Commenting on the position in Canada, Chabot et al submit that the principal is required to account for 
tax on the supply made through the agent, and the agent is required to collect tax on the commission 
charged to the principal.145 
 
In the case of Australia, the ATO and McCouat are likewise of the opinion that if sales are made through 
an agent, the principal is the one liable for GST, not the agent. Commission paid to the agent, however, 
is treated as consideration for a supply of agency services.146 
 
I argue, therefore, that whilst the partnership is deemed to make the supply made by the partner as 
agent and must account for output tax on the partner’s supply, the partner may be required to account 
for output tax on his contribution of labour to the partnership, depending on whether all the requirements 
of section 7(1)(a) have been met. 
 
In the case of Canada, Arsenault and Kreklewetz contend that where a partner acts for the purpose of 
the business of the partnership, the partner acts as an agent of the partnership, making the partner’s 
actions the partnership’s actions, which are then the actions of each and every other partner.147 Section 
 
142 [1989] 1 NZLR 422 (hereafter the Databank case). 
143 Ibid at 426. See also McKenzie GST A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 77. 
144 HMRC “VATTOS8300 – Tax points for specific categories of supplier: Agents” available at  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuels/vattosmanual/vattos8300.htm (date of use: 21 January 2016). Further support for this 
view can be found in Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 3.2, where it is stated that an agent will 
usually be involved in at least two separate supplies at one time – the supply of own services to the principal, and the 
supply made between the principal and the third-party. 
145 EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 2,130. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) agrees that when a registrant acts as 
agent in selling taxable goods or services on behalf of a principal, generally it is the principal who must charge and 
account for GST on the sale of the goods or services. See CRA “Agents” available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/forms-publications/publications/gi-012/agents.html (date of use: 17 August 2018). 
146 McCouat P Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 457; ATO “GST – Agent, consignment and progressive 
transactions” available at https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/GST/In-detail/Rules-for-specific-transactions/ Agent,-
consignment-and-progressive-transactions/GST---Agent,-consignment-and-progressive-transactions/ ?page=2 (date of 
use: 18 August 2018). 
147 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 28. 
25 
 
272.1(1) of Canada’s ETA provides that, “anything done by a person as a member of a partnership is 
deemed to have been done by the partnership in the course of the partnership’s activities and not to 
have been done by the person.” In Arsenault and Kreklewetz’s opinion, section 272.1(1) encapsulates 
the agency principle underlying partnership.148 It is stated in the explanatory notes to the amendments 
which added section 272.1(1), that the effect of this provision is that partners are not required to register 
separately for GST purposes.149 The GST effect of section 272.1(1) is to deem what would otherwise 
have been a potentially taxable supply from partner to partnership, to be a ‘nothing’ for GST purposes.150 
Consequently, the position in Canada is that a partner is not required to account for GST on the supply 
of agency services to the partnership. 
 
Both New Zealand and Australian partnership law consider a mutual agency relationship to exist 
between the partners in the sense that each partner is a principal of the business and may bind the 
other partners.151 In the UK, in terms of the Partnership Act152 every partner is an agent of the firm and 
of his other partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership. Moreover, the acts of every 
partner who performs any act while carrying on business of the kind carried on by the firm in the usual 
way, binds the firm and its partners.153 
 
Considering that in both New Zealand and the UK an agent’s supply to his principal is recognised for 
GST/VAT purposes,154 in my view a partner’s supply of agency services to the partnership could be 
subject to GST/VAT in these jurisdictions. 
 
Section 184-5(1) of the Australian GST Act, provides that: 
For the avoidance of doubt, a supply, acquisition or importation made by or on behalf of a partner of a 
partnership in his or her capacity as a partner: 
(a) is taken to be a supply, acquisition or importation made by the partnership; and 
(b) is not taken to be a supply, acquisition or importation made by that partner or any other partner of the 
partnership. 
 
 
148 Ibid. 
149 Department of Finance Canada Amendments to the Excise Tax Act, the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, the 
Income Tax Act, the Debt Servicing and Reduction Account Act and Related Acts Explanatory Notes July 1997 at 150. 
150 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 28. Murray supports this view, and argues that the practical effect of s 272.1(1) 
is that a partner is not considered to have made any sort of supply to the partnership when he performs duties ‘as a 
member of a partnership’. The partner is therefore not required to account for GST in relation to the performance of such 
duties. In fact, Murray’s article is significantly entitled “Partner Contributions: Deeming Away any Supply to the 
Partnership” and is available at http://www.cch.ca/ newsletters/TaxAccounting/july2010/Article2.htm (date of use: 4 
September 2014). 
151 Higgins Law of Partnership 87; McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 47; Williams Corporations and 
Partnerships in New Zealand para 777. 
152 1890 Chapter 39 53 and 54 Vict. 
153 Section 5. See also Scamell & I’anson Banks Lindley on the Law of Partnerships 285. 
154 See the discussion above under this sub-heading. 
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It is not clear whether section 184-5(1) has the same effect as section 272.1(1) of Canada’s ETA in 
eliminating the need for partners to account for VAT on agency services supplied to the partnership. I 
have referred to McCouat’s155 view that in terms of the Australian GST an ‘in-kind’ capital contribution 
made by a partner on entering into a general law partnership, is a supply by the partner and may be 
taxable if made as part of carrying on a separate business run by the partner.156 I argue that if the supply 
of agency services to the partnership is made by the partner as part of the carrying on of a separate 
enterprise, the partner could be liable for GST on such services. Section 184-5(1) deems the partner’s 
supply that of the partnership in the same way that an agent’s supply is deemed that of his principal. 
This, however, does not mean that the partner’s supply of agency services to the partnership should be 
ignored for GST purposes in that it is a separate transaction.157 It is possible, however, that the 
Australian legislature could have intended section 184-5(1) to have the same effect as section 272.1(1). 
 
2.6.3 Partner making his contribution ‘continuously or regularly’ 
 
A partner’s contribution will be made in the course or furtherance of an enterprise if the activities that 
culminate in making the contribution are sufficiently continuous or regular to constitute an enterprise.158 
 
The Bayly case supports the argument that a partner’s contribution to a partnership can constitute an 
enterprise. The question raised in this appeal was whether the trustees in each case were liable under 
the New Zealand GST Act for output tax on the sale of their interests in farmland plus, in the case of 
three trusts, livestock. The farming partnerships in which the trusts were members operated farming 
enterprises. In terms of the Deeds of Partnership, each of the partners placed the interest in land and 
the livestock at the use of the partnership, without transferring ownership to the partnership. 
 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue contended that in providing the farmland (plus the livestock) to 
the respective partnerships, each trust had carried on a taxable activity.159 The court agreed with the 
Commissioner and emphasised that it is the activity itself – ie, the trusts’ on-going and recurring rights 
and responsibilities – which must be continuous or regular so as to constitute a taxable activity as 
envisaged in section 6 of the New Zealand GST Act.160 
 
 
155 In para 2.3 above. 
156 McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 66. 
157 See the reasoning applied in the New Zealand Databank case above and under this sub-heading. 
158 In the New Zealand High Court case of Allen Yacht Charters Limited v CIR (1994) 16 NZTC 11,270 at 5, it was held that 
the words ‘continuously or regularly’ as contemplated in the definition of ‘taxable activity’ in s 6 of the New Zealand GST 
Act, indicate that “the activity must either be carried on all the time, i.e., continuously, or it must be carried on at reasonably 
short intervals, ie regularly. An activity that is intermittent or occasional does not qualify.” 
159 Ibid at 14,074. 
160 Ibid at 14,078. 
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As a result, a partner’s contribution of goods or services may be an enterprise activity if made in the 
course or furtherance of a continuous or regular activity carried on by the partner. Such a contribution 
is, in terms of section 7(1)(a), subject to VAT if it meets all the requirements in this provision. 
Conversely, where a partner who is not a vendor, makes a one-off contribution that is not made in the 
course or furtherance of a continuous or regular activity – eg, the one-off contribution of the ownership 
of property – the supply is not made as part of an enterprise. 
 
A question arising is whether the mere holding of a partner’s share can constitute an enterprise. A 
partner’s share has a dual nature. Firstly, a partner’s share signifies a partner’s right to claim a specific 
portion of the partnership assets, such as profits, when this portion is due. Secondly, a partner’s share 
comprises his undivided interest in jointly-owned partnership property, including partnership profits, 
other than the realisation of the property as such.161 
 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal held in Commissioner for SARS v De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd,162 that unless one conducts business as an investment company, the investments one holds 
cannot, on their own, be regarded as constituting an enterprise.163 I argue that this case is authority for 
the view that the mere holding of a partner’s share does not constitute an enterprise activity – unless, 
for example, the partner’s enterprise is buying and selling partners’ shares.164 
 
Under article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, VAT is chargeable on “the supply of goods or services effected 
for consideration within the territory of the country by a taxable person acting as such”. Article 4(1) and 
(2) of the Sixth Directive provides: 
1. ‘Taxable person’ shall mean any person who independently carries out in any place any economic 
activity specified in paragraph 2, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. 
2. The economic activities referred to in paragraph 1 shall comprise all activities of producers, traders and 
persons supplying services including mining and agricultural activities and activities of the professions. 
The exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a 
continuing basis shall also be considered an economic activity. 
 
161 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 289; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31. Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg paras 4.14 and 4.21, also confirm that every partner has a right to share in the profits of the partnership. 
This right is an essentiale of a partnership contract. They further explain that a partner has an undivided share in the 
partnership assets until the partnership dissolves and the partnership estate is liquidated. In Sacks v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue 1946 AD 31 (hereafter the Sachs case), the Appellate Division stated at 40 of the judgment that during the 
subsistence of a partnership agreement the partnership property is owned in common and in undivided shares, but that a 
partner also becomes entitled to claim a share of the partnership profits at the end of an agreed period(s) and may also be 
entitled to an amount when the partnership agreement terminates. 
162 [2012] 3 All 367 (SCA), 74 SATC 330 (hereafter the De Beers case). 
163 Ibid at para 34. 
164 See, eg, NZIR “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 14/03, – GST – Transfer of Interest in a Partnership” available at 
http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/2/72537cec-da81-407d-ad4f-e490c9f2213d/qb1403.pdf at 3 para 16 (date of use: 8 
December 2016), where the NZIR acknowledged that a partner could carry on a taxable activity of buying and selling 
partnership interests. 
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Both ‘economic activities’ in the Sixth Directive, and ‘enterprise’ in the VAT Act, require activities in 
respect of which amounts are received. The definition of ‘enterprise’ requires ‘continuous or regular’ 
activities in the course or furtherance of which goods or services are supplied ‘for a consideration’. 
‘Economic activities’ are essentially activities conducted “for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom 
on a continuing basis.” The Sixth Directive was replaced by the Council Directive with effect from 1 
January 2007. ‘Taxable person’ and ‘economic activity’ are similarly worded in the Council Directive.165 
 
In the Polysar Investments case, the ECJ held that the mere acquisition of financial holdings in 
companies does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income 
therefrom on a continuing basis, as envisaged in article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive. This is because any 
dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the holding. The position is different 
where the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in the management of the 
companies in which the holding has been acquired.166 This view was reconfirmed by the ECJ in, 
amongst others, the Sofitam SA,167 Wellcome Trust Ltd,168 and Harnas & Helm cases.169 
 
The ECJ, in the Floridienne case,170 stated that involvement in the management of subsidiaries must 
be regarded as an economic activity within the meaning of article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive, in so far 
as it entails carrying out transactions which are subject to VAT, such as the supply by the holding 
company of administrative, accounting, and information technology services to its subsidiaries.171 The 
court held, however, that in order for the dividends to be regarded as consideration for these services, 
and, therefore, fall within the scope of VAT, there must be a direct link between the services and the 
dividends.172 The court concluded that there was no such a direct link.173 
 
Citing the Polysar Investments and Harnas Helm cases with approval, the ECJ in the KapHag case, 
held that the entry of a new partner into a partnership in consideration for a contribution in cash, does 
not constitute an economic activity falling within the meaning of the Sixth Directive on the part of the 
partner.174 
 
165 See art 9 of the Council Directive. 
166 Polysar Investments Netherlands BV and Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen (Inspector of Customs and Excise) 
Arnhem, Case C-60/90 20 June 1991 paras 13 and 14. 
167 Sofitam SA (formerly Satam SA) and Ministre chargé du Budget Case C-333/91 22 June 1993 paras 12 and 13. 
168 Wellcome Trust Ltd and Commissioners of Customs & Excise Case C-155/94 20 June 1996 para 32 (hereafter the Wellcome 
Trust case). 
169 Harnas & Helm CV and Staatssecretaris van Financiën Case C-80/95 6 February 1997. 
170 Floridienne SA Beinvest SA and Belgian State 14 November 2000 Case C-142/99 (hereafter the Floridienne case). 
171 Ibid at para 19. 
172 Ibid at para 20. 
173 ibid at para 23. 
174 Ibid at para 39. 
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For reasons stated below,175 I argue that the direct-link test does not apply when determining whether 
an amount is consideration for a supply in terms of the VAT Act. It is my view that because ‘economic 
activities’ and ‘taxable person’ in the Sixth Directive are, respectively, similarly defined as ‘enterprise’ 
and ‘taxable person’ in the VAT Act, the ECJ’s reasoning as to when a financial holding constitutes an 
economic activity, can serve as guidance when considering the same issue under the VAT Act. 
 
Whether profit distributions qualify as consideration for partners’ capital contributions, is discussed 
below.176 Assuming that they are not, a mere holding of a partner’s share does not constitute an 
enterprise activity because any profit share yielded by that holding would merely be the result of 
ownership of such partner’s share.177 A partner’s contribution is, therefore, not made in the course or 
furtherance of an enterprise comprising a mere holding of a partner’s share. The holding of a partner’s 
share would, however, be part of an enterprise activity where the partner makes contributions to the 
partnership which are subject to VAT. A partner could, for example, supply management services to 
the partnership in return for which he is paid a management fee.178 As a result, a partner’s contribution 
could be made in the course or furtherance of the holding of a partner’s share, provided that such 
holding constitutes an enterprise activity. 
 
2.6.4 Whether the contribution is made for a consideration 
 
Section 7(1)(a) provides that in order for a supply to be subject to VAT, it must be made for a 
consideration. The term ‘consideration’ is defined,179 in relation to the supply of goods or services to a 
person, as meaning any payment made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, 
or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services, whether by that or any other person. 
 
Each partner receives a partner’s share when concluding the partnership agreement.180 In Sacks v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue,181 the court referred to the decision of the Cape Provincial 
 
175 See para 2.6.4.3 below. 
176 See para 2.6.4 below. 
177 See para 2.6.5 below. 
178 Unless the partners agree otherwise, it is a naturalia of partnership that each partner can represent the partnership in 
transactions that fall within the ambit of the partnership business, without further permission from his co-partners. See 
Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.50. One of the partners can, therefore, be entrusted with the management 
responsibilities of the partnership. See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 263. 
179 See s 1(1). 
180 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 289. See also Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg paras 4.14 and 4.21. 
181 1946 AD 31.  
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Division,182 whose judgment was appealed, where it held that a partner's right to share in the profits of 
the partnership accrues at the inception of partnership.183 The question arising is whether a partner 
makes his contribution to the partnership for consideration, and particularly, whether a partner’s share 
constitutes consideration for such contribution. 
 
This would depend on whether the partner receives a partner’s share on formation of the partnership, 
or any other payment, “in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of the partner’s contribution 
to the partnership, as contemplated in the definition of ‘consideration’.” These phrases are, in the 
present context, defined as follows: 
 
a. ‘respect’ means ‘1 Relation, connection, reference, regard … now chiefly in … in respect of’ 
b. ‘in response’ means ‘in reply (to), by way of reaction (to)’; 
c. ‘inducement’ means ‘1 A thing which induces someone to do something; an attraction, an incentive … A 
ground or reason which inclines one to a belief or course of action … 2 The action of inducing; persuasion, 
influence’.184 
 
Considering the ordinary meaning of ‘in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of’, the supply 
and payment are required to bear some sort of a connection if the payment is to constitute 
consideration. The question, however, is how close must that connection be? The SARS is of the view 
that although the definition of consideration is very wide, there must be a sufficient nexus between the 
supply and the payment for the supply to constitute consideration.185 
 
2.6.4.1 New Zealand 
 
The definition of ‘consideration’ in the VAT Act is virtually a duplication of the definition of the term in 
the New Zealand GST Act,186 with both definitions incorporating the phrase “in respect of, in response 
to or for the inducement of”.187 
 
 
182 Note that this is an appeal against the decision of the Cape Provincial Division which appears to be unreported. The 
appeal is reported as Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1946 AD 31. 
183 Ibid at 43. 
184 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
185 SARS Interpretation Note 70 – 14 March 2013 “Supplies made for no consideration” para 5.1.2, In CSARS v Marshall NO 
(above) at para 33 the court stated that SARS Interpretation Notes, “though not binding on the courts or a taxpayer, 
constitute persuasive explanations in relation to the interpretation and application of the statutory provision in question.”  
186 Section 2 of the New Zealand GST Act. 
187 ‘Consideration’ is defined in section 2(1) of the New Zealand GST Act as meaning, “in relation to the supply of goods and 
services to any person, includes any payment made or any act or forbearance, whether or not voluntary, in respect of, in 
response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of any goods and services, whether by that person or by any other person; 
but does not include any payment made by any person as an unconditional gift to any non-profit body.” 
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In the New Zealand Court of Appeal (Income Tax – PAYE) case of Shell New Zealand Limited,188 the 
issue was whether Shell was required to make tax deductions from particular payments made to 
employees. This, in turn, depended on whether the payments were made to each of the employees 
concerned ‘in respect of or in relation to their employment’. The court stated that the words ‘in respect 
of or in relation to’ are words of the widest import.189 According to New Zealand Inland Revenue (the 
NZIR) the courts have, in recent years, consistently rejected weak linkages between payments and 
supplies as propagated in the Shell New Zealand case.190 
 
In the Taupo Inka Nui case, the New Zealand High Court held that the use of the term ‘consideration’’ 
introduces the specific meaning given to that term in a legal context. The concept of consideration as 
used in the law of contract has an element of reciprocity. There is no such element in a situation where 
a corporate body merely collects the contributions from its members and passes them on. The court 
held that while the term ‘in respect of’ is unrestricted and wide enough to encompass a meaning which 
includes what took place in that case, it must be interpreted in relation not only to the use of the term 
‘consideration’, but also to the associated concepts of ‘response to’ or ‘inducement of’, both of which 
involve an element of reciprocity.191 
 
The facts in the New Zealand Court of Appeal case of New Zealand Refining Co Ltd192 were that 
New Zealand Refining Company Limited (NZRC) operated an oil refinery. In terms of an agreement, 
the Crown was to make the payments to NZRC only if and so far as the refinery remained operational. 
Once it closed, payments would cease and no further sums would be due unless it reopened. 
 
The court found that while the parties may well have expected the refinery to continue operating and 
supplying the oil companies with product, there was no contractual requirement that NZRC had to keep 
the refinery open.193 There was, therefore, no binding commitment to link the Crown's payments and 
the making of supplies of goods or services by NZRC.194 
 
 
188 Shell New Zealand Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1994) 16 NZTC 11,303a, Court of Appeal CA 294/93 (the 
Shell New Zealand case). 
189 Ibid at 3. 
190 NZIR Interpretation Statement 3387 “GST Treatment Of Court Awards And Out Of Court Settlements” at 11 available at 
https://iknow.cch.co.nz/document/iknzUio797637sl29688950/is3387-d2-gst-treatment-of-court-awards-and-out-of-
court-settlements-draft-interpretation-statement-is3387-d2 (date of use: 31 December 2018). 
191 Ibid at 13150. 
192 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v New Zealand Refining Co Ltd (1997) NZTC 13,187 Court of Appeal CA 239/95 (the New 
Zealand Refining Co case). 
193 Ibid at 13192. 
194 Ibid at 13193. 
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The court also stated that to constitute consideration for a supply, a payment must be made for that 
supply. The court explained that there is a practical necessity for a sufficient connection between the 
payment and the supply. The mechanics of the legislation would otherwise make it impossible to collect 
the GST. The court held that although the payments were intended as an inducement to NZRC to keep 
the refinery open for three years, they were not payments ‘for’ any supply.195 Accordingly, they were 
not subject to GST.196 
 
The word ‘for’, in the current context, means “introducing that with which something is (to be) 
exchanged: in exchange for; as the price or penalty of; in requital of. … At the cost of, to the amount 
of.”197 In terms of the ordinary meaning of the word ‘for’, an amount is consideration ‘for’ a supply if it is 
given in exchange for, or as the price of, that supply. In my view, ‘for’ clearly implies reciprocity. 
 
The court in the New Zealand Refining Co case emphasised that the definition of ‘taxable activity’ in 
section 6, itself requires a nexus between a supply and consideration, as does section 10.198 The tax 
itself is levied by section 8 on a supply in the course or furtherance of a taxable activity, and is “by 
reference to the value of that supply”. Section 10 provides that the value of a supply is “to the extent of 
the consideration for the supply”, the amount of the money involved or the non-monetary open-market 
value of the consideration.199 
 
The definitions of ‘enterprise’ in sections 7(1)(a) and 10(2), are worded similarly to the definitions of 
‘taxable activity’ in sections 8 and 10(2) of the New Zealand GST Act, and also require a nexus between 
a supply and a consideration. The definition of ‘enterprise’ requires that goods or services be supplied 
‘for a consideration’. Section 7(1)(a) also levies VAT by reference to ‘the value of the supply’. In terms 
of section 10(2) the value to be placed on a supply of goods or services shall be the amount of the 
‘consideration for [the] supply’. 
 
In the New Zealand Court of Appeal case of Chatham Islands Enterprise Trust,200 the Crown (the settlor) 
established a charitable trust (the Trust). The Commissioner of Inland Revenue claimed GST on 
 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid at 13194. 
197 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
198 Section 10 of the New Zealand GST Act: Value of supply of goods and services, provides: 
... 
(2) Subject to this section, the value of a supply of goods and services shall be such amount as, with the addition 
of the tax charged, is equal to the aggregate of,— 
(a) To the extent that the consideration for the supply is consideration in money, the amount of the money: 
(b) To the extent that the consideration for the supply is not consideration in money, the open market value 
of that consideration. 
199 New Zealand Refining Co case at 13193. 
200 Chatham Islands Enterprise Trust v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999) 19 NZTC 15,075 Court of Appeal CA 171/98. 
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payments made by the Crown to the Trust. The Commissioner contended that the Trust, in carrying out 
its functions pursuant to the Trust deed, was making a supply of services to the Crown in the course of 
a taxable activity. This was done for a consideration, so it was argued, because the two payments 
induced the Trust to carry out its functions. 
 
The court held that the Trust had not assumed a contractual or even a voluntary obligation to the 
Crown,201 and further that the payments had not been made pursuant to reciprocal obligations by the 
Trust enforceable at law. The Trust was, therefore, not making a supply of anything to the settlor in 
exchange for, or induced by, the payments.202 According to the court, the concept of supply of services, 
is not appropriate to capture the fulfilment by trustees of their duties as such – albeit that such fulfilment 
will necessarily, in a direct or indirect way, be of benefit to the beneficiaries and the settlor.203 As a 
consequence, the trustees had not made their (assumed) supply of services in the course or furtherance 
of a taxable activity.204 
 
In the New Zealand Court of Appeal case, Suzuki New Zealand Limited,205 one of the questions was 
whether Suzuki New Zealand Limited (SNZ) supplied a repair service to Suzuki Motor Company Limited 
(SMC). The court held that while the one fault sometimes could and did stimulate repair by SNZ, both 
under its warranty to the customer and at SMC's behest, to cover warranty breach by SMC, the court 
was satisfied that the subsequent payment by SMC was only for the latter repair. It was not ‘in respect 
of’, ‘in response to’, or as an ‘inducement for’ the repair carried out for the customer.206 There was a 
contractual intention of placing on one of the parties – SNZ – the obligation to perform repairs to vehicles 
under warranty, in return for an obligation by the other party – SMC – to pay.207 
 
The NZIR agrees with the New Zealand courts, and sets out its views in policy documents, which 
effectively capture the essence of the courts’ decisions. The NZIR argues that payment is consideration 
for a supply if the supply can be connected to the payment by enforceable, reciprocal obligations. It is 
not necessary for there to be a contract between the parties, but the payer and the supplier must have 
 
201 Ibid at para 18. Note that the New Zealand court requires that the supply and the payment be made in terms of an 
enforceable obligation, notwithstanding that ‘consideration’ is defined as a payment, ‘whether or not voluntary’. In other 
words, the parties must be legally bound to render performance, whether that obligation arises from contract or is 
undertaken voluntarily. 
202 Ibid at para 18. 
203 Ibid at para 30. 
204 Ibid at para 33. 
205 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Suzuki New Zealand Limited (2000) 19 NZTC 15,819 High Court Wellington CP 208/99. 
206 Ibid at para 63. 
207 NZIR Interpretation Statement 3387 “GST Treatment Of Court Awards And Out Of Court Settlements” at 10 available at 
https://iknow.cch.co.nz/document/iknzUio797637sl29688950/is3387-d2-gst-treatment-of-court-awards-and-out-of-
court-settlements-draft-interpretation-statement-is3387-d2 (date of use: 31 December 2018). 
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the ability to enforce the deal.208 Furthermore, the reciprocal-obligation requirement will generally be 
satisfied if it can be shown that payment has been made by one party ‘for’ the supply of goods or 
services by another party.209 
 
2.6.4.2 Australia 
 
Section 9.15(1)(a) and (b) of the Australian GST Act defines ‘consideration’ as including a payment ‘in 
connection with’, or ‘in response to or for the inducement of’ a supply. The only difference between the 
Australian and the South African and New Zealand definitions of ‘consideration’, is that whereas the 
South African and New Zealand definitions use the phrase ‘in respect of’, the Australian definition 
adopts the alternative phrase ‘in connection with’. The three countries’ definitions all use the phrases 
‘in response to’ and ‘for the inducement of’.210 
 
The ATO is of the view that in order for a payment to be a consideration for a supply, there must be a 
sufficient nexus between supply and payment.211 The ATO submits, on the strength of Australian case 
law, that the phrase ‘in connection with’ is of wide import and has been held to be broader in scope than 
‘for’.212 In Vidler v FC of T,213 an Administrative Appeals Tribunal, in considering whether a payment 
was ‘in connection with’ a supply of property as envisaged in section 9.15(1)(a), compared the use of 
‘for’ versus ‘in connection with’ in the Australian GST Act. Sections 9-5(a) and 75-10(2) of the Australian 
GST Act, for example, refer to a ‘supply for consideration’ and to a ‘consideration for the supply’, 
respectively. The Tribunal held that the use of the broader concept ‘in connection with’ cannot have 
 
208 NZIR Tax Information Bulletin Vol 14 No 10 (October 2002) at 27 available at 
https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/1/6/1690aff4-80b6-4683-b52f-1cda0e366e52/tib-vol14-no10.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2018). 
209 NZIR Interpretation Statement IS 10/03 “GST: Time of supply – Payments of deposits, including to a stakeholder” at 
paras 72 and 73 available at https://iknow.cch.co.nz/document/iknzUio1674868sl247811834/is-10-03-gst-time-of-supply-
payments-of-deposits-including-to-a-stakeholder-interpretation-statement-is-10-03 (date of use: 30 December 2018). The 
question is, whether, if the phrases ‘in respect of’, ‘in response to’, and ‘for the inducement of’, import the same 
requirement of enforceable reciprocal obligations into definition of consideration, are they in any way different? The NZIR 
sees a difference based on the time at which the consideration is paid. ‘In respect of’ can be characterised as a 
contemporaneous situation where payment is given for a supply at the time of payment. ‘In response to’ is seen to 
include cases where a supply is received and paid for later, while ‘for the inducement of’ includes cases where an 
enforceable supply or agreement for supply is tendered following an offer of payment for that supply. See NZIR Tax 
Information Bulletin ibid. 
210 Martin [2000] JIATax 20; (2000) 3/4 Journal of Australian Taxation 261 para 3.4. 
211 ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2001/6 “Goods and services tax: Non-monetary consideration” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?Docid=GST/GSTR20016/NAT/ATO/00001 (date of use: 31 December 2018) 
at para 68 (hereafter GSTR 2001/6); ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2012/2 “Goods and services tax: Financial 
assistance payments” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/pdf?DocID=GST%2FGSTR20122%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001&filename=law/view/pdf/p
br/gstr2012-002c3.pdf&PiT=99991231235958 (date of use: 22 December 2018) (hereafter GSTR 2012/2) para 128. 
212 GSTR 2012/2 at para. 125. 
213 2009 ATC 10-093 (Media neutral citation: [2009] AATA 395 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Sydney 2009). 
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been accidental. It must be assumed, the Tribunal reasoned, that the object of the legislation is to cast 
the net wider than would have been the case had the relationship between ‘supply’ and ‘consideration’ 
in section 9-5(a) been governed by the word ‘for’ rather than the phrase ‘in connection with’.214 
 
I argue, however, that given the use of the phrase ‘in connection with’, guidance should not be sought 
in Australian case law for the interpretation of ‘consideration’ in the VAT Act. 
 
2.6.4.3 Canada, the UK and the EU 
 
Canada’s ETA provides that GST is imposed “on the value of the consideration for the supply.”215 In the 
UK, a supply for VAT purposes takes place when something is provided ‘for a consideration’.216 In terms 
of the Council Directive,217 VAT is levied on the supply of goods and services ‘for consideration’. The 
Sixth Directive similarly provides that what is subject to VAT, is the supply of goods or services ‘effected 
for consideration’.218 The Canadian and EU law do not elaborate on what ‘for’ means in this context.219 
 
In the EU case of Apple and Pear Development Council,220 the court applied a direct-link test to 
determine whether certain charges were subject to VAT. The court held that mandatory charges 
imposed on growers do not constitute consideration having a direct link with the benefits accruing to 
individual growers from the exercise of the Apple and Pear Development Council’s functions. In the 
circumstances, the exercise of those functions, therefore, did not constitute a supply of services effected 
for consideration within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive.221 
 
In the EU case of Empire Stores,222 the court held that the supply of an article without extra charge, is 
made in consideration of the introduction of a potential customer and not in return for the purchase by 
that customer of goods in Empire Stores’ catalogue.223 The court held, therefore, that the link between 
the supply of the article without extra charge, and the introduction of a potential customer, must be 
regarded as direct, as, were the service not provided, no article would be due from or supplied without 
extra charge by Empire Stores.224 
 
214 Ibid at para 65. 
215 Section 165(1). 
216 Section 5(2) of the UK VAT Act; Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 64.1. 
217 Articles 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(c). 
218 Article 2(1). 
219 See GSTR 2001/6 at para 64. 
220 Apple and Pear Development Council and Commissioners of Custom and Excise Case 102/86 8 March 1988. 
221 Ibid at para 16. 
222 Empire Stores Ltd and Commissioners of Custom and Excise Case C-33/93 2 June 1994 (hereafter the Empire Stores case). 
223 Ibid at para 13. 
224 Ibid at para 16. 
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The ATO observes that while EU and Canadian authorities show the need for a link between supply 
and consideration if a VAT or GST liability is to arise, in New Zealand the definition of consideration 
itself describes the link.225 In the New Zealand High Court decision of New Zealand Refining,226 the 
court commented on the application of EU authorities to both the interpretation of ‘consideration’ in 
New Zealand’s GST Act, and when considering the required link between a supply and a payment. The 
court stated that the ECJ cases demonstrate the need for a link between a payment and the relevant 
service, but that the court must not apply these cases as this would go beyond the specific words 
defining ‘consideration’227 
 
The EU’s direct-link test should, therefore, not be applied in light of the difference in the wording of the 
provisions as regards the concept of ‘consideration’. However, referring to the Empire Stores case, 
van Doesum submits that a link between a supply and the consideration must be regarded as direct 
when the supply will not be made if no consideration is paid, and when no consideration will be paid if 
the supply is not made.228 This view is in line with the New Zealand courts’ interpretation of reciprocal 
obligations. 
 
The ECJ’s reasoning in Floridienne229 is still useful, however, when considering whether profit 
distributions are consideration for partners’ capital contributions, even when applying a different test 
under the VAT Act. In considering whether a direct link existed between services supplied by two 
holding companies to their subsidiaries, and the dividends declared by the subsidiaries, the court took 
the following features of dividends into account: 
a. Dividends are paid as a result of a decision taken unilaterally by the subsidiary, and the same 
dividend is declared in respect of all the shares of a given class, irrespective of whether the 
shares are owned by the holding company. In the instant case, the holding companies received 
specific remuneration for the services they supplied to their subsidiaries, distinct from the 
dividends allocated to them.230 
b. The existence of distributable profits is generally a prerequisite for payment of a dividend, and 
that payment, therefore, depends on the company’s year-end results. 
 
225 GSTR 2001/6 at para 58. See s 2(1) of the New Zealand GST Act. 
226 New Zealand Refining Company Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1995) 17 NZTC 12,307 High Court Auckland 
M 764/90. 
227 Ibid at 7. 
228 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 268. 
229 Case C-142/99 above. 
230 Ibid at para 14. 
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c. The proportions in which the dividend is distributed, are determined by reference to the type 
of shares held, in particular by reference to classes of share, and not by reference to the identity 
of the owner of a particular shareholding. 
d. Dividends represent, by their very nature, the return on investment in a company and are 
merely the result of ownership of that property.231 
 
The court found that in view, specifically, of the fact that the amount of the dividend depends partly on 
unknown factors, and that entitlement to dividends is merely a function of shareholding, the necessary 
direct link between the dividend and a supply of services did not exist.232 As a result, the dividends were 
not consideration for the supply of the holding companies’ services.233 
 
2.6.5 Whether partners’ obligations are reciprocal 
 
In my view, as the South African VAT was modelled in part on that of New Zealand,234 the definitions of 
‘consideration’ in the VAT Act and in the New Zealand GST Act are virtually identical, and both 
definitions use the phrase “in respect of, in response to or for the inducement of”, the New Zealand 
requirement of ‘enforceable reciprocal obligations’ should be adopted for the VAT Act. Australian, 
Canadian, UK, and EU authorities should not be followed based on the difference in wording of the 
relevant provisions. A payment will, therefore, be consideration for a supply if it can be connected to 
that supply by enforceable reciprocal obligations. The question is, when are obligations reciprocal in 
terms of the South African law? 
 
In ESE Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Cramer,235 the court stated that in a bilateral contract, certain 
obligations may be reciprocal. Contracts are only one of various sources of obligation.236 The court in 
ESE Financial Services further explained that obligations are reciprocal in the sense that the 
performance of the one obligation, may be conditional upon the performance of some other obligation. 
This reciprocity, according to the court, may itself be bilateral in the sense that the performance of the 
obligations represents concurrent conditions. In other words, the obligations are required to be 
performed simultaneously. Alternatively, the reciprocity may be one-sided, in that the complete 
performance of the one party’s contractual obligation may be a condition for the performance of the 
 
231 Ibid at para 22. 
232 Ibid at para 23. 
233 Ibid. The judgment in Floridienne was confirmed in Cibo Participations SA and Directeur regional des impôts du Nord-
Pas-de-Calais Case C-16/00 27 September 2001 at para 21. 
234 Schenk, Thuronyi & Cui Value Added Tax 58. 
235 [1973] 3 All SA 199 (C) 203. 
236 Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway 1. Other sources of obligation include those based in delict, and those arising from 
unjustified enrichment and negotiorum gestio (ibid). See also Joubert General Principles of Contract 17. 
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other party’s reciprocal obligation. The court held that for reciprocity to exist there must be a relationship 
between the obligation to be performed by the one party, and that due by the other party, which indicates 
that one obligation was undertaken in exchange for the performance of the other obligation.237 
 
Contractual obligations are created by agreement between parties.238 An obligation imposes duties on 
the one party to the agreement – the debtor – whilst it confers corresponding rights on the other party 
– the creditor. The creditor has a right to the performance of the duty by the debtor. Most obligations 
give rise to rights and duties for all parties to the agreement.239 In contracts that create mutual rights 
and obligations, it is a matter of interpretation whether the parties’ obligations are sufficiently closely 
connected for the principle of reciprocity to apply.240 
 
In a reciprocal contract, one party has a right to withhold his performance until the other party has 
performed. A defendant enforces the right by raising the exceptio non adimpleti contractus defence 
against a plaintiff who has not yet performed.241 
 
Two commentators have expressed a view on whether partners’ obligations are reciprocal, albeit in 
terms of, respectively, Latvian and Romanian partnership law. Balodis, although describing a 
partnership agreement in Latvian law as a ‘reciprocal contract’, submits that such an agreement is not 
aimed at the exchange of performances. He argues that the aim of a partnership agreement is, instead, 
the consolidation of performances. When describing contractual obligations in a partnership agreement 
as reciprocal, Balodis does not mean that the one contractual obligation is performed in exchange for 
the other, but that any partner can request the other partners to render performance in accordance with 
the partnership agreement, and in particular, to make a contribution to the partnership. He further 
submits that as there is no mutual exchange of performances under a partnership agreement, no 
partner can, as a general principle, withhold performance on the ground that the other partners have 
failed to perform their duties.242 
 
 
237 ESE Financial Services [1973] 3 All SA 199 (C) at 203-204. 
238 Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway 1; Joubert General Principles of Contract 21. 
239 Lubbe & Murray ibid at 4; Joubert ibid at 8-9. 
240 Lubbe & Murray ibid at 553. 
241 BK Tooling (EDMS) BPK v Scope Precision Engineering (EDMS) BPK [1979] 3 All SA 166 AD 187. According to Joubert, the 
defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus can only be raised where the performances of the parties are reciprocal and 
the one is prerequisite for the other. If the performances are not reciprocal, meaning that the performances are unrelated 
in the sense that the one is not a quid pro quo for the other, the defence does not arise. See Joubert General Principles of 
Contract 230-1. 
242 Balodis K “Contractual aspects of formation and composition of commercial partnerships” (2005) X Juridica International 
79-84 at. See also Seucan A “Specific aspects related to the partnership agreement” (2015) Social Economic Debates vol 4 
No 1 32-35 at 35. 
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A Latvian partnership is similar to a South African partnership in that although the partnership enjoys 
some legal capacity, is not a legal person.243 Other relevant features of a Latvian partnership are that a 
person who shares in the partnership profits but makes no contribution to the partnership, is not a 
member of the partnership; and that, as a general principle, the profits and losses of the partnership 
are divided among the members in proportion to their contribution to the partnership.244 
 
Seucan discusses the features of a bilateral or reciprocal contract in the context of the law of Romania, 
to establish whether a Romanian partnership agreement is such a contract.245 According to Seucan, a 
contract is reciprocal if it gives rise to mutual obligations between the parties – ie, a right accruing to 
one party to the agreement, is matched by a corresponding obligation imposed on the other party, and 
vice versa. Seucan argues that the obligations differ for each contracting party.246 Furthermore, the 
obligations arising from a reciprocal contract are interdependent. Seucan’s argument is compelling 
because, as she explains, the obligations differ as the aim pursued by each party differs.247 
 
She argues further that because the partners share a common goal, the right of one party does not give 
rise to a corresponding obligation for the other contracting party. The obligations arising from the 
partnership agreement are the same for all the partners. As the obligations are not mutual, Seucan 
maintains, the parties to the partnership agreement are not called debtors and creditors, but partners.248 
 
As in the case of a partnership under Latvian law, a partnership agreement is, in Romanian law, similar 
to a South African partnership. All three systems require the partners to contribute to the partnership in 
order to perform an activity aimed at sharing the benefits.249 
 
For my part, I argue that the obligations in a South African partnership agreement are also not 
reciprocal. There are several indications of this. Firstly, a partner does not make a contribution to the 
partnership in exchange for, or conditional upon, the performance of another obligation – eg, of being 
provided with a partner’s share – although both the obligation to make the contribution, and the 
entitlement to the partner’s share originate from the same contract.250 The obligation to make the 
contribution is imposed by the common law without any reference to a corresponding right falling to 
another party. 
 
243 Ibid at 84. 
244 Ibid at 82. 
245 Seucan (2015) Social Economic Debates 32. 
246 Ibid at 33. 
247 Ibid at 34. 
248 Ibid 34. 
249 Ibid at 33. 
250 I have stated that one of the essentialia of a partnership agreement is that each partner must make a contribution to 
the partnership, or he must make a binding undertaking that he will make a contribution. See para. 2.3. 
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Contracts of purchase and sale, and of letting and hiring of work, are examples of reciprocal 
contracts.251 The essential terms of a contract of sale are: (a) that one person must sell and the other 
must buy; (b) a defined, ascertainable thing; (c) at a fixed or fixable price in money.252 A contract of 
employment is concluded once the employee agrees to place his personal services at the disposal of 
the employer, and the latter agrees to pay the employee remuneration.253 Considering the nature of the 
two parties’ obligations, for example, in a contract of sale where the one party must sell, and the other 
party must purchase the property that is the subject of the sale, it is clear that the two obligations are 
undertaken in exchange for one another. 
 
A partner’s contribution and a partner’s share, are not similarly set against one another; the one being 
transmitted in exchange for the receipt of the other. The obligation to contribute and the right to a 
partner’s share, are distinct. 
 
There is, admittedly, a connection between the value of a partner’s contribution and the value of a 
partner’s share. As stated above,254 a partner’s share denotes both his interest in the partnership 
property such as profits when they fall due, and his interest in jointly-owned partnership property. The 
partners agree on a profit-sharing ratio.255 In the absence of an agreement regarding profit sharing, the 
profits are shared in proportion to the value of the partners’ respective contributions. Where the value 
of the individual contributions cannot be determined, the profits are shared equally.256 
 
The extent of each partner’s share in the partnership assets is agreed to by the partners, usually in the 
partnership contract. In the absence of such an agreement, the value of the partners’ shares in the 
partnership assets will be the same as their profit-sharing ratio, provided that the partners have agreed 
on how the partnership profits should be split. If the partners have not agreed on the profit-sharing ratio, 
then the values of the partners’ contributions determine the values of their respective shares of the 
partnership assets.257 
 
Logically, where the partners agree on the respective values of the shares, these values are likely to 
correspond to the value of their contributions. It stands to reason that a partner who contributed more 
 
251 ESE Financial Services (Pty Ltd v Cramer [1973] 3 All SA 199 (C) at 204. 
252 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 889; Nagel et al Commercial Law para 13.09. 
253 Du Bois et al ibid at 926; Nagel et al ibid at para 37.04. 
254 See paras 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 above. 
255 Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.43; See also Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 295. 
256 Benade et al ibid at para 3.44; Ramdhin et al ibid. In Fink v Fink 1945 WLD 226, the court held, for example, that as it is 
impossible to say that one partner contributed more than the other, they were, therefore, entitled to share equally in the 
partnership profits. 
257 Benade et al ibid at para 3.66; Ramdhin et al ibid at para 295. 
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to the partnership, would wish to receive more than his co-partner who contributed less. Therefore, the 
nature of the connection between the contribution and the partner’s share, is that while their values 
might correspond, they are not connected in the sense that they are given in exchange. Simply stated, 
the obligation to make the contribution and the award of a partner’s share, are not obligations which are 
conditional upon mutual performance. 
 
In the Bayly case,258 for example, the partnership deed did not provide for the payment of rental or 
remuneration for the use of the land and livestock. The Deeds of Partnership provided for the profits 
and losses of the partnership business to be divided and borne by the partners in proportion to their 
capital holding in the partnership,259 plus, in the case of two trusts, also in proportion to the value of the 
land they made available for use by the partnership; therefore in unequal shares.260 Although the profit-
sharing provision was linked to the capital contribution, the court did not find that the right to profit 
sharing qualified as consideration for the contribution. 
 
Secondly, it is a naturale of a partnership agreement, that a partner is not entitled to compensation for 
his contribution.261 There is, however, nothing preventing the partners from agreeing that one of them 
is to receive a salary in consideration of his taking a larger or more skilled share in the management of 
partnership affairs.262 Furthermore, if a partner has performed special work beyond that performed by 
the others, and which was not envisaged as part of his duties under the contract, he is entitled to claim 
remuneration for his services.263 Therefore, save where the partners otherwise agree, a partner is not 
rewarded for his contribution. In my view, this adds to the argument that the obligation to make a 
contribution is not subject to an obligation on another party to reward the partner, whether by conferring 
a partner’s share or otherwise. 
 
Thirdly, the exceptio non adimpleti contractus is not available to a partner who is sued by his co-
partner(s) but who has himself not yet performed his obligation(s) under the partnership contract. A 
partner can, therefore, not withhold his contribution until another partner has performed his duties under 
the partnership agreement. According to Pothier, the action available to a partner against a co-partner 
 
258 (1998) 18 NZTC 14,073. 
259 Ibid at 14077. 
260 Ibid at 14077-8. 
261 Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.52. See also Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 37 and Ramdhin et 
al “Partnership” para 294. See Parr v Crosbie (1888-1887) 5 EDC 197, where the court held at 209, that the defendant was 
not entitled to commission as, by agreement of partnership, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant agreed to be paid for 
services rendered; Liquidators of Grand Hotel and Theatre Co v Haarburger and Others, and Fichart & Daniels 1907 ORC 25 
at 31. 
262 Liquidators of Grand Hotel ibid. See also Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 37. 
263 Liquidators of Grand Hotel ibid at 31; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 294; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.52. 
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to compel the latter’s performance is the pro socio. By means of the pro socio, a partner can be 
compelled, inter alia, to contribute what he has undertaken to contribute to the partnership.264 
 
Fourthly, all partners have the same obligation: to make some contribution to the partnership.265 A 
partner is not required to perform one kind of obligation towards his partner(s), in exchange for his 
partner(s) performing a different kind of obligation towards him. In fact, the meaning of ‘contribution’266 
in this context, denotes something shared by everyone, as opposed to an exchange in the sense of 
relinquishing something in return for something different.267 
 
Finally, partnership profit distributions are similar to company dividends. Partnership profits are 
distributed on the basis of an agreement amongst the partners to distribute profits after, for example, 
the lapse of fixed periods.268 The agreement is to distribute profits, and is clearly not intended as 
payment for contributions. Furthermore, the profit distributions are, logically, dependent on whether 
there are profits available for distribution. Had there been an obligation to pay for a contribution, then 
the partnership would have been indebted to pay for the contribution irrespective of the availability of 
profits. Profit distributions are the result of holding a partner’s share, in the same way that dividends are 
the result of shareholding. It is a partner’s holding of a partner’s share that entitles him to claim a share 
of the profits.269 
 
Considering the above, neither a partner’s share, nor any profit distributions, is reciprocally connected 
and, therefore, not consideration for a partner’s contribution. As a result, a partner does not make his 
required contribution to the partnership in exchange for consideration, except if the partners agree that 
the partner is to receive a specific payment for his contribution. These are undoubtedly payments made 
“in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of” the partner’s contribution, and may, 
consequently, be subject to VAT at the standard rate, except if the contribution is either zero rated or 
exempt. 
 
 
264 Pothier A Treatise 81 paras 108 and 109; Ramdhin et al ibid at para 300. Pothier’s work has been regarded by the courts 
as an important authority on partnership law. See Ramdhin et al ibid at para 256; Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 40. 
265 See para 2.3 above. 
266 ‘Contribution’ according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, means “something paid or given (voluntarily) to a 
common fund or stock; an action etc. which helps to bring about a result; the action of contributing”. 
267 See the meaning of ‘exchange’ in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
268 The Sacks case1946 AD 31 at 40. See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31-2. 
269 See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 289 and Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 4.14. 
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In my view, a partner’s contribution of services to a partnership, that is not a resident of the Republic,270 
can qualify for zero rating if the supply meets the requirements of section 11(2)(l).271 Paragraph (iii) to 
section 11(2)(l) requires, for example, that the services must not be supplied directly to the partnership 
or any other person, if the partnership or such other person is in the Republic at the time the services 
are rendered.272 I agree with Botes that this provision is aimed at ensuring that consumption or use 
which takes place in the Republic is not zero rated.273 In my view, even if the partnership or other 
person, for example an individual partner, is considered to be present in the Republic at the time the 
services are rendered, if the partnership or other person’s presence does not relate to the supply of the 
services, the services can still qualify for zero rating.274 
 
In Australia, the ATO is of the view that a partner’s capital contribution and his partnership interest are 
consideration for one another.275 The ATO does not regard the partnership profits to be consideration 
for the partner’s capital contribution. If it had intended profits to be seen in this light, I believe it would 
have said so. I suggest that, logically, the profit distributions would be considered to be received 
 
270 Resident is defined in s 1(1) as meaning, inter alia, a ‘resident’ as defined in the IT Act. In terms of this definition a 
‘resident’ can either be a natural person or a person other than a natural person. A partnership is not a ‘person’, whether 
natural or not natural, for purposes of the IT Act and is, therefore, not subject to income tax. See Stiglingh et al Silke 2018 
para 18.1; Haupt Notes para 9.4. A ‘person’ is also deemed, for the purposes of the VAT Act, to be a ‘resident’ to the extent 
that such person carries on in the Republic any enterprise or other activity and has a fixed or permanent place in the 
Republic relating to such enterprise or other activity. See s 1(1). I am of the view, therefore, that a partnership that does 
not carry on any enterprise or other activity in the Republic, and that does not have a fixed or permanent place in the 
Republic relating to such enterprise or other activity, is not a ‘resident’ for the purposes of the VAT Act. 
271 Section 11(2)(l) zero rates services that are supplied to a person who is not a resident of the Republic, not being services 
which are supplied directly, 
(i) in connection with land or any improvement thereto situated inside the Republic; or 
(ii) in connection with movable property situated inside the Republic at the time the services are rendered, except movable 
property which- 
(aa) is exported to the said person subsequent to the supply of such services; or 
(bb) forms part of a supply by the said person to a registered vendor and such services are supplied to the said person for 
purposes of such supply to the registered vendor; or 
(iii) to the said person or any other person, other than in circumstances contemplated in subparagraph (ii) (bb), if the said person 
or such other person is in the Republic at the time the services are rendered, 
and not being services which are the acceptance by any person of an obligation to refrain from carrying on any enterprise, to 
the extent that the carrying on of that enterprise would have occurred within the Republic. 
272 In a Tax Court case, VAT Case 969 para 34, the court expressed the view that in s 11(2)(l)(iii) appears specifically to 
envisage a situation where the service is supplied (ie, contractually) to X but is physically supplied (ie, rendered) to Y. 
273 Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 11-39. In the Supreme Court of Appeal case of XO Africa Safaris v Commissioner for SARS 
(395/15) [2016] ZASCA 160 (3 October 2016) at para 30, the court stated that the history of the amendments made to s 
11(2)(l) showed that the statutory purpose underlying s 11(2)(l) was to ensure that where services were rendered to a 
foreigner by a person liable to pay VAT, but the services themselves were rendered in the Republic and the benefit of them 
was enjoyed in the Republic, they would not enjoy the benefit of zero rating. VAT would be payable at the standard rate. 
274 See Botes ibid at 11-39. 
275 GSTR 2003/13 paras 32, 58, 59. In terms of Australian partnership law, an interest in a partnership includes the right to 
receive an appropriate share of the partnership profits and an entitlement to share in the capital of the partnership. See 
Everett v Federal Commissioner of Taxation Supreme Court of New South Wales 1 November 1977 at 4,480; GSTR 2003/13 
para 34. 
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because of the partner’s ownership of a partnership interest. A partner’s contribution can, therefore, be 
subject to GST, whereas the profit distributions cannot. 
 
It is clear from the Bayly and Newman cases276 that the New Zealand courts do not regard a partner’s 
share or partnership profit distributions as consideration for a partner’s capital contribution. This is in 
view of the courts’ finding that, what appears to have been the partners’ contribution of the use of certain 
items, to have been made without consideration. Furthermore, according to the NZIR, a GST-registered 
partnership is not required to account for output tax on a capital contribution made by a partner.277 The 
NZIR does, therefore, not regard a partner’s contribution and a partner’s share to be consideration for 
one another. In New Zealand, as in Australia, the partnership profits would logically be considered to 
be received on the basis of the partner owning an interest in the partnership. They would, consequently, 
not be subject to GST. 
 
In the case of Canada, Arsenault and Kreklewetz claim that the CRA’s position is that the making of a 
capital contribution to a partnership is characterised as a supply by the partner to the partnership in 
exchange for an exempt partnership interest.278 A partner’s capital contribution is, therefore, subject to 
GST in Canada. The authors contend, however, that a distribution of partnership profits is not subject 
to GST because it is a supply of money and is made pursuant to a right279 to participate in partnership 
profits.280 
 
I have pointed out that the UK follows the KapHag case, which I discuss below,281 and that HMRC holds 
the view that where the partnership contribution consists of goods or services, neither admission into 
the partnership, nor any consequent share in partnership profits, constitutes consideration provided to 
the new partner for the goods or services he has contributed.282 
 
  
 
276 See the discussion of these two cases in para 2.6.6 below. 
277 NZIR “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 16/04, Goods And Services Tax – GST Treatment Of Partnership Capital 
Contributions” available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/QB1604.pdf 
1 paras 1, 2 (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
278 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” at 26. In support of this statement Arsenault and Kreklewetz referred to CRA 
Headquarters Ruling 11635-8 “S 272.1(1) and the Eligibility of Certain ITCs Claimed by a Partnership (27 September 2002)”. 
(I have been unable to trace the original transcript of this case.) 
279 Arsenault & Kreklewetz ibid at 38. 
280 Ibid at 35. 
281 See para. 2.8 below. 
282 See para. 2.6.1 above. 
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2.6.6 The deeming of a partner’s contribution to be made at market value 
 
A partner’s contribution will be deemed to have been at market value if the requirements of section 10(4) 
are met. These are that: 
a. the supply is made by a person for no consideration, or for a consideration in money which is 
less than the open market value of the supply; 
b. the supplier and the recipient are connected persons in relation to one another; and 
c. if a consideration equal to the open-market value of the supply had been paid by the recipient, 
he would not have been entitled to make a deduction of the full amount of the tax in respect of 
that supply.283 
 
A partnership and a member of that partnership are connected persons.284 Section 10(4) could apply 
should the partner make his contribution for no consideration,285 and where the partnership is not 
exclusively involved in the making of taxable supplies, for example, if the partnership also makes 
exempt supplies. Where the partnership is exclusively involved in the making of taxable supplies, 
section 10(4) will not apply because the partnership is entitled to deduct any VAT levied on the 
contribution in full as input tax. This is the case where the partnership acquires the contribution for 
purposes of consumption, use, or supply in the course of making taxable supplies as envisaged in the 
definition of ‘input tax’.286 
 
If section 10(4) applies, the consideration for the contribution is deemed to be the open-market value 
of that contribution. The partner must account for VAT on that open-market value, unless the supply is 
exempt from VAT. If the partner is not registered for VAT, and if the contribution involves continuous or 
regular activities as envisaged in the definition of ‘enterprise’, the partner must register for VAT if the 
deemed turnover exceeds the compulsory VAT-registration threshold. The implication here is that if a 
partner regularly contributes services for no consideration – eg, services the partnership does not 
acquire wholly for a taxable purpose – the partner must register and account for VAT on those services. 
 
In the Bayly case the Trusts, who were members of a partnership, supplied the use of land and livestock 
to the partnership without charging the partnership rental. The court held, in terms of section 10(3) of 
the New Zealand GST Act, that the Trusts were deemed to supply the land at the open-market value. 
 
283 Although “market valuation” is a standard practice in VAT law, a specific discussion of the application of the principle 
to partnerships is warranted. This is so, as is evident from the discussion below, because the “default” market valuation 
rules cannot be applied to partnerships without complete consideration of the nature of the specific transaction so 
concluded. 
284 See the definition of ‘connected persons’ in s 1(1). 
285 Or for a consideration in money that is less than the open market of the contribution. 
286 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
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It was what the provision of the interest in the land by the Trusts was worth that was assessed, and in 
each case the amount far exceeded the GST registration threshold.287 As a result, the court held that 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue had been correct in registering the Trusts for GST and assessing 
them on the open-market value of the provision of such use.288 The circumstances in the Newman case 
are comparable to those in the Bayly case. The court came to the same conclusion: that the supply was 
for no consideration, or for less than the open-market value, and was between associated persons. 
This led to the inevitable conclusion that the open-market value must be applied.289 
 
Section 10(3) read with section 10(3A) of the New Zealand GST Act, is similarly worded to section 10(4) 
of the VAT Act.290 Section 10(3A) provides that section 10(3) does not apply where, inter alia, the 
recipient acquired the supply for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies. 
 
Where no consideration is paid for the partner’s contribution, and section 10(4) does not apply, the 
value of the contribution is, in terms of section 10(23), deemed to be nil. The partner will, of course, 
have no VAT liability on the contribution. 
 
If the consideration is deemed to be nil under section 10(23), is the supply taxable? This question is 
relevant to the deduction of VAT as input tax on the expenses incurred by a partner in making the 
contribution. The court held in the KCM case, that section 10(23) does not deem a non-taxable supply 
for no consideration to be a taxable supply for no consideration.291 One of the requirements of 
section 7(1)(a), is that the supply must be made in the course or furtherance of an ‘enterprise’. Whether 
a partner’s contribution for no consideration is a taxable supply, depends on whether the contribution 
is made in the course or furtherance of an enterprise carried on by the partner independently of the 
enterprise of the partnership. 
 
 
287 At the time of 30 000 New Zealand Dollars over 12 months. 
288 The Bayly case at 14079. 
289 Ibid at 15688 para 92. 
290 Section 10(3) provides that where - 
a. a supply is made by a person for no consideration or for a consideration in money that is less than the open market 
value of that supply; and 
b. the supplier and the recipient are associated persons, 
the consideration in money for the supply shall be deemed to be the open market value of that supply. 
291 KCM v Commissioner for the SARS (VAT 711), [2009] ZATC 2 (14 August 2009) para 9. 
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As in the case of South Africa, New Zealand, the UK,292 and Australia293 only have general rules that 
apply to supplies for no consideration, instead of specific provisions that provide for the VAT/GST 
implications of capital contributions made by partners for no consideration.294 HMRC is of the view that 
if the incoming partner is a taxable person, and makes his contribution for no consideration, he is treated 
as having made a deemed supply of goods or services if the ‘deemed supply’ criteria295 are met.296 
 
I stated that the ATO is of the view that a partner’s capital contribution and his partnership interest are 
consideration for one another.297 The general rules in Division 72 would only apply should the 
partnership interest be valued at less than the partner’s contribution. 
 
In the case of Canada, and according to Arsenault and Kreklewetz, it is not entirely certain whether 
section 272.1(3) of Canada’s ETA applies to property contributed on the formation of a partnership. 
They contend that this provision’s application would likely be redundant in view of the related-party298 
and the special deeming rule299 in Canada’s ETA, which deems a partner to be related to the 
partnership.300 The latter provisions, they argue, have the same effect as section 272.1(3),301 which 
essentially provides that where a person who is, or agrees to become, a member of a partnership, 
supplies property or a service to the partnership otherwise than in the course of the partnership’s 
activities, 
 
a. where the property or service is acquired by the partnership exclusively for commercial activities of 
the partnership, any amount that the partnership agrees to pay the person in respect of the property 
or service is deemed to be consideration for the supply; and 
 
292 See, eg, Schedule 4 to para 5 of the UK VAT Act which treats certain supplies made for no consideration as supplies for 
VAT purposes; HMRC “Basic principles and underlying law: Supply for no consideration” available at  
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-consideration/vatsc03400 (date of use: 22 August 2018). See 
too Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 71.22. 
293 See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 466. In terms of Division 72 of the Australian GST Act, a 
supply to an associate below market value is treated as if it was for market value, unless the associate is entitled to a full 
input tax credit. 
294 Or for a consideration below the market value. 
295 See, eg, Schedule 4 para 5 of the UK VAT Act. 
296 HMRC “Consideration: Partnership Contributions” available at  https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-
supply-and-consideration/vatsc68000 (date of use: 17 August 2018); Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax 
para 50.7. 
297 See para 2.6.5 above. 
298 In s 155(1). In terms of this provision, where a supply of property or a service is made between persons not dealing with 
each other at arm’s length, for no consideration or for consideration less than the fair market value of the property or 
service at the time the supply is made, and the recipient of the supply is not a registrant who acquires the property or 
service for consumption, use, or supply exclusively in the course of commercial activities of the recipient: (a) if no 
consideration is paid for the supply, the supply is deemed to be made for consideration, paid at that time, of a value equal 
to the fair market value of the property or service at that time; and (b) if consideration is paid for the supply, the value of 
the consideration is deemed to be equal to the fair market value of the property or service at that time. 
299 In s 126(3). 
300 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 27. 
301 Ibid. 
48 
 
b. in any other case, the supply is deemed to have been made for consideration that is equal to the fair 
market value. 
 
2.7 Deductions relating to contributions made to the partnership 
 
A partner may have incurred VAT on the acquisition of goods or services which he subsequently 
contributes to the partnership.302 Furthermore, if the partner is a vendor, his contribution will be subject 
to VAT at fifteen per cent if the supply meets the requirements of section 7(1)(a). The question arising 
is whether any deductions in relation to such acquisitions by the partner can be made, and if so, by 
whom. 
 
‘Input tax’ is either the VAT levied on goods or services acquired wholly for the purpose of consumption, 
use, or supply in the course of making taxable supplies; or, where the goods or services are acquired 
partly for such purpose, to the extent that the goods or services are acquired by the vendor for such 
purpose.303 The extent to which a vendor uses goods or services for a taxable purpose, is determined 
in accordance with the provisions of section 17(1). 304 In essence, the section provides that the basis 
for such apportionment is the ratio of the intended taxable use to non-taxable use.305 Therefore, VAT 
levied on the acquisition of goods or services acquired by a vendor-partner to make contributions to the 
partnership that are taxable supplies, is deductible by that partner as input tax. 
 
In a New Zealand case, Case T10,306 the issue was whether the objecting husband and wife partnership 
was entitled to a GST input refund on their purchase of a title-based timeshare in a unit in a luxury hotel 
complex at a tourist resort. This depended on whether they purchased the timeshare for the purpose of 
making taxable supplies.307 
 
The husband and wife partnership conducted a take-away food business which was registered for GST 
purposes. The resort’s units were rented to the public.308 The resort was run by a partnership consisting 
of the timeshare purchasers and known as the accommodation partnership.309 The accommodation 
 
302 Goods, which have been acquired as second-hand goods and on which no VAT was charged, may also be contributed. 
303 ‘Input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). Input tax, which is commonly referred to as ‘notional input tax’, is also deductible on the 
non-taxable acquisition of second-hand goods. The amount of the input tax is equal to the tax fraction of the lesser of any 
consideration in money given by the vendor for or the open-market value of the supply to him. See para (b) of the definition 
of ‘input tax’. 
304 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
305 Note that in terms of proviso (i) to s 17(1), where the intended taxable use is equal to not less than 95 per cent of the 
total intended use, the goods or services concerned may be regarded as having been acquired wholly for the purpose of 
making taxable supplies. This is commonly referred to as the de minimis rule. 
306 (1997) 18 NZTC 8,055. 
307 Ibid at 8056. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. 
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partnership was registered for GST on the taxable rental activity.310 Although the units were owned by 
the partners, including the objectors, the accommodation partnership accounted for output tax and 
claimed input credits on all rental activity.311 
 
The TRA held that the workings of section 57 deprived the objectors of a GST input refund. In terms of 
section 57(2)(a) of the New Zealand GST Act,312 the objectors could not be registered for GST in relation 
to the operation of the timeshare. Furthermore, the supply of the objectors’ timeshare was deemed, by 
section 57(2)(b) of the New Zealand GST Act, to be made by the accommodation partnership and not 
the objectors. Any relevant taxable supplies were, therefore, deemed by section 57 not to be made by 
the objectors but by the accommodation partnership. Therefore, the objectors had not acquired the 
timeshare for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies as required by the definition of ‘input 
tax’.313 The TRA held that the objectors were not entitled to the GST input refund.314 
 
Section 51(1)(a) similarly deems the partnership, as opposed to the partners, to be carrying on the 
partnership’s enterprise. Applying the reasoning in the TRA in Case T10, a partner may not deduct 
input tax in relation to an acquisition of goods and services, on the basis of these items being used in 
the enterprise of the partnership. A partner is, instead, entitled to an input tax deduction relating to an 
enterprise he carries on distinct from the partnership. If the partner deducted the VAT on an acquisition 
as input tax, which is subsequently contributed to the partnership, then the partner would be deemed, 
in terms of section 18(1),315 to have made a supply on which output tax is payable. This would be the 
case where the partner’s contribution is not a taxable supply. The partner’s earlier input tax deduction 
would then, effectively, be reversed. 
 
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK have no specific provisions applicable to a partner’s deduction of 
VAT/GST on acquisitions related to his capital contribution to the partnership. The ATO is of the view, 
 
310 Ibid at 8057. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Section 57(2) provides that, “[w]here an unincorporated body that carries on any taxable activity is registered pursuant 
to this Act - 
(a) the members of that body shall not themselves be registered or liable to be registered under this Act in relation to the 
carrying on of that taxable activity; 
(b) any supply of goods or services made in the course of carrying on that taxable activity shall be deemed for the purposes 
of this Act to be supplied by that body, and shall be deemed not to be made by any member of that body; and (c) …” 
313 Case T10 at 8060. 
314 Ibid at 8064. 
315 Section 18(1) provides that where goods or services have been “acquired, manufactured, assembled, constructed or 
produced” by a vendor wholly or partly to make taxable supplies, or the goods or services were held or applied for that 
purpose, and the goods or services are subsequently utilised wholly to make non-taxable supplies, the vendor is deemed 
to make a taxable supply. 
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however, that a partner is entitled to input tax credits related to a taxable, in-kind capital contribution of 
a thing, which he initially acquired in his own enterprise.316 
 
Section 272.1(2) of Canada’s ETA allows partners in the form of corporations, trusts, and other 
partnerships, to register for GST and obtain input tax credits paid on inputs intended for partnership 
activities.317 
 
Even if a partner’s contribution is not taxable, a deduction might still be available to the partnership 
under section 18(4). Where a partner acquires goods or services in the circumstances envisaged in 
section 18(4),318 the partnership is allowed a deduction319 if the partnership uses those goods or 
services to make taxable supplies.320 Botes’s submission that this is the case where the goods or 
services constitute partnership assets, or where the partner has merely granted the partnership the 
right of use of the goods or services, is in my view correct.321 Botes’s reference to ‘partnership assets’ 
is understood to refer to jointly-owned partnership property. I am in agreement with this view because 
a partnership will only be in a position to ‘apply’ goods or services that have been acquired by a partner, 
 
316 GSTR 2003/13 paras 75 and 80. As in Australia, in New Zealand, and the UK, a partner’s contribution to a partnership 
could be taxable, depending on the circumstances (see para 2.6.1 above), I am of the view that a partner should, in these 
countries, in principle be permitted a deduction of the VAT/GST levied on an acquisition made for the purpose of making a 
taxable contribution. 
317 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 39. For individual partners who are excluded from much of the application of 
s 272.1 relief – eg, where they are not reimbursed by the partnership – is available under s 253 of Canada’s ETA, which 
provides for employees’ and partners’ rebate rules. This rebate may be available to an individual who is a member of a 
partnership registered for GST. The partner must have personally paid the GST on expenses that he did not incur on the 
account of the partnership. A partner cannot, however, claim a GST partner rebate for the GST he paid on expenses for 
which the partnership paid him a reasonable allowance. See CRA “GST/HST Rebate for Partners” available at 
http://www.ryan.com/contentassets/ 715a003710244c5e80facae6b7862d4f/cra-rc4091.pdf (date of use: 18 August 
2018). 
318 The circumstances envisaged under s 18(4) are, in broad outline,  
(a) goods or services have been supplied to a partner prior to the commencement date of the VAT Act, ie, 30 
September 1991, and such goods or services were applied by the partner in the course of an activity which 
would have been an enterprise if section 1 had been applicable prior to such commencement date; 
(b) goods or services have been supplied to a partner on which tax was charged, and no deduction has been made 
in relation to such supply; and 
(c) second-hand goods have been supplied, otherwise than under a taxable supply, to a partner and no deduction 
has been made in respect of such second-hand goods. 
319 The deduction is permitted under s 16(3)(f), which provides that the amount of tax payable in respect of a tax period is 
calculated by deducting from the sum of the amounts of output tax which are attributable to that period, the amounts 
calculated in accordance with s 18(4) or (5) in relation to goods or services applied during the tax period as contemplated 
in that section. 
320 The partnership is permitted a deduction in accordance with a formula set out in s 18(4). In terms of this formula, the 
deduction is equal to the tax fraction of the lesser of the adjusted cost, or the open-market value of the supply of the goods 
or services, multiplied by the percentage of the intended taxable use of such goods or services by the partnership. The 
taxable use must be determined in accordance with the apportionment method contemplated in s 17(1). 
321 Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 18-22. 
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if the partner has contributed either the ownership or the use of such goods or services to the 
partnership. 
 
In terms of section 18(4), the partnership is entitled to the deduction if no deduction has been made in 
respect of, or in relation to, such goods or services.322 In my view, whether either the partner or the 
partnership is entitled to a deduction, depends on whether the partner’s contribution constitutes a 
taxable supply. If it does, the partner is entitled to an input tax deduction. If the partner has not obtained 
an input tax deduction, the partnership could be allowed the deduction under section 18(4). 
 
As stated above,323 the partnership may qualify for the section 18(4) deduction if it ‘applies’ the goods 
or services acquired by the partner. Importantly, section 18(4) provides that the “goods or services shall 
be deemed to be supplied” to the partnership. Section 18(4) does not specify whether either the 
ownership, or the use of the goods or services, is deemed to be so supplied. 
 
Botes submits that where only the right of use of goods or services has been granted, but the goods or 
services are deemed to be supplied to the partnership under section 18(4), “such goods or services 
become assets of the partnership’s VAT enterprise.”324 I understand Botes to be arguing that the goods 
or services are deemed by section 18(4), to become jointly- owned partnership property, even if only 
the use of the goods or services has been supplied to the partnership. She justifies her view by arguing 
that it ensures VAT neutrality where the partnership returns the goods or services to the partner when 
the right to use them terminates. Botes argues that such a return of the goods or services constitutes a 
supply, and as the partner and the partnership are connected persons in relation to one another, this 
supply is deemed to have been made at market value if all the requirements of section 10(4) are met. 
The VAT position will effectively then be neutral, as the deduction allowed to the partnership will merely 
be recouped.325 
 
There is merit in Botes’s argument considering that, according to the Report of the VATCOM,326 the 
VAT Act introduced a consumption-type tax, which taxes supplies to consumers but grants businesses 
an input credit.327 In other words, the private consumer must carry the tax burden. If VAT is not levied 
 
322 The deduction is permitted in the tax period during which the goods or services are applied by the partnership for use 
in the course of making taxable supplies. See s 18(4) read with s 16(3)(f). 
323 That is under this sub-heading. 
324 Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 18-22. 
325 Ibid. 
326 The VATCOM was a committee consisting of members from both the private and the public sectors, appointed by the 
Minister of Finance to consider the comments and representations made by interested parties on the Government's Draft 
Value-Added Tax Bill, which was published on 18 June 1990. 
327 Report of the VATCOM (Government Printer 1991) (hereafter the VATCOM Report) Ch 2 at 4. 
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on the partnership’s return of the goods or services to the partner, no VAT is levied on a partner’s 
private consumption, which would undermine the purpose of the VAT Act. 
 
Furthermore, the deduction is equal to the tax fraction328 applied to the lesser of the adjusted cost of 
the goods or services or their open-market value, but only to the extent of their intended taxable use as 
determined in accordance with section 17(1).329 The extent to which a partnership uses a partner’s 
contribution for a taxable purpose must, therefore, be determined by reference to the use of that 
contribution in the partnership’s enterprise. That the deduction is based on the cost or value of the 
goods or services – which is the type of deduction that is normally allowed when ownership is acquired 
– and not, for example, on a deemed rental amount for their use, bolsters the argument that the 
ownership of the goods or services is deemed to have been acquired. 
 
The next issue concerns the making of deductions in relation to any VAT levied on partners’ 
contributions. The partners’ contributions make up the capital of the partnership.330 The partnership 
capital is part of the partnership assets331 to the extent that the capital still exists.332 The establishment 
of a jointly-owned partnership fund is a naturale of a partnership agreement. Therefore, in the absence 
of an agreement to the contrary, the partnership assets are jointly owned by the partners in undivided 
shares.333 
 
Williams submits that if the partners intend to contribute the ownership of the property to the partnership 
(a contribution quoad dominium), then such property becomes ‘common property’, which the partners 
own jointly, and in which each partner has an undivided share.334 Beinart contends that in this situation, 
a full right of ownership is converted into a shared right, and even if the capital is returnable to the 
partner in full, the right of ownership is replaced by an actio in personam.335 The use of property may, 
however, be contributed to the partnership – as was confirmed by the court in Fink v Fink (ie, a 
 
328 ‘Tax fraction’ is defined in s 1(1) as meaning “the fraction calculated in accordance with the formula r/100 +r in which 
formula ‘r’ is the rate of tax applicable under s 7(1).” 
329 See s 18(4). 
330 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 286; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26; Mongalo, Lumina & Kader 
Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.3.1. 
331 Partnership assets are also referred to as ‘partnership property’ or ‘partnership funds’. See Ramdhin et al ibid at para 
284; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26. 
332 Ramdhin et al ibid; Schlemmer v Viljoen above at 315: The court distinguished between three groups of partnership 
assets, namely, profits derived from the partnership business, partnership capital contributed by the partners and assets 
lent by the partners to the partnership. 
333 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 287; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 
3.61. 
334 Williams ibid at 28. 
335 Beinart 1961 Acta Juridica 155. 
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contribution quoad usum) – while the ownership of the property vests exclusively in one of the 
partners.336 
 
I argue that whatever is supplied or acquired by the body of persons making up the partnership, within 
the course and scope of its common purpose, is supplied or acquired by the partnership as a separate 
person for VAT purposes.337 In view of the partnership’s status as a person, the ownership or use of 
the contribution is, for VAT purposes, deemed to be acquired by the partnership as envisaged in the 
definition of ‘input tax’, as opposed to by the partners. A partnership that is a vendor, would 
consequently be entitled to deduct any VAT levied on a partner’s contribution as input tax, provided that 
the partnership acquires the contribution for a taxable purpose. The partnership will, conversely, be 
refused a deduction of input tax to the extent that it acquires the contribution for a non-taxable purpose, 
for example, the contribution is acquired to make exempt supplies. 
 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK do not have special provisions regulating a partnership’s 
deduction of VAT/GST levied on a partner’s contribution. Commenting on the position in the UK, 
Hemmingsley and Rudling argue that if an incoming partner contributes goods and/or services on which 
VAT is due, and the partnership uses them for its business purposes, the partnership can recover the 
VAT as input tax subject to the normal rules.338 The ATO is of the view that a partnership’s acquisition 
of a partner’s in-kind contribution, relates to the making of supplies by the partnership in the course of 
its ordinary or general business. They argue, therefore, that any claim for input tax credits is determined 
by reference to the use of the in-kind capital contribution in the partnership’s business activities, and is 
a creditable acquisition if the requirements for an input tax credit are met.339 
 
 
336 Fink v Fink above at 244, 245; See Williams ibid. 
337 See para 2.3. 
338 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.7. In terms of the UK VAT Act, input tax, in relation to a taxable 
person, comprises VAT on goods and services supplied to him, provided the goods or services are used for the purpose of 
business carried on by him. See s 24(1); Hemmingsley & Rudling ibid at para 34.1. 
339 GSTR 2003/13 para 67. You are entitled to an input tax credit, in terms of the Australian GST Act, if you acquire the 
thing for a ‘creditable purpose’ (s 11-5; 11-20) which means that you must have acquired it in carrying on your enterprise 
(s 11-15). See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Locations 120 and 121. In Canada a registrant who acquires 
property or a service for consumption, use, or supply in commercial activities may claim input tax credits to recover all or 
part of the tax the registrant paid on the acquisition of the property or service. See Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to 
GST/HST para 3,010. See also CRA “Input tax credits (ITCs)” available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/payroll/ benefits-allowances/remitting-gst-hst-on-employee-benefits/input-tax-
credits-itcs.html (date of use: 19 August 2018). In terms of s 20(3C) of the New Zealand GST Act input tax as defined in s 
3A(1)(a) of that Act, may be deducted to the extent to which the goods or services are used for, or are available for use in, 
making taxable supplies. See also NZIR “Apportionment input tax when goods and services are acquired” available at 
https://www.ird.govt.nz/gst/additional-calcs/change-adjust/apportion/input-tax.html (date of use: 19 August 2018). In 
my view, considering the requirements for an input tax credit in Canada and New Zealand, a partnership should be 
entitled to deduct the GST levied on a partner’s contribution to the partnership, provided that such contribution is 
applied by the partnership for commercial activities in Canada, and for making taxable supplies in New Zealand. 
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2.8 The acquisition of partners’ shares 
 
When considering the VAT treatment of the acquisition of partners’ shares on the formation of a 
partnership, it is important to determine whether the partners’ shares are supplied to the partners, 
whether by the partners to each other in terms of the partnership agreement, or by the partnership to 
the partners.340 
 
In the case of Canada, Arsenault and Kreklewetz argue that to the extent that the partners are viewed 
as obtaining an interest in the partnership as a result of the partnership’s formation, or in return for their 
contribution of property, if any, the supply of that interest is ‘issued’ by the partnership to the partner.341 
 
According to the ATO, the better view is that the interests in a partnership are supplied by the 
partnership and not by the partners to each other.342 The ATO considers that the partnership as an 
entity, creates an interest in the partnership. This is a consequence, so the argument goes, of the 
acceptance of a partnership as an entity, and that supplies and acquisitions made by or on behalf of 
partners in their capacity as partners are treated as supplies and acquisitions by the partnership.343 The 
ATO relies on section 184-5(1) of the Australian GST Act,344 which provides that supplies and 
acquisitions made by, or on behalf of, partners in their capacity as partners, are treated as supplies and 
acquisitions by the partnership. 
 
South Africa’s VAT Act does not have a provision corresponding to subsection 184-5(1). The ATO’s 
reliance on subsection 184-5(1) is in any event questionable, since a partner does not act in his capacity 
as partner representing the partnership when he enters into a partnership agreement. As stated,345 a 
partnership is established by means of an agreement between the prospective partners. The 
partnership is not a signatory to the partnership agreement and can, therefore, not supply the partners’ 
shares in terms of this agreement. The partner is, instead, contracting on his own behalf when he signs 
the partnership agreement. 
 
In the KapHag case a partner was admitted to an existing partnership. It is important to note that the 
case did not concern the receipt of a partner’s share on a partnership’s formation. The Bundesfinanzhof 
took the view that when a partnership admits a partner in consideration of a contribution in cash or in 
kind, it makes a supply of services for consideration within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth 
 
340 See GSTR 2003/13 para 54. 
341 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 27. 
342 GSTR 2003/13 para 55. 
343 Ibid at para 56. 
344 See para 2.6.2 above. 
345 See para 2.1 above. 
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Directive. It considered, however, that the concept is questionable, as a partner is admitted, not on the 
basis of a bilateral contract between the new partner and the partnership, but on the basis of a 
partnership agreement concluded between partners. From the viewpoint of civil law, therefore, the new 
partner might be regarded as obtaining his share in the partnership from the other partners, not the 
partnership.346 
 
The ECJ held in the KapHag case that a partnership which admits a partner in consideration of payment 
of a contribution in cash, does not effect a supply of services for consideration towards that person 
within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive.347 It is irrelevant, the ECJ reasoned, whether 
the admission of the new partner is regarded as the act of the partnership itself, or as that of the other 
partners, since the admission of a new partner does not constitute a supply of services for consideration 
for the purposes of the Directive.348 As pointed out previously, the UK follows the KapHag case.349 
 
The NZIR is of the view that no existing partnership interests can be supplied when contributions are 
made by the partners to a newly created partnership. Rather, the partnership interests are created as 
a matter of law by the formation of the partnership.350 
 
I agree with this view. A partner’s share, received on a partnership’s formation, is a product of the 
partnership agreement. When the partnership agreement is concluded the partners’ shares simply 
accrue to the partners.351 Moreover, as stated, it is an essential term of the partnership agreement that 
the partnership business be carried on in common,352 hence each partner’s right to share in the 
partnership profits, for example.353 Additionally, a partner’s share relating to his interest in jointly-owned 
partnership property is a naturale of the partnership agreement.354 As a result, the partners’ shares 
come into existence from the moment of the establishment of the partnership because of the relevant 
terms of the partnership agreement. That being the case, the partners’ shares are not supplied to the 
partners when the partnership is formed, because at that moment there are no partners’ shares which 
can be the subject of a supply. 
 
 
346 KapHag case para 20. 
347 Ibid at para 43. 
348 Ibid at para 42. 
349 See para 2.6.1. 
350 NZIR “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 16/04, Goods And Services Tax – GST Treatment Of Partnership Capital 
Contributions” available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/QB1604.pdf 
4 para 20 (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
351 See the Sacks case 1946 AD 31 at 43. See para 2.6.4 above. 
352 See para 2.5 above. 
353 See para 2.6.3 above. 
354 See para 2.7 above. 
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I also agree with the Bundesfinanzhof’s argument in the KapHag case, that the partnership does not 
supply the partners’ shares on formation because the partnership agreement, from which the partners’ 
shares originate, is concluded by the partners and not by the partnership.355 
 
The ECJ offers a different explanation of why there is no supply when a partner is admitted to a 
partnership. In the Kretztechnik case,356 the ECJ considered the question of whether a public limited 
company makes a supply for consideration within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, 
when listing on a stock market and in issuing shares to new shareholders in return for the issue price.357 
The court referred to the KapHag case and stated that the same conclusion must be drawn regarding 
the issue of shares for the purpose of raising capital.358 
 
The court also agreed with the reasoning of Advocate-General Jacobs in points 59 and 60 of his 
opinion.359 The Advocate-General contended that when a company issues new shares, it is not selling 
any existing intangible property or any right over a fraction of its existing assets. It is increasing its 
assets by acquiring capital, and acknowledging the new shareholders' rights as residual owners of a 
previously non-existent fraction of the increased assets which they contributed in the form of capital.360 
He further argued that from the company’s point of view, there is an acquisition rather than a supply, of 
capital and thus no transaction capable of being taxed or exempted from VAT. From the shareholder's 
point of view, it is an investment, an employment of capital, and not an acquisition.361 
 
The court reasoned that as far as the shareholder is concerned, payment of the sums necessary for 
the increase in capital, is not a payment of consideration but an investment or an employment of 
capital.362 As a result, the court held that a share issue does not constitute a supply of goods or services 
for consideration within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive.363 
 
In the KapHag and the Kretztechnik cases, the ECJ found not only that the partnership or the company 
did not supply a service in the relevant circumstances, but that, in addition, the contribution made by 
the partner or the shareholder did not constitute consideration.364 
 
 
355 See para 2.1 above. 
356 Kretztechnik AG v Finanzamt Linz Case C-465/03, 26 May 2005 (hereafter the Kretztechnik case). 
357 Ibid at para 15. 
358 Ibid at para 25. 
359 Ibid at para 26. 
360 Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in the Kretztechnik AG v Finanzamt Linz case at para 59. 
361 Ibid at para 60. 
362 Ibid at para 26. 
363 Ibid at para 27. 
364 See KapHag case at para 43 and the Kretztechnik case at para 27. 
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Referring to the Kretztechnik case,365 van Doesum argues that the ECJ draws no distinction between 
the admission of a partner to a partnership in consideration of a payment of a contribution in cash, and 
the issue of shares in a company.366 Applying Advocate-General Jacob’s opinion in Kretztechnik,367 
van Doesum argues that, from the partnership’s perspective, there is an acquisition of capital, not a 
supply. Where a partnership grants a partner a ‘share’ in the partnership, it is not selling any existing 
intangible property or any right over a fraction of its existing assets. The partnership merely increases 
its assets by acquiring capital, and acknowledging the partner’s rights as residual owners of a previously 
non-existent fraction of the increased assets which they contributed in the form of capital.368 
 
The question is whether the ECJ’s reasoning also applies to the South African VAT Act, so that a 
partner’s acquisition of a partner’s share on the establishment of a partnership, cannot result from a 
supply for the reasons given by the ECJ. 
 
The term ‘supply’ is defined in the VAT Act to ‘include’, amongst others, performance in terms of a sale, 
rental agreement, and all other forms of supply, whether voluntary, compulsory, or by operation of 
law.369 This definition is not exhaustive as the use of the word ‘include’ in the definition, suggests that 
both the things specifically mentioned in the definition are envisaged, as well as things that fall within 
the ordinary meaning of the defined term. The phrase ‘all other forms of supply’ has the same 
broadening effect. Considering that the VAT Act does not provide a clear definition of the term “supply”, 
it is not always easy to determine whether a particular transaction constitutes a “supply. The dictionary 
meaning of ‘supply’, in the present context, is to “make available (something needed or wanted); provide 
for use or consumption, esp. commercially.”370 
 
In Shell's Annandale Farm (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS,371 the court held that some form of act 
is required to constitute a supply for the purpose of VAT legislation. It can also be inferred from the 
judgment in National Educare Forum v Commissioner for SARS,372 that ‘supply’ as defined in the VAT 
Act, means to provide something.373 The courts’ understanding of ‘supply’ in the VAT Act, accords with 
its dictionary meaning and the meaning given to the term by the courts in New Zealand. ‘Supply’ is 
 
365 The Kretztechnik case at paras 23-25. 
366 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 264. 
367 The Kretztechnik case para 59. 
368 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 267. 
369 See ‘supply’ as defined in s 1(1). 
370 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
371 62 SATC 97 at 107. 
372 National Educare Forum v Commissioner of SARS [2002] JOL 9423 (Tk). 
373 The applicant argued in this case that it performed no act in procuring ‘the provision of food items’ to school children 
(at 24). The court held, on the contrary, that the applicant indirectly supplied the food items through subcontractors (at 
28). 
58 
 
defined in section 5(1) of the New Zealand GST Act, as including ‘all forms of supply’. In Databank 
Systems Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the New Zealand High Court held that in the 
context of section 5(1), ‘supply’ simply means ‘to furnish with or provide’.374 
 
Van der Zwan and Stiglingh argue that, based on the meaning of supply as set out above essentially 
as an action where something is provided, grounds may exist to advance a similar argument to that of 
the ECJ, namely that the issuing of shares is not a form of supply as the company does not provide, 
furnish, or give something to the new shareholder.375 
 
Otto and Trombitas376 maintain that the ECJ follows a substance-over-form approach, which means 
that the nature of a supply is determined on the basis of its economic substance, instead of an analysis 
of its legal form.377 Relying on the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in CIR v Gulf Harbour 
Development Limited,378 they question whether a New Zealand court would also prefer a substance-
over-form approach.379 This case concerned the sale to the public of redeemable preference shares in 
a company which operated a golf club and related facilities. The question was whether an ‘equity 
security’ had been supplied. An equity security is defined by section 3(2) as meaning, “… any interest 
in or right to a share in the capital of a body corporate.”380 
 
If an equity security had been supplied, it would qualify as the supply of a ‘financial service’ as defined 
in section 3(2), which by the operation of sections 6(3)(d) and 14(1), would be exempt from GST. The 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue contended that the supply was, in substance, membership in the golf 
club, which was not a ‘financial service’ and, therefore, attracted GST. 
 
The court applied the principles enunciated in Marac Life Assurance Ltd v C of IR; C of IR v Marac Life 
Assurance Ltd,381 where the court held382 that the true nature of a transaction can only be ascertained 
by careful consideration of the legal arrangements actually entered into and carried out, rather than an 
assessment of the broad substance of the transaction measured by the results intended and achieved, 
or of the overall economic consequences. What is crucial, the court stated, is the determination of the 
 
374 (1987) 9 NZTC 6,213 High Court Wellington M328/87 at 6,223. 
375 Van der Zwan & Stiglingh 2011 De Jure Law Journal 334. 
376 Otto J & Trombitas E What’s happening in GST? New Zealand 2014 Tax Conference. 
377 In jurisdictions where the “substance over form principle” applies, I believe that it can be argued that the economic 
substance remains the determining factor. 
378 (2004) 21 NZTC 18,915 (CA) (hereafter, the Gulf Harbour case). 
379 Otto J and Trombitas E “What’s happening in GST?” New Zealand 2014 Tax Conference at 11. 
380 The Gulf Harbour case para 2. 
381 (1986) 8 NZTC 5,086, [1986] 1 NZLR 694. 
382 Ibid at NZTC 5,097; NZLR 705. 
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legal rights and duties actually created by the transaction into which the parties entered.383 The court in 
the Gulf Harbour case held, therefore, that preference shares had been sold and that they were equity 
securities for purposes of the New Zealand GST Act.384 
 
The South African courts’ position on ‘substance-over-form’ in contractual interpretation corresponds to 
that of New Zealand. It is clear from the Appellate Division case Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and 
another v CIR,385 that the question of taxability (or non-taxability) must be decided in accordance with 
the legal rights of a taxpayer arising from the transaction. A court only engages the substance, rather 
than the form, of a transaction if the transaction is in fraudem legis – ie, when it is intentionally disguised 
so as to escape the provisions of the law. The court must be satisfied that there is a real intention, 
definitely ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention.386 
 
Otto and Trombitas submit that in a share subscription, the legal form is the issue or allocation of an 
equity share in consideration of the invested funds. It constitutes a supply, ie, something is furnished 
under an enforceable agreement which creates reciprocal obligations. They further submit that it is 
unlikely the New Zealand courts would depart from the transactional analysis preferred in GST cases, 
and instead favour the economic analysis taken by the ECJ in the Kretztechnik case.387 
 
I argue that South African courts will decide the VAT treatment of a share issue in accordance with the 
legal rights flowing from the transaction. Considering the nature of a share, a share issue is, in effect, 
a supply of a right to a proportionate part of the assets of the company, either by way of dividend, or 
through the distribution of assets in winding up, in return for the payment of a consideration.388 The 
court will, in all likelihood, ignore the alleged substance of the transaction – ie, the acquisition of capital 
from the company’s point of view, and the making of an investment from that of the shareholder. 
 
A court will equally consider a partner’s contribution to the partnership to be a supply rather than an 
investment. Furthermore, it is unlikely to agree with the ECJ’s reasons for holding that a partnership is 
not making a supply when it admits a partner to the partnership based on the analysis that, in substance, 
the partnership is increasing its assets by acquiring capital. 
 
383  The Gulf Harbour case para 19. 
384 In the Nelson case at para 16 the court confirmed that in the absence of sham, it is the legal character of the transaction 
actually entered into and carried out which is decisive. 
385 [1997] JOL 213 (A). 
386 Ibid at 18-20. Barry Ger states that, ‘the courts will consider if the parties truly intended to give effect to the 
agreement in accordance with its terms. If they did, then substance follows the form and the agreement will stand’. See 
Ger B “High Court Challenges SCA’s interpretation of simulated transactions” available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/25.pdf (date of use: 9 December 2016). 
387 Otto and Trombitas What’s happening in GST? New Zealand 2014 Tax Conference 11. 
388 Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (Juta 2012) 213. 
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Otto and Trombitas389 point out that Kretztechnik reflects a position taken only in the EU, whilst all other 
indirect tax systems – eg, Australia,390 Canada,391 and Singapore392 – follow a process similar to that in 
New Zealand,393 and treat the first issue of shares as an exempt supply. 
 
Assuming that a partner’s acquisition of a partner’s share results from a supply, and that the supply is 
made to the partner by the partnership, the question which arises is whether such a supply is made by 
the partnership in the course or furtherance of carrying on an enterprise as contemplated in 
section 7(1)(a). The ATO is of the view that the supply of an interest in a partnership, is made in the 
course or furtherance of the enterprise that the partnership carries on. It reasons that the supply of the 
interest in the partnership has the necessary connection with the enterprise to render the supply “in the 
course or furtherance of the enterprise”.394 
 
As stated above,395 both ‘economic activities’ in the Sixth Directive, and ‘enterprise’ in the VAT Act, 
envisage on-going activities. In the Wellcome Trust case, the ECJ held that if the taking of shares does 
not in itself constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, the same must be 
true of activities consisting in the transfer of such shares.396 In the EDM case, the ECJ held that activities 
which go beyond the compass of the simple acquisition and sale of securities, such as transactions 
carried out in the course of a business trading in securities, indeed fall within the scope of the Sixth 
Directive.397 
 
The De Beers case, where the court held that unless one conducts business as an investment company, 
the investments one holds cannot on their own be regarded as constituting an enterprise,398 is in 
keeping with both the Wellcome Trust and EDM cases. 
 
389 Ibid at 11. 
390 McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Locations 252 and 257; ATO “Financial supplies” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/GST/When-to-charge-GST-(and-when-not-to)/Input-taxed-sales/Financial-supplies/ 
(date of use: 20 September 2018). 
391 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST paras 13,005, 13,015 and 13,025; Barnett Introduction to Federal Income 
Taxation in Canada para. 7,930. 
392 Singapore Inland Revenue Authority “Supplies Exempt from GST” available at https://www.iras.gov.sg/ 
irashome/GST/GST-registered-business/Working-out-your-taxes/When-is-GST-not-charged/Supplies-Exempt-from-GST/ 
(date of use: 9 December 2016). 
393 See McKenzie GST A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 43; NZIR “GST – Current Issues – Chapter 2 – Financial Services” 
available at http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2015-ip-gst-current-issues/chapter-2 paras 2.1, 2.22 (date of use: 20 
September 2018). 
394 GSTR 2003/13 para 59. 
395 See para 2.6.3. 
396 The Wellcome Trust case para 33. 
397 Empresa de Desenvolvimento Mineiro SGPS SA (EDM) and Fazenda Pública Case C-77/0129 April 2004 para 59 (hereafter 
the EDM case). 
398 See para 2.6.3 above. 
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Assuming that the partnership held the partners’ shares, and that it supplied those shares to the 
partners upon the establishment of the partnership, I argue that those supplies would probably not be 
made by the partnership in the course or furtherance of carrying on an enterprise. In the unlikely event 
that the partnership supplied the shares in the course or furtherance of an enterprise which traded in 
partner’s shares, the supply could be subject to VAT. 
 
2.9 The deductibility of VAT on pre-formation and pre-business expenses 
 
Expenses that may typically be incurred prior to the formation of a partnership (also referred to as ‘pre-
formation expenses’) are, for example, legal fees incurred in drafting the partnership agreement, and 
accounting fees for services incident to the organisation of the partnership – such as setting up the 
partnership’s accounting system.399 
 
The question is whether the partnership may deduct the VAT levied on pre-formation expenses as an 
input tax deduction. Section 19 allows for the deduction of VAT levied on the acquisition of goods or 
services for or on behalf of a company, but before its incorporation, provided that certain requirements 
are met.400 The relief under section 19 specifically applies only to companies,401 and is therefore not 
available to partnerships. 
 
Section 18(4)(b)(i), however, permits a deduction in relation to goods or services that were supplied to 
a person, if: 
a. no deduction was made in respect of such goods or services; and 
b. such goods or services are applied by that person, or, where he is a member of a partnership, 
by that partnership, for consumption, use, or supply in the course of making taxable supplies. 
 
Badenhorst submits that VAT may be deducted by a partnership on goods or services acquired prior to 
the commencement of business operations under section 18(4).402 As it is not required that a 
 
399 See Rickets & Tunnell Practical Guide to Partnerships 116. 
400 Section 19 requires, inter alia, that the goods or services must have been acquired prior to incorporation of the company, 
by a person who – 
(a) was reimbursed by the company for the whole amount of the consideration paid for the goods or services; and 
(b) acquired those goods or services for the purpose of an enterprise to be carried on by such company and has not 
used those goods or services for any purpose other than carrying on such enterprise. 
401 Section 1(1) defines a ‘company’ as meaning a company as defined in s 1 the IT Act, which defines a ‘company’ as 
including a company, co-operative, an association formed to serve a specified purpose, or a portfolio comprised in any 
investment scheme. 
402 Badenhorst G “When VAT returns to your pocket” 8 October 2007 Business Day at 6. 
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partnership actually commence business before it is established,403 it is indeed possible for acquisitions 
to be made by the partnership after its establishment, but before the commencement of its business 
operations. I agree with Badenhorst; seeing that whilst section 19 permits an input tax deduction on 
goods or services acquired on behalf of a company prior to its incorporation, section 18(4)(b) does not 
allow a deduction related to acquisitions made prior to the establishment of a partnership. A scenario 
contemplated in section 18(4)(b), is where the goods or services have been supplied to a person, and 
such goods or services are applied, “where he is a member of a partnership”, by the partnership. That 
the person making the acquisition is a member of the partnership, clearly implies the existence of the 
partnership at the time of the partner’s acquisition. Section 18(4)(b) does not envisage a situation where 
the acquisition is made before the establishment of the partnership and, therefore, before the person 
making the acquisition became a member of the partnership. The relief under section 18(4)(b) is, 
therefore, more restricted than under section 19. 
 
A partnership is, consequently, not allowed a deduction in relation to pre-formation expenses, but only 
for expenses incurred before the commencement of business (ie, pre-business expenses). Therefore, 
if the partners incur pre-business expenses, and the relevant goods or services are subsequently 
applied by the partnership for use in the course of making taxable supplies, the partnership qualifies for 
the section 18(4)(b) deduction. 
 
In Australia and New Zealand, as in South Africa, only companies are permitted to deduct GST as input 
tax in relation to pre-incorporation supplies.404 
 
In Canada and the UK, however, pre-registration relief is granted to persons, which should include 
partnerships. When a person registers for GST in Canada, he is considered to have acquired any assets 
used in a commercial activity immediately after that time, and to have paid GST on those assets. As a 
result, the new registrant is eligible to claim an input tax credit to the extent that the goods are used in 
commercial activity.405 In the UK, provided that certain requirements are met, VAT incurred on goods 
 
403 See para 2.5 above. 
404 McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Locations 20 and 132; ATO “Special rules for specific GST credit claims” 
available at https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/GST/Claiming-GST-credits/Special-rules-for-specific-GST-credit-claims/ 
(date of use: 19 August 2018); McKenzie GST A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 105; Marsden Bookkeepers Guide 428. 
405 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 3,100. A similar legislative provision allows a new registrant to claim 
an input tax credit on GST which became payable before registration for services and which is rendered after registration. 
The input tax credits are available to the extent the service is used in a commercial activity. See Chabot et al EY’s 
Complete Guide to GST/HST para 3,100. See also CRA “Eligibility for ITC on ‘start-up’ costs – Eligible capital property” 
available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications/p-019r/eligibility-on-
start-costs-eligible-capital-property.html (date of use: 19 August 2018). 
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or services supplied to a taxable person before the date on which he was registered for VAT, may be 
treated as input tax.406 The New Zealand GST Act similarly provides for pre-registration relief.407 
 
As concerns the EU, in the Polski Trawertyn-case,408 the future partners of a partnership, before the 
creation of the partnership, acquired immovable property for the future exploitation by the partnership. 
The partners’ subsequent contribution of the immovable property to the partnership was exempt from 
VAT. The question was whether the partners were entitled to deduct the VAT as input tax, although the 
immovable property was used by the partnership (instead of by the partners) in its taxable activities.409 
The ECJ held that the partners may be considered to be taxable persons for the purposes of VAT and 
are, therefore, entitled to the input tax deduction.410 The court reasoned that in applying the principle of 
neutrality in VAT, a taxable person whose sole object is to prepare the economic activity of another 
taxable person, and who has not effected any taxable transaction, may exercise a right to deduct in 
relation to taxable transactions carried out by the other taxable person.411 
 
In the Malburg-case,412 Malburg, who was a member of a partnership that had dissolved, founded a 
new partnership. Malburg made available a client base, which he had acquired following the dissolution 
of the old partnership, to the new partnership free of charge. The question before the ECJ was, having 
regard to the principle of neutrality, whether Malburg was entitled to deduct the VAT paid on the 
acquisition of the client base, as input tax.413 The ECJ distinguished this case from Polski Trawertyn. In 
the latter case, the contribution of the immovable property fell within the scope of VAT, but constituted 
an exempt transaction. In the Malburg-case, however, the provision of the client base for use by the 
partnership free of charge did not constitute an “economic activity” within the meaning of the Sixth 
Directive.414 Consequently, the ECJ reasoned, that there was no direct and immediate link between a 
 
406 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 34.10; HMRC “How to treat input tax: pre-registration, pre-
incorporation and post-deregistration claims to input tax under regulation 111” available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-
internal-manuals/vat-input-tax/vit32000 (date of use: 20 August 2018). 
407 Section 21B of the New Zealand GST Act permits a registered person to deduct input tax relating to goods or services 
acquired before registration. See NZIR “Subsequent registration” available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-
manuals/vat-input-tax/vit32000 (date of use: 20 August 2018). It is evident that transitional problems in respect of VAT 
are a common phenomenon and are, therefore, not exclusive to partnerships. In my view, transitional rules must be 
developed to ensure a smooth VAT transition. This study, however, focuses on partnerships primarily. A complete analysis 
of transitional rules is, therefore, not provided. The authorities referenced in the footnotes above offer general 
discussions on the topic. 
408 Kopalnia Odkrywkowa Polski Trawertyn P. Granatowicz, M. Wąsiewicz spółka jawna v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w 
Poznaniu Case C-280/10 1 March 2012. 
409 See 4 of the judgment. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Finanzamt Saarlouis v Heinz Malburg Case C-204/13 13 March 2014. 
413 See 5 of the judgment. 
414 See 6 of the judgment. 
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particular input and output transaction giving rise to entitlement to deduct.415 Moreover, seeing that the 
principle of fiscal neutrality is not a rule of primary law, but a principle of interpretation, the ECJ held 
that it does not allow the scope of the entitlement to deduct input tax, to be extended in the face of an 
unambiguous provision of the Sixth Directive.416 
 
Ehrke-Rabel, criticising the Malburg-case argues, that as regards the requirement of a direct and 
immediate link between an input and output transaction for the entitlement of deduction of VAT, there 
is no substantial difference between an output transaction exempt from VAT and an output transaction 
not falling within the scope of VAT. In both cases, there is no right to deduct input VAT.417 Ehrke-Rabel 
is of the view that Malburg seems to reduce the impact of Polski Trawertyn to specific situations, so that 
when determining the deductibility of VAT relating to preparatory acts, the particular circumstances 
need to be considered.418 
 
According to Papis, the ECJ in Polski Trawertyn adopted a non-formalistic approach giving priority to 
the fundamental principles underlying and constituting an integral part of the VAT system before the 
formal obligations established by legislation of national laws of EU Member States.419 
 
In my view, as the interpretive technique followed by South African courts according to which the 
“inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself”, the ECJ’s decision’s in Polski 
Trawertyn and Malburg cannot serve as guidance to the interpretation of the VAT Act on the deductibility 
of VAT on pre-formation expenses.420 Accordingly, the courts will not grant input relief beyond what is 
permitted by sections 18(4)(b) and 19. 
 
2.10 Single entity selling a share in its business 
 
The sale by a person of a share in his business could result in the establishment of a partnership if all 
the requirements for a partnership are met. The ATO regards this transaction as the supply of an 
enterprise to the partnership by the entity selling a share in the business, with the consideration being 
a supply of an interest in the partnership, together with a payment of money from the purchaser.421 
 
415 Ibid. 
416 See 7 of the judgment. 
417 Ehrke-Rabel (2014) World Journal of VAT/GST Law 122. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Papis (2012) World Journal of VAT/GST Law 99. 
420 See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Edumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA), where the court stated at para. 
18: 
“The ‘inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself', read in context and having regard to the 
purpose of the provision in the background to the interpretation and production of the document." 
421 GSTR 2003/13 para 84. 
65 
 
 
I argue that the VAT treatment of a transaction of this nature would depend on how the deal is 
structured. The seller could either sell an undivided interest in his business to the purchaser in return 
for a purchase consideration, after which they agree to each contribute their undivided shares in the 
business to the partnership. Alternatively, the owner of the business can contribute the business to the 
partnership, and the other party can make a capital contribution of his own, eg, a cash payment, to the 
partnership. 
 
In my view, each party’s contribution of an undivided share in the business to the partnership would not 
qualify for zero rating under section 11(1)(e), which zero rates the supply of an ‘enterprise’ which is 
capable of separate operation. The two contributions are two separate supplies that must be viewed 
independently of one another when considering the VAT treatment of each supply. The two undivided 
shares together constitute an enterprise, but each one, considered individually, does not constitute an 
enterprise distinct from the other. Moreover, each undivided share is not capable of separate operation 
as required by section 11(1)(e). 
 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, like South Africa, do not have specific provisions that 
regulate the VAT/GST treatment of the above factual scenarios.422 
 
  
 
422 In my view, however, each party’s contribution of an undivided share in the business to the partnership would also not 
qualify for zero rating in each of these VAT/GST jurisdictions as each undivided share would not be capable of operating 
separately as a business. In Australia the supply of a going concern is GST-free in certain circumstances. According to 
McCouat, it is possible to sell a going concern that consists of an enterprise which is part of a larger enterprise. He argues, 
however, that this does not apply if what is sold does not comprise an enterprising itself. See McCouat Australian Master 
GST Guide [E-book] Location 327. The ATO is likewise of the view that the supply of a going concern would be GST-free 
provided that all the things that are necessary for the continued operation of the enterprise is supplied. See ATO GSTR 
2002/5 “Goods and services tax: When is a ‘supply of a going concern’ GST-free?” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/pdf?DocID=GST%2FGSTR20025%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001&filename=law/view/pdf/p
br/gstr2002-005c5u1.pdf&PiT=99991231235958 (date of use: 21 December 2018) para 17. The New Zealand GST Act 
provides for the zero-rating of the supply of a going concern provided that, amongst others, the supplier and the recipient 
agree that the supply is of a going concern. There is a supply of a taxable activity, or part of a taxable activity, where that 
part is capable of separate operation. See McKenzie GST A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 296. According to the NZIR, 
to qualify for the zero-rating, it must be the supply of the whole or stand-alone part of a taxable activity. See NZIR “Zero-
rated supplies” available at https://www.ird.govt.nz/gst/additional-calcs/calc-spec-supplies/calc-zero/calc-
zero.html#salegoingconcern (date of use: 20 August 2018). In the UK, where certain conditions are met the transfer of a 
business as a going concern must be treated as neither a supply of goods, nor a supply of services and is, therefore, not 
subject to VAT. One of the conditions, in relation to a part transfer of a business, is that, that part must be capable of 
separate operation. See HMRC “Transfer of a business as a going concern (VAT Notice 700/9)” available at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transfer-a-business-as-a-going-concern-and-vat-notice-7009 (date of use: 20 August 2018); 
Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax paras 8.9 and 8.10. Canada’s ETA does not have a provision which zero 
rates the supply of a business as a going concern. 
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2.11 Conclusion 
 
The focus in this chapter has been on the VAT treatment of supplies that are typically made on the 
formation of a partnership. This required a consideration of the law of partnership, regarding the 
formation phase, as well as a consideration of pertinent provisions in the VAT Act, some of which 
compel a deviation from the common law. Deeming a partnership to be a person, for example, creates 
a strong dichotomy between the general legal nature, and the VAT character of a partnership 
transaction. How a transaction is seen for partnership law purposes, is often very different from how it 
is viewed from a VAT perspective. Determining the precise impact of the provisions in the VAT Act 
relevant to partnerships, on the character or nature of a partnership transaction raises difficulties in 
interpretation in that the extent to which the provisions are intended to supplant or alter the common 
law, is often not clear due to a lack of detailed guidance by the legislature. 
 
The partnership law and VAT law dichotomy is an important theme that runs through most of the 
thesis,423 and always requires careful consideration of the interplay between the common law and the 
VAT Act. 
 
It was argued that whilst a partnership cannot be the bearer of rights and duties in terms of the common 
law, for VAT purposes, it is quite capable of making supplies and acquisitions, of registering for VAT as 
a single person, and of carrying on an enterprise independently of its members. Importantly, the 
partnership’s status as a separate person enables supplies and acquisitions to be made between the 
partnership and its members, even though, legally, the same person is both supplier and acquirer in 
the same transaction. This separate-person status naturally enables more transactions that are subject 
to VAT to be recognised in the activities that are typically undertaken by a partnership, especially 
between the partnership and its members. 
 
In the following chapter, the VAT treatment of transactions commonly entered into throughout the 
operation of a partnership, is considered – save for the transfer of partners’ shares which is addressed 
in Chapter Four. 
 
  
 
423 See Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” at 35 who also grapple with this common-law and GST-law dichotomy in their 
paper. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
OPERATION OF A PARTNERSHIP 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The following transactions are typically encountered in the operation of a partnership: 
a. Supplies from a partner to the partnership, whether as a contribution of capital, or as a third-
party supplier.424 
b. Supplies by the partnership, including supplies made by a partner acting on behalf of the 
partnership, to a third party. 
c. Acquisitions by the partnership. 
d. Distributions to partners, including profit and in specie distributions. 
e. Private or domestic use of partnership property. 
f. The supply of partners’ shares.425 
 
The VAT implications of these transactions, which are not expressly provided for in the VAT Act, are 
discussed in this chapter, save for the supply of partners’ shares. 
 
3.2 Supplies from a partner to the partnership 
 
3.2.1 The nature of a partner’s supply 
 
As stated above,426 a partner’s supply can be a contribution to the capital of the partnership. After the 
formation of the partnership, the agreed capital can, with the consent of all the partners, be added to or 
withdrawn at any time.427 The partner, on the basis of the partnership agreement,428 makes the 
contribution in his capacity as a partner. Where the partner, instead, makes the supply as a third-party 
 
424 A partner acts as a third-party supplier where he makes a supply to the partnership, also referred to as a third-party 
supply, as part of a transaction that does not involve a capital contribution. See GSTR 2003/13 para 104. 
425 See Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 262; Ward J “GST and the Formation & Dissolution of Partnerships” available at 
http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www. 
tved.net.au/PublicPapers/June_2003,_Sound_Education_in_GST,_GST_and_The_Formation___Dissolution_of_Partnershi
ps.html 4 (date of use: 2 May 2017). 
426 See paras 2.6 and 3.1 above. 
427 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 297; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 5; Scamell & I’Anson Banks 
Lindley on the Law of Partnerships 495. See also Schlemmer v Viljoen en Andere [1958] 2 All SA 309 (T) at 315. 
428 See Ramdhin et al ibid at para 263; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 3.21 and 3.22. According to Bamford Law of 
Partnership 27, a partner is a debtor to the partnership for what he has agreed to contribute. See also Williams Concise 
Corporate and Partnership Law 5. 
68 
 
supplier (eg, as an independent contractor) he acts in a non-partner capacity, as the supply is not made 
in terms of the partnership agreement.429 Strictly speaking, these supplies do not fall within the ambit of 
the partnership business as envisaged in the partnership agreement.430 
 
I concluded in Chapter Two,431 that a partner’s contribution to the partnership may simultaneously serve 
as a supply as agent on behalf of the partnership, to a third party, and by carrying out that task, as an 
in-kind contribution of labour to the partnership. As an agent, the partner contracts an obligation in the 
name of the partnership.432 Where the partner acts as a third-party supplier, he is not an agent of the 
partnership, but incurs an obligation in his personal capacity. The partner’s actions would, 
consequently, not render the partnership liable.433 
 
In my view, when a partner who is a vendor makes a contribution or a supply to the partnership as a 
third-party supplier, the supply will be subject to VAT at fifteen per cent, provided that all the 
requirements of section 7(1)(a) have been met.434 Most important, here, is that the supply must be made 
for a consideration.435 Should the partner act as an agent for the partnership, the partner is liable for 
any VAT on his supply of ‘agency’ or ‘representation’ services to the partnership, whilst the partnership 
is liable, through the partner as agent, for any VAT on the supply made to the third party. 
 
3.2.2 The consideration for the partner’s supply 
 
The value of a partner’s supply to the partnership is the amount of the consideration for such supply.436 
Where the supply is made for no consideration, or for a consideration which is less than the open-
market value of the supply, and the partnership is not exclusively involved in the making of taxable 
 
429 See Burke Federal Income Taxation [E-book] Locations 969 and 972. 
430 It is an essentialia of a partnership agreement that the partnership business must be carried on for the joint benefit of 
the parties. See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 5; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” paras 262 and 263; Benade 
et al Ondernemingsreg paras 3.32 to 3.35. A partner who makes supplies as an independent contractor, acts for his own 
benefit. According to Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 29, partners often provide personal services or personal 
property to their partnerships, which do not fall strictly within the ambit of the partnership’s business.  
431 See para 2.6.2 above. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 8.4.1; Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 29. 
434 A supply by a partner to a partnership may also be zero-rated or exempt. A supply by a partner, who is a vendor, of an 
enterprise or of a part of an enterprise, which is capable of separate operation, is zero-rated subject to compliance with s 
11(1)(e). A loan made by a registered partner to a partnership, which constitutes a ‘financial service’ as defined in s 2(1)(f), 
is exempt under s 12(a).  See GSTR 2003/13 para 108. 
435 Section 7(1)(a) requires that the supply must be made in the course or furtherance of an enterprise carried on by the 
vendor. The definition of ‘enterprise’ in s 1(1), in turn, requires that the supply must be made for a consideration. 
436 The amount of the consideration for the supply is determined in accordance with s 10(3), which provides that such 
consideration shall be – 
(a) to the extent that such consideration is a consideration in money, the amount of money; and 
(b) to the extent that such consideration is not a consideration in money, the open market value of that consideration. 
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supplies, section 10(4) could come into play and deem the consideration for the supply to be its open-
market value. 
 
Should the partnership make taxable supplies only, the value of the supplies made to the partnership 
is not really important. This is because the VAT levied on such supplies is, in any case, deductible as 
input tax. Where, however, the partnership does not make taxable supplies only, the value of the 
partners’ supplies matters as the VAT on those supplies is not fully deductible by the partnership.437 
 
3.2.3 The distinction between consideration for a supply and profit distributions 
 
In my opinion, it is important to distinguish between a payment made as consideration for a partner’s 
supply, and a distributive share in profits, whether the supply is a capital contribution or a third-party 
supply. If the payment is consideration, the supply will be subject to VAT if it is made in the course or 
furtherance of the partner’s enterprise. If, however, the payment is a profit distribution, it does not 
constitute consideration since, as I argue above,438 a partner’s share and any resultant profit 
distributions, are not reciprocally connected to a partner’s contribution. A profit distribution would also 
not be consideration for a third-party supply because that distribution is clearly the result of ownership 
of a partner’s share439 and not intended to constitute payment for a supply. If section 10(4) – in terms 
of which the consideration for the contribution is deemed to be its open-market value – does not apply, 
the value of the supply will, in terms of section 10(23), be deemed to be nil. 
 
Even though the partnership is entitled to deduct any VAT levied as input tax where it applies the 
contribution or other acquisition for a taxable purpose, it is clearly administratively more burdensome 
for a partner to register for VAT and to account for output tax on the transaction. Consequently, a partner 
would be in a more favourable position if the payment for the supply were classified as a profit 
distribution, as a profit distribution would not constitute consideration for either a capital contribution or 
a third-party supply. I argue that the partners could be disposed to claim that a payment is a profit 
distribution, and not a consideration, in order to ‘shelter’ the supply from VAT.440 
 
Burke is of the view that the nature of a payment to a partner might not be clear which makes it difficult 
to distinguish between a payment for a supply, and a profit distribution.441 What may cause this 
uncertainty, in my opinion, is that partners are unrestricted as regards agreeing on the amount of each 
 
437 See Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 29. 
438 See para 2.6.5 above. 
439 See para 2.6.3 above. 
440 See Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 45. 
441 Burke Federal Income Taxation Locations 2775 and 2778. 
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partner’s profit share in the partnership agreement, and the formula used to determine the respective 
shares may be complex or unusual.442 
 
The next issue is how the nature of a payment to a partner can be determined where it is unclear from 
the terms of the partnership agreement whether the payment is a profit distribution or consideration. 
The fundamental object of interpreting a contact is to establish and give effect to the common intention 
of the parties. To do this, a court will have regard to the language used in the contract and the 
surrounding circumstances.443 
 
In my view, the following indicators could be useful in determining the nature of a payment made to a 
partner. 
a. A specific payment made by a partnership to a partner, in return for a supply to the partnership, 
is required to be made to the partner after the payment of partnership creditors, but before the 
division of net profits.444 I argue that if the payment is prioritised or sequenced in this way, it is 
indicative of the amount being a payment of consideration for the partner’s supply, rather than 
a profit distribution. A payment made for a supply, consequently, reduces the profits available 
for distribution.445 
b. An obligation of a partnership to make payment with respect to a liability that is certain, 
irrespective whether there are profits or not,446 is, according to Burke, difficult to reconcile with 
the concept of a distributive share of partnership profits.447 These may take the form of fixed, 
periodical payments that do not fluctuate depending on the partnership’s net profits (eg, a fixed 
salary, although a partner cannot be employed by the partnership, or fixed interest payments). 
The liability could well exceed the partnership’s profits at the end of an accounting year – for 
example, when profits are required to be distributed as agreed to in the partnership contract. 
If the amount or the fact of payment is, instead, contingent upon the entrepreneurial risks of 
the partnership business, and, accordingly, dependent on the partnership’s net profits, the 
payment, in all likelihood, constitutes profit share.448 
c. Payments made to a partner in addition to his profit share, and which are based on the 
partner’s normal hourly rate for those types of service – or as Burke puts it, resemble the 
manner in which third parties compensate the partner – point to the payment of 
 
442 See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 295. 
443 Joubert WA “Contract” in Kühne M (ed) Law of South Africa vol 9 (LexisNexis 2014) para 351. 
444 Jameson v Irvin’s Executors (1887-1888) 5 SC 222 at 252; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 294. 
445 Burke Federal Income Taxation Location 1209, 1212. 
446 See Jameson v Irvin’s Executors (1887-1888) 5 SC 222 at 252. 
447 Burke Federal Income Taxation Location 2776. 
448 Ibid at Location 2873. 
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consideration.449 This reasoning would also apply to supplies of property in return for a related 
payment, without regard to the success of the partnership business. This type of transaction 
would more closely resemble a sale or an exchange, than a capital contribution that is placed 
at the disposal of the partnership and subjected to the risks of the business.450 
d. The relative proximity in time between the supply and the payment, instead of the partner 
receiving payment when profit distributions are normally made, suggests a payment of 
consideration.451  
e. In the case of a third-party supply, the partnership may withhold payment if the partner has not 
yet rendered performance, or if his performance is defective, by raising the defence of exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus against the partner.452 A partner, however, is entitled to his share in 
the profits whether or not his contribution is defective. If his contribution is not forthcoming or 
is defective, the partner can, by means of the pro socio, only be compelled to contribute what 
he has agreed to the partnership.453 The nature of the action available to the partnership 
against the partner is, therefore, a relevant consideration. 
 
I believe that if the supply is a contribution, then it is more likely that the payment to the partner is a 
distribution of profits, since, as stated above,454 it is a naturale of the partnership agreement that a 
partner is not entitled to compensation for his contribution. As a result, save where the partners 
otherwise agree, a partner is not rewarded for his contribution. A partner is, therefore, not normally paid 
a consideration for his contribution, but rather receives payment in the nature of profit distributions. 
 
If, however, as stated,455 a partner has performed special work beyond that performed by the other 
partners, and which was not envisaged as part of his duties under the partnership agreement, he is 
 
449 Ibid at Location 2888. See also CRA GST/HST Policy Statement P-244 – Application of Sub-s 272.1(1) of the Excise Tax 
Act available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications/p-
244/partnerships-application-subsection-272-1-1-excise-tax-act.html (date of use: 31 December 2018) 3-4 (hereafter CRA 
Policy Statement P-244). The CRA’s administrative policy on the meaning of the phrase ‘anything done by a person as a 
member of a partnership’, as contemplated in sub-s 272.1(1) of Canada’s ETA, is provided in this policy statement. Sub-s 
272.1(1) provides that, “anything done by a person as a member of a partnership is deemed to have been done by the 
partnership in the course of the partnership's activities and not to have been done by the person.” The practical effect of 
sub-s 272.1(1) is that a partner is not considered to have made any sort of supply to the partnership when he performs 
duties “as a member of a partnership”, and the partner, accordingly, is not required to account for GST in relation to the 
performance of such duties. See Murray BF “Partner Contributions: Deeming Away any Supply to the Partnership” 
available at http://www.cch.ca/ newsletters/TaxAccounting/july2010/Article2.htm (date of use: 4 September 2014). 
450 See Burke Federal Income Taxation Location 2902, 2905; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 5; Ramdhin et 
al “Partnership” para 263; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.26. 
451 See Burke Federal Income Taxation Location 2875, 2878. 
452 See para 2.6.5 above. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Ibid. 
455 Ibid. 
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entitled to claim remuneration for his services. Consequently, a partner is normally paid a consideration 
for a third-party supply. 
 
The partnership agreement might, however, not be clear on the nature of the supply.456 In my view, the 
following indicators could be useful in determining the nature of a partner’s supply, which could, in turn, 
be indicative of the nature of the partnership’s payment to the partner. 
 
a. If the partner’s supply relates to the purpose of the partnership business, as specified in the 
partnership agreement, or, as Burke submits, the services are closely related to the 
partnership’s activities,457 it is more likely that the supply is a contribution and the payment a 
distributive share in the profits.458 The argument, in my view, is that the partner’s supply is 
intended to achieve the partnership’s objective, as opposed to the partner’s personal business 
objective. 
b. That the partner is performing the activity not only for the partnership, but also for an enterprise 
which he carries on separately from the partnership, is indicative of a third-party supply.459 
c. A partner is entitled to be reimbursed for expenses which he has incurred in connection with 
partnership affairs.460 Therefore, where a partner is reimbursed by the partnership for 
necessary expenses he has incurred in order to make the supply to the partnership, this 
suggests a contribution.461 As stated,462 when making a contribution of labour to the 
partnership, that contribution may simultaneously serve as a supply by the partner as agent 
on behalf of the partnership to a third party. In terms of the law of agency, a principal must 
reimburse the agent for all expenses reasonably and properly incurred in carrying out his 
mandate.463 
d. A partner has the right to be indemnified for losses which he personally suffers whilst carrying 
on the partnership business. The risk of such losses must, however, be directly and 
inseparably linked to the carrying on of the partnership business.464 In accordance with agency 
law, a principal must, similarly, indemnify an agent for losses or liability incurred in the 
execution of his mandate.465 The partnership is, therefore, liable for the actions of the partner 
 
456 Burke Federal Income Taxation Location 2795. See also Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 44. 
457 Burke ibid at Location 2790, 2793. 
458 See CRA Policy Statement P-244 at 2. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 37; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 294; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg paras 4.17 and 4.18. 
461 See CRA Policy Statement P-244 at 2. 
462 See para 2.6.2 above. 
463 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 997; Kerr Law of Agency 177. 
464 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 294; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 4.18; Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 37. 
465 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 997; Kerr Law of Agency 177. 
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carried out within the course and scope of the partnership business.466 I argue that the 
existence of an obligation to indemnify a partner for losses resulting from his supply, points to 
the supply being a contribution.  
e. A transaction effected by a partner with a third party as agent for the partnership, is binding as 
between the partnership, as principal, and the third party. The partnership is liable under the 
contract, and may consequently be sued by the third party, whilst no liability attaches to the 
partner under the transaction.467 I argue, therefore, that if the partnership, rather than the 
partner, can be sued under the contract with the third party, the partner’s supply is likely to be 
a contribution, in that he acted as agent for the partnership. 
 
Clearly, the above indicators would not, singly, be decisive of the nature of a supply or payment. They 
must, however, be weighed together with all other relevant factors when determining the true intention 
of the parties. 
 
There is no requirement that partners’ contributions must take the same form, be of equal value, or of 
the same quantity.468 Partners are also free to determine the amount of each partner’s share.469 
Partners are, therefore, not required to share equally in the partnership profits. I stated470 that in the 
absence of an agreement regarding profit share, the profits are shared in proportion to the value of the 
partners’ respective contributions. Where the value of the individual contributions cannot be 
established, the profits are shared equally. In my opinion, inequalities in contributions or in profit sharing 
do not, in themselves, imply that the supply is in fact a third-party supply, or that the payment is a 
consideration in that such inequalities are perfectly normal in a partnership agreement.471 
 
3.3 Supplies made by a partnership to third parties 
 
3.3.1 The partnership’s supply of partnership property 
 
I argue472 that a partnership can make supplies and acquisitions in view of its status as a person for 
VAT purposes. The property that will generally be supplied by the partnership, is property that forms 
 
466 See CRA Policy Statement P-244 at 2. 
467 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 998; Kerr Law of Agency 177. 
468 See para 2.6 above. 
469 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 295; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg para 3.43. 
470 See para 2.6.5 above. 
471 See Murray BF “Partner Contributions: Deeming Away any Supply to the Partnership” available at 
http://www.cch.ca/newsletters/TaxAccounting/ july2010/Article2.htm (date of use: 4 September 2014). 
472 See para 2.3 above. 
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part of, or is used in, its enterprise. A partner’s contribution, for example, must be placed at the disposal 
of the partnership473 and will, therefore, be used in the partnership’s enterprise. 
 
All property used in the partnership is deemed to be partnership property if it is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the partnership business that the property should be a partnership asset.474 Whether 
property made available to the partnership constitutes partnership property, depends on the intention 
of the partners as established from the partnership agreement and the surrounding circumstances.475 
Property can, therefore, be partnership property regardless of whether or not it is jointly owned by the 
partners.476 As stated,477 the establishment of a jointly-owned partnership fund is only a naturale of a 
partnership agreement. The question is, however, whether all partnership property, despite ownership, 
can be the subject of a supply made by the partnership. 
 
In the New Zealand decision in Case S83,478 the objector – a father-and-son farming partnership – used 
farmland separately owned by each partner. A family company purchased the farmland from each 
partner. The Commissioner for Inland Revenue considered that the land had been sold in the course of 
the partnership’s taxable activity, and assessed the partnership for GST output tax on the respective 
sales by the partners to the family company. 
 
The dispute in this case turned on the correct interpretation of section 57(2)(b) of the New Zealand GST 
Act, which provides that, “any supply of goods and services made in the course of carrying on that 
taxable activity shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be supplied by that body, and shall be 
deemed not to be made by any member of that body.”479 
 
The Commissioner submitted that because the land formed part of the taxable activity of the 
partnership, the sale is deemed by section 57(2)(b) to have been made by the partnership rather than 
by the individual partners, and that this is so irrespective of whether the land is also partnership property 
under general law. It was submitted for the Commissioner, in the alternative, that if section 57(2)(b) 
 
473 See para 3.2.3 above. 
474 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 285; Bamford Law of Partnership 28, is of the view that normally, if it is necessary for 
the effective execution of the agreement that the asset be partnership property, this will be implied as the intention of the 
parties. According to Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26, ‘partnership property’ or ‘partnership assets’ 
means all the assets which belong to the partnership. 
475 Muller en ‘n Ander v Pienaar [1970] 2 All SA 410 (C) at 415; Fortune v Versluis [1962] 1 All SA 414 (A) at 357; Bamford 
Law of Partnership 28; Ramdhin et al ibid at para 285. According to Mongalo, Lumina & Kader Forms of Business Enterprise 
para 2.3.6.1, ‘partnership property’ are those assets (or property) in respect of which partners agree that they would be 
used for the realisation of the object of the partnership. See also Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 30. 
476 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 285; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 3.61 to 3.63. 
477 See para 2.7 above. 
478 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,515. 
479 Ibid at 6. 
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cannot apply unless the land is partnership property, then the land in question was partnership 
property.480 
 
The court held that section 57(2)(b) requires not only that the land be supplied in the course of carrying 
on the partnership’s taxable activity, but also that it be partnership property. According to the court, 
there was no compelling evidence that the partners supplied ownership of the land to the partnership.481 
As a result, the court held that the land could not have been sold by the partnership because it did not 
own it. The land was, therefore, not sold in the course of carrying on the partnership’s taxable activity 
of farming.482 The court determined that in making the objector partnership’s GST assessment, the 
Commissioner had acted incorrectly by concluding both that the land was the objector partnership’s 
property used in its taxable activity, and that the supply of the land was made by the objector 
partnership. The objector partnership, accordingly, succeeded.483 
 
In explaining the reason for its decision, the court stated that section 57(2)(b) cannot be taken to mean 
that the sale of land made in the course of a partnership’s taxable activity of farming, is deemed to be 
made by the partnership. The flaw, according to the court, is that in the absence of some clear deeming 
legislative provision, a person or partnership cannot supply what that person or partnership does not 
own. A supply which is not made by the partners, as partners, or for them, cannot be made in the course 
of carrying on the partnership’s taxable activity or as part of its termination.484 In my view, the collection 
of individuals constituting the partnership and acting in the course and scope of the partnership’s 
common purpose, must be supplying the ownership of the property in order for the partnership, as the 
deemed person, to be the supplier of such ownership. The interpretation of section 57(2)(b) in Case S83 
was confirmed in Case S84485 and in CIR v Dormer and Anor.486 
 
Considering that section 51(1)(a) deems the partnership to be carrying on the partnership’s enterprise, 
it is in my view similar to section 57(2)(b), as this provision in effect deems any supply of goods or 
services made in the course of carrying on that enterprise, to have been made by the partnership. That 
being so, I argue that the above New Zealand cases can provide guidance on the interpretation of 
section 51(1). As the two provisions have the same effect, section 51(1)(a) cannot also be taken to 
 
480 Ibid at 7. 
481 Ibid at 10. 
482 Ibid at 11. 
483 Ibid at 12. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Case S84 above. 
486 (1997) 18 NZTC 13,446 at 11. In Case S84 at 8, the court held that all the assets used by a partnership in its taxable 
activity form part of that taxable activity. The partnership cannot, however, make a supply of the ownership of assets which 
it does not own. The court held, accordingly, that the land in question had not been sold in the course of carrying on the 
partnership’s taxable activity because the partnership did not own the land.  
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mean that the supply of property used in the partnership’s taxable activity, is necessarily deemed to be 
made by the partnership. As was held in the New Zealand cases, a partnership can only supply what it 
owns – subject, however, to section 18(4)(b), which is considered below.487 
 
In Lewkowitz v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,488 the court referred to the following general 
principle489 to be applied when interpreting deeming provisions: 
When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was 
not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the 
statutory fiction is to be resorted to.490 
 
Considering, in addition, the purpose of section 51(1) of the VAT Act, in Case S84491 the court 
expressed the view that section 57(2) of the New Zealand GST Act was intended to apply to the day-
to-day supplies to or from an unincorporated group (eg, a partnership) by making it clear that, where 
partners make or receive supplies, they are deemed to be doing so on behalf of the partnership. The 
court suggested that the aim of section 57(2) is to clarify that where people operate a partnership, they 
can register the partnership for GST purposes, and do not need to register each partner. Supplies in 
the course of the partnership’s activity, made by one or more partners, are deemed to have been made 
by the partnership and not by the partner. The same applies to inputs regarding supplies to a partner 
for the partnership. In the light of the meaning and purpose of section 57(2), it appeared to the court to 
be stretching the concept to submit that land owned by a partner is supplied by the partnership, just 
because the partnership was conducting an activity on it.492 
 
In my view, section 51(1) achieves the same aim as section 57(2) of the New Zealand GST Act, namely, 
that where the members of a partnership carry on an enterprise, the partnership, instead of its members, 
must register for VAT independently of the members. Supplies and acquisitions made by the members 
in conducting the partnership’s enterprise must, therefore, be accounted for under the partnership’s 
VAT registration number. There is nothing in section 51(1) to suggest that it also has as its purpose, to 
allow a partnership that which is generally not permitted to any other vendor, and that is to account for 
VAT on the supply of the ownership of property which the particular vendor does not own, but is only, 
 
487 That is below under this sub-heading. 
488 1946 AD 579. 
489 Quoted in Leitch v Emmot 1929 2 KB 236 at 245 and taken from Ex parte Walton 17 Ch D 746 at 756. 
490 Ibid at 590. 
491 Case S84 above. 
492 Ibid at 8. 
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for example, using in its enterprise. Only in exceptional cases provided for in the VAT Act may one 
person, account for VAT on the supply of property which belongs to another person.493 
 
In line with the judgment in Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees referred to above,494 the 
court held in Casserley v Stubbs,495 that before ruling that a statute intends to alter the common law, 
the statute must either explicitly say that it is the intention of the legislature to alter the common law, or 
the inference from the statute must be such that no conclusion is warranted other than that the 
legislature had such an intention.496 Although commenting on the UK’s tax system, Loutzenhiser’s 
statement that, in the case of deeming provisions, the courts will not allow one “to deem too far”,497 also 
applies to deeming provisions in South African law. I argue that a deeming provision is taken too far if 
there is no evidence of either an expressed or implied intention of the legislature which supports the 
particular interpretation. 
 
Section 51(1), and particularly subparagraph (a), does not explicitly state, and nowhere in this provision 
is there evidence of a legislative intent, that all property used in the partnership’s enterprise, whether 
that property is jointly owned by the partners or not, is capable of being supplied by the partnership. In 
the circumstances, arguing the contrary is simply taking the deeming provision too far, given the lack 
of evidence of such an alleged intent. There is, consequently, no evidence of a legislative intent “to alter 
the course of the common law”,498 which requires that in the case of an agreement of purchase and 
sale, the seller must agree to deliver to the purchaser the free possession of the thing sold (ie, the 
merx).499 In my view the partners, acting together in partnership, cannot honestly make such an 
undertaking if they are not the rightful owners of the merx. 
 
As stated above,500 where goods or services are deemed to be supplied to the partnership under 
section 18(4)(b), such goods or services are then effectively deemed to be jointly owned partnership 
property, even if only the use of the goods or services has been supplied by the partner to the 
partnership. It follows that if such goods or services are subsequently supplied, the supply will be 
 
493 Section 54(5), for example, provides that in the case of the auction of goods, where the supply would not be a taxable 
supply, the principal and the auctioneer may agree that the supply shall be treated as if it were made by the auctioneer and 
not by the principal. Section 18(4)(b) is another exception. 
494 See para 2.2.2. 
495 1916 TPD 310 at 312. 
496 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 160. See also Botha Statutory Interpretation 86 para 7.3.4. 
497 Loutzenhiser Tiley’s Revenue Law para 71.6.3 
498 See Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees 1909 TS 811 at 823. 
499 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 889. Note that ownership in a movable is transferred by delivery, that is, by the transfer 
of possession. See Van der Merwe CG “Things” in Kühne M (ed) Law of South Africa vol 27 (LexisNexis 2014) para 219. 
500 See para 2.7 above. 
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deemed to be made by the partnership, and in the course or furtherance of its enterprise, even though 
the ownership of such goods or services is held by a partner. 
 
Therefore, save for the ownership of property that is deemed under section 18(4)(b) to have been 
acquired by the partnership, it can only supply jointly-owned partnership property.501 Jointly-owned 
partnership property not only comprises property contributed quoad dominium, but includes, in the 
absence of a contrary agreement, all other partnership assets.502 Other examples of jointly-owned 
partnership property is property acquired with partnership funds during the partnership’s existence, 
unless otherwise agreed,503 and profits resulting from the partnership business.504 Contributions quoad 
usum, do not stop being assets in the partners’ respective personal estates as the partnership only 
acquires the right of use of the contributions.505 
 
As a partnership does not have legal personality, third parties do not conclude agreements with the 
partnership but with the partners. The partners, therefore, carry the rights and obligations flowing from 
these agreements, which usually arise by way of contract.506 Furthermore, because a partnership 
cannot own property in its own name, the supply of the jointly-owned partnership property will be made 
by the individual partners acting together in partnership.507 
 
Arsenault and Kreklewetz submit, in relation to the Canadian partnership law, that all partners maintain 
their individual, undivided interests in the partnership property, in the sense that when it is acquired or 
sold, it is regarded as an acquisition or sale by each individual, undivided interest in it.508 This view, in 
my opinion, also represents the position under the South African partnership law in that jointly-owned 
partnership property is held by the partners in undivided shares.509 When a supply or acquisition is 
made by the partnership, each partner should, logically, be supplying or acquiring his undivided share 
in the property concerned. The fact that an ownership interest in the property may remain with the 
supplying partners, is irrelevant for VAT purposes, since, as stated above,510 that which is supplied or 
 
501 In Case S83 above at 9, the court expressed the view that with respect to land, the best evidence that the land does not 
fall within s 57(2)(b) and is private property, is the existence of a lease between the individual partners and the partnership. 
The court also stated that the best evidence that s 57(2)(b) should apply to the land is where the land is partnership 
property. In my view, the court must have been referring to jointly-owned partnership property. 
502 The Sacks case at 40. See also Oosthuizen v Swart [1956] 2 All SA 304 (SWA) at 307; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 
287; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.62. 
503 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 285; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 30. See for example Fink v Fink 1945 
WLD 226 where reference is made at 242 to partnership assets that have been acquired out of partnership profits. 
504 Ramdhin et al ibid; Williams ibid; Schlemmer v Viljoen en Andere [1958] 2 All SA 309 (T) at 315. 
505 Williams ibid at 28; Ramdhin et al ibid at para 287. 
506 Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 5.01; Ramdhin et al ibid at paras 281 and 305. 
507 See Case S84 above at 9. 
508 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 11-12. 
509 See para 2.7 above. 
510 See para 2.3 above. 
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acquired by the partners as partners of the partnership, is supplied or acquired by the partnership as a 
separate person for VAT purposes.511 
 
In Australia and Canada, a partnership is liable for the GST on a supply that falls within the ambit of, 
respectively, section 184-5(1) of the Australian GST Act, or section 272.1(1) of Canada’s ETA.512 In my 
view, it is not clear from these provisions whether the partnership can only supply the ownership of 
jointly-owned partnership property, as is the case in New Zealand. In terms of the Australian GST Act, 
a supply is normally something that passes from one entity to another.513 Considering the factors listed 
below,514 which, according to the ATO are indicative of a supply being made by a partner in his capacity 
as a partner, especially that the supply must be made in the names of all the partners, the ATO’s view 
seemingly, is that a partnership can only supply property which belongs to it. Canada’s ETA defines 
‘supply’ to mean the provision of property or services in any manner, including a sale.515 It stands to 
reason that an entity can only provide ownership in an item under an agreement of sale, if that item 
belongs to that entity. 
 
As in the case of New Zealand, I argue that a partner’s supply of the ownership of an item can only 
constitute a supply as envisaged in section 184-5(1) and section 272.1(1), and therefore be deemed to 
be made by the partnership, if such ownership vests in the partnership. 
 
The UK VAT Act, does not have a provision similar to the above Australian and Canadian provisions, 
or which serves to clarify when a supply should be considered to have been made by the partnership.516 
 
511 ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2009/1 “Goods and services tax: General law partnerships and the margin 
scheme” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/pdf?DocID=GST%2FGSTR20091%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001&filename=law/view/pdf/p
br/gstr2009-001c2.pdf&PiT=99991231235958 (date of use: 22 December 2018) 
(hereafter GSTR 2009/1) para 39. 
512 GSTR 2003/13 para 27; McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Locations 66 and 67. See also Chabot et al EY’s 
Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010; CRA Policy Statement P-244. 
513 ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2006/9 “Goods and services tax: Supplies” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/pdf?DocID=GST%2FGSTR20069%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001&filename=law/view/pdf/p
br/gstr2006-009c9.pdf&PiT=99991231235958 (date of use: 21 December 2018) paras 93, 94; McCouat ibid. Location 64. 
In terms of s 9-40 of the Australian GST Act, GST is levied on a ‘taxable supply’. Section 9-10 defines ‘supply’ as ‘any form 
of supply whatsoever’. 
514 See para 3.3.2 below. 
515 Section 123(1); Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 2,005; CRA ‘General Information for GST/HST 
Registrants’ available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications 
/rc4022/general-information-gst-hst-registrants.html (date of use: 22 August 2018). 
516 Section 4(1) of the UK VAT Act provides that VAT is charged on the ‘supply’ of goods or services made in the UK. 
‘Supply’ is defined in s 5(2) as meaning “all forms of supply, but not anything done otherwise than for a consideration.” In 
the UK the consensus is that a supply of goods usually means the transfer of both title to the goods and possession of, or 
control over, the goods. If possession of goods is transferred but title is retained, for example, when goods are lent out on 
hire, this is a supply of services. See HMRC “Basic principles and underlying law: What is a supply of goods?” available at 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-consideration/vatsc04100 (date of use: 20 August 2018); 
Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 64.3. According to HMRC there are several ways by which a supply 
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3.3.2 Partner acting as agent for the partnership when making a supply 
 
A partner has authority to contract on behalf of the partnership by reason of the partnership relationship. 
This is based on a partner having the powers of an agent, and not by reason of an act of authorisation.517 
There are, however, certain requirements that must be met in order for the partnership to be bound by 
a contract entered into by a partner with a third party.518 Those requirements are that the partnership 
must have existed at the relevant date; that the contracting partner had authority to bind the partnership; 
and that the partner entered into the contract in the name of the partnership.519 
 
A partner enters into a contract in the name of the partnership if it is the intention of the contracting 
partner and the third party that the contractual obligation will be incurred by the partnership and not by 
the contracting partner in his personal capacity.520 Whether this was the intention of the partner and 
third party is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case.521 
 
 
can be made, the most common being the transfer of ownership or the transfer of possession of goods, or the provision 
of a service by one party to another. See HMRC “Basic principles and underlying law: Supply for consideration” available 
at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-consideration/vatsc03300 (date of use: 22 August 2018). 
In the UK VAT Tribunal Decision of W & J Tang (t/a Ziploc) MAN/97/1123 (VTD 15426) the chairman observed that when 
determining whether a supply is made by the partnership or an individual partner, “the critical and decisive factor [was] 
the inclusion of the proceeds in the partnership accounts as income of the partnership”. See Dolton & Rudling Tolley’s 
VAT Cases para 47.31. In my view, all the partners would only be entitled to the proceeds of the sale if they jointly owned 
the sold property. The position in the UK, therefore, is the same as the other jurisdictions considered: namely, that a 
partnership can only supply the ownership of property under an agreement of sale, if that property belongs to that 
partnership. 
517 Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 8.1.1. In Potchefstroom Dairies and Industries Co Ltd v Standard 
Fresh Milk Supply Co 1913 TPD 506 (above), the court stated, for example, at 512 that, “for once it has been shown that 
several persons are partners, so far as they act within the scope of their authority the one, ex lege, binds the other. No 
written authority is requisite …”. See also Muller en ‘n Ander v Pienaar [1968] 3 All SA 290 (A) at 296. Save where the 
partners otherwise agree, it is a naturalia of partnership that every partner is entitled, without permission from his co-
partners, to represent the partnership in transactions that fall within the ambit of the partnership business. See Benade 
et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.50; Bamford Law of Partnership 50; and Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 
39. Furthermore, according to Benade et al ibid at para 5.04, a partnership will always be represented by another party, 
whether by a partner or a third party, when entering into a contract, as it is not physically or legally capable of negotiating 
and signing contracts.  
518 Henning ibid at para 8.1.3; Benade et al ibid at para 5.02; Bamford Law of Partnership 50-51. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 8.4.1. See Sacca Ltd v Olivier [1954] 2 All SA 279 (T) where the court 
gave judgment against the plaintiff holding, at 283, that it had not been proved that any agreement had ever been entered 
into between the plaintiff and a certain Nel, as agent for the partnership, even though the goods in question had been 
supplied for the benefit of the partnership. Benade et al ibid at paras 5.16 and 5.17, are of the view that a partnership will 
normally not be a party to a contract if the person, who had the necessary authority to conclude the contract on behalf of 
the partnership and the third party, did not have the intention that the partnership should be a contracting party. 
521 Henning ibid at para 8.4.1. It is also Bamford’s view that it will depend on the circumstances of each case whether 
‘personal’ or ‘partnership’ liability has been created, and the conduct, knowledge and intention of the contracting partner 
and the third party must be considered when making that determination. See Bamford Law of Partnership 56. 
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Arsenault and Kreklewetz argue, correctly in my view, that the terms of the partnership agreement may 
well be the most important criteria in considering whether a partner’s actions are as a partner of the 
partnership.522 An agreed contribution in the form of labour, for example, could be clearly set out in the 
partnership agreement to leave no doubt about the duties which a partner is required to fulfil on behalf 
of the partnership. The partners’ duties might, however, not be clearly or precisely set out in the 
partnership agreement, and this will demand a consideration of other relevant indicators to determine 
the contracting parties’ intention. 
 
The indicators proposed above,523 that could be relevant in determining the nature of a partner’s supply 
– ie, whether the supply qualifies as a capital contribution or a third-party supply – may also be relevant 
in determining whether the partner acted as agent on behalf of the partnership. It is important to make 
this determination because the partnership is not required to levy VAT on a supply where, in making 
that supply, a partner acted as principal in his own name, rather than as agent for the partnership. 
 
The factors proposed by the ATO524 which may indicate that a supply is made by a partner in his 
capacity as a partner, are:  
a. that the consideration for the supply is paid to a common fund, or to all the partners; 
b. that the supply is of a kind typically made in the type of enterprise carried on by the partnership; 
c. that the invoice, or tax invoice, shows the firm or business name, or the names of all the 
partners as supplier; 
d. that all the partners agree to the supply being made; and 
e. that any agreement under which the supply is made, is in the names of all the partners. 
 
These indicators may be relevant for the South African VAT Act in determining the intention of the 
parties, but not without qualification. 
 
I agree that whether the consideration for the supply is paid into a common fund or to all the partners, 
is a relevant indicator considering certain reciprocal duties on the partners. A partner is under a duty to 
account for, and deliver to the partnership, whatever he has acquired as a partner on behalf of the 
partnership.525 Consequently, if the supply was made by the partnership, the consideration therefor 
 
522 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 44. 
523 See para 3.2.3 above. 
524 In GSTR 2003/13 para 29 and ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2003/D5 “Goods and services tax: Tax law 
partnerships” at para 44 available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/pdf?DocID=DGS%2FGSTR2003D5%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001&filename=law/view/pdf/
pbr/gstr2003-d005.pdf&PiT=99991231235958 (date of use: 21 December 2018). 
525 Or within the scope of the partnership business, or in continuance of partnership transactions, or was his duty to acquire, 
or was intimately connected with the partnership. See Bamford Law of Partnership 33; Williams Concise Corporate and 
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must be accounted for to the partnership. In my view, this duty to account facilitates the fulfilment of the 
duty to share profits. Each partner must allow his co-partner the latter’s agreed share of the profits.526 
 
In terms of the proviso to section 54(1), where the relevant supply is a taxable supply and the agent is 
a vendor, the agent may issue a tax invoice in relation to such supply as if the agent had made a taxable 
supply. However, the proviso only applies if the agent is a vendor. It follows that a partner who is a 
vendor, acting as agent for the partnership, may issue the tax invoice in his own name even though the 
partnership is the supplier. Conversely, if the partner is not a vendor, the partnership’s particulars must 
be reflected on the tax invoice. If the issued (or received) tax invoice is in the name of the partner, and 
the partner acted as agent on behalf of the partnership, the requirements of section 54(3) must be 
met.527 
 
In terms of South African partnership law, all partners need not always agree on the making of a supply 
in order for that supply to be a partnership supply. Each partner is entitled to participate in the 
management of the partnership business.528 This right is, however, a naturale of partnership and can 
be contractually excluded, limited, or varied.529 Subject to the terms of the partnership agreement, 
therefore, the general rule is that every partner has the implied authority (mutual mandate) to conclude 
transactions falling within the scope of the partnership business. According to Ramdhin et al, a 
resolution by the majority of partners is (apparently) required for the alienation of partnership assets 
other than the normal merchandise of the business.530 In this light, I am of the view that the inquiry 
should be directed at the management powers of the partners in terms of the partnership agreement, 
to determine: which partners had the authority to make the relevant supply; whether those partners, 
who were so empowered, consented to the supply; and the nature of the supply – ie, whether 
partnership assets or normal trading stock were supplied – before inferences are drawn as to the 
probable identity of the supplier. 
 
I argue that a contract under which a supply is made, need not be in the names of all the partners, in 
the sense that all the partners must be co-signatories to the contract, provided that the partner(s) who 
 
Partnership Law 37. Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 4.28, are of the view that partners must give an account of all 
assets acquired and all expenses incurred while they acted within the ambit of the partnership business.  
526 Bamford ibid at 37; Williams Ibid at 6; Benade ibid at para 3.32. 
527 Section 54(3) provides that where a tax invoice in relation to a supply has been issued by or to an agent as contemplated 
in s 54(1) or (2), the agent must maintain sufficient records to enable the name, address, and VAT registration number of 
the principal to be established. In terms of proviso (i) to s 54(3), in respect of all supplies made by or to an agent on behalf 
of the principal, the agent must notify the principal in writing by means of a statement of certain particulars. 
528 Bamford Law of Partnership 29; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 296; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 
38; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.32. 
529 Benade et al ibid at para 3.32. 
530 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 296. See also Benade et al ibid para 4.20. 
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signs the contract is duly authorised, and it is intended that the contractual obligation be incurred by the 
partnership.531 
 
3.4 Acquisitions made by a partnership 
 
3.4.1 The partnership’s acquisition of ownership 
 
In terms of the definition of ‘input tax’, a partnership which is a vendor, is entitled to deduct the VAT 
payable on acquisitions where the goods or services concerned are ‘acquired’ by the partnership, either 
wholly or partially, for the purpose of making taxable supplies.532 As ‘acquired’ is not defined in the VAT 
Act, its ordinary meaning must be considered, but in the context within which it is used.533 ‘Acquire’ 
means to “come to possess (something)”.534 Considering the meaning of ‘supply’ within the relevant 
context, a person can acquire, or come to possess, an item under different forms of supply, eg, a sale, 
rental, or an importation.535 
 
In Case T35,536 the issue before the TRA was whether the NZIR acted incorrectly in disallowing the 
objector’s claim for input tax levied on the importation of computer boards.537 Section 2 of the 
New Zealand GST Act defines ‘input tax’ in paragraph (b) of its definition538 as meaning: 
 Tax levied … on goods entered for home consumption … by that person 
… being in any case goods and services acquired for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies. 
 
The TRA confirmed that legal ownership is the basis of inputs and outputs.539 Therefore, to acquire an 
item one must obtain legal rights in the nature of proprietary rights. The TRA held that the objector had 
not acquired the computer boards because it did not own them. The computer boards belonged to the 
manufacturer. The objector held the boards as agent for the manufacturer for supply to customers on 
behalf of the manufacturer, to allow the manufacturer to comply with its contractual warranties made 
upon sale.540 The supply to the customers was, therefore, made by the manufacturer and not by the 
objector. The TRA, accordingly, agreed that the NZIR had not acted incorrectly in disallowing the 
objector’s claim for input tax levied upon the importation of the computer boards.541 
 
531 See para 3.3.2 above. 
532 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
533 New Union Goldfields Limited v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 17 SATC 1, 1950 (3) SA 392 (A) at 15. 
534 Concise Oxford English Dictionary at 11. 
535 See the definition of ‘supply’ in s 1(1); Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 1 input tax-5. 
536 (1997) 18 NZTC 8,235. 
537Ibid at 8,236. 
538 As it read at material times. 
539 Case T35 above at 8,239. 
540 Ibid at 8,240. 
541 Ibid. 
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There was no allegation that the objector had acquired the use of the computer boards. In my opinion, 
the TRA obviously did not intend to hold that the meaning of ‘acquire’ does not extend to the acquisition 
of the use of an item under, for example, a lease arrangement. Had the use of the mother boards been 
supplied in such circumstances, the objector would have acquired their use and an acquisition of 
ownership would not have been required. 
 
The argument regarding the precondition for a partnership’s output tax liability, in my view, also applies 
to an entitlement to input tax. In other words, a partnership can only supply or acquire an item, if it 
supplies or acquires ownership of that item (eg, if the relevant transaction, is a purchase and not a 
lease), regardless of whether the item forms part (or will form part) of its taxable activity. An exception 
is, once again, section 18(4) which permits the partnership a deduction, assuming all relevant 
requirements have been met, even if it only acquires the use of the goods or services from a partner. 
 
As stated above,542 where an acquisition of ownership is made by the partnership, each partner 
acquires his undivided share in the ownership of the property concerned. For VAT purposes, however, 
such an acquisition is made by the partnership as a separate person. 
 
The SARS has expressed the view that when a partner acquires goods as agent on behalf of the 
partnership, the partnership will only be permitted an input tax deduction if the asset is reflected in the 
partnership’s financial statements.543 Ramdhin et al submit, on the contrary, that it is not a condition 
precedent that property must be entered in the partnership’s accounts in order for it to become jointly-
owned partnership property. Such entry, however, is evidence of the fact that the assets have been 
acquired for the partnership.544 This view is correct considering how property becomes jointly-owned 
partnership property and that entering it in the partnership accounts is not set as a requirement.545 
 
 
542 See para 2.7 above. 
543 SARS VATNews No 4 – December 1995 available at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/Documents/VATNews-
Archive/LAPD-IntR-VATN-Arc-2013-04%20-%20VATNews%204%20December%201995.pdf (date of use: 12 March 2017). 
544 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 288. 
545 For example, movables initially contributed, which are in the possession of a partner at the date of entering into the 
partnership, become ipso iure, in other words by operation of law, common to the partners without delivery, incorporeal 
rights must be ceded, and fixed property requires formal transfer. See Oosthuizen v Swart [1956] 2 All SA 304 (SWA) at 309; 
Berman v Brest 1934 WLD 135 at 139. When a partner acquires movable property as agent on behalf of the partnership, 
such property becomes the joint property of the partners ipso iure. See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 288. Furthermore, 
whether property made available by a partner to the partnership constitutes partnership property depends on the 
partnership agreement and the surrounding circumstances (see para 3.3.1 above). In my view, whether property is entered 
into the partnership’s accounts can at most be a relevant factor in determining the partners’ intention with regard to that 
property. 
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Furthermore, to qualify for the input tax deduction, the partnership must acquire the goods or services 
for the purpose of making taxable supplies.546 This means that the supplies must be made in the course 
or furtherance of an enterprise carried on by the partnership.547 The partnership is deemed, by 
section 51(1)(a), to carry on the partnership’s enterprise. It is for this reason that in Case T10,548 the 
TRA held that because the objectors’ taxable activity regarding the timeshare had been subrogated 
from them to the accommodation partnership by section 57 of the New Zealand GST Act, they should 
have claimed the input tax through the accommodation partnership regarding the acquisition of the 
timeshare.549 It is, therefore, the partnership which may deduct input tax in relation to acquisitions made, 
as it is similarly deemed to carry on the partnership’s enterprise. 
 
In the case of Australia and Canada, reference was made above550 to section 184-5(1) of the Australian 
GST Act, and section 272.1(1) of Canada’s ETA, respectively. These sections effectively deem 
acquisitions made by partners, acting in their capacity as partners, to be made by the partnership. In 
terms of the Australian GST Act, an ‘acquisition’ is any form of acquisition whatsoever.551 As in the case 
of a supply, having regard to the factors which the ATO considers to be indicative of an acquisition 
being made by a partner in that capacity – eg, that the acquisition was made with the consent of all the 
partners and paid for out of partnership profits552 – the ATO holds the view that a partnership can only 
acquire property, under an agreement of sale, for example, in respect of which the partnership acquires 
ownership. 
 
In the case of Canada, registrants are entitled to an input tax credit for tax paid on ‘purchases’ that 
relate to a commercial activity.553 Reference was made above to section 272.1(2) of Canada’s ETA,554 
which permits partners an input tax credit where the relevant property or service was acquired by the 
partner, “in the course of activities of the partnership but not on the account of the partnership.”555 
Section 272.1(2) is an exception to the general rule in section 272.1(1).556 It follows that a partnership 
is entitled to an input tax credit on the basis of section 272.1(1), and in contrast to section 272.1(2), 
 
546 See the definition of ‘input tax’ in s 1(1). 
547 See the definition of ‘taxable supply’ in s 1(1) and s 7(1)(a). 
548 See para 2.7 above. 
549 Case T10 above at 8064. 
550 See para 2.6.2 above. 
551 Section 11-10. 
552 GSTR 2003/13 para 30. Other factors mentioned by the ATO are that the acquisition is used in the enterprise of the 
partnership and that the invoice or tax invoice shows the firm or business name, or the names of all the partners as 
recipient. 
553 CRA “Input tax credits (ITCs)” available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/ 
businesses/topics/payroll/benefits-allowances/remitting-gst-hst-on-employee-benefits/input-tax-credits-itcs.html (date 
of use: 19 August 2018); Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 3,010. 
554 See para 2.7 above. 
555 See s 272.1(2) of Canada’s ETA. 
556 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 29. 
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where a partner makes an acquisition on the account of the partnership meaning, in my view, for or on 
behalf of the partnership. This implies that to qualify for an input tax credit under an agreement of sale, 
the partnership must acquire ownership of the property or service. 
 
The UK has no specific provisions which deal with when an acquisition should be considered to have 
been made by the partnership.557 Section 24(1)(a) of the UK VAT Act provides that ‘input tax’, in relation 
to a taxable person, means VAT on the supply to him of any goods or services that are used for the 
purpose of a business carried on by him. In the UK, for an input tax claim to be valid, the claim must be 
made by the person to whom the supply was made. Therefore, a partnership is only entitled to deduct 
input tax in the case of an acquisition of ownership, if such ownership is supplied to the partnership.558 
In my view, the position in the UK is that, in the case of a sale, the supply of ownership of the item must 
be made to the partnership if the partnership is to obtain an input tax credit on the purchase. 
 
3.4.2 Partner making an acquisition as principal 
 
Van Doesum argues that a partner may acquire goods or services for the partnership when he acts in 
one of three capacities. A partner can either make the acquisition as an organ (ie, an agent) 
representing the partnership. He can also act as an investor (ie, a partner) acquiring the item for the 
purpose of making a contribution to the partnership; or he can supply the item to the partnership as a 
third-party supplier.559 According to the ATO, a partner making an acquisition in relation to the enterprise 
of the partnership, ordinarily makes it in his capacity as partner. It submits, however, that the fact that 
an acquisition relates to the partnership’s enterprise, does not necessarily mean that the acquisition 
was made by the partner in his capacity as partner. The ATO gives as an example, a partner making 
calls from a private telephone to partnership clients.560 
 
Where a partner acting as principal, acquires goods or services for use in the partnership’s enterprise, 
such goods or services will only become jointly-owned partnership property if their ownership is 
transferred to the partnership.561 The expense incurred in making an acquisition as principal, is the 
partner’s expense, and entitles him to an input tax deduction if the relevant requirements are met – eg, 
 
557 See Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 34.5; HMRC “VAT Input Tax basics: Introduction” available 
at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-input-tax/vit10100 (date of use: 21 August 2018). 
558 Furthermore, the UK Government importantly confirms that VAT charged on ‘purchases’ is input tax. See UK 
Government VAT guide (VAT Notice 700) available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/vat-guide-notice-700 para 4.1 (date 
of use: 30 August 2018). 
559 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 263. 
560 GSTR 2003/13 para 110. 
561 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 288; Bamford Law of Partnership 29. According to Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 
3.63, a partner is required to transfer the ownership of property to the partnership in order for the partners to be co-
owners of that property. See also Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26. 
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where the acquisition is made for the purpose of making a taxable contribution to the partnership.562 As 
stated above, even if a partner’s contribution is not taxable, and the partner does not qualify for an input 
tax deduction, a deduction might still be available to the partnership under section 18(4).563 Any 
subsequent reimbursement received by the partner from the partnership, would not constitute a 
payment for the supply made by the third party to the partner, as the partnership has no obligation to 
pay the third party. The VAT treatment of the partner’s subsequent supply of the property to the 
partnership, depends on whether the supply is made as a capital contribution or as a third-party supply, 
the VAT implications of which have been dealt with.564 
 
The situation envisaged in section 18(4) must be distinguished from the situation where a partner makes 
an acquisition as an agent for the partnership. Section 18(4)(b)(i) applies where ‘goods or services have 
been supplied to’ the partner. The partner, therefore, acts as principal in acquiring the goods or services, 
and he subsequently supplies their ownership or use to the partnership. 
 
3.4.3 Partner acting as agent for the partnership when making an acquisition 
 
Section 54(2) provides that where a vendor makes a taxable supply of goods or services to an agent 
who is acting on behalf of his principal, that supply is deemed to have been made to the principal and 
not the agent. Therefore, where a partner acquires something as agent for the partnership, the 
partnership is deemed to have made the acquisition of the relevant goods or services. As a result, the 
partnership, and not the partner, is entitled to deduct the VAT levied on the supply as input tax. This is 
because the supply is deemed to be made to the partnership, which also incurs the liability for the 
supply through the partner as agent. To qualify for the deduction, all the requirements of the definition 
of ‘input tax’ must be met, and the partnership must also be in possession of a tax invoice as required 
by section 16(2)(a). A partner who acts as agent for the partnership may, on the strength of the proviso 
to section 54(2), request that he be provided with a tax invoice, and the vendor may issue a tax invoice 
as if the supply had been made to the partner.565 
 
Following on from the above and in terms of the common law, a contracting partner will have made an 
acquisition as agent on behalf of the partnership, if that partner and the third party intended that the 
obligation, created by the contract which they concluded, will be an obligation of the partnership.566 
Even though a contract may be for the benefit of the partnership, the partnership will not be liable if the 
 
562 See the definition of ‘input tax’ in s 1(1). 
563 See para 2.7 above. 
564 See paras 2.6 and 3.2.1 above. 
565 Note that the tax invoice can even be made out in the name of an agent who is a non-vendor. 
566 See para 3.2.1 above. 
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contracting partner and the third party intended the obligation to be incurred personally by the partner.567 
A question is whether the common-law requirement for liability as principal under a contract, also 
applies when determining whether a partnership is entitled to an input tax deduction of the VAT levied 
on goods or services acquired by a partner acting on behalf of that partnership. 
 
In Mr X v The Commissioner for the SARS,568 the court came to the conclusion that it is the contracting 
party who is entitled to the input tax deduction. The court held that a member of a close corporation 
who was registered for VAT, was not permitted to deduct input tax in respect of expenditure incurred 
relating to two construction contracts. The court found on the evidence, that the close corporation – 
which was not a registered vendor – was the contracting party in respect of these contracts.569 
 
The SARS subscribed to the same view in its now withdrawn rulings on VAT,570 and is continuing to 
propagate this view in its Draft Guide on the Taxation of Professional Sports Clubs and Players.571 The 
main criteria for a deduction of input tax by an employer according to the SARS, besides other 
administration related requirements, is whether the employee incurred the expense contractually as 
agent on behalf of his employer when making the purchase. It is for this reason, Retief submits, that 
the SARS will not permit an input tax deduction for some reimbursement expenses, such as reimbursing 
the employee for cell phone costs. The argument is that the services are generally rendered by the cell 
phone provider to the employee, and the employer is not party to the contract, nor is the contract entered 
into for and on behalf of the employer.572 
 
The UK VAT Tribunal case of The British Broadcasting Corporation v The Commissioners,573 was an 
appeal by the BBC against a decision of the Commissioners disallowing the deduction of an amount of 
VAT as input tax. The VAT was paid by an employee of the BBC on a hotel bill when staying away from 
 
567 Henning Perspectives on the Law of Partnership para 8.4.1. In Alcock v Mali Dyke Syndicate 1910 TS 567 at 569, for 
example, the plaintiff argued that the partnership was liable for the payment of goods which had been supplied on credit, 
because the goods were used by the partnership, and were ordered by a partner. The court held, inter alia, that the plaintiff 
was not entitled to look to the partnership for payment as the credit was really given to the partner personally (at 570). See 
also Sacca Ltd v Olivier [1954] 2 All SA 279 (T) at 283 and Guardian Insurance and Trust Company v Lovemore’s Executors 
(1887-1888) 5 SC 205 at 211. According to Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 45, if a partner enters into a 
contract in his own name and on his own behalf, only he is bound to the contract. 
568 Mr X v The Commissioner for the SARS, TC-VAT 867 (hereafter, VAT Case 867). 
569 VAT Case 867 at para 36. 
570 SARS Rulings 284 and 384. See Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 105 and 150. 
571 SARS “Draft Guide on the Taxation of Professional Sports Clubs and Players” para 5.9.1(b) available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/Alldocs/LegalDoclib/Drafts/LAPD-LPrep-Draft-2016-43%20-%20Draft%20Guide% 
20on%20the%20Taxation%20of%20Professional%20Sports%20Clubs%20and%20Players.pdf (date of use: 25 January 
2017). 
572 Retief (2014) 21 Tax Professional 20-21. 
573 [1974] VATTR 100 (hereafter the BBC case). 
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home on BBC business. This issue turned on whether the hotel accommodation had been supplied to 
the BBC. 
 
The Tribunal held that the mere fact that the hotel accommodation was supplied to the employee in the 
course of his duties for the BBC, does not mean that the supply was made to the BBC. Holding that this 
is a question of fact, the Tribunal took into account that the employee was free to make whatever 
arrangements he wished for his accommodation – ie, he could stay at a cheap hotel or an expensive 
one and the BBC would neither know nor care. He could, therefore, make his own arrangements to 
which the BBC was not a party. The Tribunal considered, further, that if a dishonest person in the 
employee’s position had left the hotel without paying his bill, the hotelier would have had no recourse 
against the BBC. From this, the Tribunal held that the supply of the hotel accommodation had not been 
made to the BBC and, as a result, it was not entitled to the input tax deduction. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Another UK VAT Tribunal case, Stirlings (Glasgow) Ltd v The Commissioners,574 also concerned 
whether VAT levied on supplies made to employees was deductible by their employer as input tax. In 
this case, Stirlings (Glasgow) Ltd (the Company) appealed against a decision by the Commissioners 
disallowing a deduction of input tax paid on supplies of petrol covered by allowances made by the 
Company to its employees employed as travellers. The Tribunal accepted that the petrol was used by 
the employees for business purposes. 
 
The Tribunal was correct, in my view, in maintaining that the ratio of the BBC case is that the question 
turns largely on who the parties to the contract of supply are. As a result, the Tribunal held that the 
supply of the petrol was made to the travellers personally as the contracts of supply were between the 
travellers and the respective garages. It was the travellers who had the choice of garage, and who 
purchased such petrol as they required. The Tribunal further held that the travellers were not agents, 
and had no authority to purchase in the name of the Company. If they had obtained the petrol on credit, 
the garages could not have sued the Company for the price, but would have had recourse against the 
other party to the contract of sale, namely, the traveller. The Company’s appeal, therefore, failed. 
 
Commenting on the above two cases, De Koker and Kruger argue that whether a supply is made to the 
employer or the employee does not depend on who physically receives the supply, but instead on the 
identity of the contracting parties.575 
 
 
574 [1982] VATTR 116 (hereafter the Stirlings case). 
575 De Koker & Kruger Value-Added Tax para 2.3. 
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The NZIR disagrees with these UK cases, and submits that an employer should not only be permitted 
a deduction where the employer is in a contractual relationship with the supplier. This view, according 
to the NZIR, is too limited. An employer should also qualify for a deduction, so the NZIR submits, where 
the expenditure initially incurred by the employee and subsequently reimbursed by the employer, was 
incurred by the employee in the course of the employer’s business. This view, the NZIR claims, is in 
line with the purpose of the legislation.576 The qualifying criterion for deduction, therefore, is not whether 
the employer is a party to the contract with the supplier, but whether the employee incurred the relevant 
expense in the course of the employer’s business. In both of the UK cases the courts were well aware 
that the acquisitions were used in the employers' businesses, and in the BBC case, in particular, the 
court expressly rejected this as a relevant consideration. 
 
In Canada v Merchant Law Group,577 which is discussed below,578 the disputed point was whether the 
relevant disbursements were incurred by the respondent as agent for its clients and, therefore, whether 
the respondent was liable for GST on the disbursements.579 The court held that the issue depended on 
whether the respondent’s clients were bound by the contracts with third-party suppliers and were, 
accordingly, liable for payment under the contracts and also exposed to any risk as party to the 
contracts.580 
 
Whether a person is considered to be acting either as principal or agent in Australia, depends on the 
party who is in a contractual relationship with the supplier. The ATO and McCouat are of the view that 
some of the factors that indicate that a person is acting as a principal are that: he decides prices; 
assumes the commercial risks; acts in his own name; and does not have to disclose his remuneration.581 
The positions in Canada, the UK, and Australia therefore, correspond. 
 
In my view, the above UK and Canadian cases can provide guidance on the meaning of ‘acquired’ in 
the definition of ‘input tax’ in that they are consistent with the common law on partnerships. There is no 
evidence of a legislative intent in the VAT Act to deviate from the common law. Therefore, for the 
purposes of both the common law and the VAT Act, a person will be considered to have supplied or 
acquired goods or services, if he is a party to the contract under which that supply or acquisition is 
made. This means that the person must have incurred the obligation created by the contract. In the 
 
576 NZIR Tax Information Bulletin Vol 2 No 3 at 5 available at https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/b/a/badb15d0-2e78-
446a-984b-127bf7e8a14b/tib-vol2-no03.pdf (date of use: 31 December 2018). 
577 2010 FCA 206. 
578 See para 3.4.4 above. 
579 Canada v Merchant Law Group 2010 FCA 206 at para 15. 
580 Ibid at para 25. 
581 ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2000/37 “Goods and services tax: Agency relationships and application of 
the law” para 28 available at https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?DocID=GST/GSTR200037/NAT/ATO/00001 
 (date of use: 31 December 2018); McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 458. 
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above Canadian cases, the employees concluded the contracts as principals because they were 
personally liable under the contracts. In my view, de Koker and Kruger are correct where they state that 
while it could possibly be argued that the employees would not have entered into these contracts but 
for the fact of their employment, this is simply a matter of subjective motive.582 
 
As stated,583 whether a partner acquires goods or services as agent for the partnership depends on 
whether the partner and the third-party supplier intended the contractual obligation to be incurred by 
the partnership. Relevant factors could indicate in what capacity a partner made an acquisition. I argue 
that factors such as whether the acquisition is used in the enterprise of the partnership, or whether the 
acquisition is paid for out of partnership profits, or from a partnership account,584 might not always be 
helpful. As the cases illustrate, acquisitions made by a partner, acting either as agent or principal, could 
be for use in the partnership business, or ultimately paid for with partnership funds. In my view, factors 
that are also relevant are, for example, whether the partner or the partnership is liable under the contract 
and, therefore, liable to make payment to the supplier; whether the partner is given an allowance with 
the freedom to contract with whomever and whenever he so pleases; and the nature of the acquisition 
that could suggest that the supply must have been made to the partner in his personal capacity, such 
as services supplied by a cell phone provider. 
 
I further argue that where a third party makes a supply of goods or services to a partner, who in making 
the acquisition acts as an agent for the partnership, the intervention of the partner does not change the 
nature of, or the VAT rate applicable to, the third party’s supply. There is no reason for the character of 
the third party’s supply to change considering that it is deemed to be made to the partnership. If, for 
example, the third party’s supply is zero rated, then the supply will retain its zero rating. If the partner 
makes an acquisition as principal, however, and on-supplies the relevant goods or services to the 
partnership for an amount, which includes the cost of the third party’s supply, that cost could lose its 
zero rating. That the supply to the partner is zero rated is irrelevant when determining the VAT rate of 
the partner’s supply to the partnership. 
 
In the Canadian Tax Court case of SLM Direct Marketing Ltd v The Queen585 (the SLM case) the 
appellant, SLM Direct Marketing Ltd (SLM), was assessed on the basis that its costs of postage (or 
mailing costs) to destinations outside of Canada, were inputs to re-supplies of a service to clients, that 
the re-supplies were taxable supplies, and that GST applied to the entire re-supply. The nature of SLM’s 
business was to distribute clients’ products, such as letters, for a fee. SLM addressed envelopes, folded 
 
582 De Koker & Kruger Value-Added Tax para 2.3. 
583 See para 3.2.1 above. 
584 See GSTR 2003/13 para 30. 
585 2007 TCC 415. 
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material, inserted the material into envelopes and packages, and delivered them to a carrier, such as 
Canada Post, for delivery to their eventual destination. Where mail was to be delivered outside of 
Canada, SLM paid the cost of mailing to the carrier and in its invoice to the client included the postage 
it had paid as a reimbursement charge. The Minister of National Revenue (the Minister) assessed SLM 
on its failure to charge GST for postage it paid for the clients to the carriers, and for which it was 
reimbursed.586 
 
The court held, on the basis of Canadian Agency Law and the evidence, that SLM was an agent of its 
clients when it paid the costs of its clients’ mailings to destinations outside Canada, and mailed the 
material. When SLM paid the costs of mailing, it did so on behalf of the client, not for itself.587 As agent, 
SLM was, therefore, not liable to pay the GST.588 SLM’s appeal was allowed. 
 
Chabot et al submit that because the relationship in the SLM case was considered an agency 
relationship, the court determined that supplies of postage or mailing services to destinations outside 
Canada, retained their zero-rated status even though SLM paid for those supplies and was reimbursed 
by its clients.589 The court, in my view, did not explicitly make this point, but it is to be implied in the 
judgment. The court, instead, stated that because of its finding that SLM acted as agent for its client, it 
did not need to consider whether, had SLM re-supplied the mailing service to its client, this re-supply 
service qualified for zero rating.590 With this statement the court was clearly implying that because SLM 
acted as agent, the supply retained its character and, therefore, its rate of zero per cent. Had SLM’s 
intervention, even as agent, resulted in the supply forfeiting the zero rating, then the court would have 
said so, because it would have been a noteworthy point. 
 
In the Canadian Federal Court case of Canada v Merchant Law Group,591 the respondent was a 
partnership that practised law. In the course of providing legal services, the respondent acquired various 
goods or services from third-party suppliers and treated their cost as disbursements billed to clients. 
The respondent did not levy GST on disbursements it viewed as having been incurred as agent for its 
clients. The Minister argued that such disbursements were consideration for the supply of legal services 
 
586 SLM claimed that it was acting as an agent of the client when it purchased postage (or paid mailing costs) and mailed 
the material to destinations outside of Canada. SLM also submitted that it was not liable for GST on the postage costs for 
material shipped to a destination outside of Canada since these services are zero-rated in terms of Canada’s ETA (at para 
9). It was the Minister’s view that the cost of mail to a destination outside of Canada paid by SLM and for which it invoiced 
the client, constituted an input to a re-supply of a service which is taxable and applied GST on the whole amount of the 
supply. In the Minister’s view no agency relationship existed between SLM and its client. SLM was assessed as a re-supplier 
of a service (at para 10). 
587 Ibid at para 24. 
588 Ibid at para 15. 
589 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 2,130. 
590 The SLM case para 25. 
591 Canada v Merchant Law Group 2010 FCA 206. 
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and so were taxable supplies and subject to GST.592 What was in dispute in this case, as previously 
stated,593 was whether the relevant disbursements were incurred by the respondent as agent for its 
clients.594 The court held that the respondent could not meet the onus of establishing that it acted as 
agent for its clients when it incurred the disbursements,595 and dismissed the respondent’s appeal.596 
 
In answering some of the concerns raised by the respondent, the court explained that an exempt 
disbursement may become taxable if it is an input to a lawyer’s services. Equally, a disbursement that 
is subject to GST and is an input to a lawyer’s services, may become a zero-rated disbursement if the 
client is not resident in Canada.597 
 
Whether a partner acts as agent or principal will in most cases not affect the incidence of tax if the 
partnership makes taxable supplies only.598 The VAT levied by the third-party supplier or by the partner 
who, as principal, on-supplies the third party’s supply to the partnership, will be deductible as input tax 
by the partnership which conducts a fully taxable business. The situation could be different if the 
partnership only partially makes taxable supplies. The third party could, for example, make a supply 
that is not taxable (eg, the supply is exempt or the third party is not a vendor) or that is zero rated. If the 
partner acts as principal, then the cost of the third party’s supply would be included in his fee charged 
to the partnership. The whole fee could then be subject to VAT if that partner is a vendor, resulting in a 
VAT cost to the partnership as it would not be entitled to a full input tax deduction. 
 
3.4.4 Partnership reimbursing partner’s expenses 
 
In addition to his own share, a partner is entitled to be refunded for expenses he incurred in connection 
with the partnership business. A partner who pays a partnership creditor, or who pays for the 
maintenance of partnership property with his own funds, is therefore entitled to be refunded by the 
partnership. The partnership is also liable to the partner for interest on these items.599 The question 
then arises whether the partnership is entitled to deduct the VAT on such expenses reimbursed to the 
partner. 
 
592 Ibid at para 2. 
593 See para 3.4.3 above. 
594 Canada v Merchant Law Group2010 FCA 206 at para 15. 
595 Ibid at para 26. 
596 Ibid at para 37. 
597 Ibid at para 33. 
598 See Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 2,130. 
599 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 294; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 37; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg para 4.18; Bamford Law of Partnership 38. See Pataka v Keefe and Another [1947] 3 All 125 (A) at 129 
and Schneider NO v Raikin [1954] 4 All SA 59 (W) at 61 where the court confirms that in Pataka v Keefe at 129 Tindall JA, 
mentions the possibility that a partner may in certain circumstances sue his partner for reimbursement of money spent by 
the former on the business of the partnership. 
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In the BBC case, reference was made by the BBC’s representative to a public notice issued by the 
Commissioners, which provided that where an employee pays expenses, including VAT, that tax can 
be treated as input tax by the employer if the employee has been reimbursed for his expenditure. The 
Tribunal held, however, that there was no reimbursement in this case, and set out its views on the 
distinction between a disbursement and an allowance. According to the Tribunal, there must be some 
specific link between the original payment and the subsequent repayment, before the latter can be said 
to be in reimbursement of the former. The Tribunal could find no such link in this case regarding the 
hotel bill for accommodation, although, the 80p VAT itself was reimbursed. It stated that an allowance 
is paid irrespective of the actual expenditure of the staff member concerned. The Tribunal held that the 
allowance in this case, was an allowance to enable a staff member to meet the cost of staying away 
from home without loss to himself, but it could not be said to be a reimbursement of any specific 
expenses. The Tribunal did not express a view on whether the Commissioner’s public notice was 
correct, ie, whether in the case of the reimbursement of an expense, the employer would be entitled to 
deduct input tax. 
 
I argue that whether the amount paid by the partnership is a reimbursement of the costs which the 
partner incurred, or the partner was paid an allowance by the partnership to defray costs, is not decisive 
in determining the partnership’s entitlement to input tax. Different meanings can be ascribed to 
‘reimbursement’. Moreover, distinctions can be made between different categories of reimbursement 
considering, for example, the SARS’s policy on input tax deductions related to reimbursements. I stated 
that the SARS will not even permit an input tax deduction for some reimbursement expenses.600 There 
is, however, merit in the argument of the Tribunal in the BBC case, namely, that there is a closer 
connection between the payment of costs, and an amount paid in reimbursement of those costs, as 
opposed to an allowance to defray future costs. The argument, in my view, is that with an allowance an 
employee has more freedom to choose what and where to purchase in the future, suggesting that the 
expense is incurred by the employee as principal, although in the course of the employer’s business. 
In the case of a reimbursement, the employer reimburses specific expenses already incurred by the 
employee. The employer’s willingness to reimburse the expenses could imply his acceptance that they 
are for his account. I argue, however, that whether an amount is a reimbursement or an allowance can, 
at most, be an indicator, together with other relevant indicators, when determining whether the relevant 
obligation was incurred personally by an employee or a partner, or by the employee or the partner as 
agent for the employer or the partnership, rendering it liable. 
 
 
600 See para 3.4.3 above. 
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Section 54(2) deems a supply made to a partner, acting as agent for the partnership, to be made to the 
partnership. In terms of agency law, the partnership is liable under the contract concluded by a partner 
as agent for the partnership, with a third party. I argue, therefore, that the supply is not only deemed to 
be made to the partnership, but the partnership is also considered to have incurred the expense for that 
supply. The payment made by the partner for the supply to the third party is a payment made on behalf 
of the partnership because the obligation to make the payment is the partnership’s obligation. In other 
words, it is as if the partnership itself made the payment for the supply, including the VAT levied thereon, 
as the activities of an agent are attributed to his principal in terms of the law of agency.601 
 
In my view, the payment of the partner to the third party will, therefore, be subject to VAT and could 
trigger the time of supply under the general time of supply rule in section 9(1), which deems the supply 
to have taken place at the earlier of either the time an invoice is issued, or any payment of consideration 
is received in respect of that supply. The partnership is permitted an input tax deduction based on the 
payment made by the partner as agent. 
 
I am of the view that the amount of the reimbursement paid by the partnership to the partner, 
reimbursing the partner for the payment he made to the third party, is not a payment made for any 
supply, and in particular, not for the supply made by the third party. It is therefore not subject to VAT. 
The partner will have already paid for the third party’s supply, and is only later reimbursed by the 
partnership. The reimbursement is, therefore, not intended to be a payment for a supply. 
 
I further argue that the third party does not make a supply to the partner, who in turn ‘on-supplies’ the 
third party’s supply to the partnership. The partner could well be supplying an agency service to the 
partnership by representing the partnership in its dealings with the third party. Any fee charged by the 
partner to the partnership for this agency or representation service, could include the costs which he 
personally incurred in order to fulfil his agency mandate. The fee, including such costs, would potentially 
be subject to VAT if the partner is a vendor. The partner is, of course, required to provide the partnership 
with a tax invoice.602 The partnership is then entitled to an input tax deduction if the service was acquired 
for a taxable purpose.603 
 
Support for this analysis can be found in the case of Commissioner for SARS v British Airways Plc.604 
In this case British Airways Plc (BA), an international air carrier, charged its passengers a fare made 
up of the aggregate of various elements reflected separately on the passenger ticket. The bulk of the 
 
601 See para 2.6.2 above. 
602 See s 20(1). 
603 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
604 67 SATC 167. 
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fare was an amount designed to recover its operating costs and its profit. The remainder of the fare 
comprised various smaller elements. The appeal concerned the VAT treatment of one of these latter 
elements included in the composite fare.605 That element was a ‘passenger service charge’ (the charge) 
levied by Airports Company Ltd (Airports Company) for general airport services606 available to 
passengers at its airports. BA reflected this charge separately on the ticket as one of the elements that 
made up the composite fare.607 
 
It was submitted on behalf of the Commissioner, that although Airports Company supplied the airport 
services for which the charge was made, it supplied those services to BA, which in turn supplied them 
to its passengers, and the supply of the services by BA attracted tax. The court disagreed with this 
argument. It held that, on the evidence, the relevant services were supplied by Airports Company and 
that VAT was levied when that supply was made. A further tax, explained the court, does not accrue 
when BA did no more than recover the charge it was required to pay for the supply of the service by 
Airports Company. As a result, the court held that moneys recovered by BA were not a consideration 
for its provision of airport services simply because it did not supply them at all.608 
 
Although the role of BA was not described as that of an agent acting on behalf of its passengers, BA 
was in a similar position to that of an agent because of the court’s finding that Airports Company 
supplied the airport services to the passengers, notwithstanding BA paying for those services. What is 
important, however, is the court’s confirmation that BA’s recovery of the charge from its passengers 
was not subject to VAT because it was not payment for a supply made by BA to the passengers. 
 
The UK case of Rowe & Maw (a firm) v Customs and Excise Commissioners609 (the Rowe & Maw case) 
and the Canadian cases discussed below,610 also support this view. The Rowe & Maw case was an 
appeal against a decision of a VAT tribunal in which it was found that the reimbursement of travel fares, 
disbursed by the appellants in the exercise of their profession as solicitors, was part of the consideration 
for their provision of legal services, and therefore subject to VAT. The question was whether there was 
a taxable supply of legal services as regards the reimbursement of the travel fares. 
 
Bridge J distinguished between two different classes of disbursement which a solicitor may expend on 
his client’s behalf. In the one situation a solicitor may purchase goods or services as agent for his client. 
The goods or services purchased are supplied to the client, not to the solicitor, who merely acts as an 
 
605 Ibid at para 3. 
606 That is baggage handling facilities, waiting lounges, check-in counters, etc. 
607 Ibid at para 6. 
608 Ibid at para 15. 
609 [1975] STC 340. 
610 See under this sub-heading. 
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agent in making the payment. In his view no VAT is payable because such payments form no part of 
the consideration for the solicitor’s own services to his client. The situation is different, however, where 
the goods or services purchased are supplied to the solicitor – as in the Rowe & Maw case – in the 
form of travel tickets to enable him effectively to perform the service supplied to his client. In such case, 
Bridge J held, VAT is payable because the payment is part of the consideration which the client pays 
for the service supplied by the solicitor. The appellants’ appeal was, accordingly, dismissed. 
 
Therefore, where a partner who is a vendor, makes an acquisition as principal and subsequently on-
supplies the relevant goods or services to the partnership as part of a taxable supply in return for 
payment of an amount, which includes the cost of such acquisition, then the full amount will be subject 
to VAT. 
 
Bearing in mind the distinction drawn by Bridge J between the two classes of disbursement, in my view, 
where a partner incurs expenses that are reimbursed by the partnership, the partnership would be 
entitled to an input tax deduction where the partner acted as agent for the partnership. A question is 
whether the partnership would, nevertheless, qualify for a section 18(4) deduction, where a partner who 
is not a vendor, makes the acquisition as principal and is reimbursed by the partnership. 
 
A partner could acquire goods or services as principal, and thereafter on-supply the ownership or use 
of the goods or services to the partnership. It is my view that in these circumstances the partnership 
would be entitled to a section 18(4) deduction, provided that it applies the goods or services for a taxable 
purpose.611 However, instead of the partner on-supplying the goods or services to the partnership, he 
may simply use such goods or services for the purpose or benefit of the partnership’s business.612 An 
example is where the partner makes calls from a private telephone to partnership clients.613 The goods 
or services can also be acquired by the partner in the course of his duties, although the acquisition is 
made by the partner as principal. An example here is where the partner incurs accommodation costs 
while away from home on partnership business.614 In the latter circumstances, the NZIR is in favour of 
granting an employer a deduction where the employee, who is later reimbursed by his employer, incurs 
the expense as principal.615 
 
Where a partner makes an acquisition as principal, a distinction must, therefore, be made between the 
partner merely applying the goods or services for the benefit of the partnership’s business, and a partner 
 
611 See para 2.7 above. 
612 See the discussion of the Stirlings case in para 3.4.3 above. 
613 See GSTR 2003/13 para 110. 
614 See the discussion of the BBC case in para 3.4.3 above. 
615 See para 3.4.3. 
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who on-supplies their ownership or use to the partnership, who then applies such goods or services. In 
the former scenario, the partnership would not qualify for a section 18(4) deduction, whilst in the latter 
scenario the partnership could qualify. It might, in my view, be difficult always to distinguish between 
these two scenarios as in each case the goods or services are ‘applied’ by a partner(s). I argue that the 
answer depends on whether there is a contract in place between the partner and the partnership, in 
terms of which the ownership or use of the goods or services is supplied to the partnership. On this 
basis the partnership could be entitled to a section 18(4) deduction. 
 
In Australia, the VAT treatment of reimbursements made to partners, employees, and other persons 
who act on behalf of entities, is specifically regulated. Section 111-5(1)(c) of the Australian GST Act 
provides that if a partnership reimburses a partner for an expense, he incurs related directly to his 
activities as a partner in the partnership, the reimbursement is treated as consideration for an acquisition 
made by the partnership from the partner. This provision, therefore, allows a registered partnership to 
claim input tax credits on certain acquisitions made by its partners where these expenses are 
reimbursed.616 The partnership may not, however, claim an input tax credit if the partner himself is 
entitled to claim one.617 According to the ATO, section 111-5(1)(c) applies where partners incur 
expenses directly related to their activities as partners of the partnership, but not actually incurred in 
their capacities as partners.618 In order to qualify for the deduction, the supply to the partner must be 
taxable,619 and the partner needs to provide the partnership with the tax invoice.620 Where a partner 
makes an acquisition and is acting in his capacity as a partner of the partnership, the acquisition is 
taken to be by the partnership and reimbursement does not arise.621 
 
In the case of Canada, reference was made to sections 272.1(1) and 272.1(2) of Canada’s ETA,622 
which permit either the partnership, or a partner, a deduction, depending on whether the acquisition 
was made ‘on the account of the partnership’. If section 272.1(2) applies, the partnership is deemed 
not to have acquired the property or service except as otherwise provided in section 175(1) of Canada’s 
ETA, which applies where the partner is reimbursed by the partnership.623 Section 175(1) enables the 
partnership to claim an input tax credit in respect of an amount reimbursed to partners for the acquisition 
of property or services for consumption or use in relation to partnership activities. When the conditions 
 
616 GSTR 2003/13 para 111; McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 133. 
617 McCouat ibid. 
618 GSTR 2003/13 para 110. 
619 Ibid at para 112. 
620 Ibid; McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 133. 
621 GSTR 2003/13 para 112. 
622 See paras 2.6.2 and 3.4.1 above. 
623 CRA “Reimbursements” para 6 available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-
publications/publications/9-4/reimbursements.html (date of use: 21 August 2018); Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to 
GST/HST para 10,010. 
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under section 175(1) are met, the partnership is deemed to have received the property or service, and 
to have paid the GST in respect of the supply at the time the reimbursement is paid.624 Section 175(1), 
therefore, permits the partnership a deduction even though the relevant acquisition was made by a 
partner. 
 
In the case of New Zealand, it was stated625 that according to the NZIR, an employer should also qualify 
for a deduction where the expenditure initially incurred by the employee and subsequently reimbursed 
by the employer, was incurred by the employee in the course of the employer’s business. The NZIR 
would, presumably, also permit a partnership a deduction where a partner incurs an expense as 
principal, but in the course of the partnership’s business. 
 
The UK VAT Act does not have special rules regulating the deductibility of VAT by a partnership relating 
to expenses incurred by its members. Considering the judgments in the BBC and Stirlings cases, 
however, in my view a partnership is only entitled to an input tax credit if it, as opposed to the partner 
who is reimbursed, is a party to the relevant contract and therefore makes the acquisition as principal. 
 
3.4.5 Whether property is acquired for a taxable purpose 
 
In terms of the definition of ‘input tax’626 a partnership is entitled to an input tax deduction if the goods 
or services are acquired for the ‘purpose’ of making taxable supplies. As a partnership is not a natural 
person and does not have legal personality, a question arises as to how the purpose of a partnership 
should be determined for VAT purposes. ‘Purpose’ is not defined in the VAT Act. Its dictionary meaning 
is, inter alia, “the reason for which something is done or for which something exists.”627 
 
Case N27,628 in my opinion, is useful in understanding how the ‘intention’ of a partnership can be 
established. In this case, the issue was whether the objecting partnership was carrying on a ‘taxable 
activity’ under the New Zealand GST Act, which would entitle it to claim certain input tax deductions 
and to GST registration.629 Section 6(1)(a)630 defines ‘taxable activity’ as “any activity which is carried 
 
624 Ibid. Where the partner is not an individual (ie, the partner is a corporation, trust, or other partnership), he is deemed 
to have acquired the property or service and to be engaged in those activities of the partnership. Consequently, the partner 
is entitled to claim input tax credits in respect of those acquisitions. See Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST 
para 10,010. Therefore, the partnership is not eligible to claim an input tax credit for the tax paid even though it has 
reimbursed the partner. See CRA “Reimbursements” ibid at para 28. 
625 See para 3.4.3 above. 
626 See s 1(1). 
627 Concise Oxford English Dictionary at 1167. 
628 Case N27 above. 
629 New Zealand GST Act at 6. 
630 As it read at material times. 
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on continuously or regularly by any person … and involves or is intended to involve … the supply of 
goods and services to any other person for a consideration …”. In terms of section 6(3), however, 
‘taxable activity’ does not include, in relation to any person:  
(a) Being a natural person, any activity carried on essentially as a private recreational pursuit or hobby; 
or 
(aa) Not being a natural person, any activity which, if it were carried on by a natural person, would be 
carried on essentially as a private recreational pursuit or hobby; …631 
 
The TRA held that in considering whether the activity of the partnership is a taxable activity, 
consideration must be given to section 57 of the New Zealand GST Act, which provides that the 
partnership, and not its individual members, is liable to be registered for GST as a person.632 In other 
words, the partnership’s intention is the relevant intention as the partnership is the GST-registered entity 
and the entity claiming the input tax deduction. 
 
As I understand the TRA’s argument, the reason why one can speak of a partnership as having an 
intention, is because for the purposes of the GST Act, the partnership has “its own collective 
personality”, although under general law a partnership has no legal personality of its own, distinct from 
that of the individual partners. Additionally, the TRA reasoned that because the collective purpose of 
the partnership may be separate from its members, when determining whether the partnership is 
carrying on a taxable activity, the collective purpose of the partnership, rather than that of the partners, 
must be considered.633 
 
According to the TRA, the partnership’s intention and the purpose of its activity must be determined 
from the partnership agreement and the surrounding circumstances.634 In my view, the partnership 
contract is, of course, important because it should reflect the common intention of the partners and 
describe the nature of the business carried on for their joint benefit.635 
 
The TRA concluded that the partnership agreement, as executed by the partners, established that the 
partnership carried on a taxable activity, although some of the individual members of the partnership 
probably derived private and personal enjoyment from the undertaking, as envisaged in 
section 6(3)(a)(aa).636 
 
 
631 Ibid at 7. 
632 Ibid at 11. 
633 Ibid at 11. 
634 Ibid at 10. 
635 See the Pezzutto case, where the court confirmed that one of the essentialia of partnership is that the business be carried 
on for the joint benefit of the parties. See para 2.1 above. 
636 New Zealand GST Act. 
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The New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in C of IR v National Distributors Limited,637 although dealing 
with an income tax issue, is nonetheless instructive. In determining whether the sale of certain shares 
was subject to income tax, it was necessary for the court to establish the purpose of the taxpayer 
company. The court held that where the taxpayer is a company, the collective purpose in the minds of 
those in control of the company’s relevant decisions is determinative. In CIR v Richmond Estates (Pty) 
Ltd, the Appellate Division held that as a company is an artificial person, the only way to establish its 
intention is to find out what its directors, acting as such, intended. Their formal acts in the form of 
resolutions, constitute evidence as to the intentions of the company of which they are directors.638 
 
The TRA’s decision in Case N27 also, in principle, applies to the VAT Act, in that it is the partnership 
that is deemed – in terms of section 51(1)(a) – to be carrying on the partnership’s enterprise as a 
separate person. The purpose of the partnership, rather than that of any individual partner, must be 
considered when determining the partnership’s ‘purpose’ as envisaged in the definition of ‘input tax’. 
 
I stated above 639 that the management of the partnership can be entrusted to a particular partner(s). If 
one partner is, for example, authorised to make the relevant purchase, then an argument can be made 
that the individual intention of that partner – ie, the person in control of the purchase – should also be 
considered together with all other relevant indicators – eg, any resolution passed authorising the 
purchase. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, an individual partner’s purpose could also be 
relevant in determining the purpose of the partnership as a collective.640 
 
  
 
637 (1989) 11 NZTC 6,346. 
638 20 SATC 355, 1956 (1) SA 602 (A) at 361. 
639 See para 3.3.2 above. 
640 In Australia an input tax credit is deductible if the thing is acquired for a ‘creditable purpose’. See McCouat Australian 
Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 120; ATO “Mergers and acquisitions – claiming input tax credits” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/GST/In-detail/Rules-for-specific-transactions/Business-asset-transactions/Mergers-
and-acquisitions---claiming-input-tax-credits/?page=4 (date of use: 21 August 2018). In Canada, eligibility for an input tax 
credit is generally based on the registrant’s ‘intention’ at the time he acquires the property or service. See Chabot et al 
EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 3,010; CRA “Calculating Input Tax Credits” available at 
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications /8-3/calculating-input-tax-
credits.html (date of use: 21 August 2018). In the UK, one of the requirements for deducting VAT as input tax, is that the 
acquisition must have been for the ‘purposes’ of business. See Hemmingsley & Rudling  Tolley’s Value Added Tax paras 
34.2 and 34.6; HMRC “VAT Input Tax basics: introduction” available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-
input-tax/vit10100 (date of use: 21 August 2018). The effect of s 184-5(1) of the Australian GST Act, s 272.1(1) of Canada’s 
ETA, and s 45(1) of the UK VAT Act, is that the partnership is deemed to carry on the enterprise and commercial or 
business activity of the partnership. As a partnership is treated as a separate person for VAT/ GST purposes in each of 
these jurisdictions (see para 2.2.3 above), and is deemed be carrying on the partnership’s enterprise, I argue that when 
establishing the purpose or intention with which an acquisition is made, the relevant purpose or intention is that of the 
partnership and not an individual partner(s). Therefore, in my opinion, the positions in these jurisdictions correspond to 
that in South Africa and New Zealand. 
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3.5 Distributions to partners 
 
During the existence of a partnership agreement, the partnership property is jointly owned by the 
partners in undivided shares. Consequently, save where the partnership agreement provides otherwise, 
the receipts and accruals in the partnership business are acquired by the partners in common, without 
any one partner acquiring a separate right of ownership thereto. A partnership agreement, however, 
almost invariably provides for the division of profits after the lapse of fixed periods of time.641 
 
Partners have certain rights and duties regarding their capital contributions. A partner is, as a general 
rule, required to keep his contributed capital in the partnership until it dissolves. The partnership 
agreement may, however, provide that the partnership’s capital be either added to or withdrawn.642 
 
The partners may also agree to distribute jointly-owned partnership property, other than partnership 
profits and contributed capital, to a partner.643 
 
Therefore, if authorised in the partnership agreement, a partnership can make distributions of profits, 
contributed capital, or other jointly-owned partnership property, to the partners. The question is whether 
these distributions, in cash or in specie, are subject to VAT. 
 
3.5.1 Profit and non-profit cash distributions 
 
I argue that a partner’s contribution of capital is not connected to profit distributions made to him as 
such distributions result from the holding of a partner’s share.644 As a result, a profit distribution does 
not constitute consideration and is not subject to VAT. Furthermore, a profit distribution in money is not 
a supply of ‘goods’ or ‘services’, as money is specifically excluded from the definitions of these terms.645 
A profit distribution in money can, therefore, not be a taxable supply. 
 
In my opinion, any non-profit cash distribution made by a partnership, although not a supply of goods 
or services, could still be consideration for a supply made by the partner to the partnership, and the 
partner’s supply may well be subject to VAT on that basis. 
 
  
 
641 Sacks Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1946 AD 31 at 40; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 297; Williams Concise 
Corporate and Partnership Law 31. 
642 See para 3.2.1 above. 
643 See Whiteaway’s Estate and Others v CIR 1938 TPD 482. 
644 See para 2.6.5 above. 
645 See the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘services’ in s 1(1). 
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3.5.2 In specie distributions 
 
For VAT to be levied, section 7(1)(a) requires a supply of goods or services. I stated that ‘supply’ in the 
VAT Act means ‘to provide something’ and that the term has been interpreted by the New Zealand High 
Court to mean “to furnish with or provide”.646 
 
According to McKenzie, there has been some speculation that in specie distributions are not supplies.647 
In support of his argument that in specie distributions are indeed supplies,648 he refers, inter alia, to a 
number of New Zealand cases on the meaning of the word ‘supply’ in the New Zealand GST Act. In 
Case M108,649 for example, the TRA had regard to the very wide meaning given to the word ‘supply’. 
In Case P74,650 the court held that the nature of the supply was the provision of a training programme, 
and it constituted a supply because ‘something of value’ was conferred. The latter case went on appeal 
in Television NZ Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.651 The High Court confirmed the decision of 
the TRA and held that what is decisive is the contractual obligation undertaken to provide training, which 
in the court’s view, could only be regarded as a supply of services. The NZIR also holds the view that 
an in specie distribution is a supply of goods for GST purposes.652 
 
The South African and New Zealand courts’ understanding of ‘supply’ in a VAT/ GST context, is in line 
with that of the Australian, Canadian, and the UK courts.653 
 
McKenzie’s and the NZIR’s conclusion that an in specie distribution constitutes a supply, is correct 
because one entity transfers property of value to another person. This also applies to a partnership 
where, by means of an in specie distribution, all the partners transfer their undivided ownership interest 
in the property concerned to one of the partners. For VAT purposes, however, it is the partnership 
making the supply to the partner.654 
 
646 See para 2.8 above. In New Zealand, GST is also charged on a ‘supply’ of goods and services in terms of s 8(1) of the New 
Zealand GST Act. 
647 McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] Locations 315. 
648 Ibid, Locations 316 to 319. 
649 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,684 TRA No 90/22 Dec No 87/90. 
650 (1992) 14 NZTC 4,496 TRA No 91/88 Dec No 74/92. 
651 (1994) 16 NZTC 11,295. 
652 NZIR, Appendix A to Tax Information Bulletin No 11 June 1990 “Distributions in specie upon liquidation or dissolution 
of a company – Income Tax, Stamp Duty and GST implications” at 2 available at 
https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/e/a/eaa2c015-52d2-4a76-9680-a31b75d96fa4/tib-vol1-no11appendixa.pdf (date of 
use: 19 December 2018) 
653 See para 3.3.1 above. 
654 See ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2003/13A3 – Addendum “Goods and services tax: General law 
partnerships” para 85A available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?docid=GST/GSTR200313A3/NAT/ATO/00001 (date of use: 31 December 
2018) (hereafter GSTR 2003/13A3 - Addendum). 
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Questions arising, are whether an in specie distribution is a supply made in the course or furtherance 
of the partnership’s enterprise, and is for consideration. The ATO believes this is the case.655 It reasons 
that the application of an asset in an enterprise establishes the necessary connection between the 
supply of the asset and the relevant enterprise.656 The ATO’s view is correct in light of the New Zealand 
judgment in Case K55.657 Therefore, if the relevant goods are used to carry on the partnership’s 
enterprise, the in specie distribution of those goods is in the course or furtherance of the enterprise. 
 
A distribution in specie could be subject to VAT if the partner makes a payment – in cash or in kind – to 
the partnership in return for the distribution. When considering possible payment options a partner could 
make in return for an in specie distribution, it is important to distinguish between partnership property 
and partnership capital. 
 
As regards the nature of a partnership’s capital, I stated658 that one of the essentialia of a partnership 
agreement is that each partner must make some contribution to the partnership. These contributions 
can be in money or something having a monetary value, and make up the capital of the partnership.659 
The contributions go into a common fund termed the ‘partnership capital’, and are kept separate from 
the personal estates of the partners. This capital is a fixed sum constituted by the aggregate monetary 
value of the partners’ contributions.660 
 
Jointly-owned partnership property means all the property owned jointly in undivided shares by the 
partners.661 Partnership capital, while it subsists, forms part of the partnership property, but it is merely 
a portion thereof.662 The importance of the separate identity of the partnership capital is that when the 
partnership is dissolved this amount, or its value, is returned to the partners. Partnership ‘property’, on 
the other hand, is sold and the proceeds divided between the partners.663 
 
655 Ibid. 
656 Ibid at para 85E. 
657 See para 2.6.1. 
658 See para 2.3. 
659 Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26. Williams also states here that where a partner contributes services 
or skill, the value of such contributions does not form part of the partnership capital. See also Mongalo, Lumina & Kader 
Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.3.1; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 286. 
660 Williams ibid; Mongalo, Lumina & Kader ibid. 
661 Williams ibid at 29; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 287; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 3.53 and 3.54. 
662 Schlemmer v Viljoen en Andere [1958] 2 All SA 309 (T) at 315; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 286; Williams ibid at 26. 
The aggregate value of the partnership property fluctuates. If the partnership is making a profit, the aggregate value of 
partnership property increases, whilst it decreases if the partnership is making a loss. 
663 Ramdhin et al ibid; Mongalo, Lumina & Kader Forms of Business Enterprise para 2.3.3.1; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg 
para 6.47; Ferreira v Fouche [1949] 1 All SA 130 (T) at 132; Schlemmer v Viljoen en Andere ibid. As partners are entitled to 
a return of their contribution, it is advisable for the partnership agreement to assign a monetary value to a contribution 
that consists of property and not of money. See Williams ibid. As the contribution is subjected to the risks of the business, 
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The question arises as to whether a partner may apply either his capital contribution or other partnership 
property, in exchange for the partnership’s distribution to him. 
 
The ATO is of the view that an in specie distribution of partnership property by a partnership to a partner 
is made for consideration. This consideration, it submits, may be monetary, non-monetary, or a 
combination of both.664 In support of this view, it argues that the term ‘consideration’, as defined in 
subsection 9.15(1) of the Australian GST Act,665 is a broad term for GST purposes. It not only 
incorporates the meaning of the term in contract law, but also its broader meaning in conveyancing 
referred to by Dixon J in the High Court decision in Archibald Howie Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp 
Duties (NSW) 49B (Archibald Howie).666 
 
In Archibald Howie the issue was whether the transfer of shares could be assessed for duty under, inter 
alia, section 66(3B) of the Stamp Duties Act.667 Section 66(3B) applied to a conveyance made on a 
bona fide consideration in money or money’s worth of not less than the unencumbered value of the 
property conveyed.668 
 
The facts were that the appellant company transferred certain shares in other companies – which 
formed part of the assets of the appellant company – to two of its shareholders. The purpose of the 
transfer was to give effect to a resolution for a reduction in the share capital of the appellant company. 
The reduction was carried out by a distribution of these assets in specie.669 
 
The court670 held that under section 66, the word ‘consideration’ should receive the wider meaning it is 
accorded in conveyancing, rather than the more limited meaning under general contract law. The court, 
whilst acknowledging that the difference between the two meanings is perhaps not very material, stated 
that in the law of contracts the consideration is the amount offered and accepted. In conveyancing, 
however, the consideration is the money or value passing which moves the conveyance or transfer.671 
 
 
the partner’s contribution will only be returned to him if the fortunes of the business so permit. See Ramdhin et al ibid at 
para 263. 
664 GSTR 2003/13A3-Addendum para 85H. 
665 ‘Consideration’ is defined in sub-s 9.15(1) to include any payment, or any act or forbearance, in connection with, in 
response to or for the inducement of a supply of anything. 
666 (1948) 77 CLR 143, [1948] HCA 28 (herafter Archibald Howie); GSTR 2003/13A3-Addendum para 85I. 
667 1920-1940 (NSW). 
668 Archibald Howie at 154. 
669 Ibid at 151. 
670 Per Dixon J. 
671 Ibid at 152. 
106 
 
The court agreed that the transfers were made for consideration in money or money’s worth within the 
meaning of section 66. It held that in a distribution in specie in consequence of a reduction in capital 
based on the possession of surplus assets, there are aspects of the transaction which evidence an 
adequate consideration in money or money’s worth.672 
 
The court explained that while a shareholder has no proprietary interest in the assets of an incorporated 
company, his ‘share’ is a portion of the company’s share capital in relation to which he has certain 
rights. The shareholder is, for instance, entitled to have share capital applied in accordance with the 
memorandum and articles of association. Furthermore, insofar as assets are available for this purpose, 
the shareholder is entitled to have his paid-up capital returned on liquidation or on a reduction of capital, 
if the method of returning is sanctioned in the articles of association.673 The court held that the return of 
the paid-up amount is the discharge pro tanto674 of a claim by the shareholder on the assets of the 
company.675 The reduction in both the amount and value of the share, therefore, afforded an adequate 
consideration in money and in money’s worth.676 
 
As stated above,677 the Australian GST Act’s definition of ‘consideration’ differs from that in the VAT Act 
to the extent of its use of the phrase ‘in connection with’. Australian case law, or the views of the ATO, 
on the meaning of ‘consideration’ for GST purposes must, therefore, be carefully considered before 
placing any reliance thereon. Furthermore, there is no justification for adopting the view of the court in 
Archibald Howie that ‘consideration’ must, for South African VAT purposes, be given its wider meaning 
in conveyancing – whatever that might mean in South African law. I argue678 that for the purposes of 
the VAT Act, a payment that is reciprocally connected to a supply, is consideration for that supply. I 
nonetheless hold the view that the reasoning in Archibald Howie is persuasive, namely that the 
proportionate reduction in both the amount and value of the share could be consideration paid by the 
shareholder for the company’s return to him of share capital. Considering the meaning of ‘consideration’ 
in the VAT Act, I argue that such a reduction would constitute consideration for the return of the share 
capital if there is, in the circumstances, a reciprocal connection between the proportionate reduction in 
the value (or amount) of the share, and the return of the share capital. In other words, the reduction in 
the share value occurs as payment for the return of the share capital in the form of, for example, an 
in specie distribution. 
 
 
672 Ibid. 
673 Ibid at 152. 
674 That is, to such extent. 
675 Ibid at 153. 
676 Ibid at 154. 
677 See para 2.6.4.2 above. 
678 See para. 2.6.5 above. 
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The ATO is of the view that the comments of Dixon J in Archibald Howie, apply equally to in specie 
distributions by partnerships to partners.679 The ATO argues that such an in specie distribution has the 
effect of discharging a claim that the partner has over the assets of the partnership. Consequently, 
when an in specie distribution is made, the partner’s entitlement or claim over the assets of the 
partnership is reduced proportionately.680 
 
In my view, Archibald Howie can be distinguished from the ECJ judgment in Case 154/80681 where the 
Secretary of State for Finance assessed a cooperative association on the basis of its members’ 
reduction in the value of their shares, as consideration for the cooperative’s providing storage 
services.682 The issue before the ECJ was whether the cooperative had charged its members 
consideration for its services within the meaning of article 8(a) of the Second Directive.683 
 
The ECJ referred to Annex A point 13 regarding article 8(a) which provides that, “[t]he expression 
‘consideration’ means everything received in return for the supply of goods or the provision of services 
…”.684 The ECJ held that there must be a direct link between the service provided and the consideration 
received, which does not happen in a case where the consideration consists of an unascertained 
reduction in the value of the shares held by the members of the cooperative.685 The European 
Commission submitted that it is difficult to establish with any certainty, the real effect which the annual 
decision on the storage charges had on the value of the shares because that value could also be 
influenced one way or the other by various other factors.686 The ECJ also held that such consideration 
 
679 GSTR 2003/13A3-Addendum para 85K. 
680 Ibid at para 85N. 
681 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Coöperatieve Aardappelenbewaarplaats GA Case 154/80 5 February 1981 at 445 
(herafter the Aardappelenbewaarplaats case). 
682 Ibid at 447. The facts in this case were that the cooperative ran a cold-storage depot in which it laid in potatoes and 
stored them for its members’ account. Each grower owning shares was entitled to deposit 1 000 kilograms of potatoes a 
year for each share against payment of a storage charge fixed by the cooperative. Pending the sale of the cold-store, the 
cooperative did not ‘impose or receive’ any storage charge as remuneration for the services it provided for the relevant 
financial years. Consequently, in the belief that its services had been provided for no consideration, the cold-storage did 
not account for VAT on the services. The Secretary of State for Finance, however, considered that the cooperative had 
nevertheless charged its members something in return, owing to the reduction in value of their shares resulting from the 
non-collection of their storage charges. He, therefore, assessed what was received in return to be the storage charge 
ordinarily charged. 
683 The Second Council Directive of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of member states concerning turnover 
taxes – Structure and procedures for application of the common system of value-added tax (1967 English Special Edition 
Official Journal 16). 
684 The Aardappelenbewaarplaats case 447. In terms of art 2(a) of the Second Directive: “The following shall be subject to 
the value-added tax: 
(a) The supply of goods and the provision of services within the territory of the country by a taxable person against 
payment”; while art 8 provides: “‘The basis of assessment shall be: in the case of supply of goods and the 
provision of services, everything which makes up the consideration for the supply of the goods or the provision 
of services …”. 
685 Ibid at 454. 
686 Ibid at 451. 
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must be a subjective value, which is the consideration actually received, and not a value assessed 
according to objective criteria.687 The inspector had calculated the consideration by applying ‘the most 
usual price’ for the storage charge.688 The ECJ concluded that such a loss of value may, therefore, not 
be regarded as a payment received by the cooperative providing the services,689 and that the 
cooperative’s services were not taxable.690 
 
In my view, had the cooperative and its members, firstly, agreed that a reduction in the members’ shares 
would constitute payment for the cooperative’s supply of the storage services, and, secondly, had they 
agreed on the amount by which the value of the shares would be reduced, the ECJ would probably 
have gone along with the assessment. 
 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Whiteaway, the court held that a partner’s capital is a 
debt due to him from the partnership, and has nothing to do with his share of the assets – save that he 
has a lien over those assets for repayment of capital once outside creditors and advances by partners 
have been paid.691 I argue that, subject to the consent of all the partners, the debt comprising of a 
partner’s capital can immediately be due by the partnership to that partner, and not only when the 
partnership is dissolved.692 It stands to reason that if a partner is required to pay the partnership for an 
in specie distribution, and the partnership is indebted to the partner for an amount of capital, the partner 
and the partnership would be reciprocally indebted. 
 
I have stated that although a partner is not entitled to acquire an individual right to ownership in any 
partnership property before a general distribution, the partners may agree on a division of profits after 
the lapse of fixed periods of time.693 On the agreed date for profit sharing, the partner will have a claim 
for his proportionate share of the partnership’s net profits.694 In my opinion, in the case of an in specie 
distribution, the partner would be indebted to the partnership for his obligation to pay for the distribution, 
whereas the partnership could be indebted to the partner for an amount of capital which the partner, as 
 
687 Ibid at 454. 
688 Ibid at 451. 
689 Ibid at 454. 
690 Ibid at 455. 
691 1933 TPD 486 at 501. 
692 See para 3.2.1 above where I state that after the formation of the partnership, the agreed capital can at any time, with 
the consent of all the partners, be added to or withdrawn. 
693 See para 3.5 above. 
694 See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 297. Note that only once the state of the partnership affairs has been determined, 
will it be clear whether a partner is entitled to claim any amount from the partnership, and if so, the extent of his claim. In 
a given situation, a partner would not be entitled to institute a claim for his share of the profits, but actually be liable to 
pay over his share of the nett loss of the partnership. See Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 4.42. According to Williams 
Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31, until the agreed date for profit sharing has arrived, none of the partners has any 
rights to profits. 
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per agreement between all the partners, is entitled to withdraw, or an amount of profit share that is due 
to the partner. 
 
In Schierhout v Union Government,695 the court held that when two parties are mutually indebted to one 
another, if both debts are liquidated and fully due, the doctrine of compensation comes into play. The 
one debt extinguishes the other pro tanto as if payment had been made.696 The doctrine of 
compensation or compensatio is also referred to as ‘set-off’.697 Set-off constitutes payment, and is the 
total or partial discharge of debts owed reciprocally by two persons.698 
 
The firm KPMG is correct, in my view, that a shareholder’s debt arising from his obligation to pay for an 
in specie dividend, can be set off against the company’s indebtedness to him – for example, where the 
company sets off the value of the dividend in specie against its loan obligation to the shareholder.699 A 
partner’s indebtedness for an in specie distribution for which payment is required, can likewise be offset 
against the partnership’s indebtedness to the partner in the form an amount of capital which the partner 
is entitled to withdraw, or a share in profits due to the partner. In my opinion, the payment for the 
in specie distribution can also be structured in the form of a barter,700 which I deal with below.701 
 
As concerns the time of supply when set off is applied, in the SARS’s (since withdrawn) Ruling 193,702 
it is stated that where set off is applied before any invoice has been issued, set off will take place, and, 
therefore, payment will be made when the vendor delivers the goods to clients to whom he is personally 
indebted. This is in line with Schierhout v Union Government where the court held that the claim in that 
case would be regarded as having been extinguished from the moment the mutual debts were both 
extant.703 Therefore, in the case of set-off, payment as envisaged in section 9(1), takes place at the 
moment when both liquidated and fully due debts co-exist. At the moment the partnership makes an 
in specie distribution to the partner which results in mutual indebtedness between the partnership and 
the partner as regards any capital or profit distributions due to the partner, the time of supply in 
 
695 1926 AD 286. 
696 Ibid at 289; Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 9-6. 
697 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 832. 
698 Ibid. In Symon v Brecker 1904 TS 745 at 747, Innes CJ explained that compensation in our law is equivalent to payment. 
It operates ipso facto (ie, by the very fact or act) as a discharge. As soon as two debts exist between which there is mutuality 
so that the one can be compensated against the other, then, by operation of law, the one debt extinguishes the other pro 
tanto. 
699 KPMG “VAT implications of dividends, including dividends in specie” available at https://www.saica.co.za/ 
integritax/1997/413_VAT_implications_of_dividends_including_dividends_in specie.htm at 3 (date of use: 13 March 
2017). 
700 “Barter” means an exchange of goods or services for other goods or services. See Concise Oxford English Dictionary at 
110. 
701 That is below under this sub-heading. 
702 Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax SARS Rulings - 70. 
703 Schierhout v Union Government 1926 AD 286 at 289. 
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section 9(1) is triggered. Each party receives payment from the other at the moment of set off, and a 
potential VAT liability arises for both parties. Support for this view can be found in the case Van Heerden 
and Others v The State,704 where estate agency commissions were sacrificed by means of set off. The 
court held that output tax was nonetheless payable on the commissions even though the supplier did 
not invoice the recipient for the commissions, and the recipient made no payment of the commission to 
the supplier.705 
 
The ATO is of the view that the consideration for an in specie distribution from a partnership is the 
proportion of the partner’s interest in the partnership that would be: 
a. an amount debited to the capital account of the partner; 
b. an amount debited to the current account of the partner; or 
c. a combination of amounts debited to both the partner’s capital account and current account.706 
 
The ATO’s view accords with the accounting for a partnership. In the books of the partnership, three 
accounts will be opened for each of the partners, namely a capital, drawings, and current account.707 A 
withdrawal of capital, and a drawing against money due to a partner, are debits to his capital and current 
accounts, respectively.708 
 
I agree with the NZIR’s submission that the mere credit entry to, for example, a partner’s account within 
the partnership’s books of account, is not accepted as payment as this simply acknowledges the debt. 
To be treated as a payment, according to the NZIR, the amount credited must be applied in some way 
to the partnership’s benefit. In line with my argument above, the NZIR submits that payment would 
occur, for instance, if the credit was set off against an amount(s) owing by the partner.709 
 
The ATO submits that to the extent that the total credit standing to a partner, as reflected in the 
combined balance of the partner’s capital and current account, is insufficient to pay for the in specie 
distribution, the consideration for the distribution could also include: 
a. any monetary payment by the partner; and 
 
704 73 SATC 7. See Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 1 consideration-2A. 
705 Van Heerden and Others v The State 73 SATC 7 at para 139. 
706 GSTR 2003/13A3 – Addendum para 85N. 
707 Flynn & Koornhof Fundamental Accounting 23-3. 
708 Ibid at 23-4. The difference between the drawings and the current account is that drawings against expected profits are 
from the drawings account, whereas drawings from the current account are against moneys due to the partner (ibid at 23-
5). 
709 NZIR Tax Information Bulletin Vol 1 No 4 at 1 available at https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/c/c/ccd4dbdc-97f0-4a6e-
9730-3cb4ba68916b/tib-vol1-no04.pdf (date of use: 31 December 2018); McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] 
Location 341. 
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b. any entry into an obligation, or promise by the partner to pay the partnership.710 
 
The ATO’s approach also applies to South African law because when set-off is applied, equal debts are 
both discharged. In the case of unequal debts, the lesser debt is discharged whilst the larger remains 
in force for the balance or excess only.711 The in specie distribution could, therefore, be made to the 
partner by the partnership either wholly or partially on credit. The parties may agree that the partner is 
liable for interest on the outstanding amount. A partner is, after all, liable for the repayment, together 
with interest, of the partnership’s money he has used in his private affairs.712 
 
I have pointed out that the payment for the in specie distribution can be structured in the form of a 
barter. Set off must be distinguished from a barter contract or an exchange. In the case of barter, the 
consideration for the supply of the goods sold is entirely in some other commodity.713 In other words, 
the partnership and the partner may agree that in exchange for the in specie distribution, the partner 
will supply goods or services to the partnership. In my view, a shareholder’s agreement to a reduction 
in the value of his share, as in the case of Archibald Howie, constitutes the supply of a service in the 
form of the surrender of a right in relation to a certain portion of the share capital. 
 
The case of Whiteaway’s Estate and Others v Commissioner for Inland Revenue714 illustrates how 
partnership capital was used to pay for an in specie distribution. In this case, the partners agreed to 
transfer certain fixed partnership property to two of the partners for their joint use and sole benefit. It 
was further agreed that the purchase price for the fixed property would be paid by the partners through 
an adjustment of their capital accounts.715 
 
The leading case on barter in New Zealand is Lanauze v King & Anor.716 In this case, two parties, 
Lanauze and King, entered into an agreement in terms of which Lanauze was to transfer 930 kilograms 
of paua quota to King, in return for the transfer to him of a house and its contents. The issue concerned 
the time of supply of the paua quota. Section 9(1) of the New Zealand GST Act, like section 9(1) of the 
 
710 GSTR 2003/13A3 – Addendum para 85O. 
711 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 832; Ramdhin A et al “Obligations” in Kühne M (ed) Law of South Africa vol 19 (Lexis 2016) 
para 244. 
712 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 297; Scamell & I’Anson Banks Lindley on the Law of Partnerships 568. To the extent 
that the partnership supplies the goods to the partner on credit, and the partner is liable to pay interest on the provision 
of the credit, the partnership would be making a supply of a financial service to the partner that is exempt from VAT in 
terms of s 12(a) read with s 2(1)(f). See para 2.6 above. 
713 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 891. In a sale the price must be in money. If it is not money but is chiefly or entirely in 
some other commodity, it is no longer a contract of sale, but of barter or exchange. See Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words 
“Barter”. 
714 Whiteaway’s Estate and Others v CIR 1938 TPD 482. 
715 Ibid at 485. 
716 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,360; McKenzie GST A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 249. 
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VAT Act, deems the supply of goods or services to be made at the earlier of the time of issue of an 
invoice, or when payment is received. The court held that in the context of a swap arrangement where 
house and contents were to be exchanged for a quota, the vesting of ownership and equitable title in 
the property is payment for the purposes of section 9(1).717 
 
I argue, therefore, that if registered for VAT, the partnership and the partner could each have a VAT 
liability for their respective supplies – ie, the partnership’s supply of goods by means of the in specie 
distribution, and the partner’s supply of a service in the form of surrendering a right. Both supplies 
would, in terms of section 9(1), be deemed to have taken place from the moment that ownership of the 
goods or services supplied vests in the recipient. 
 
In South Atlantic Jazz Festival (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS,718 the vendor staged annual 
international jazz festivals. The vendor concluded sponsorship agreements with various sponsors. In 
terms of these agreements the sponsors, inter alia, provided goods and services for the festivals, in 
return for which the vendor provided goods and services to the sponsors in the form of branding and 
marketing. Both the vendor and the sponsors were registered for VAT. It was common cause that the 
vendor was liable to levy output tax on the goods and services provided to the sponsors under the 
sponsorship agreements. The issue before the court was whether the vendor should be entitled to set 
that output tax liability off against a deduction of input tax in relation to the supplies made by the 
sponsors to the vendor.719 According to the court, the transactions under the sponsorship agreements 
could, in essence, be regarded as barter transactions.720 The sponsors were required to levy VAT on 
their supply of the goods and services concerned to the vendor.721 As these were barter transactions, 
the value of the goods and services supplied by the sponsors was, in terms of section 10(3)(b), the 
open-market value of the consideration received in return for the supply.722 The court noted that the 
sponsors did not account separately for the VAT on the consideration provided by the vendor. The court 
held that the VAT levied by the sponsors is thus deemed, in terms of proviso (ii) to section 10(2), to 
have been an amount equal to the tax fraction of the open-market value of the goods and services 
 
717 Lanauze v King & Anor ibid at para 22. See also Case T61 (1998) 18 NZTC 8,461, where a partnership received cash for 
the entire commercial building sale, save for $800 000 for which the purchaser company issued fully paid-up ordinary shares 
in itself to the partnership. The TRA held that payment occurred once the parties had performed their obligations under 
the sale and purchase agreement. That was done with regard to the $800 000 by the purchaser company issuing the shares 
to the partnership in satisfaction of part-payment of the purchase price. The TRA also held that such share issues constitute 
payment by way of barter. Ibid at para 17. 
718 77 SATC 254. 
719 Ibid at para 3. 
720 Ibid at para 4. 
721 Ibid at para 5. 
722 Ibid at para 9. Section 10(3) provides that the amount of consideration shall be- 
(a) to the extent that such consideration is a consideration in money, the amount of the money; and 
(b) to the extent that such consideration is not a consideration in money, the open market value of that consideration. 
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received as consideration for the supply.723 By virtue of its counter-performance under the barter 
transaction, the vendor must be taken to have paid the tax.724 The vendor’s appeal was upheld. 
 
As an in specie distribution in return for a partner surrendering his right to, for example, a portion of the 
capital, is also a barter transaction, the value of the goods and services supplied by the partnership and 
the partner is, in terms of section 10(3)(b), the open-market value of the consideration each party 
receives in return. Each party is entitled to an input tax deduction of the VAT levied on the other party’s 
supply, subject to the applicable provisions in the VAT Act. 
 
The partnership would be liable for VAT on the in specie distribution at fifteen per cent. If, however, the 
distribution constitutes the supply of an enterprise (or part of an enterprise which is capable of separate 
operation), disposed of as a going concern to a partner registered for VAT, the supply will be zero rated 
under section 11(1)(e).725 
 
Section 10(4) could apply if the partnership makes the in specie distribution for no consideration, or for 
a consideration in money that is less than its open-market value. Section 10(4) would, for example, 
apply where the partner is not registered for VAT, because had a consideration equal to the open-
market value been paid, the partner would not have been entitled to a full input tax deduction. The 
consideration for the in specie distribution would then be deemed, by section 10(4), to be the open-
market value of that distribution. 
 
A partner who is a vendor, is entitled to deduct the VAT levied726 on the in specie distribution where the 
goods are acquired by the partner for the purpose of making taxable supplies. 
 
In the case of Canada, Arsenault and Kreklewetz are of the view that where a partnership distributes 
partnership property to a partner, there is potential GST liability, and the supply is deemed to have been 
made at the free-market value under section 272.1(4) of Canada’s ETA.727 
 
723 Section 10(2) provides that the value to be placed on any supply of goods or services shall be the amount of the 
consideration for such supply, as determined in accordance with s 10(3), less so much of such amount as represents tax. In 
terms of the proviso (ii) to s 10(2), where the portion of the amount of the said consideration which represents tax is not 
accounted for separately by the vendor, that portion is deemed to be an amount equal to the tax fraction of the 
consideration. 
724 South Atlantic Jazz Festival at para 10. A substantial portion of the judgment concerns the documentary proof required 
by the vendor to support the input tax deductions in question, which is not relevant for current purposes. 
725 See KPMG available at https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/1997/413_VAT_implications_of_dividends_ 
including_dividends_in specie.htm (date of use: 13 March 2017). See also McKenzie GST A Practical Guide [E-book] 
Locations 255 and 256. 
726 At fifteen per cent. 
727 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 49. Section 272.1(4) provides that where a partnership disposes of its property 
to a person who is a member of the partnership, the partnership is deemed to have made to the person, and the person is 
deemed to have received from the partnership, a supply of the property for consideration equal to the total fair-market 
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The UK has no specific provisions to deal with the VAT implications of distributions by a partnership to 
its partners.728 
 
3.6 Private or domestic use of partnership property 
 
A partner may use partnership property for private purposes, but subject to limitations, provided that 
this does not conflict with the partnership business.729 
 
When a partner applies partnership property for private purposes, it is an application or use of the 
property by the partner and not the partnership, simply because they are two distinct persons for VAT 
purposes. As a result, the partnership would be supplying the use of the property to the partner, who, 
in turn, subjects the property to his private use. Should the partner pay consideration to the partnership 
for such use, the supply could be subject to VAT.730 
 
In my opinion, a supply of goods or services acquired for use in the partnership’s enterprise without a 
charge, by a VAT-registered partnership to a partner, could provide an opportunity for VAT abuse. This 
could result in the supply not being subject to VAT ending in a VAT-free acquisition by the partner, 
whilst the partnership claimed an input tax deduction when the goods or services were acquired. To 
avoid this result, these supplies without charge, Schenk and Oldman submit, should be treated as 
supplies for consideration subject to VAT.731 
 
Where the supply of use is made for no consideration, or for a consideration below the open-market 
value of the supply, and the partner does not intend to use the property exclusively for a taxable 
purpose, section 10(4) could apply and the consideration for the supply could be deemed to be the 
open-market value of that supply. The partnership would then be required to levy VAT on that market 
value. 
 
If, however, the partnership does not charge the partner a consideration, and section 10(4) is not 
applicable, the question is whether the partnership would still be making a taxable supply to the partner. 
 
value of the property. The view that a partnership’s distribution to a partner can potentially be subject to GST is correct 
considering the meaning of ‘supply’ in Canada’s ETA as “the provision of property or a service”. See above under this sub-
heading and s 272.1(4). 
728 Considering the meaning of ‘supply’ in the UK as the transfer of ownership or possession (para 3.3.1 above), in my view, 
an in specie distribution by a partnership to a partner could potentially be subject to VAT in the UK. 
729 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 297; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.70; Pothier A Treatise para 84. 
730 In terms of s 7(1)(a). 
731 Schenk, Thuronyi & Cui Value Added Tax 108. 
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Section 10(23) provides that, save as otherwise provided in section 10, where a supply is made for no 
consideration, the value of that supply is deemed to be nil. The Tax Court held in KCM v Commissioner 
for SARS,732 that the purpose of section 10(23) is merely to provide a value of nil for a supply in certain 
instances. There is nothing in the wording of section 10(23), the court reasoned, to justify reading into 
it a purpose to deem a non-taxable supply for no consideration to be a taxable supply for no 
consideration.733 The SARS is correct in submitting that in determining whether the making of supplies 
for no consideration is a taxable supply, it must be clear that the activities which gave rise to the supply 
were conducted in the course or furtherance of business or enterprise activities.734 
 
There is also an argument that where a partnership permits a partner to use partnership property for 
private purposes and for no consideration, this activity is inherently not aimed at advancing the 
partnership’s enterprise, but is for the sake of the partner. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, 
the partnership would not be providing such use in terms of a taxable supply. As a result, the partnership 
could be required to make a change in use adjustment in terms of section 18(2).735 
 
Where a partner uses partnership money in his private affairs, that money must be repaid to the 
partnership, together with interest.736 The partnership would be making a supply of a financial service 
to the partner that is exempt from VAT,737 to the extent that the partner is liable to pay interest for the 
use of the money. Depending on the amount of interest charged to the partner, and the value of any 
other amounts received which are unrelated to the making of taxable supplies, the partnership could be 
required by section 17(1) to apportion the VAT levied on its acquisition of goods or services.738 
 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK, have no GST/VAT provisions that specifically apply where a partner 
uses partnership property for a domestic or private purpose. 
 
 
732 Case No VAT 711. 
733 Ibid at para 9. 
734 SARS Interpretation Note 70 – 14 March 2013 para 3.3. 
735 Section 18(2) provides that where capital goods or services have been acquired, manufactured, assembled, constructed 
or produced by a vendor, wholly or partly for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in the course of making taxable 
supplies, and if the extent of the application or use of such goods or services in the course of making taxable supplies is 
subsequently reduced in relation to their total application or use, an adjustment is required. The adjustment is based on 
the extent of the increased non-taxable use of such goods or services. See s 10(9). No adjustment is, however, necessary 
where the cost of the goods or services (excluding VAT) is less than R40 000 – see proviso (i) to s 18(2). 
736 See para 3.5.2 above. 
737 In terms of s 12(a), read with s 2(1)(f). 
738 As stated above (para 3.6), a partner’s private use of partnership property will, however, be negligible. If the intended 
use of goods or services for non-taxable purposes is less than five per cent of their total intended use, the VAT on such 
goods or services will, on the basis of the de minimis rule in proviso (i) to s 17(1), not be apportioned. 
116 
 
Considering that in New Zealand the meaning of ‘supply’ is “to furnish with or provide”,739 and that 
section 10(3) of the New Zealand GST Act740 is worded similarly to section 10(4) of the VAT Act,741 in 
my view, section 10(3) could apply to deeming a partnership’s supply of partnership property to a 
partner for his private use, to be at the open-market value of that supply.742 Supplying use in this form 
would, therefore, potentially be subject to GST. 
 
The ATO considers that when goods are removed from the partnership for private consumption by a 
partner, there is a supply by the partnership in the course or furtherance of its enterprise.743 The supply 
may, therefore, be subject to GST. If there is no consideration, or the supply is for inadequate 
consideration, the supply may be taxable on application of Division 72.744 Where Division 72 applies, 
the value of the supply is its GST exclusive market value.745 
 
As pointed out above,746 section 272.1(4) of Canada’s ETA, applies where a partnership ‘disposes’ of 
partnership property to a partner. According to Arsenault and Kreklewetz, provided the ownership of 
the underlying property is not being transferred to partners, the transaction will not attract GST under 
section 272.1(4). They argue, however, that where a partnership confers a benefit on a partner, 
section 172(2) of Canada’s ETA could still apply.747 This would deem the partnership to have made a 
supply of the property or service for consideration equal to its fair-market value.748 The conferring of the 
 
739 See para 3.5.2 above. 
740 Read with s 10(3A) of the New Zealand GST Act. 
741 See para 2.6.6 above. 
742 Section 10(3) of the New Zealand GST Act provides that where - 
a. a supply is made by a person for no consideration or for a consideration in money that is less than the open market 
value of that supply; and 
b. the supplier and the recipient are associated persons, 
the consideration in money for the supply shall be deemed to be the open market value of that supply. Section 10(3A) 
provides that s 10(3) does not apply where, inter alia, the recipient acquired the supply for the principal purpose of making 
taxable supplies. 
743 GSTR 2003/13 para 102. 
744 Ibid para 102. 
745 Ibid para 90. See also McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 464. The views of the ATO on how 
Division 72 is applied accord with those of PiperAlderman. Section 72-5 of the Australian GST Act provides that a supply to 
an associate for no consideration will be a taxable supply if the associate is not registered or required to be registered, or 
the associate acquires the things applied otherwise than solely for a creditable purpose. According to Piper Alderman, 
even though the supply is not being made for consideration, a distribution made by a discretionary trust may still be a 
taxable supply where Division 72 of the GST Act applies. See PiperAlderman “GST on in specie transfers of assets from 
discretionary trusts to beneficiaries” available at 
https://www.piperalderman.com.au/__files/f/4074/tax%20alert%2015.pdf (date of use: 22 August 208). A partnership 
and its members are associates. See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 464. 
746 See para 3.5.2 above. 
747 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 33. 
748 Section 172(2) provides that where a partnership appropriates property or a service that was acquired in the course of 
commercial activities of the partnership, for the benefit of a partner, the partnership is deemed to have made a supply of 
the property or service for consideration equal to the fair market value of the property or service. Chabot et al EY’s Complete 
Guide to GST/HST para 2,135 agree that s 172(2) applies to partnerships, amongst others, where property or services are 
appropriated for the personal use of a partner. 
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benefit is, therefore, potentially subject to GST. This would be the case, they contend, where the 
partnership grants the exclusive use of property, for example a computer or cell phone, to a partner in 
the course of partnership activities.749 
 
In the UK, where at the direction of a person carrying on a business, goods held by the business are 
put to any private use or made available to any person for use for a non-business purpose, a supply of 
services is seen to have taken place750 and gives rise to a VAT liability.751 This would probably also 
apply where a partnership allows a partner to use partnership property for a non-business purpose. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I explored the VAT treatment of various transactions that commonly occur during a 
partnership’s operation. A concern I highlighted, is the potential for inaccurate classification of payments 
made by a partnership to a partner, which could make the difference as regards a partner’s liability to 
register and account for VAT on his supplies to the partnership. In Chapter Six I consider the desirability 
of taxing a partner’s capital contributions to the partnership, and whether there is justification for an 
amendment to eliminate such a requirement to account for VAT. 
 
I further explored the dichotomy between the nature of different partnership transactions in partnership 
law and VAT law, particularly during the partnership’s operation, and I emphasised once again that a 
departure from the common law must be justified. 
 
I examined the role of a partner, and illustrated how the capacity in which he acts when transacting for 
the benefit of the partnership – whether as agent or as principal – impacts on related supplies and 
acquisitions for both the partner and the partnership. 
 
That the collective purpose of the partnership is important when determining whether an acquisition has 
been made for a taxable purpose, is a reminder that when applying a VAT provision to a partnership 
transaction, the partner’s status as a separate person for VAT purposes must be borne in mind. 
 
749 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 33, 34. 
750 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 47.6. See also HMRC “Private use and self-supply of goods and 
services for VAT” available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/vat-private-use-and-self-supply-of-goods-and-services (date 
of use: 22 August 2018). 
751 The same applies to services. Where a person carrying on a business puts services supplied to him to any private or 
non-business use, he is treated as having supplied those services in the course or furtherance of the business. Private use 
includes use outside the business by any person, and own personal use where a business is carried on by an individual. 
See Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 47.6. See also HMRC “Private use and self-supply of goods and 
services for VAT” available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/vat-private-use-and-self-supply-of-goods-and-services (date 
of use: 22 August 2018). 
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I considered the VAT treatment of distributions and the alternative payment options therefor that could 
serve as consideration. It was also shown that the VAT Act adequately counters the potential for VAT 
abuse when partnership property is applied by partners for private or domestic purposes. 
 
In the following chapter, the VAT implications of transactions that arise when a partnership is dissolved 
but its business is continued by a new partnership, are discussed. Special focus is placed on the supply 
of partners’ shares that typically occur during this phase. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE TECHNICAL DISSOLUTION OF A PARTNERSHIP 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In theory, the dissolution of a partnership requires that it be liquidated. In practice, however, either in 
the partnership or a subsequent agreement, or by will, or by conduct, the remaining partners often take 
over the business of the partnership. On dissolution there is, accordingly, a succession to the rights and 
liabilities of the dissolved partnership by one of the partners or by a new partnership.752 It is only in the 
absence of such an agreement that a formal liquidation takes place.753 That a partnership has been 
dissolved, therefore, does not mean that it has been liquidated.754 A dissolution that does not result in 
the liquidation of the partnership’s assets and liabilities, is known as a ‘technical dissolution’, whereas 
a dissolution that does result in such liquidation, is termed a ‘general dissolution’.755 The VAT 
implications of a general dissolution and liquidation of a partnership are addressed in Chapter Five. 
 
In this chapter, the VAT treatment of transactions typically related to the technical dissolution of a 
partnership, especially the transfer of partners’ shares, is discussed. In addition to what has already 
been stated regarding partners’ shares, a more in-depth understanding of the nature of a partner’s 
share is required to answer the threshold question of whether its supply, in the context of dissolutions, 
is subject to VAT. The associated question is whether such VAT, and the VAT on related expenses, 
are deductible as input tax. The relevance or application of section 11(1)(e), which zero rates the supply 
of an enterprise, to the supply of partners’ shares and to the transfer of the partnership’s enterprise 
from the dissolved to the new partnership, is considered.756 Other issues examined are the VAT 
implications of the transfer of the partnership’s liabilities to the new partnership, and the application of 
the reorganisation provisions of section 8(25) to partnerships. 
 
  
 
752 Berco Sameday Express v McNeil and others [1996] 4 All SA 100 (W) at 105; Bamford Law of Partnership 110; Benade et 
al Ondernemingsreg para 6.16; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 47. 
753 See Berco Sameday Express ibid; Benade et al ibid at para 7.01. 
754 Ferreira v Fouche [1949] 1 All SA 130 (T) at 132. Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 314. 
755 GSTR 2003/13 para 127; Morse Partnership Law para 7.32 at 225. 
756 Batistich M, Stuk J & Stuk J “GST and the Sale of a Partnership Interest” available at 
http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tved.net.au/PublicPaper
s/July_2000,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_GST_and_the_Sale_of_a_Partnership_Interest.html (date of use: 31 
December 2018). 
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4.2 Causes of dissolution 
 
A partnership can be dissolved through a number of different causes, for example: 
 
a. Agreement of dissolution: Partners can dissolve the partnership by express or implied 
agreement.757 
b. Change in membership: Any change among the partners destroys the identity of the 
partnership.758 The retirement of a partner, or the admission of a new partner, therefore, 
dissolves the partnership.759 
c. Death of one of the partners: The death of one of the partners dissolves the partnership.760 
d. Sequestration: The sequestration of the estate of the partnership or of the private estate of a 
partner dissolves the partnership.761 
e. Partner becoming alien enemy: Alien enemies are barred during war from entering into a 
partnership agreement.762 
  
 
757 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 312; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 6.02; Bamford Law of Partnership 75; Williams 
Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 48. 
758 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 312; Benade et al ibid at para 6.09; Bamford ibid at 76; Williams ibid at 48 - 49. In Executors 
of Paterson v Webster, Steel & Co (1881) 1 SC 350 at 355, the court stated that “[t]here can be no doubt that, as a general 
principle, the Court can only recognise the members of which the firm consists, and that any change among them 
destroys the identity of the firm”. In Standard Bank v Wentzel & Lombard 1904 TS 828 at 833, the court held that when 
the new partner, Aldred, joined the partnership there was a change in its constitution, and that the identity of the firm was 
altered. 
759 Berco Sameday Express v McNeil and others [1996] 4 All SA 100 (W) at 105; Ramdhin et al ibid at para 312; Benade et al 
ibid at paras 6.08 to 6.10; Bamford ibid at 75, 76; Williams ibid at 48, 49. 
760 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 312; Benade et al ibid at para 6.11; Bamford ibid at 77; Williams ibid at 49. See McLeod and 
Shearsmith v Shearsmith 1938 TPD 87 at 89, where the court stated that, “[a]s the partnership share of the deceased was 
specifically bequeathed in trust to the executors, it is as trustees and not as the legal representatives of the deceased that 
they figure in the present partnership, which is clearly not the same partnership as that between McLeod and the testator.” 
See also Van der Merwe v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste [1977] 1 All SA 591 (A) at 596, 597. 
761 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 312; Benade et al ibid at para 6.23; Bamford ibid at 79; Williams ibid at 49. 
762 Ramdhin et al ibid; Benade et al ibid at para. 6.22; Bamford ibid at 80; Monhaupt v Minister of Finance (1918) 39 NPD 47 
at 50. Other causes of a partnership’s dissolution are: 
a. Completion of business or undertaking: A partnership that was formed for the purpose of carrying out a particular 
business or undertaking is dissolved by the completion of such business or undertaking. See Ramdhin et al ibid; Benade 
et al ibid at para 6.07; Bamford ibid at 75. 
b. Effluxion of time: A partnership entered into for a fixed term will be dissolved by the expiration of its agreed time of 
duration. See Ramdhin et al ibid at para 312; Benade et al ibid at para 6.05; Bamford ibid at 75). 
c. Partner declared mentally ill: A court may dissolve a partnership if one of its members is declared mentally ill by a 
court. See Ramdhin et al ibid; Bamford ibid at 81. 
d. Frustration: A partnership is dissolved if, due to circumstances beyond the control of the partners, the business 
purpose of the partnership becomes objectively impossible to achieve. See Ramdhin et al ibid; Bamford ibid at 76, 77. 
e. Notice of dissolution: A partnership, formed for an indefinite duration, will be dissolved if any one of the partners gives 
notice that he no longer intends to continue the partnership. See Ramdhin et al ibid; Benade et al ibid at para 6.13; 
Bamford ibid at 81. 
f. Just or lawful cause: A partner, if justified and reasonable, may obtain a court order dissolving the partnership. See 
Ramdhin et al ibid; Bamford ibid at 82. 
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4.3 The formation of a new partnership 
 
After dissolution, a partner has a right to demand that the partnership be liquidated, unless the partners 
have agreed otherwise.763 In the case of the retirement or death of a partner, a new partnership is 
created if the remaining partners agree to continue with the business of the partnership.764 A new 
partnership also comes into existence by the admission of a new partner.765 The admission of new 
members into a partnership can only be effected by a contract between them and each and all of the 
old members.766 
 
When the new partnership is created, the partnership’s business is transferred from the old partnership 
to the new partnership.767 In Berman v Brest and Another,768 the court held that where a new partnership 
is formed by the addition of another partner to the old partnership, all movable assets will, by process 
of law and without any act on the part of the partner, pass to the new partners.769 The court held further 
that immovable property and incorporeal rights belonging to the old partnership can only be acquired 
by the new partnership by formal transfer and cession, respectively.770 The partnership property of the 
old partnership is, therefore, transferred to the new partnership, whether by operation of law or by an 
act of the partners of the old partnership. 
 
 
763 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 314. According to Bamford ibid at 97, on dissolution the partners have a right to wind up the 
partnership affairs. In Kaplan v Turner 1941 SWA 29 at 32, the court stated that in the absence of any agreement to the 
contrary the partners have an equal right in a liquidation of the partnership estate. See also Meissner v Joubert 1946 CPD 
618 at 621, where reference is made to every partner’s claim for the liquidation of the partnership assets, and Ellery v Imhof 
1904 TH 170 at 172. 
764 Executors of Paterson v Webster, Steel & Co (1881) 1 SC 350 at 355; Divine Gates & Co v African Clothing Factory 1930 
CPD 238 at 240; Van der Merwe v Sekretaris na Binnelandse Inkomste [1977] 1 All SA 591 (A); Ramdhin et al ibid at para 
312. See also Bamford ibid at 110. 
765 Executors of Paterson v Webster, Steel & Co (1881) 1 SC 350 at 355; Standard Bank v Wentzel and Lombard 1904 TS 828 
at 833. See also Whitelock v Rolfes, Nebel & Co 1911 WLD 35 at 38 where the court stated that, “the original partnership 
terminated in 1909, on the admission of Taylor, and, if he subsequently left the partnership, another new partnership came 
into existence.” A partner who seeks to enforce a succession agreement does so not as a partner or former partner, 
however, but independently as a newly-contracting partner. See Bamford ibid at 112. Furthermore, the new partnership 
does not necessarily have the same rights and obligations as the old partnership. See Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 
6.18. 
766 Wagstaff and Elston v Carter & Talbot 1909 TS 121 at 123. See also Bamford ibid. 
767 In Standard Bank v Wentzel & Lombard 1904 TS 828 at 834 the court stated that, “[w]hen a new partner enters the firm, 
and the new partnership takes possession of the movable assets of the old, those assets cease to belong jointly to the 
original partners, and they become the joint property, for the purposes of the partnership and subject to its conditions, of 
the three new partners.” In Essakow v Gundelfinger and Another 1928 TPD 308 the court stated at 315 that, “there is a 
dissolution between two partners, and in terms of the dissolution the whole business is transferred to the partner 
who continues to carry on the business.” See also Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1946 AD 31; Ramdhin et al 
“Partnership” para 312. 
768 Berman v Brest and Another 1934 WLD 135. 
769 See also Standard Bank v Wentzel & Lombard 1904 TS 828 at 834. 
770 Berman v Brest and Another 1934 WLD 135 at 139. See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” at para 312 and Bamford Law of 
Partnership at 111, 112. 
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4.4 The transfer and acquisition of a partner’s share 
 
A number of questions arise relating to the transfer of partners’ shares. For example, does a retiring 
partner or the deceased estate of a deceased partner (or ‘the decedent’s estate’) dispose of the 
partner’s share upon retirement or death? Also, when disposing of the share, what exactly is disposed 
of? On the admission of a new partner, what is the nature of the rights he acquires on admission, and 
how does he acquire those rights? As stated above,771 a partner’s share denotes both his undivided 
share in jointly-owned partnership property, and his right to claim a specific portion of the partnership 
assets, such as profits, when this portion is due.772 There are, accordingly, two distinct rights which a 
partner or his deceased estate can potentially dispose of upon retirement or death, or which a new 
partner can acquire upon his admission to the partnership. 
 
A partner’s undivided share in jointly owned partnership property 
 
In Rane Investment Trust v CSARS,773 the appellant (Rane) was an investment trust. It became a 
partner in an en commandite partnership formed for the purpose of investing in film ventures. This 
appeal concerned, inter alia, a deduction claimed by Rane for expenditure incurred from income under 
section 24F of the IT Act. 
 
A commanditarian partnership was formed between Compass Films (Pty) Ltd (Filmco) and Movie 
Ventures (Pty) Ltd (Movie Ventures). Filmco bought a film named Final Cut from a production company. 
Rane subsequently became a partner. It acquired its interest from Movie Ventures, and paid a capital 
contribution of R90 000. Rane claimed its share of the cost of acquiring the film as a deduction under 
section 24F(2)(a) of the IT Act. Section 24F(2)(a) permits as a deduction from the income of a film 
owner, an allowance in respect of the production cost he incurred in respect of a film used by him in the 
production of his income. Production cost is defined in section 24F(1), and includes expenditure 
incurred by a film owner in the acquisition of a film. The Commissioner for the SARS disallowed the 
deduction. 
 
The Commissioner argued that Rane's expenditure was in respect of its acquisition of its partnership 
share, not the acquisition of the film. The court, dismissing the Commissioner’s argument, stated that, 
that argument loses sight of the principle that in acquiring the share, Rane was also acquiring, as part 
of the business of the former partnership, a share in the film, which was an asset. The court held that it 
was the expenditure on the film as an asset taken over by the new partnership which was deductible, 
 
771 See para 2.6.3 above. 
772 The latter right is hereafter referred to as the ‘right to profit’. 
773 Rane Investment Trust v CSARS [2003] 3 All SA 39 (SCA), 65 SATC 333. 
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and not the amount of R90 000 paid by Rane to become a partner.774 
 
Therefore, in acquiring a partner’s share a partner also acquires an undivided share in the jointly-owned 
partnership property. It follows, logically, that when a partner disposes of his partner’s share, he is also 
disposing of his ownership right in the jointly-owned partnership property. This was confirmed in Chipkin 
(Natal) (Pty) Ltd v CSARS,775 where the court referred with approval to the principle in Rane – ie, that 
in acquiring the share Rane was also acquiring a share in the film. 
 
In Chipkin, the appellant and others entered into a partnership. Its contribution to the partnership 
was a cash amount, for which it acquired a 30 per cent interest in the partnership. The appellant 
subsequently transferred 99,9 per cent of its 30 per cent interest in the partnership to one of the 
partners.776 
 
The court held that when it made the capital contribution to the partnership, the appellant simultaneously 
obtained a 30 per cent interest in the partnership and an undivided share in the aircraft. The court held, 
further, that when the appellant disposed of 99 per cent of its 30 per cent interest in the partnership, it 
disposed of a corresponding percentage of its undivided share in the aircraft.777 I am of the view, 
therefore, that when a partner disposes of his partner’s share when retiring from a partnership, he 
disposes of his undivided interest in all jointly-held partnership property, including his interest in 
partnership profits which form part of the partnership property.778 This should also apply in the case of 
the death of a partner, where the remaining partners purchase the deceased partner’s undivided 
interest in jointly- owned partnership property. In Van der Merwe v Sekretaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste,779 for example, which is discussed below,780 the remaining partners purchased the 
decedent’s share of the partnership’s goodwill. It should also be possible for a partner to dispose of his 
interest in jointly-owned partnership property even after dissolution, as property contributed quoad 
dominium remains the joint property of the partners until liquidation.781 
 
 
774 Ibid at 345. 
775 [2005] 3 All SA 26 (SCA). 
776 Ibid at 28. 
777 Ibid at 29. 
778 I stated in para 2.6.3 above, that a partner’s share consists of a partner’s right to claim a specific portion of the 
partnership assets, as well as his share in jointly-owned partnership property, including partnership profits. 
779 Van der Merwe v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste [1977] 1 All SA 591 (A). 
780 That is, under this sub-heading. 
781 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315. In Brighton v Clift [1970] 4 All SA 243 (R) 246, the court referred to the 
respondent’s “right as a partner to remain in possession of the partnership assets until a liquidator is appointed” According 
to Pothier A Treatise 122, para 160, dissolution does not prevent the things which the partners have put into the partnership 
for the purpose of being common between them, from continuing common among the former partners until a distribution 
or division takes place.  
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A partner’s right to profit 
 
As regards a partner’s right to profit, there could be a distribution of profits after the partnership is 
dissolved but before its liquidation and termination. Former partners are entitled to their share of the 
profits and losses arising from transactions which necessarily result from transactions commenced or 
concluded prior to dissolution.782 
 
In Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,783 the appellant was a former member of a partnership. 
The accounts of the partnership’s business were drawn up annually for the period 1 July to 30 June. 
One of the terms of the partnership agreement was that the profits should be divided in specific 
proportions between the three partners. The appellant was entitled to 43 and one-third per cent of the 
profits. It was agreed that he would retire from the partnership with effect from 1 January 1941, and that 
his partner’s interest would be sold to the two remaining partners. In terms of the deed of dissolution, 
the partners agreed that the appellant would be paid £5 351 as his agreed share of the profits for the 
period 1 July 1940 to 31 December 1940. This sum was an agreed estimate of the amount of the 
appellant’s profit share for the stated period. The Commissioner for Inland Revenue, acting on the 
assumption, amongst others, that the year’s profits had been earned at a uniform rate throughout the 
year, calculated the appellant’s share of the profits at £14 297 and issued tax assessments on that 
basis. The appellant objected to the assessments arguing that his taxable income was £5 351. 
De Villiers J for the Cape Provincial Division, ruled in favour of the Commissioner. This decision was 
overturned on appeal, the Appellate Division holding that the sum of £5 351 was profit to which the 
appellant was entitled for the relevant period.784 Although the appeal court disagreed with De Villiers 
J’s decision, it agreed with the following noteworthy statements made by him during the course of his 
judgment: 
The right to profit is a valuable right, which he may sell, cede or otherwise dispose of. The value of the 
right may turn out, when the accounting period ends, to be very great or worthless, but it is a right vested 
in the retired or deceased partner which the retired partner or the executor of a deceased partner may 
sell, cede, or otherwise dispose of. In other words, it is a right to which he has become entitled on 
dissolution.785 
 
And further: 
 
782 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 53. In Nash v Muirhead (1909) 
26 SC 26, a partnership transaction had not been concluded before the dissolution of a two-person partnership. The court 
found that the transaction was carried on by one of the partners in his capacity as a partner and for the benefit of the 
partnership (at 31, 32). The court held, therefore, that the other partner was interested in this transaction and that he 
never gave up his interest in it by any agreement at the dissolution (at 34). 
783 Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1946 AD 31. 
784 Ibid at 43. 
785 Ibid. 
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The right to profit is quite distinct from the actual profits earned. The actual profits simply mean the 
excess of receipts over expenditure over a given period. The right, however, exists throughout. It is 
merely the value of the right which remains uncertain until eventually ascertained. 
A partner's right to share in the profit and his liability to share in losses accrues at the inception of 
partnership. The value of that right or the extent of that liability varies as the year goes on.786 
 
The court held that the appellant, importantly, “did not cede a portion of his share of profits to anyone 
after dissolution.” What the appellant and his partners instead agreed to, as a condition of dissolution, 
was to amend the existing agreement as to the division of profits. They agreed that the appellant’s 
share should not be 43 and one-third per cent of the profits made during the half-year ending 
31 December 1940, but the fixed sum of £5 351.787 The court held further that the right to profit arose 
from the partnership agreement and was a right of a capital nature. The amount of £5 351 “accrued to 
[the appellant] by virtue of that right” to profits.788 
 
Important lessons can be drawn from the Sacks case concerning a partner’s right to profit on dissolution. 
Firstly, the right to profit is a valuable right that vests in the retired or deceased partner, which the retired 
partner or the executor of a deceased partner may sell. The court also implied that such a sale is 
possible as it disagreed that the appellant had ceded his right, in this case. This is confirmed in Van der 
Merwe v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste.789 Secondly, a partner need not sell or cede his right to 
profit as in the Sacks case, where the appellant received an agreed amount based on his right, in the 
same way that a dividend accrues to a shareholder by virtue of his shareholding.790 
 
In Van der Merwe v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste,791 the issue was whether, for purposes of 
income tax, certain partnership income relating to uncompleted assignments, accrued either to the two 
remaining partners or to the widow of a deceased partner. The court accepted that in the absence of a 
contrary agreement, the decedent’s estate could claim the decedent’s share in the profits from 
assignments which were uncompleted at the time of dissolution, but which were subsequently 
completed by the surviving partners. The court held that in the partnership agreement the partners 
intended that upon dissolution of the partnership resulting from the death of a partner, the surviving 
partners could continue with the partnership business for their own benefit. The partners further agreed 
that they would, in the manner determined in the partnership agreement, pay compensation to the 
 
786 Ibid. 
787 Ibid at 42. 
788 Ibid at 43. 
789 Van der Merwe v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste [1977] 1 All SA 591 (A). 
790 In Nash v Muirhead (1909) 26 SC 26, the plaintiff and the defendant were partners of a dissolved partnership. The plaintiff 
sued the defendant for his share of the profits from a transaction that was uncompleted at the date of dissolution. The 
court, granting judgment for the plaintiff, held that he “was interested in this transaction, and that he never gave up his 
interest in it by any agreement at the dissolution” (at 34). As in the Sacks case, the plaintiff in this case also did not give up 
or sell his right to profit on dissolution of the partnership. 
791 [1977] 1 All SA 591 (A). 
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widow of the deceased partner for the goodwill attached to the name of the decedent and for his share 
in uncompleted assignments.792 The same applied when a partner retired.793 The court held that the 
relevant amounts paid to the widow formed part of the surviving partners’ gross income and were, 
therefore, subject to income tax in their hands.794 
 
It is clear that the deceased partner’s right to profit relating to the uncompleted assignments at the time 
of his death, as well as his share in the goodwill – which is partnership property – were purchased by 
the surviving partners.795 It is for this reason that the profits flowing from these assignments accrued to 
the surviving partners and not to the deceased partner’s widow. 
 
I argue, based on the Sacks, Nash, and van der Merwe cases above, that a retiring or deceased 
partner’s right to profit in the dissolved partnership can, on dissolution, either be retained by the retiring 
partner or by the decedent’s estate, depending on the agreement between the partners. In this case, 
the retiring partner or the decedent’s estate will receive the share of the profits by virtue of holding the 
right to profit. Alternatively, a retiring partner or the decedent’s estate, can sell the partner’s right to 
profit to the remaining partners who will then receive that partner’s profit share. 
 
A retiring partner (or a decedent’s estate) cannot sell a partner’s share, including a right to profit in the 
new partnership, simply because he is not a member of, and therefore does not own any rights in, the 
new partnership. He can only dispose of his partner’s share in the dissolved partnership. The remaining 
partners acquire their partners’ shares in the new partnership when they enter into a partnership 
agreement regulating the affairs of the new partnership. 
 
4.5 The admission of a new partner 
 
In my view, any number of the existing partners of a dissolved partnership can sell a portion of their 
ownership interest in the jointly-owned (dissolved) partnership’s property to a newly admitted or 
incoming partner. The partnership property of the dissolved partnership is then transferred to the new 
partnership.796 The new partner and existing partners thereafter each has an ownership interest in the 
partnership property of the new partnership. 
 
792 Ibid at 596, 597. 
793 Ibid at 597. That is, the retiring partner had to be compensated for his share in the goodwill of the partnership and for 
his share in the assignments that were uncompleted at the time of dissolution. 
794 Ibid at 601. 
795 This is also Ramdhin et al’s understanding that the surviving partners purchased the decedent’s interest upon his death. 
See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 312. 
796 See para 4.3 above. I am of the opinion that the contribution of the dissolved partnership’s property to the new 
partnership would be made in terms of the partnership agreement, referred to in para 4.3, between the new member(s) 
and the old members. 
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I suggest that, alternatively, rather than purchasing ownership interests in the partnership property of 
the dissolved partnership, the incoming partner can simply make a contribution to the new partnership 
in terms of the new partnership agreement. The VAT implications of a capital contribution upon the 
formation of a partnership have been dealt with above.797 
 
The new partner owns a partner’s share in the new partnership in the terms of the partnership 
agreement with the existing partners. I argue798 that partners’ shares are not supplied to the partners 
when the partnership is formed, because at that moment no partners’ shares exist. The existing 
partners, therefore, do not supply a partner’s share in the new partnership, including a right to profit, to 
the new partner. 
 
4.6 The dissolved partnership ceasing to be a ‘person’ 
 
As explained,799 the reasons for the dissolution of a partnership are various. The question arising is 
when would a dissolved partnership cease to be a person for VAT purposes? In Goldberg and Another 
v Di Meo,800 the appellant argued that as a partnership has no identity separate from its members, it 
changes its identity and ceases to exist whenever there is a change in its membership. The old 
partnership in this case, the appellant argued, had ceased to exist because the original partners had 
been replaced.801 The court, rejected this argument and held that if a change occurs in the constitution 
of a partnership – eg, a partner retires or a new partner joins – a new partnership comes into being, but 
the old partnership continues to exist until its affairs have been liquidated.802 In Kaplan v Turner,803 the 
court stated that the partnership continues after dissolution solely for purposes of liquidation. Despite 
the dissolution event, the old partnership continues to exist in terms of the common law and, therefore, 
to be a person for VAT purposes, until its liquidation. Until the liquidation of the old partnership it, 
therefore, exists concurrently with the new partnership.804 
 
As the partnership’s business is transferred from the old to the new partnership, the old partnership is 
no longer carrying on an enterprise, and its continued VAT registration is no longer justified.805 
 
797 See para 2.6 above. 
798 See para 2.8 above. 
799 See para 4.2 above. 
800 [1960] 2 All SA 459 (N). 
801 Ibid at 465. 
802 Ibid at 468. 
803 Kaplan v Turner1941 SWA 29 at 31, 32. 
804 See also Van der Merwe v Sekretaris na Binnelandse Inkomste [1977] 1 All SA 591 (A) at 596. 
805 Section 24(3) provides that a vendor who ceases to carry on all enterprises must notify the Commissioner for SARS of 
that fact, whereupon the Commissioner must cancel the vendor’s registration. 
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4.7 The dissolved and new partnership deemed to be one person 
 
Section 51(2) provides, subject to certain requirements, that where a partnership is dissolved and a 
new partnership which continues to carry on the enterprise of the dissolved partnership as a going 
concern comes into being, the dissolved partnership and the new partnership are deemed to be one 
and the same partnership, and therefore the same ‘person’. This provision requires that the partnership 
be dissolved in consequence of the retirement or withdrawal of one or more (but not all) of its members, 
or the admission of a new member.806 Furthermore, the new partnership must consist of the remaining 
members of the dissolved partnership, or such remaining members and one or more new members. As 
the dissolved and the new partnerships are deemed to be the same person, the dissolved partnership 
is not required to deregister for VAT. The new partnership need not apply for VAT registration but simply 
continues to account for VAT under the VAT registration number of the dissolved partnership. 
 
The purpose of section 51(2), like section 57(2)(e) of the New Zealand GST Act, is simply to ensure the 
continuity of a body of persons.807 This effectively does away with the administrative burden, inflated 
compliance costs, and VAT recovery issues,808 on the basis of the section 8(2) deemed supply which 
arises when a person ceases to be a vendor, which would otherwise result from the frequent 
deregistration and registration of partnerships. This is especially so, considering that “the remaining 
partners more often than not take over the business of the partnership.”809 The legislature achieved this 
by deeming the two persons, ie the dissolved and the new partnership, to be one person. 
 
Where the enterprise of the dissolved partnership is not continued by a new partnership, the provisions 
of section 51(2) do not apply and the dissolved partnership is required to deregister for VAT. This would 
occur, for example, where a partner in a two-person partnership retires, leaving the remaining ‘partner’ 
to continue with the partnership’s enterprise alone. The remaining ‘partner’ cannot on his own, 
constitute a partnership in that a partnership arises out of a contract between two or more persons.810 
 
I have previously stated that when a partnership dissolves and a new partnership is created, immovable 
property belonging to the members of the old partnership must be formally transferred into the names 
of the members of the new partnership.811 This transfer could give rise to liability for transfer duty under 
 
806 Note that in terms of s 25(e), a partnership that is a vendor, must within 21 days notify the Commissioner in writing of 
any change in the composition of the members of the partnership. 
807NZIR available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/QB1604. pdf 8 para 
45 (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
808 See NZIR ibid at 8 para 47 (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
809 Berco Sameday Express v McNeil and others [1996] 4 All SA 100 (W) at 105. 
810 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 254; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 3.02; Bamford Law of Partnership 1; Williams 
Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 10. 
811 See para 4.3 above. 
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section 2(1) of the Transfer Duty Act.812 This section provides for the imposition of transfer duty on the 
value of ‘property’ acquired by a person.813 However, section 9(15) of the Transfer Duty Act provides 
that no duty is payable in respect of the acquisition of a property under a transaction which, for purposes 
of the VAT Act, is a taxable supply of goods to the person acquiring the property. In short, transfer duty 
is not payable if VAT is payable. Therefore, if the dissolved partnership and the new partnership are 
deemed to be one and the same partnership, there can be no supply of the immovable property for VAT 
purposes, as a person can obviously not make a supply to himself.814 As a result, there can be no VAT 
liability on the transfer of the immovable property if section 51(2) applies. However, if section 51(2) 
applies, the members of the new partnership could be burdened with a transfer duty liability as transfer 
duty is payable by the person who acquires the property.815 
 
Both an obligation to pay VAT at fifteen per cent, and a transfer duty liability can be avoided if 
section 51(2) does not apply, and if the supply of the immovable property forms part of the supply of an 
enterprise, as envisaged in section 11(1)(e).816 The possible zero rating of the supply of the dissolved 
partnership’s enterprise to the new partnership, or to a sole remaining partner who continues with the 
partnership’s business, is discussed below.817 Section 51(2) affords the Commissioner for the SARS a 
discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, to direct otherwise – ie, to direct that the old 
and the new partnership are not to be regarded as the same partnership.818 
 
 
812 40 of 1949. 
813 ‘Property’ is defined, in s 1 of the Transfer Duty Act, as meaning land in the Republic and any fixtures thereon, and 
includes any real right in land. 
814 Note, however, that the VAT Act allows for a supply that can be construed as a self-supply, to be a deemed supply for 
VAT purposes. An example is s 8(9), read with paragraph (ii) of the proviso to the definition of ‘enterprise’ in s 1(1), which 
provides that the supply of goods or services by a vendor to an independent branch or main business of that vendor located 
outside the Republic, is a deemed supply of goods or services in the course of furtherance of the vendor’s enterprise. The 
vendor and its branch or main business are, in terms of the general law, part of a single ‘person’. 
815 Section 3 of the Transfer Duty Act. Note that the definition of ‘person’ in s 1(1) of the Transfer Duty Act does not include 
a partnership. The individual partners of the new partnership, instead of the new partnership as a separate person, are 
therefore liable for the transfer duty. 
816 See Cross New Zealand Master Tax Guide 974 para 23-110. 
817 See para 4.9 above. 
818 The decision of the Commissioner is, however, not subject to objection and appeal. Section 104(1) of the 
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (the TA Act) provides that a taxpayer who is aggrieved by an assessment made in respect 
of the taxpayer may object to the assessment. In terms of s 104(2) of the TA Act certain decisions may be objected to and 
appealed against in the same manner as an assessment. Section 104(2)(c) of the TA Act provides that a taxpayer may object 
and appeal against “any other decision that may be objected to or appealed against under a tax Act.” Section 32(1) of the 
VAT Act lists the decisions that may be objected to or appealed against under the VAT Act. A decision made by the 
Commissioner for the SARS in terms of s 51(2) is not listed in s 32(1). As it is a discretionary decision, it is subject to review 
by the court. Section 5(1) provides that powers conferred and the duties imposed upon the Commissioner for the SARS by 
or in terms of the provisions of the VAT Act, may be exercised or performed by the Commissioner, or by any SARS official. 
In Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for SARS 2001 (1) SA 1109 (CC), 2001 (2) JTLR 37, (2001) 63 SATC 13 at para 40, the 
court stated that it has long been accepted that when the Commissioner exercises discretionary powers conferred upon 
him by statute, the exercise of the discretion constitutes administrative action which is reviewable in terms of the principles 
of administrative law. See Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 5-2. 
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As section 51(2) deems the dissolved and the new partnerships to be one and the same partnership, a 
question arises as to whether, in the case of a change in membership, the sale of a partner’s share and 
other related transactions, should be disregarded from the point of view of the outgoing and remaining 
partners. An argument can possibly be made that if the fact of the termination of a person and the 
formation of a new person are ignored for VAT purposes, the legislature may well have intended that 
all transactions related to, or which brought about this termination and formation, should likewise be 
ignored and, therefore, not hold any VAT implications. 
 
Where a new partnership is created on the retirement or withdrawal of a partner, some of the following 
transactions will probably occur. The retiring partner or the decedent’s estate could sell the partner’s 
share in the dissolved partnership to the remaining partners. This would be a sale of the retiring (or 
deceased) partner’s undivided interest in the jointly-owned partnership property and the retiring 
partner’s right to profit in the dissolved partnership. The remaining partners would receive any profit 
distributions made by the dissolved partnership by virtue of their owning a right to profit in the dissolved 
partnership. This would include the retiring partner’s right to profit which they had acquired. The 
remaining partners would enter into a new partnership agreement and each would own a partner’s 
share in the new partnership. The remaining partners would contribute the jointly-owned partnership 
property of the dissolved partnership to the new partnership. 
 
Section 57(2)(e) of the New Zealand GST Act provides that “any change of members of that body shall 
have no effect for the purposes of this Act.” The Commissioner of the NZIR disagrees that this wording 
means that a supply of a partner’s share has no GST effect. The Commissioner argues that 
section 57(2)(e) refers to a change of members of a body, and that it is possible to have a transfer of a 
partner’s share without having a change of members. That will be the case when an existing partner 
transfers some, but not all, of his interest in a partnership to one or more of the other partners. In that 
case, the Commissioner submits, the partnership interests have changed, but the members of the 
partnership have not. In the Commissioner’s view, reference to a change of members, rather than to 
changes of membership interests, indicates the intended scope of the provision.819 
 
According to Cross, the scope of section 57(2)(e) is unclear, although she does concede that it is 
generally accepted that the minimum effect of the provision is that the retirement, admission, or variation 
of existing partners’ interests has no effect on the partnership’s registration. This means that the ‘new’ 
partnership need not apply for a new GST registration number.820 
 
819 NZIR “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 14/03, – GST – Transfer Of Interest In A Partnership” para 13 available at 
http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/2/72537cec-da81-407d-ad4f-e490c9f2213d/qb1403.pdf (date of use: 8 December 
2016). 
820 Cross New Zealand Master Tax Guide 974. 
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In Whiteaway’s Estate v CIR,821 the court referred to changes in the proportion in which partners share 
in the profits and losses of the business, and in their rights in the partnership assets, without there 
being a change in membership.822 Batistich et al, commenting on Australian partnership law, distinguish 
between changes of partnership interests which effect a change in the membership of a partnership, 
on the basis that such changes operate to dissolve the partnership; and intra-partnership changes, such 
as an assignment of part of one partner’s interest to another partner, which merely change the extent 
of interests held by existing partners. This type of change does not dissolve the partnership.823 
 
It is possible, therefore, for there to be a change in partners’ shares without the partnership being 
dissolved and a new partnership created because of a change in membership, which is the premise on 
which an application of section 51(2) is based. Adopting the argument of the Commissioner of the NZIR, 
I argue that a change in partners’ shares is not necessarily equal to a change in membership causing 
the partnership to dissolve. Therefore, the reference to a change in membership in section 51(2) is not, 
per se, a reference to a change in partners’ shares. 
 
There is no evidence of a legislative intent to ignore not only the membership change, but also the 
mechanism used to achieve that change – ie, the supply of a partner’s share and related transactions.824 
Moreover, the fact that supplies between the old and the new partnership are disregarded, clearly does 
not mean that supplies between other persons should also not be recognised. For example, the supplies 
between the remaining partners and an outgoing partner, and between the partners and the dissolved 
and the new partnership can be subject to VAT. 
 
The Commissioner for the NZIR submits that not all partnership contributions will necessarily involve 
the supply of a partnership interest. To illustrate this he gives the example where two existing partners 
make contemporaneous capital contributions in proportion to their existing partnership interests (eg, 
two partners, each holding a 50 per cent partnership interest, each contributes an additional $10 000). 
The partnership interest of each partner does not change.825 
 
 
821 Whiteaway’s Estate v CIR 1938 TPD 482. 
822 Ibid at 491. 
823 Batistich M, Stuk J & Stuk J “GST and the Sale of a Partnership Interest” available at 
http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tved.net.au/PublicPaper
s/July_2000,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_GST_and_the_Sale_of_a_Partnership_Interest.html (date of use: 31 
December 2018). 
824 See NZIR 7 para 43 available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-
083ecb04679c/QB1604.pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
825 Ibid at 4 para 20. 
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This argument – that a change in partners’ shares does not necessarily mean a change in membership 
– applies equally to partners who make additional capital contributions. The same arguments in favour 
of recognising the supply of partners’ shares in the context of the continuation of a dissolved 
partnership’s business by a new partnership, apply to capital contributions in the same circumstances. 
This is further support for the view that section 51(2) does not prevent contributions made by the 
partners to the new partnership from being recognised as supplies, and therefore potentially subject to 
VAT. 
 
Section 272.1(7) of Canada’s ETA provides that where a partnership would, but for this section, be 
regarded as having ceased to exist, “the other partnership is deemed to be a continuation of and the 
same person as the predecessor partnership”, subject to certain requirements.826 The CRA's position 
is that where section 272.1(7) of the ETA applies, the supplies of property from the predecessor 
partnership to the partners, and from the partners to the new partnership, are subject to the normal 
GST rules in Canada’s ETA.827 
 
Arsenault and Kreklewetz disagree with the CRA. They contend that if ownership of the partnership 
property is in the hands of the partnership for GST purposes, and if under section 272.1(7) nothing has 
changed (ie, the new partnership is deemed to be the same person as the old partnership), the CRA’s 
position is blatantly incorrect. They reason that the underlying commercial and legal realities should not 
matter, as a partnership is a legal person for GST purposes.828 
 
 
826 Section 272.1(7) provides as follows: 
Continuation of predecessor partnership by new partnership 
Where 
(a) a partnership (in this subsection referred to as the ‘predecessor partnership’) would, but for this section, be 
regarded as having ceased at any time to exist, 
(b) a majority of the members of the predecessor partnership that together had, at or immediately before that 
time, more than a 50% interest in the capital of the predecessor partnership become members of another 
partnership of which they comprise more than half of the members, and 
(c) the members of the predecessor partnership who become members of the other partnership transfer to the 
other partnership all or substantially all of the property distributed to them in settlement of their capital interests 
in the predecessor partnership, except where the other partnership is registered or applies for registration under 
s 240, the other partnership is deemed to be a continuation of and the same person as the predecessor 
partnership. 
827 Government of Canada Draft Policy Statement on the GST/HST implications of the transfers of property referred to in 
paragraph 272.1(7)(c) of the Excise Tax Act GST/HST Notices – Notice 166 14 April 1996 at 2 available at 
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications/notice166/ draft-policy-statement-
on-gst-hst-implications-transfers-property-referred-paragraph-272-1-7-excise-tax-act.html (date of use: 31 December 
2018). 
828 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 51. 
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Considering the impact of section 51(2), supplies between the dissolved and the new partnership are 
ignored for VAT purposes because one entity cannot make supplies to itself. Furthermore, as the jointly-
owned partnership property is deemed to belong to the partnership, and the dissolved and the new 
partnerships are deemed to be the same person, the various transfers of the ownership in such property 
in terms of the general law, are not regarded as supplies and, consequently, hold no any VAT 
implications. 
 
The Australian GST Act does not have a provision dealing specifically with the situation where a 
dissolved partnership’s enterprise is continued by a newly-created partnership, which corresponds to 
section 51(2). A written partnership agreement may, however, either expressly by a continuity or non-
dissolution clause, or by implication, provide for the continuation of the partnership in the event of a 
change in its membership.829 It is Taxpayers Australia Inc’s view that a reconstituted partnership retains 
its GST registration despite the change in its membership. Furthermore, as there is no winding up of 
the partnership, the change in membership does not give rise to any supplies or acquisitions from one 
partnership to another. It also argues, importantly, that even though the acquisition or sale of an interest 
in the partnership may require a change in legal title to partnership assets, where such property remains 
in the partnership, there is no supply. This is because any supply of partnership property would be by 
the partnership as, for GST purposes, legal title in the partnership property vests in the partnership.830 
 
In terms of section 45(1) of the UK VAT Act, no account is to be taken of any change in the partnership 
in determining, for the purposes of the VAT Act, whether goods or services are supplied to, or by, such 
persons.831 According to HMRC, the purpose of section 45(1) is to ensure continuity by providing that 
changes in the composition of a partnership do not create the need for a partnership to deregister and 
re-register for VAT every time the partners change. It contends that, “it makes unnecessary to take 
account of any changes in the composition of the partnership when determining what supplies have 
been made or received by the partnership business.” I understand HMRC to argue that where 
section 45(1) is applicable, supplies by the partnership resulting from changes in the composition of the 
partnership are not recognised for VAT purposes. HMRC further holds the view that section 45(1) has 
no effect on any supply that one of the partners may be making as a taxable person in his own right.832 
 
 
829 GSTR 2003/13 para 150. The ATO argues that the view that there can be continuity of a partnership for GST purposes, 
means that the partnership is dissolved only as far as a retiring or deceased partner is concerned. Moreover, the 
reconstituted partnership continues as far as the continuing partners are concerned. See GSTR 2003/13 para 167. 
830 Taxpayers Australia Inc Taxpayers Guide para 24.323. 
831 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.2. 
832 HMRC Business Brief 30/04 “VAT and Partnership ‘Shares’” available at https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-
1.nsf/54e6de9e0c383719802572b9005141ed/5b231f3c7401364e802572ab004ba603?OpenDocument (date of use: 23 
August 2018). 
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4.8 The supply of a partner’s share 
 
4.8.1 The identities of the supplier and the recipient of a partner’s share 
 
The NZIR is of the opinion that the transfer of partnership interests is made by the partners because 
the partnership is not a legal entity separate from the partners which could itself supply partnership 
interests.833 The NZIR’s view, that the partnership interests are supplied by the partners, is in my opinion 
correct. Its reason for holding that view is incorrect. I argue that the reason why the partnership does 
not supply partnership interests is not because it is not a legal entity separate from the partners. The 
partnership is indeed, for South African VAT and New Zealand GST purposes, deemed to be a person 
separate from its members, and on that basis it is capable of making supplies, including supplies to its 
own members.834 As stated above,835 whatever is supplied or acquired by the body of persons making 
up the partnership, within the course and scope of its common purpose, is supplied or acquired by the 
partnership as a separate person for VAT purposes. I argue that the partnership cannot supply the 
partners’ shares simply because such shares are not jointly owned by all the partners, and therefore, 
for VAT purposes, owned by the partnership. It does not have the same status as, for example, jointly-
owned partnership property that is owned in common by all the partners. Partnership interests are 
owned by the partners,836 and it is for that reason that they can only be supplied by the partners.837 
 
The ATO argues that a sale of an interest in a partnership by a continuing partner to an incoming 
partner, or by an outgoing partner to either a continuing or an incoming partner, is a partner-to-partner 
transaction because it does not involve the creation or supply of any new interest by the partnership.838 
 
833 NZIR “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 16/04, Goods And Services Tax – GST Treatment Of Partnership Capital 
Contributions” available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/ QB1604.pdf 
3 para 17 (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
834 See paras 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.3 above. 
835 See para 2.3 above. 
836 Williams states, for example, that when we speak of a partner’s ‘share in the partnership’ we mean two things: First, we 
mean his proportionate interest in the partnership property, while the partnership is a going concern. Second, we mean his 
proportionate share in the partnership property after it has been realised and all the partnership creditors have been paid. 
See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31. See also Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 289; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg paras 4.14 and 4.21: and Bamford Law of Partnership 29, 37. 
837 I argue (para 2.8 above) that for the purposes of the VAT Act, the partners’ shares are not supplied by the partnership 
to the partners when the partnership is formed. 
838 GSTR 2003/13 para 174. Commenting on Australia’s GST, Batistich et al state that in circumstances involving the 
retirement of a partner, it would appear that the individual partner is the entity making the supply. See Batistich M, Stuk J 
& Stuk J “GST and the Sale of a Partnership Interest” available at 
http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tved.net.au/PublicPaper
s/July_2000,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_GST_and_the_Sale_of_a_Partnership_Interest.html (date of use: 31 
December 2018). 
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In Canada and the UK, the consensus is that, for GST purposes, a partner disposes of his share in the 
partnership.839 
 
The NZIR also submits that the supply of a partnership interest in return for a capital contribution is, for 
GST purposes, not deemed to be made by the partnership because the supply of the partnership 
interest is not made in the course of the partnership’s taxable activity.840 Again, the conclusion is correct, 
but the reasoning is flawed. It is correct that the supply of the partnership interest is not made in the 
course or furtherance of the partnership’s enterprise in that the partnership interest is not used or 
applied in the partnership’s enterprise. This is, however, not the reason why the partner, as opposed to 
the partnership, is the supplier of the partnership interest. Only the partner can supply the ownership of 
the partnership interest because only he owns it. Reference is made above841 to the New Zealand case 
of Case S83842 where the court stated that a person or partnership cannot supply what that person or 
partnership does not own.843 
 
As regards the recipient of the supply of a partnership interest, the NZIR submits that any supply of a 
partnership interest will necessarily be a supply made by a partner to another partner (either existing or 
new).844 I am in agreement with this view as partnership interests are owned by partners. 
 
4.8.2 The partnership property and the right to profit 
 
When a partner disposes of his partner’s share, he disposes of both his undivided interest in the jointly-
owned partnership property, and his right to profit.845 I argue846 that for VAT purposes, the jointly-owned 
partnership property, including property contributed quoad dominium and partnership profits, is owned 
by the partnership. Considering once more the common-law and VAT dichotomy, whilst in terms of the 
common law a partner disposes of his undivided interest in the jointly-owned partnership property when 
supplying his partner’s share, this is not true for VAT purposes. Only the partnership, which is the 
deemed owner, is capable of supplying ownership of partnership property. When a partner disposes of 
 
839 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.8; HMRC Business Brief 30/04 “VAT and Partnership 
‘Shares’” available at  https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/54e6de9e0c383719802572b9005141ed/ 
5b231f3c7401364e802572ab004ba603?OpenDocument (date of use: 23 August 2018); Arsenault & Kreklewetz 
“Partnerships” 34; Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010. 
840 NZIR 1 para 6 available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/ QB1604. 
pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
841 See para 3.3.1 above. 
842 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,515. 
843 See also Case S84 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,526 and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Dormer and Anor (1997) 18 NZTC 13,446 
at para 3.3.1. 
844 NZIR 3 para 17available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/ QB1604. 
pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
845 See para 4.4 above. 
846 See para 2.7 above. 
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all or a portion of his partner’s share, therefore, the component of the supply made up by his interest in 
the jointly-owned partnership property, should not be recognised as a supply for VAT purposes. 
 
Whilst the property contributed quoad dominium is deemed to be owned by the partnership, the property 
contributed quoad usum can, on dissolution of the partnership, immediately be reclaimed in whole by 
the contributing partner. It is not subject to sale and division between the partners.847 If the goods were 
deemed to have been supplied to the partnership in terms of section 18(4), then the partnership could 
be liable for VAT on the supply of the goods to the partner.848 
 
Instead of disposing of the ownership of property contributed quoad dominium to the remaining partners 
on dissolution, the new partnership could be given the use thereof. In Monhaupt v Minister of Finance,849 
the partnership was dissolved by operation of law on the outbreak of war. The court held that if, on the 
dissolution of a partnership, the business is continued without any realisation and distribution by one or 
more of the partners as trustees for the others, they are liable to account to the outgoing partners for 
that portion of the profits fairly attributable to the use of the capital they contributed.850 I argue that if a 
new partnership is formed by the continuing partners, the partnership property of the dissolved 
partnership is transferred to the new partnership. The former partners are, however, the rightful owners 
of their capital that is used by the new partnership. If the former partners are vendors, then they could 
incur a VAT liability in relation to the supply of such use to the new partnership. As the former partners 
are not partners in the new partnership, they would not receive a share in the profits of the new 
partnership by virtue of owning any partners’ shares. Such share in the profits would in fact be payments 
made for the use of their capital and, therefore, constitute consideration for a supply.851 
 
Unlike the partnership property jointly owned by the partners, in my view a partner enjoys an ‘individual 
entitlement’ to his share in the partnership profits.852 In other words, his right is separate from the other 
partners who have the same right, and is also distinct from the partnership property. A partner’s right to 
profit is not deemed to be owned by the partnership as is the case with jointly-owned partnership 
property. As a result, the partner, rather than the partnership, can supply ownership of the right to profit. 
 
 
847 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 26, 27. According to Beinart, the 
partner who has contributed the use of property, in effect takes such property back before any division takes place. See 
Beinart 1961 Acta Juridica 146. 
848 See para 3.3.1 above. 
849 (1918) 39 NPD 47. 
850 Ibid at 51, 52. 
851 If the capital constitutes an amount of money, and the amounts paid to the former partners are consideration for the 
use of such money, the supply of such use could be exempt under s 12(a), read with s 2(1)(f). 
852 See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 289; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg para 4.14; and Bamford Law of Partnership 37. 
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Arsenault and Kreklewetz’s argument that for GST purposes the transfer of a partner’s share is no 
different from the transfer of any other equity interest,853 is, in my view, also applicable to the VAT Act. 
The legal status of companies is dealt with in section 19 of the Companies Act.854 From the date and 
time of its incorporation, a company is a juristic person and it has all the legal powers and capacity of 
an individual.855 As a company is a separate entity distinct from its shareholders or members, the 
property vested in the company cannot be regarded as vested in all or any of its shareholders.856 
Instead, the shareholders own shares in the company. A share in a company consists of a bundle or 
conglomerate of personal rights which entitle the holder to a certain interest in the company, its assets, 
and its dividends.857 Before company property can be owned by a shareholder, it must be transferred 
to the shareholder – eg, by means of a cash dividend.858 The VAT Act, moreover, defines ‘equity 
security’ to mean, amongst others, “any interest in or right to share in the capital of a juristic person”.859  
 
Based on the above, I argue that in the case of a company, the company’s property may well belong to 
the company, but a shareholder is still regarded as owning an interest in that property by virtue of his 
share(s). Similarly, for VAT purposes the partnership property is deemed to belong to the partnership, 
but a partner owns an interest in that property in the form of, amongst others, a right to profit. 
 
Because the partnership property is deemed to belong to the partnership, and a partner would only be 
disposing of his right to profit and not his undivided interest in the jointly owned partnership property, 
the nature of the assets cannot influence the VAT rate to be applied to the supply of a partner’s share. 
The supply of a partner’s share cannot be zero rated, for example, based on a disposal of a partner’s 
undivided interest in jointly-owned gold coins as envisaged in section 11(1)(k). Moreover, a partner’s 
supply of his right to profit is a supply of a ‘service’, which includes anything done or to be done, and 
the surrender of a right. 
 
In both the Rane Investment Trust and Chipkin cases there was a change in the membership of the 
partnership. The court’s reference in Whiteaway's Estate v CIR860 to changes in partners’ shares without 
there being changes in membership, implies that it is possible for a partner to sell a portion of his 
interest in the jointly-held partnership property, and a portion of his right to profit, to a co-partner. 
My view is that the above arguments also apply to such an intra-partnership change. I argue that the 
 
853 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 35. 
854 Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act). 
855 Section 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. 
856 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530at 550, 551; Delport et al Henochsberg 84. 
857 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc [1983] 1 All SA 145 at 151; Delport et al ibid at 158. 
858 See s 46 of the Companies Act; Delport et al Henochsberg 198. 
859 Section 2(2)(iv). 
860 1938 TPD 482. 
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partner selling a portion of his partner’s share would, legally, be supplying a portion of his joint 
ownership interest in the partnership property to the purchasing partner. For VAT purposes, 
however, and based on the above arguments, the partner does not make a supply of the partnership 
property, the ownership of which remains with the partnership. Furthermore, the partner’s supply of 
a portion of his right to profit, would be recognised for VAT purposes. 
 
In Sacks v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,861 the remaining partners paid the retiring partner 
separate amounts for his share of the partnership profits, and for his interest in the jointly-owned 
partnership property.862 It is envisaged that a single consideration could be paid for a partner’s share. 
Section 10(22) provides that where a taxable supply is not the only matter to which a consideration 
relates, the supply shall be deemed to be for such part of the consideration as can properly be attributed 
to it. Whether the supply of a partner’s share is taxable – albeit that only the partner’s right to profit can 
be supplied by the partner – is considered below.863 If the supply of the right to profit is taxable in the 
circumstances, then the single consideration paid could be apportioned between the amount of the 
consideration that relates to the taxable component of the supply, and that part which is a non-supply 
for VAT purposes.864 As a result, only that part of the consideration which relates to the right to profit, 
would be subject to tax at either the standard or zero rate. 
 
According to Arsenault and Kreklewetz, while Canada’s ETA clearly deems a partnership to be a 
separate person, it is not clear on deeming a partner’s interest in the underlying capital of a partnership 
to be a ‘nothing’ for GST purposes.865 They maintain that although this is likely the intended result, it is 
not as certain as it could be because it appears to rely solely on the partnership’s status as a ‘person’.866 
They also point out that while Canada’s ETA has defined an ‘interest in a partnership’ as a ‘financial 
instrument’,867 it does not clarify what is meant by an ‘interest in a partnership’ – an issue which is not 
self-evident.868 
 
In Australia, the supply by a partner of an interest in a partnership is a financial supply.869 Australia’s 
GST Act provides that a ‘financial supply’ is input taxed,870 and that the term ‘financial supply’ has the 
 
861 1946 AD 31. 
862 Ibid at 36. 
863 See para. 4.8.3 above. 
864 See Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 10-29; SARS Rulings - 52. 
865 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 35. 
866 Ibid at 26. 
867 In s 123(1) of Canada’s ETA. 
868 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 35, 36. 
869 GSTR 2003/13 para 174. 
870 Section 40-5(1). If a supply is ‘input taxed’, no GST is payable on it, but the supplier normally cannot claim input tax 
credits for the GST payable on its business inputs that relate to that supply. See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-
book] Location 19. 
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meaning it is accorded in the regulations.871 In terms of these regulations,872 the disposal of an interest 
in ‘the capital of a partnership’ is a financial supply.873 Reference is also made in the regulations to 
‘interests in a partnership’.874 As with Canada, the Australian GST Act and regulations do not clarify the 
meaning of ‘the capital of a partnership’ and ‘interests in a partnership’. It is, therefore, not clear whether 
these phrases include jointly-owned partnership property. 
 
The ATO acknowledges that a supply of an interest in the partnership by a partner may require the 
outgoing partner to effect a change in legal title or interest in partnership assets. Furthermore, the 
acquiring partner acquires the beneficial and legal interests under the supply of the interests in the 
partnership. The ATO argues that for GST purposes, however, the transfer of the legal interest does 
not involve a separate supply by the outgoing partner.875 It reasons that any supply of partnership 
property would be by the partnership. Therefore, where property remains in the partnership, there is no 
supply as the supply and acquisition would be by the partnership.876 
 
The UK VAT Act and the New Zealand GST Act, do not define the terms ‘partner’s share’, ‘interest in a 
partnership’, or comparable terms. However, the NZIR argues that a partnership interest is a chose in 
action, and therefore, a service. It contends that the supply of a partnership interest is not the supply of 
a portion of the underlying assets held by the partnership.877 
 
Regarding the position in the UK, HMRC argues that a share in the partnership is distinct from the 
assets contributed by the partner on joining the partnership. It maintains, therefore, that even if the 
selling price of the share is determined by the value of those assets, they are not the subject of the sale. 
The supply of the assets would, accordingly, attract its own liability for VAT purposes.878 HMRC agrees 
with my argument that a single consideration for a partner’s share may have to be split between the 
portion that relates to the partner’s undivided share in the jointly-owned partnership property, and the 
balance of his interest in the partnership. 
 
  
 
871 Section 40-5(2). 
872 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999 Statutory Rules 245, 1999 made under the A New Tax 
System (Goods and Services Tax) Act, 1999. 
873 Item 10 in the table in regulation 40-5.09. 
874 Part 8 of Schedule 7 to the regulations includes ‘interests in a partnership’ as an example for item 10. 
875 GSTR 2003/13 para 182. 
876 Ibid para 183. 
877 NZIR 3 para 17 available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/2/72537cec-da81-407d-ad4f-e490c9f2213d/qb1403. 
pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016). 
878 HMRC Business Brief 30/04 “VAT and Partnership ‘Shares’” available at https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-
1.nsf/54e6de9e0c383719802572b9005141ed/5b231f3c7401364e802572ab004ba603?OpenDocument (date of use: 23 
August 2018). See also Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.8. 
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4.8.3 Whether the supply of a partner’s share is subject to VAT 
 
The supply of a partner’s share is subject to VAT if the requirements of section 7(1)(a), read with the 
definition of ‘enterprise’, are met. Importantly, 
 
a. the partner must be a vendor; 
b. the partner must make the supply of the partner’s share in the course or furtherance of carrying 
on an enterprise; and 
c. the supply must be for a consideration. 
 
As I argue above,879 a partner cannot be registered for VAT on the basis of the partnership’s enterprise, 
given the partnership’s status as a separate person, and section 51(1)(a) which deems the partnership 
to be carrying on its enterprise separate from its members. A partner could, however, be registered for 
VAT on the basis of, for example, taxable capital contributions made to the partnership, or an enterprise 
carried on by the partner independently of the partnership. 
 
For a partner’s supply of his partner’s share to be subject to VAT, the supply must be made in the 
course or furtherance of an enterprise he carries on. According to the NZIR, this would be possible but 
uncommon,880 as the supply will not be made by a partner who is a vendor or, if the partner is a vendor, 
will not be a supply made in the course or furtherance of a taxable activity carried on by him.881 I stated 
that the mere holding of a partner’s share does not constitute an enterprise activity.882 Its subsequent 
sale would, therefore, not attract VAT. 
 
There are situations, however, where the supply of a partner’s share could be part of a separate 
enterprise carried on by the partner, and consequently, be subject to VAT. An exceptional case 
mentioned previously,883 is where a partner conducts an enterprise of buying and selling partners’ 
shares.884 
 
879 See paras 2.3 and 2.4 above. 
880 NZIR 8 para 17 available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-b692-083ecb04679c/QB1604. 
pdf  (date of use: 8 December 2016) 
881 Ibid at 1. 
882 See para 2.6.3. 
883 Ibid. 
884 The NZIR 3 is in agreement with this view. See NZIR available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/2/ 72537cec-
da81-407d-ad4f-e490c9f2213d/qb1403.pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016). Batistich M, Stuk J & Stuk J “GST and the Sale 
of a Partnership Interest” available at 
http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http://www.tved.net.au/PublicPaper
s/July_2000,_Lawyers_Education_Channel,_GST_and_the_Sale_of_a_Partnership_Interest.html (date of use: 31 
December 2018). I argue on the contrary, that any supply made by the individual partner is not made in the course or 
furtherance of an enterprise, even if the partner often swaps between partnerships. I disagree, because one can conceive 
of a partner swapping so often between partnerships that his acquisition and sale of partners’ shares and the 
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Although the ECJ has not considered the disposal of shares in a partnership, it has considered 
transactions involving shares in companies.885 The point was made earlier886 that both ‘economic 
activities’ in the Sixth Directive, and ‘enterprise’ in the VAT Act, envisage on-going activities. In the EDM 
case,887 one of the points at issue before the ECJ was whether a holding company’s sale of shares and 
other negotiable securities, constitutes ‘economic activities’ within the meaning of article 4(2) of the 
Sixth Directive.888 The court held that transactions relating to securities that would constitute economic 
activities are those from which revenue is earned on a continuous basis. Such transactions go beyond 
the simple acquisition and sale of securities, such as transactions carried out in the course of a business 
trading in securities.889 The court held further that an undertaking which performs activities consisting 
of the simple sale of shares and other negotiable securities, is to be regarded as confining itself to 
managing an investment portfolio in the same way as a private investor.890 HMRC considers that the 
principles applicable to transactions involving shares in companies, also apply to transactions involving 
partnership shares, even though the ECJ, as stated above, has not considered the disposal of shares 
in a partnership.891 
 
Reference was made to the De Beers case892 where the court held that unless one conducts business 
as an investment company, the investments one holds cannot be regarded on their own as constituting 
an enterprise.893 Therefore, both the ECJ and the court in De Beers, regarded the ‘business’ of trading 
or dealing in shares as an economic or enterprise activity, respectively. 
 
In CIR v Nussbaum,894 the issue was whether the proceeds of the taxpayer’s sales of shares should be 
included in his gross income, and so be subject to income tax, on the basis that he was engaged in a 
scheme of profit-making employing shares as stock-in-trade. Although this is an income tax case, in my 
view it nonetheless sheds light on the type of share-dealing activity which a court is likely to regard as 
an enterprise activity for purposes of the VAT Act. The court stated that the broad question to be 
answered was whether the relevant sales effected by the respondent, being an individual, amounted to 
 
accompanying activities, are sufficiently continuous or regular to constitute a ‘taxable activity’ as defined in s 6(1)(a) of 
the New Zealand GST Act. 
885 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.8. 
886 See paras 2.6.3 and 2.8 above. 
887 Case C-77/01 29 April 2004. 
888 Ibid at para 29. 
889 Ibid at para 59. 
890 Ibid at para 60. 
891 Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.8; HMRC Business Brief 30/04 “VAT and Partnership 
‘Shares’” available at https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/54e6de9e0c383719802572b9005141ed/ 
5b231f3c7401364e802572ab004ba603?OpenDocument (date of use: 23 August 2018). 
892 See para 2.6.3 above. 
893 The De Beers case at para 34. 
894 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 58 SATC 283. 
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the realisation of capital assets or the disposal of trading stock in the course of carrying on a business.895 
The court held that continuity is a necessary element in the carrying on of a business in the case of an 
individual.896 
 
The court’s enquiry was specifically directed to whether the respondent, contemporaneously with his 
main investment purpose, had a secondary profit-making purpose.897 The following factors, in my view, 
provided evidence of the continuity of the taxpayer’s share-dealing activity: 
 
a. the considerable number and frequency of the taxpayer’s sale of shares held for only five years 
or less; 
b. the close watch which the taxpayer kept on his portfolio and on every shareholding within it;898 
and 
c. the reasons why the taxpayer sold so many shares held for only comparatively few years. Not 
only was profit inherent in the sale of shares whose dividend yield had dropped, but the 
taxpayer manifestly worked for it.899 
 
The court held that an investor buys shares ‘for keeps’ and, generally, adds to his portfolio using surplus 
existing income.900 
 
Based on the above, I argue that a frequent purchase and sale of partner’s shares may well be indicative 
of an enterprise which is dealing in such shares.901 It should be noted that the definition of ‘enterprise’ 
requires that the activity, in the course or furtherance of which the supply is made, instead of the supply 
itself, be carried on continuously or regularly.902 A partner would, therefore, be carrying on an enterprise 
should he continuously or regularly perform an activity in the course or furtherance of which partners’ 
 
895Ibid at 1162. 
896 Ibid at 1164. This is not so in the case of a company, the court explained, whose declared objects and its manifestly being 
in business to make profit, will generally make it easier to infer a secondary profit-making purpose than would be in the 
case of an individual. 
897 Ibid at 1162. 
898 Ibid at 1165. 
899 Ibid. 
900 Ibid at 1166. 
901 Although VAT and income tax are vastly different, the reasoning applied in Nussbaum may equally apply for VAT 
purposes. In Nussbaum the court listed the factors that illustrated the “continuity” of the sale of the shares, whereas 
“enterprise” is a continuous or regular activity (see “enterprise” as defined in s 1 of the VAT Act). 
902 See Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 1 enterprise 5. See also De Koker & Kruger Value-Added Tax para 3.6. According to 
the NZIR, a subdivision of land into two allotments, involving no development work, will not in itself amount to a taxable 
activity. The NZIR argues, though, that the greater the number of allotments created and sold, the more extensive the 
development work, the more time and effort involved, and the higher the financial commitment to the project, the more 
likely that the activity is carried on continuously. Therefore, it is more likely that there is a taxable activity. See NZIR Tax 
Information Bulletin Vol 7 No 3 (September 1995) 9 available at https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/5/7548757f5-4e9a-
b3e5-27074f8b2493/tib-vol07-no03.pdf (date of use: 21 March 2018). 
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shares are supplied for a consideration. The partners’ purchase and sale of partner’s shares would form 
part of this enterprise, and the supply of those shares would potentially be subject to VAT. The factors 
listed above could be indicative of the partner’s status as either a dealer in partners’ shares, or as a 
‘passive’ investor. 
 
The fact that a partner is a vendor does not necessarily mean that the supply of his partner’s share is 
taxable in that the supply of the share may be unrelated to that enterprise. The definition of ‘enterprise’ 
specifies the nature of the nexus required between the taxable activity and the supply, for the supply to 
be taxable: the supply must either be ‘in the course’, or in the ‘furtherance’ of the taxable activity. 
 
In the ECJ case of Régie Dauphinoise,903 an issue was whether certain treasury placements fell within 
the scope of VAT in terms of the Sixth Directive.904 The facts were that the taxable person (Régie) was 
involved principally in the management of property. It received advances from the co-owners and 
lessees for whom it managed the properties. With the agreement of its clients, it invested those sums 
for its own account with financial institutions. Régie became the owner of the sums advanced with effect 
from their payment into its account. It remained under an obligation to repay, but was entitled to retain 
the interest on the investments. 
 
The court held that the receipt by a manager of interest resulting from the investment of monies received 
from clients in the course of managing their properties, constitutes the direct, permanent, and necessary 
extension of the taxable activity, with the result that the manager is acting as a taxable person in making 
such an investment.905 
 
In New Zealand Case K55,906 the objector purchased a car, which he traded in on the purchase of a 
new car. The old car was used for both business and private purposes. The question was whether the 
objector should have to pay GST on the sale of his old car. This depended on whether the supply was 
in the course of a taxable activity carried on by the objector.907 The TRA decided this case on an 
application of section 8(1), read with section 6(1)(a), of the New Zealand GST Act.908 
 
903 Régie Dauphinoise – Cabinet A Forest SARL and Ministre du Budget Case C-306/94 11 July 1996 (hereafter Régie 
Dauphinois). 
904 The scope of VAT is defined in art 2 of the Sixth Directive, which provides that only activities of an economic nature are 
subject to tax (Régie Dauphinois para 15). The concept of ‘economic activities’ is defined in art 4(2) of the Sixth Directive. 
See para 2.6.3 above. 
905 Régie Dauphinois para 18. 
906(1988) 10 NZTC 453. See para 2.6.1 above. 
907 I stated above (para 2.6.1) that in this case the TRA held that if capital assets are used to carrying on a taxable activity, 
the sale of those assets can readily be in the course or furtherance of that activity. See Case K55 at 4. 
908 Section 8(1) provides that GST is charged on the supply of goods and services by a registered person ‘in the course or 
furtherance of a taxable activity’ carried on by that person. ‘Taxable activity’ is defined in s 6(1)(a) as any activity which is 
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The TRA reasoned that for a supply to be in the course or furtherance of a taxable activity, some 
discernible nexus909 or relationship should be apparent between that activity and the supply. It is, 
moreover, a question of fact and degree whether there is such a relationship. In the present case, the 
TRA held, there was clearly a nexus between the objector’s farming activities and the sale of his car, 
the principal use of which was for those activities. The objector was, therefore, liable to pay output tax 
on the sale of the car.910 
 
In CIR v Dormer and Anor,911 the New Zealand High Court held that the phrase “in the course or 
furtherance of a taxable activity” in section 8(1) is to be given a sufficiently wide meaning to include 
supplies made in connection with that activity.912 
 
In a New Zealand case, Case M129913 the question for determination by the TRA was whether 
payments received by the objector pursuant to the Department of Labour’s Job Opportunities Scheme 
(JOS) constituted consideration for a taxable supply in the form of the provision by the objector of 
employment under the JOS. The TRA held that there was no taxable supply between the objector and 
the Department of Labour because the department was not involved in the employment in any way. 
The TRA considered, however, that the engagement of the employee must have been effected in the 
course or furtherance of a taxable activity. The objector’s taxable activity was that of a drapery retailer 
and it engaged the employee to assist in that business. That engagement, the TRA held, was “a normal 
incident of running such a business.”914 
 
In another New Zealand case, Case N43,915 the TRA held that an act performed for the purpose or 
object of furthering the taxable activity, or achieving its goal, can be to help, achieve, or advance, and 
is thus the ‘furtherance’ of a taxable activity.916 The TRA found that the purchase, subdivision of the 
building, and the placement of the dwellings on the land by the objector, were in the furtherance of a 
taxable activity, namely, the subdivision and sale of the lots of a farm as part of the broader taxable 
activity of the sale of land. The TRA held that the whole purpose of erecting the dwellings on the two 
lots was to achieve the desired result of the sale of the land. It agreed that the Commissioner’s amended 
 
carried on continuously or regularly by a person, and involves the supply of goods and services to another person for a 
consideration. 
909 A ‘nexus’ is a link or connection. 
910 Case K55 at 5. 
911 CIR v Dormer and Anor (1997) 18 NZTC 13,446. 
912 Ibid at 11. 
913 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,839. 
914 Ibid at 7. 
915 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,361. 
916 Ibid at 6. 
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assessments were correct when the value of the dwellings was included as part of the land sold and, 
therefore, part of the taxable supplies made by the objector.917 
 
In my view, the definitions of ‘taxable supply’ in Canada’s ETA, and ‘enterprise’ in the VAT Act, are not 
sufficiently comparable. Canada’s ETA defines a ‘taxable supply’ as “a supply made in the course of a 
commercial activity.”918 
 
The definition of a ‘taxable supply’ in the Australian GST Act is similar to that of an ‘enterprise’. In terms 
of the Australian GST Act,919 a taxable supply is made if “the supply is made in the course or furtherance 
of an enterprise” that the supplier is carrying on. In support of its argument that a partnership’s supply 
of an interest in the partnership, upon its formation, is made in the course or furtherance of the 
partnership’s enterprise, the ATO referred to the above reasoning in Case N43920 with approval.921 
 
In my view, the New Zealand case law, as opposed to that of the ECJ, should serve as guidance on 
the link required between a supply and a taxable activity for that supply to be taxable. The definition of 
‘taxable activity’, and section 8(1) of the New Zealand GST Act, are similarly worded to the definition of 
‘enterprise’922 and section 7(1)(a) of the VAT Act, both provisions incorporating the concept “in the 
course or furtherance of”. Moreover, the Régie Dauphinoise case set the requirement of a “direct, 
permanent and necessary extension of the taxable activity” for an activity to be part of a taxable activity. 
There is no such requirement in the definition of ‘enterprise’, or any justification for reading it in. The 
ECJ’s test is demonstrably more specific and restrictive than the New Zealand test, and it is merely an 
example of a connection between the activity and the supply. 
 
According to HMRC, which is clearly applying the reasoning in Régie Dauphinoise, a partner’s share 
would be acquired and disposed of as a direct extension of the partner’s economic activities, if that 
share was acquired in the course or furtherance of his own economic activities. If so, it reasons, the 
 
917 Ibid at 7. See also McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 9. 
918 In s 123(1). In Canada no GST will apply to the purchase of a new or additional interest in a partnership or to a person 
transferring his partnership interest to another entity as the supply of a partnership interest is an exempt financial service. 
See Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010; Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 35. In my view, that 
a supply of a partnership interest could be subject to GST in appropriate circumstances, had it not been specifically been 
exempted. 
919 In s 9-5(b). 
920 That is, that an act done for the purpose or object of furthering the taxable activity, or achieving its goal, can be to help, 
achieve, or advance, and thus a ‘furtherance’ of a taxable activity. 
921 GSTR 2003/13 para 59. The reasoning in Case N43 is replicated in the Australian EM to a New Tax System (Goods and 
Services Tax) Bill, 1999, para 3.10, where it is stated that, “[a]n act done for the purpose or object of furthering an 
enterprise, or achieving its goals, is a furtherance of an enterprise although it may not always be in the course of that 
enterprise.” Note that in terms of the Australian GST Act the provision, acquisition, or disposal of a partnership interest is 
input taxed. See para 6.4 below. 
922 See the definition of ‘enterprise’ in s 1(1). 
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subsequent transfer of that share for a consideration will also be an economic activity. An example 
given by the HMRC, is of a partner who has a business asset for sale and, rather than selling it directly, 
contributes the asset to a partnership and thereafter sells the resulting partnership share.923 Applying 
the New Zealand case law to this example, there is in my view clearly a nexus between the initial 
application of the asset in the partner’s separate enterprise, and the activities that followed, namely the 
contribution of the asset to the partnership and the sale of the partner’s share. Those subsequent 
activities were undertaken with the object of furthering the taxable activity in that they were aimed at 
helping, achieving, or advancing the taxable activity. 
 
The New Zealand case law can also be applied to the facts in the Régie Dauphinoise case. There is, 
undoubtedly, a nexus between the property management and investment activities, as the lessees’ 
advances – as the common denominator in the two activities – were used to make the investments. 
Furthermore, I argue that if it is ‘normal’, meaning usual or typical in this type of business, for a property 
manager to invest lessees’ advances for own account, then such investment activity is in the course or 
furtherance of the property manager’s enterprise.924 
 
Another example of a partner holding his partner’s share providing a nexus with a separate enterprise 
carried on by that partner, is where he enters into what is known as a ‘sell-with’ partnership. The 
partners carry on their separate enterprises, selling some of their products separately, but they also 
collaborate with their partners to market and sell certain of their products together in an effort to extend 
their market reach.925 
 
As I have argued above,926 holding a partner’s share constitutes an enterprise activity where the partner 
makes taxable contributions to the partnership. The subsequent sale of such a share could be subject 
to VAT. In my view, where a partner makes taxable supplies to the partnership as a third-party supplier, 
as opposed to making taxable contributions, the holding of the partner’s share will not be part of the 
partner’s enterprise. The fact that the partner owns a partner’s share is irrelevant to his acting as a third-
party supplier. A person’s status as a partner and his ownership of a partner’s share, are not required 
for the rendering of the third-party supplies as he acts independently of the partnership. A partner’s 
obligation to make a contribution, however, and the payment of any consideration therefor, are 
regulated by the partnership agreement. It is, therefore, because of the partner’s status as a partner 
 
923 HMRC Business Brief 30/04 “VAT and Partnership ‘Shares’” available at  https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-
1.nsf/54e6de9e0c383719802572b9005141ed/5b231f3c7401364e802572ab004ba603?OpenDocument (date of use: 23 
August 2018). See also Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 50.8. 
924 See Case M129 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,839. 
925 IT Services Marketing Association “Making Partnerships Work: How to ‘Sell-With,’ Not ‘Sell-Through’” available at 
https://www.itsma.com/making-partnerships-work/ (date of use: 3 March 2018). 
926 See para 2.6.3 above. 
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that the contributions are made. The NZIR supports this view. It gives as an example, a partner who, 
acting as a third-party supplier, makes taxable supplies by renting commercial premises to his 
partnership. The NZIR submits that, that partner’s sale of his share to one of the partners would not be 
taxable because he does not make the supply of the partner’s share in the course or furtherance of his 
taxable rental activity.927 
 
The supply of a mere partner’s share will not qualify for zero rating under section 11(1)(e). A partner’s 
share is not on its own capable of constituting an enterprise, or part of an enterprise which is capable 
of separate operation.928 However, where the holding of the partner’s share is part of an enterprise (eg, 
an enterprise of making taxable contributions to the partnership), then the supply of that enterprise, 
including the partner’s share, could be zero rated. All the assets necessary for carrying on such 
enterprise (or part of it) must be supplied by the partner to the recipient.929 Furthermore, the supply of 
a partner’s share, although it does not on its own constitute the supply of an enterprise, has the effect 
that the partnership’s enterprise is transferred from the dissolved to the new partnership.930 
 
4.9 The supply of the partnership’s enterprise as a going concern 
 
The dissolved and the new partnership will not be deemed to be one and the same partnership if 
section 51(2) does not apply. In my view, the ATO’s argument that a dissolved partnership can make a 
supply to the new partnership comprising some of the same partners as the dissolved partnership 
making the supply,931 is also true for the VAT Act. The fact that the two partnerships are persons and, 
therefore, different entities for VAT purposes, makes it irrelevant that they share some of the same 
partners.932 
 
As the partnership property, including the partnership’s business, is, in terms of the common law, 
transferred by process of law from the dissolved to the new partnership,933 it is possible for the key 
requirements in section 11(1)(e) to be met, namely, that the supply must be of an enterprise, or of a 
part of an enterprise, which is capable of separate operation, and is disposed of as a going concern. 
 
 
927 NZIR “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 14/03, – GST – Transfer Of Interest In A Partnership” para 36 available at 
http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/2/72537cec-da81-407d-ad4f-e490c9f2213d/qb1403.pdf (date of use: 8 December 
2016). 
928 See Cross New Zealand Master Tax Guide 974 para 23-110. 
929 See proviso (i)(bb) to s 11(1)(e). 
930 GSTR 2003/13 para 124. 
931 GSTR 2003/13 para 123. 
932 See the discussion on Nelson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue in para 2.3 above. 
933 See para 4.3 above. 
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Section 7(1)(a) levies VAT on the supply of goods or services by a ‘vendor’. As a result, only a ‘vendor’ 
can make a supply which is zero rated under section 11(1)(e).934 The dissolved partnership must, 
therefore, be a ‘vendor’ to qualify for zero rating. Section 11(1)(e) also requires that the supply be made 
to a ‘registered vendor’. In terms of section 24(3), the old partnership would only be required to notify 
the Commissioner that it has ceased to carry on all enterprises, within 21 days of the date of such 
cessation; whilst the Commissioner must cancel the registration with effect from the last day of the tax 
period during which all such enterprises ceased. The old partnership, whilst existing concurrently with 
the new partnership,935 and before its liquidation and deregistration for VAT, can, therefore, supply the 
partnership’s enterprise to the new partnership as a vendor.936 Furthermore, if section 51(2) is not 
applicable, the new partnership is, as a person separate from the old partnership, entitled to apply to 
be registered for VAT under its own VAT registration number. 
 
Section 7(1)(a) requires that a supply be made in the course or furtherance of an ‘enterprise’. The 
definition of ‘enterprise’,937 in turn, requires that the supply be made for a consideration. In my opinion, 
although for VAT purposes the dissolved partnership supplies the partnership property, including the 
partnership’s enterprise, to the new partnership, the new partnership does not pay the dissolved 
partnership a consideration for the supply. Instead, the remaining partners pay the retiring partner (or 
the decedent’s estate) for his interest in the jointly-owned partnership property. For a payment to 
constitute ‘consideration’, however, it need not be made by the recipient of the supply, but can equally 
be made by a third party, provided the payment is “in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement 
of” the supply.938 The payment made to the departing partner is, however, not for the ‘entire’ partnership 
enterprise, but only for his undivided interest in the enterprise. There is no payment made by anyone 
which is intended to be a payment in exchange for the supply of the enterprise. This makes sense 
because the dissolved partnership does not ‘sell’ the enterprise to the new partnership. The enterprise 
is, instead, transferred by process of law to the new partnership. The enterprise is, therefore, supplied 
for no consideration and the value of the supply is deemed, by section 10(23), to be nil. 
 
As the value of the supply of the enterprise is deemed to be nil, a question arising is whether the 
requirement in proviso (i)(cc) to section 11(1)(e), that the parties must have agreed in writing “that the 
consideration agreed upon for that supply is inclusive of tax at the rate of zero per cent”, is complied 
with. I argue that this requirement is met because section 10(23) deems there to be a ‘consideration’, 
 
934 See SARS Interpretation Note 57 – 31 March 2010 “Sale of an enterprise or part thereof as a going concern” available 
at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-57%20-
%20Sale%20Enterprise%20Part%20Going%20Concern.pdf (date of use: 1 December 2019) para 4.2. 
935 See the discussion under para 4.6 above. 
936 Note that a ‘vendor’ is defined in s 1(1) as a person who is or is required to be registered for VAT. 
937 In s 1(1). 
938 See ‘consideration’ in s 1(1). 
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albeit of nil value. Nothing prevents the parties from agreeing that this deemed consideration is inclusive 
of tax at the rate of zero per cent. 
 
In my view, section 7(1)(a), read with the definition of ‘enterprise’ and section 10(23), envisages the 
possibility of a supply being a taxable supply, including at zero rate, even though it is made for no 
consideration.939 The requirement for a taxable supply in terms of section 7(1)(a), is that the supply 
must be made “in the course or furtherance of any enterprise”. There is no requirement in section 7(1)(a) 
that the supply has to be made for a consideration. As long as the supply for no consideration is made 
in the course or furtherance of an enterprise it would be taxable.940 That the definition of ‘enterprise’ 
requires that supplies be made for a consideration, does not mean that this is also a requirement for 
section 7(1)(a). I argue that the supply of the enterprise by the dissolved partnership to the new 
partnership is taxable because it is an act performed by the dissolved partnership in connection with 
the termination of its enterprise. In terms of proviso (i) to the definition of ‘enterprise’, anything done in 
connection with the commencement or termination of an enterprise is deemed to be done in the course 
or furtherance of that enterprise. 
 
The Australian GST Act similarly provides that the supply of a going concern is GST-free if certain 
requirements are met. These include that: the recipient is registered for GST; the supplier and the 
recipient have agreed that the supply is of a going concern; and the supplier supplies to the recipient 
all the things necessary for the continued operation of the enterprise.941 The ATO contends that if an 
existing partnership is dissolved, the transfer of the entire enterprise to the new partnership could 
constitute the supply of a going concern, which may be GST-free in terms of section 38-325(1).942 
 
Cross, commenting on the position in New Zealand, submits that in the case of a two-person partnership 
where one partner buys the other out, the dissolved partnership could sell its taxable activity to the 
purchasing partner as a going concern.943 I agree that this is true for VAT purposes, but I argue that in 
 
939 See the discussion on the KCM case in paras 2.6.6 and 3.6 above. 
940 See Interpretation Note 70 para 5.3. 
941 Section 38-325(1) provides that the supply of a going concern is GST-free if 
(a) the supply is for consideration; and 
(b) the recipient is registered or required to be registered; and 
(c) the supplier and the recipient have agreed in writing that the supply is of a going concern. 
In terms of s 38-325(1) a supply of a going concern is a supply under an arrangement under which: 
(a) the supplier supplies to the recipient all of the things that are necessary for the continued operation of an 
enterprise; and 
(b) the supplier carries on, or will carry on, the enterprise until the day of the supply (whether or not as a part of a 
larger enterprise carried on by the supplier). 
942 GSTR 2003/13 para 124. 
943 Cross New Zealand Master Tax Guide 974 para 23-110. In terms of s 11(1)(m) of the New Zealand GST Act GST at the 
zero per cent can be charged on the supply of a taxable activity as a going concern, subject to meeting certain requirements. 
See McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] Locations 18 and 19. In my view, if s 57(2)(e) of the New Zealand GST Act is 
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terms of the common law, the dissolved partnership does not sell the partnership’s enterprise to the 
purchasing partner. The purchasing partner, instead, purchases the other partner’s undivided interest 
in the partnership property thereby acquiring full ownership interest in the partnership’s enterprise. The 
common law provides for a transfer of the partnership’s business from the dissolved partnership to a 
partner who continues with the business on his own.944 Before the purchase of the retiring partner’s 
undivided ownership interest, the partnership property is deemed to belong to the dissolved partnership. 
After the purchase, ownership of the partnership property vests in the purchasing partner. In my view, 
the ownership of the partnership property is, for VAT purposes, supplied by the dissolved partnership 
to the purchasing partner by operation of law. The supply of the partnership’s enterprise, which is part 
of the partnership property, can likewise be zero rated if the requirements of section 11(1)(e) are met. 
 
Reference was made to section 272.1(7) of Canada’s ETA945 which deems the new partnership to be 
a continuation of, and the same partnership as the predecessor partnership. Canada’s ETA, however, 
does not have a provision that could zero rate the supply of the partnership enterprise from the 
predecessor to the new partnership in the event that section 272.1(7) does not apply. 
 
The UK provisions on this point, are not comparable to the VAT Act. In the UK, the sale of the assets 
of a VAT-registered business are normally subject to VAT at the appropriate rate. Where certain 
conditions are met, however, the transfer of a business as a going concern must be treated as neither 
a supply of goods, nor a supply of services, and is, therefore, outside the scope of VAT.946 HMRC 
remains of the view that there is no transfer of a business as a going concern through changes in the 
constitution of a partnership.947 
 
4.10 The transfer of liabilities to the new partnership 
 
In terms of section 22(1), where a partnership, which is a vendor: 
 
a. has made a taxable supply for consideration in money; 
 
not applicable, and the dissolved partnership’s taxable activity is continued by a new partnership, the transfer of the taxable 
activity to the new partnership should qualify for zero rating under s 11(1)(m). 
944 Essakow v Gundelfinger and Another 1928 TPD 308 at 315. See para 4.4 above. 
945 See para 4.7 above. 
946 HMRC “Transfer a business as a going concern (VAT Notice 700/9)” para 1.2 available at https://www.gov.uk/ 
guidance/transfer-a-business-as-a-going-concern-and-vat-notice-7009 (date of use: 23 August 2018); Hemmingsley & 
Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 8.9. 
947 HMRC “Transfer a business as a going concern (VAT Notice 700/9)” para. 1.3 available at https://www.gov.uk/ 
guidance/transfer-a-business-as-a-going-concern-and-vat-notice-7009 (date of use: 23 August 2018). The justification for 
the ATO’s view appears to be s 45(1) of the UK VAT Act, which provides that no account is to be taken of any change in 
the partnership. See para 4.7 above. 
151 
 
b. has furnished a return in respect of the tax period for which the output tax on the supply was 
payable, and has properly accounted for the output tax on that supply; and 
c. has written off so much of the consideration as has become irrecoverable, 
 
the partnership may make a deduction. The deduction is equal to a portion of the amount of tax charged, 
bearing the same ratio as the amount written off as irrecoverable to the total consideration. 
 
In my view, if section 51(2) is applicable and the dissolved and the new partnership are deemed to be 
one and the same partnership, then the new partnership would be entitled to the section 22(1) deduction 
if a transferred debt becomes irrecoverable and the other requirements of this provision have been met. 
Even though the dissolved partnership is the person who made the taxable supply, the new partnership 
would be entitled to the deduction because the two entities are deemed to be the same person. 
 
In the event that section 51(2) does not apply – eg, on the basis of a directive granted by the 
Commissioner – the new partnership would not meet the requirements in section 22(1)(a) and (b), ie, 
of having made the relevant taxable supply, submitted the return, and accounted for the output tax on 
the supply. The new partnership would potentially be entitled to a deduction under section 22(1A), 
instead. This provision permits a deduction where the dissolved partnership has transferred the account 
receivable, relating to the taxable supply, at face value to the new partnership on a non-recourse basis, 
and any amount of that face value has been written off as irrecoverable. The dissolved partnership will 
in all likelihood transfer debts to the new partnership on a non-recourse basis in view of its imminent 
termination. As a general principle, debtors cannot object to the transfer of claims which the dissolved 
partnership has against them to the new partnership.948 
 
There are no legislative provisions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or the UK, which specifically 
provide for the VAT/ GST implications of the transfer of liabilities from a predecessor partnership to a 
successor partnership. In these VAT/GST jurisdictions it is possible for the dissolved partnership’s 
business to be continued by a new or reconstituted partnership under the same VAT/ GST registration 
number.949 This should have the effect that the dissolved and the new partnership are considered to be 
the same entity. Furthermore, all these jurisdictions permit a deduction of the VAT/ GST component of 
a bad debt written off, subject to meeting certain requirements.950 In my view, such a new or 
 
948 Executors of Paterson v Webster, Steel & Co and Others (1881) 1 SC 350 at 355; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 312. 
949 See para 4.7 above. 
950 See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 156; ATO Goods and Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2000/2 
“Goods and services tax: Adjustments for bad debts” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?docid=GST/GSTR20002/NAT/ATO/00001 
(date of use: 31 December 2018); Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 8,170; Crowe Soberman LLP 
“Canada: How Do I Manage The GST/HST On A Bad Debt” available at 
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reconstituted partnership should be permitted a bad-debt deduction, which the old partnership would 
otherwise have qualified for had it not dissolved. 
 
In terms of section 22(3), where a partnership which accounts for tax payable on an invoice basis has: 
 
a. made a deduction of input tax in respect of a taxable supply of goods or services made to it; 
and 
b. within a period of twelve months after the expiry of the tax period within which that deduction 
was made, not paid the full consideration in respect of such supply, 
 
an amount equal to the tax fraction of that portion of the consideration which has not been paid, is 
deemed to be tax charged in respect of a taxable supply. 
 
The dissolved partnership remains in existence in so far as creditors are concerned, until their claims 
have been discharged.951 The dissolved partnership may, however, transfer all the rights and liabilities 
of the partnership enterprise to the new partnership, and that transfer will be binding between the 
outgoing and incoming partners. As regards the transfer of liabilities, the creditors are not bound to 
accept the new partnership in substitution for the members of the old partnership with whom they had 
contracted.952 
 
If section 51(2) applies, the new partnership could incur a tax liability in terms of section 22(3) if the 
debt is not settled within the twelve months. The dissolved and new partnerships are deemed to be one 
and the same partnership, and the new partnership would, therefore, be deemed to have made the 
input tax deduction contemplated in section 22(3), although the relevant supply had been made to the 
dissolved partnership. Conversely, if section 51(2) does not apply, a potential tax liability would rest 
with the old partnership as the new partnership had not made the deduction of input tax on the relevant 
supply as contemplated in section 22(3). In my view, whether or not the creditors accept the substitution, 
 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/607584/sales+taxes+VAT+GST/How+Do+I +Manage+The+GSTHST+On+A+Bad+Debt 
(date of use: 24 August 2018); McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] Locations 97 and 98. See NZIR Public Ruling -BR 
Pub 05/01 “Bad Debts – Writing off debts as bad for GST and Income Tax purposes” available at 
https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/0/1/01b2c8004ba383c0b079bd9ef8e4b077/ pu05001.pdf (date of use: 24 August 
2018); Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 7.1; HMRC “Relief from VAT on bad debts (VAT Notice 
700/18)” available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/relief-from-vat-on-bad-debts-notice-70018 (date of use: 24 August 
2018). 
951 Essakow v Gundelfinger and Another 1928 TPD 308 at 312; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 316. According to Williams, 
the dissolution of a partnership does not extinguish its debts to third parties, who remain entitled to sue the partnership 
or the individual partners, and judgment can be given against the partnership even though it has been dissolved. See 
Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 54. 
952 Executors of Paterson v Webster, Steel & Co and Others (1881) 1 SC 350 at 355; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 312; 
Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 54. 
153 
 
the new partnership’s failure to make timeous payment would render the dissolved or the new 
partnership liable for the section 22(3) tax depending on whether or not section 51(2) applies. 
 
4.11 The deductibility of VAT on costs incurred relating to the transition from the dissolved 
to the new partnership 
 
The following are typical costs that could be incurred on the dissolution of a partnership because of the 
transition from the old to the new partnership (the transition expenses):953 
 
a. Legal costs related to the transfer of jointly owned partnership property, for example immovable 
property and incorporeal rights, from the dissolved to the new partnership. 
b. Legal costs related to the drafting of a new partnership agreement.954  
c. Accounting fees related to the adjustment of the partnership’s accounting records resulting 
from the change in the composition of the partnership.955 
 
The issue is whether any VAT incurred on such transition costs is deductible by the partnership as input 
tax. Should the dissolved and the new partnership be deemed to be one partnership in terms of 
section 51(2), then the costs incurred by the old partnership would also be deemed to have been 
incurred by the new partnership. The VAT is deductible if the relevant goods or services were acquired 
by the partnership for the purpose of consumption, use, or supply in the course of making taxable 
supplies.956 
 
In the De Beers-case a consortium approached De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (DBCM) and 
proposed a transaction in terms of which a new company would become the holding company of DBCM. 
In considering the proposal of the consortium, DBCM employed the services of NM Rothschild and 
Sons Ltd (NMR), a London-based company, as independent financial advisers to advise its board on 
whether the consortium’s offer was fair and reasonable. DBCM also appointed a range of South African 
service providers to assist in finalising the proposed transaction. 
 
 
953 See, for example, Mack R & Chapman J “Partnership Structural Changes: Deductibility of Expenses” available at 
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2009/sep/partnershipstructuralchangesdeductibilityofexpenses. html (date of 
use: 6 March 2018). 
954 See, eg, the KapHag-case where a lawyer invoiced the partnership for providing legal advice and drafting the partnership 
agreement when a new partner was admitted to the new partnership. 
955 Flynn & Koornhof Fundamental Accounting 23-8. The authors also submit at 23-8, that changing the composition of the 
partnership can result in some complex areas that need to be dealt with. 
956 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
154 
 
In an assessment, the Commissioner for the SARS determined that NMR’s services were ‘imported 
services’ and that VAT was, therefore, payable on such services by DBCM in terms of section 7(1)(c).957 
‘Imported services’ are defined958 to mean “a supply of services that is made by a supplier who is 
resident or carries on business outside the Republic to a recipient who is a resident of the Republic to 
the extent that such services are utilised or consumed in the Republic otherwise than for the purpose 
of making taxable supplies”. Furthermore, the Commissioner determined that the VAT charged by local 
service providers did not qualify as input tax. Considering ‘the purpose’ referred to in the definitions of 
‘imported services’ and ‘input tax’, the primary question was whether the services of NMR’s and the 
South African service providers’ had been acquired for the purpose of making taxable supplies. 
 
The Commissioner contended that NMR’s services were unrelated to DBCM’s core activities, which 
were the mining and sale of diamonds. NMR was not providing services directed at making any of 
DBCM’s businesses better or more valuable. It was the interests of DBCM’s departing shareholders 
and investors, rather than the interests of DBCM itself, which formed the focus of NMR’s services.959 
 
The court held that in the case of a public company there is a clear distinction between: 
 
a. the enterprise with its attendant overhead expenses; and 
b. the special duties which are imposed on the company in the interest of its shareholders as 
individuals in consequence of the fact that a choice has been made to conduct an enterprise 
in a corporate form.960 
 
The court held further, that the duty imposed on a public company is too far removed from the 
advancement of the VAT enterprise to justify characterising services acquired in the discharge of that 
duty, services acquired for purposes of making taxable supplies. The court agreed with the submissions 
on behalf of the Commissioner,961 and upheld its appeal.962 
 
 
957 Section 7(1)(c) levies VAT on the supply of imported services by a person at fifteen per cent on the value of the 
importation. Section 7(2) provides that the tax payable in terms of s 7(1)(c) must be paid by the recipient of the imported 
services. 
958 In s 1(1). 
959 At para 26. It was contended on behalf of DBCM that as it had chosen to conduct its business as a public company, it had 
certain statutory obligations (para 23).  Its board had a duty to report to the shareholders as to whether the consortium’s 
offer was fair and reasonable and to obtain independent financial advice in that regard (para 25). DBCM could not 
realistically continue to operate its enterprise without complying with its legal obligation to acquire NMR’s services (para 
24). The services of NMR were, therefore, directly linked to its making of on-going supplies (para 23). 
960 At para 27. 
961 At paras 27, 28. 
962 At para 43. 
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In ITC 1744,963 the appellant was incorporated to exploit a patent for the manufacture of steel shipping 
containers suitable for road freight. The appellant required capital to manufacture the containers. It 
employed the services of A, a company who undertook share placings for the appellant. The question 
was whether the VAT levied by A on its services was deductible as input tax. 
 
The court applied the ECJ’s ‘direct and immediate link’ test and referred, inter alia, to the case of BLP 
Group plc v Commissioner of Customs and Excise.964 It held that the appellant was not entitled to deduct 
the VAT levied on the services supplied by A, because those services were directly and immediately 
linked to the issue of shares, which is exempt in terms of section 12(a), read with section 2(1). The 
principle is, so the court explained, that where goods or services are used for an exempt supply, it is 
not legitimate for the taxpayer to look through that supply to an ultimate purpose of making taxable 
supplies – in this case the manufacture and sale of steel shipping containers.965 
 
In the BLP case, BLP claimed to deduct the VAT paid on professional services supplied to it in 
connection with the sale of shares in another company, which was an exempt transaction. BLP sold the 
shares for the purpose of raising the funds necessary to pay its debts, which derived from the taxable 
transactions it had effected. The court held, in effect, that the VAT was not deductible because the 
acquired services were directly and immediately linked to the sale of shares, which was an exempt 
transaction. It was irrelevant that the ultimate purpose of the transaction was the carrying out of a 
taxable transaction.966 
 
The BLP-case was decided on the basis of article 17(2) of the Sixth Directive, which provides that: 
[I]n so far as the goods and services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions, the taxable person 
shall be entitled to deduct from the tax which he is liable to pay: 
(a) value added tax due or paid in respect of goods or services supplied or to be supplied to him by 
another taxable person. 
 
Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive levies VAT on the supply of goods or services effected for 
consideration by a taxable person acting as such. A taxable person may, therefore, deduct VAT on 
 
963 ITC 1744 65 SATC 154. 
964 BLP Group plc and Commissioners of Customs and Excise Case C-4/94 6 April 1995 (hereafter the BLP case). 
965 ITC 1744 65 SATC 154 at 157, 158; In Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR 1948(4) SA 580 (A), 15 SATC 381, the question was whether 
certain expenses were deductible under s 11(a) of the IT Act. The court, per Centlivres JA, stated that it is not concerned 
with deductions which may be considered proper from an accountant's point of view or from the point of view of a prudent 
trader, but merely with the deductions which are permissible according to the language of the IT Act. (at p 238) Accounting 
and business principles are, therefore, irrelevant when considering whether an expense is deductible in terms of the IT Act., 
When determining whether the VAT on an expense is deductible as input tax, this principle applies equally. Whether a 
transaction entitles the taxpayer to an “input tax” deduction depends on whether the requirements in terms of the Act are 
met, irrespective of whether the transaction might, from an accounting or business perspective, be considered to have 
been incurred for business purposes. 
966 BLP case para 27. 
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goods or services, but only in so far as those goods or services are used to make supplies that are 
subject to VAT in terms of article 2(1). Articles 2(1) and 168 of the Council Directive, which replaced 
the Sixth Directive, are phrased similarly to articles 2(1) and 17 of the Sixth Directive.967 
 
Section 7(1)(a) levies VAT on the supply by a vendor of goods or services supplied by him in the course 
of carrying on an enterprise. The definition of ‘input tax’,968 read with section 17(1), permits the deduction 
of VAT levied on acquired goods or services, but only to the extent that those goods or services are 
consumed, used, or supplied in the course of making taxable supplies. 
 
The court stated in ITC 1744, that despite the difference in wording between article 17 of the 
Sixth Directive and section 7, it considered the BLP case helpful.969 I agree with van der Zwan and 
Stiglingh who submit that because there is no significant difference between the requirements, 
respectively imposed on input tax deductions in South Africa and in the European Union, the decisions 
of the ECJ can serve as guidance on this particular topic.970 
 
There is a contradiction between ITC 1744 and the ECJ, though, on whether the transfer of shares is 
an on-going activity as envisaged in ‘enterprise’ in the VAT Act and ‘economic activity’ in the 
Sixth Directive.971 The court in ITC 1744 simply accepted, without considering the circumstances, that 
the issue of shares in that case was exempt in terms of section 12(a), and that such issue was, 
therefore, made in the course or furtherance of an enterprise as contemplated in section 7(1)(a). 
Reference was made above972 to the ECJ cases of Wellcome Trust and EDM, where it was held that 
whilst the concept ‘economic activity’ does not involve the simple transfer of shares, it does include, for 
example, the business of trading in shares.973 
 
In the KapHag case974 a new partner was admitted to a partnership. The partnership was intended to 
take the form of a closed property fund.975 A lawyer charged the partnership a fee plus VAT for providing 
 
967 Article 2(1) provides that: “[T]he following transactions shall be subject to VAT: (a) the supply of goods for consideration 
within the territory of the Member State by a taxable person acting as such … (c) the supply of services for consideration 
within the territory of a Member State by a taxable person acting as such …”. Article 168 provides that: “[I]n so far as the 
goods and services are used for the purpose of the taxed transactions of a taxable person, the taxable person shall be 
entitled, in the Member State in which he carries out these transactions, to deduct the following from the VAT which he is 
liable to pay: (a) The VAT due or paid in that Member State in respect of supplies to him of goods or services, carried out or 
to be carried out by another taxable person…”. 
968 See s 1(1). 
969 ITC 1744 65 SATC 154 at 157. 
970 Van der Zwan & Stiglingh 2011 De Jure 337. 
971 Or in the Council Directive. 
972 See para 2.8 above. 
973 The Wellcome Trust case para 33; the EDM case para 59. 
974 KapHag case. 
975 Ibid at para 13. 
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legal advice and drafting the partnership agreement. The legal advice related to the ‘closed property 
fund’ concept and the formation of the partnership.976 The issue was whether the partnership was 
entitled to deduct the VAT on the lawyer’s fee. The ECJ concluded that a partnership which admits a 
partner in consideration of payment of a contribution in cash does not effect a supply of services to that 
person for consideration within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive.977 This case is not 
helpful, even though the issue before the court is relevant to the current discussion. I argue978 that it is 
unlikely that a South African court will agree with the ECJ’s reasons for holding that a partnership is not 
making a supply when admitting a partner to the partnership, based on the analysis that in substance 
the partnership is increasing its assets by acquiring capital. I further argue that the partners, as opposed 
to the partnership, supply partners’ shares.979 
 
Section 3A(1) of the New Zealand GST Act previously defined input tax to mean “tax charged under 
section 8(1) on the supply of goods and services made to that person, being goods and services 
acquired for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies.” The reference to ‘principle purpose’ has 
now been removed. I agree with van der Zwan and Stiglingh that the cases decided on the basis of this 
former wording, may not be helpful as the definition of ‘input tax’ in the VAT Act does not contain a 
similar reference to a ‘principal purpose’.980 It is apparent from the New Zealand High Court case of 
Mangaheia Trust,981 that the New Zealand courts have not applied the ECJ’s direct and immediate link 
test, when determining whether goods or services were acquired ‘for the principal purpose of making 
taxable supplies’. The court confirmed that the ‘sufficient nexus’ approach to ascertaining the ‘principal 
purpose’ has been used on a number of occasions.982 The court further stated that there is no 
requirement that the specific expenditures on which input tax credits are claimed need in any way to be 
directly and demonstrably linked to the specific resulting products.983 The court either rejected, or at 
least applied a test other than the direct and immediate link test. 
 
As the partnership does not supply the partners’ shares to the partners upon the admission of a new 
partner (or at any other stage, including at the formation of the partnership), the transition expenses 
incurred when a new partner is admitted are not directly and immediately linked to any specific supply. 
The ECJ has decided a number of cases dealing with the deduction of the VAT on acquisitions that 
have no direct and immediate link to a specific supply. 
 
976 Ibid at para 15. 
977 Ibid at para 43. 
978 See para 2.8 above. 
979 See para 4.8.1 above. 
980 Van der Zwan & Stiglingh 2011 De Jure 337. 
981 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Trustees in the Mangaheia Trust and Trustees in the Te Mata Property (2009) 24 NZTC 
23,711 
982 Ibid at 23,718. 
983 Ibid at 23,720. 
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In the Cibo-case,984 for example, one of the issues was whether Cibo Participations SA (Cibo), a holding 
company, was entitled to deduct VAT in respect of the supply of various services by third parties for the 
acquisition of shares in its subsidiaries. The services in question included the auditing of the companies, 
assistance with the negotiation of the purchase price of the shares, organising the take-over of the 
companies, and legal and tax services. 
 
The court confirmed the view of the ECJ that to give rise to the right to deduct, the goods or services 
purchased must have a direct and immediate link with the output transactions in respect of which VAT 
is deductible. The court clarified that the reason why there is a right to deduct in the case of such a 
direct and immediate link, is because the VAT on the acquired goods or services is a component of the 
cost of the output transactions. The expenditure must, therefore, form part of the costs of the output 
transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible, which use the acquired goods and services.985 This 
ensures complete tax neutrality for all economic activities, provided they are themselves subject to 
VAT.986 The court found that there was no direct link between the various services purchased by a 
holding company in connection with its acquisition of a shareholding in a subsidiary, and any output 
transaction in respect of which VAT is deductible. The amount of VAT paid by the holding company on 
the expenditure incurred for those services, does not directly burden the various cost components of its 
output transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible. The expenditure does not form part of the 
costs of the output transactions which use the service.987 
 
In the Kretztechnik case, where the court held that a share issue does not constitute a supply of goods 
or services for consideration within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, it also considered 
whether there was a right to deduct input VAT paid on supplies linked to a share issue. As the share 
issue was considered not to be a supply, there was no direct link between the relevant purchases and 
an output transaction in respect of which VAT was deductible. 
 
In both the Cibo and Kretztechnik cases, the court held that the costs of the supplies acquired were 
part of the taxable person’s general costs and cost components of an undertaking’s products. Such 
services do, therefore, in principle have a direct and immediate link to the taxable person’s business as 
a whole.988 
 
 
984 See Cibo Participations SA and Directeur regional des impôts du Nord-Pas-de-Calais Case C-16/00, 27 September 2001 
(herafter the Cibo case). 
985 Ibid at para 31. 
986 Ibid at para 27. 
987 Ibid at para 32. 
988 Ibid at para 33 and the Kretztechnik case para 36. 
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In both cases, the company was entitled to deduct all the VAT charged on the expenses it incurred for 
the various supplies it acquired in the context of the share acquisition and the share issue carried out, 
respectively, provided however, that all the transactions carried out by that company constituted taxed 
transactions.Thus, if the company carried out both transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible, 
and transactions in respect of which it is not, it may deduct only that proportion of the VAT which is 
attributable to the former.989 
 
As argued above,990 a share issue is considered to be a supply in terms of the VAT Act. The court’s 
ruling in Kretztechnik on this particular point – that a share issue does not constitute a supply – is 
therefore not true for the VAT Act. The Kretztechnik case nonetheless remains relevant to the issue of 
the deductibility of the VAT on transition expenses on the basis that a partnership does not supply the 
partners’ shares. 
 
In the Securenta case,991 where the taxpayer simultaneously carried out economic activities, taxed and 
exempt, and non-economic activities outside the scope of the Sixth Directive, the ECJ held that 
deduction of the VAT relating to expenditure connected with the issue of shares and a-typical silent 
partnerships is allowed only to the extent that the expenditure is attributable to the taxpayer’s economic 
activity within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, and provided they are themselves 
subject to VAT.992 The Securenta case serves to illustrate how the ‘direct and immediate link’ test is 
applied to share issue costs which are considered to be general costs. 
 
In Skatteverket v AB SKF,993 one of the issues before the ECJ was whether there is a right to deduct 
input VAT in terms of the Sixth Directive on services required for a disposal of shares, on the ground 
that the costs of those services form part of the taxable person’s general costs.994 Confirming earlier 
decisions, the court stated that whether there is a direct and immediate link will depend on whether the 
cost of the input services is incorporated either in the cost of particular output transactions, or in the 
cost of goods or services supplied by the taxable person as part of his economic activities.995 The court 
held that to establish whether there is such a direct and immediate link, it is necessary to establish 
 
989 The Cibo case at para 34 and the Kretztechnik case at para 37; Heber points out that this approach, that was introduced 
by the ECJ, is often referred to as the ‘look-through approach’, which ignores the causal link between one particular input 
transaction which is subject to VAT and one particular output transaction which is outside the scope of VAT. (Heber 2013 
World Journal of VAT/GST Law 24) The court thus ‘looks through’ the transactions which are causally linked to the input 
transaction (Ibid at 33) 
990 See para 2.8 above. 
991 Securenta Göttinger Immobilienanlagen und Vermögensmanagement AG v Finanzamt Göttingen Case C-437/06, 17 
March 2008 (hereafter the Securenta case). 
992 Ibid at para 31 read with para 28. 
993 Skatteverket v AB SKF Case C-29/08 29 October 2009. 
994 Ibid at para 54. 
995 Ibid at para 60. 
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whether the costs incurred are likely to be incorporated in the price of the shares which the taxable 
person, AB SKF, intends to sell, or whether they are only among the cost components of AB SKF’s 
products.996 
 
Regarding the deductibility of the VAT on transfer costs, the transfer of ownership of the partnership 
property from the members of the dissolved partnership to the members of the new partnership, is, in 
terms of the common law, a transaction between such individual members. It could be argued, 
therefore, that because the transaction is between the individual partners, the partnership should not 
be permitted a deduction of the VAT. This argument is questionable, however, in that both the dissolved 
and the new partnership are deemed persons, who are also deemed to own the jointly-held partnership 
property. Furthermore, if section 51(2) applies, then this provision deems the dissolved and the new 
partnership to be one person.997 I argue that there can be no supply of the immovable property for VAT 
purposes, as a person cannot make a supply to himself in terms of this specific matrix of facts.998 The 
transfer costs are, therefore, not linked to any specific supply. As a result, the partnership will not have 
a right to deduct the VAT based on the transfer costs having a direct and immediate link with any 
specific taxable supply.999 The transfer costs, instead, have a direct and immediate link with the 
partnership’s business as a whole.1000 Should the partnership make taxable supplies only, then the VAT 
will be fully deductible. If not, then the VAT will be deductible only to the extent that the partnership 
makes taxable supplies.1001 
 
If section 51(2) does not apply, deeming the dissolved and the new partnership to be one and the same 
partnership, the supply of the partnership property by the dissolved partnership to the new partnership 
could be taxable, whether at fifteen per cent or the zero rate.1002 The dissolved partnership should be 
 
996 Ibid at para 62; Ramsdahl Jensen and Stensgaard in summarising the position in the EU, accordingly, distinguish between 
two overall categories of expenses, namely, direct and overhead costs. If a direct and immediate link between the relevant 
input and output transactions exists, the cost will be a direct cost and the VAT thereon will either be fully deductible or not 
deductible, depending on the character of the output transaction. If that is not the case, then it must be established whether 
the cost is directly and immediately linked to the person’s overall economic activity and, therefore, forms part of the 
overhead costs. If so, then the VAT on such overhead costs will either be fully, partially or not deductible, depending on the 
character of the person’s overall economic activity. (Ramsdahl Jensen & Stensgaard 2014 World Journal of VAT/GST Law 
24) 
997 See para 4.7 above. 
998 Ibid; A self-supply is indeed possible in terms of the VAT Act. S 8(9) of the VAT Act (as one example) provides that the 
supply of goods or services by a vendor to an independent branch or main business of the vendor located outside the 
Republic, is deemed to be a supply of goods or services in the course or furtherance of the vendor's enterprise. Proviso (ii) 
of the definition of “enterprise” in s 1, deems a branch or main business to be independent if it is separately identifiable, 
has a separate system of accounting and is permanently located at premises outside the Republic. As a result, a vendor can 
make a supply to such a branch or main business even though, in reality, they form part of the same entity, but are deemed 
to be separate for VAT purposes. 
999 See the Cibo case at para 31. 
1000 See the Cibo and Kretztechnik cases at paras 33 and 36 respectively. 
1001 See the Cibo, Kretztechnik, and Securenta cases at paras 34, 37, and 31 respectively. 
1002 See para 4.7 above. 
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entitled to deduct the VAT on the transfer costs based on such costs having a direct and immediate link 
with a specific taxable supply.1003 
 
The next issue concerns the deductibility of the VAT incurred on the cost of drafting a partnership 
agreement for the new partnership. In the De Beers case the court implied that the mutual relationship 
between DBCM and its shareholders was not part of its enterprise and, hence, its agreement with the 
Commissioner’s argument that because the focus of the relevant services “was the interest of DBCM’s 
departing shareholders and investors, rather than the interest of DBCM itself”,1004 the services were not 
acquired for a taxable purpose. If the relationship between a company and its shareholders is not part 
of its enterprise then, logically, the relationship between its shareholders should be even further 
removed from its enterprise because it is a relationship that the company is not party to. It can hardly 
be contended that the VAT on the cost of drafting a shareholders’ agreement is deductible by the 
company. The same reasoning should also be applicable to the members of a partnership. A 
partnership agreement gives rise to the legal rights and obligations between the partners.1005 Although 
the partnership comes into existence because of the partners entering into a partnership agreement, 
the fact is that the partnership agreement regulates the affairs between the individual partners. I 
therefore argue, that the VAT on the cost of drafting a new partnership agreement is not deductible as 
input tax because the relationship between the members of a partnership is not part of its enterprise. 
 
The next issue concerns the deductibility of VAT on accounting fees related to the adjustment of the 
partnership’s accounting. In the De Beers case, the court implied that the VAT on an enterprise’s 
overhead expenses is deductible because of its distinction between a public company’s enterprise with 
its attendant overhead expenses, and the special duties which are imposed on the company in the 
interest of its shareholders, which, according to the court, is too far removed from the advancement of 
its enterprise.1006 The SARS moreover considers administrative overheads, such as audit and 
accounting fees, typical examples of expenses incurred for the purpose of making taxable supplies on 
which input tax may be deductible by a vendor.1007 
 
In my view, the nature of the accountancy services should be considered to determine whether they 
are incurred for the purpose of making taxable supplies. According to Flynn and Koornhof, there are a 
few fundamental accounting procedures that must be followed when a change in the composition of a 
 
1003 See the Cibo case at para 31. 
1004 The De Beers case at para 26. 
1005 See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 7. 
1006 The De Beers case at para. 27. 
1007 SARS Legal Counsel VAT 404 Guide for Vendors available at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-
VAT-G02%20-%20VAT%20404%20Guide%20for%20Vendors.pdf (date of use: 1 January 2019) 55. 
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partnership occurs.1008 It is, for example, essential to determine the amounts due to each partner on the 
date when the partnership dissolves. To make this determination it may be necessary to revalue some 
or all of the partnership’s assets.1009 The accounting procedure is done for the benefit of the individual 
partners. As the Commissioner argued in the De Beers case, this particular procedure is not to be 
directed at making the partnership’s enterprise better or more valuable. It is the interest of the members 
of the partnership, rather than the interest of the partnership itself, that forms the focus of the service.1010 
 
Flynn and Koornhof further submit that once the change in composition has been effected, it is useful 
to draft a Statement of Financial Position reflecting the opening financial position of the new 
partnership.1011 This accounting procedure has a closer connection with the new partnership’s 
enterprise because it is an overhead expense that is required for managing the business of the 
partnership. The accounting procedure is, however, not linked to any specific supply, but instead has a 
direct and immediate link with the partnership’s business as a whole. Should the partnership only make 
taxable supplies, the VAT will be fully deductible. If not, the VAT is deductible only to the extent that the 
partnership makes taxable supplies. 
 
As in the case of South Africa and New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the UK also have general 
provisions regulating the deductibility of input tax credits, but no specific provisions aimed at 
partnerships.1012 
 
1008 Flynn & Koornhof Fundamental Accounting 23-8. 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 The De Beers case at para 26. 
1011 Flynn & Koornhof Fundamental Accounting 23-9. 
1012 In terms of the Australian GST Act, you are entitled to an input tax credit in relation to ‘creditable acquisitions’. A 
‘creditable acquisition’ is a thing which is acquired solely or partly for a ‘creditable purpose’ (s 11-5; ATO Goods and 
Services Tax Ruling: GSTR 2008/1 “Goods and services tax: When do you acquire anything or import goods solely or partly 
for a creditable purpose” available at 
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/pdf?DocID=GST%2FGSTR20081%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001&filename=law/view/pdf/p
br/gstr2008-001c3.pdf&PiT=99991231235958 (date of use: 22 December 2018) para 1 (hereafter GSTR 2008/1); McCouat 
Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Locations 120 and 121) which is not defined in the Act. The ATO explains some 
factors that provide guidance in determining whether an acquisition or importation is for a creditable purpose 
(GSTR 2008/1 para 70). Based on the ATO’s factors, GST levied on transition costs would be deductible as input tax in 
Australia if such costs are incidental or relevant to the continuance of the partnership’s enterprise, or are used in the 
enterprise, and the costs do not meet the personal needs of the partners as individuals. See GSTR 2008/1 para 70. In 
terms of Canada’s ETA registrants are normally entitled to an input tax credit on purchases that relate to a ‘commercial 
activity’. See s 169(1); CRA “Input tax credits (ITCs)” https://www.canada.ca/ en/revenue-
agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/payroll/benefits-allowances/remitting-gst-hst-on-employee-benefits/input-tax-
credits-itcs.html (date of use: 19 August 2018); Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 3,010, which is also not 
defined in Canada’s ETA. According to Chabot et al, the CRA has traditionally interpreted ‘commercial activity’ to mean 
the activities of running the day-to-day business of an entity. They state, however, that it was concluded in cases that the 
relevant expenses were incurred in the course of commercial activities, even though there was no direct link between the 
expenses and the goods and services produced. In all cases the judgments were, furthermore, consistent in finding that a 
taxpayer engaged exclusively in commercial activities, cannot incur expenses for any other activity. Therefore, if a 
taxpayer is only engaged in commercial activities, the GST on expenses incurred in connection with initial public offerings, 
takeovers, and other activities, is deductible as input tax. See Chabot et al ibid at 208. Section 120(1) of Canada’s ETA 
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4.12 Group relief measures 
 
Section 8(25) provides that where goods or services are supplied by a vendor to another vendor, those 
vendors must, for purposes of that supply or subsequent supplies of those goods or services, be 
deemed to be one and the same person. This is subject to the condition that the provisions of 
sections 42,1013 44,1014 45,1015 or 471016 of the IT Act are met.1017 
 
It is stated in an EM that section 8(25) ensures that the transactions entered into between group 
companies, as envisaged by the relevant sections of the IT Act, have no VAT consequences for either 
vendor where the vendors are partially taxable entities.1018 As section 8(25) deems the supplier and the 
 
excludes from the definition of ‘commercial activity’, the making of exempt supplies. In my view, the GST incurred on 
transition costs would be fully deductible in Canada if the partnership is solely engaged in commercial activities. In the 
UK, in order for VAT incurred to be treated as deductible input tax, the supplies must have been incurred for the ‘purpose 
of the business’ (Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 34.2) which is not defined the UK VAT Act. HMRC 
suggests, on the basis of UK case law, that input tax incurred on a cost can be claimed if it relates directly to the function 
and carrying on of the business. If it merely provides an incidental benefit to the business, it is unlikely that input tax can 
be claimed. See HMRC “VAT Input Tax basics: how to determine business use” available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-
internal-manuals/vat-input-tax/ vit10600 (date of use: 24 August 2018). In the UK the VAT on transition costs would, 
therefore, be deductible as input tax if such costs relate directly to the function and carrying on of the partnership 
business, and not if they merely provide an incidental benefit to the business. In New Zealand, the GST on such costs 
would be deductible as input tax if the costs have a ‘sufficient nexus’ with the making of taxable supplies. See the 
reference to Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Trustees in the Mangaheia Trust and Trustees in the Te Mata Property at 
para 4.11). 
1013 Section 42 applies to an ‘asset-for-share transaction’, meaning a transaction in terms of which a person disposes of an 
asset to a resident company, in exchange for the issuing of an equity share in that company (s 41(1)(a)). 
1014 Section 44 applies to an ‘amalgamation transaction’, meaning a transaction in terms of which a resident company (the 
‘amalgamated company’) disposes of all of its assets to another resident company by means of an amalgamation, 
conversion, or merger, and as a result of which the existence of the amalgamated company will be terminated (s 44(1)(a)). 
1015 Section 45 applies to an ‘intra-group transaction’, meaning a transaction in terms of which an asset is disposed of by 
one company (the ‘transferor company’) to a resident company (the ‘transferee company’) and both companies form part 
of the same group of companies at the end of the day of the transaction and as a result of which the transferee company 
acquires that asset from the transferor company (s 45(1)(a)). 
1016 Section 47 applies to a ‘liquidation distribution’, meaning a transaction in terms of which a resident company (the 
‘liquidating company’) disposes of all of its assets to its shareholders in anticipation of or in the course of the liquidation, 
winding up or deregistration of that company, but only to the extent to which those assets are so disposed of to another 
resident company and which on the date of the disposal forms part of the same group of companies as the liquidating 
company (s 47(1)(a)). 
1017 Section 8(25) will, however, not apply to a supply contemplated in s 42 or 45 of the IT Act unless: 
a. That supply is of an enterprise (or part of an enterprise which is capable of separate operation) where the supplier 
and the recipient have agreed in writing that such enterprise (or part) is disposed of as a going concern; or 
b. The enterprise (or part) disposed of as a going concern has been carried on in relation to goods or services applied 
mainly for the purposes of such enterprise (or part) and partly for other purposes. Such goods or services will be 
deemed to form part of such enterprise (or part) notwithstanding paragraph (v) of the proviso to the definition of 
‘enterprise’ in s 1 (provisos (i) and (ii) to s 8(25)). 
In terms of para (v) of the proviso to ‘enterprise’, an activity will not be deemed to be the carrying on of an enterprise to 
the extent to which it involves the making of exempt supplies. 
1018 EM on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 40 of 2005, at 69. It is further stated that where a partially-taxable business 
is transferred, or where business assets that were used in a partially-taxable business are transferred or declared as a 
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recipient to be one and the same person “for purposes of that supply or subsequent supplies of those 
goods or services”, the supply by the supplier to the recipient is deemed to be a non-event for VAT 
purposes and, therefore, has no VAT consequences.1019 Should the recipient on-supply such goods or 
services, then the normal VAT provisions will apply.1020 
 
In the 2015 Budget Tax Proposals, the view is expressed that the corporate restructuring provisions 
referred to in section 8(25) apply only to groups of companies that are incorporated, and not to 
unincorporated entities such as joint ventures and partnerships.1021 It was, therefore, proposed that 
because the VAT Act recognises unincorporated persons as vendors, the VAT Act be amended “to 
remove the unintended anomalies and allow for reorganisation relief for all vendors”.1022 The VAT Act 
is yet to be amended to give effect to this proposal. In my view, a partnership desiring the kind of relief 
envisaged in section 8(25), may in the interim apply for a VAT ruling1023 requesting a special 
dispensation in terms of section 72 from the Commissioner for the SARS.1024 
 
dividend in specie, an unintended VAT cost is generally created for the parties involved by the possible applications of ss 
16(3)(h) and 18A. The supplying vendor is not required to make an adjustment in terms of s 16(3)(h), whilst the purchasing 
vendor is not required to make a s 18A adjustment (EM bid). In my opinion, and from the perspective of the supplying 
vendor, an unintended VAT cost is not created by an application of s 16(3)(h). The provision which gives rise to the VAT 
liability is s 8(16), which provides that the supply by a vendor of goods or services he acquired partly for the purpose of 
making taxable supplies and were held by him partly for that purpose immediately before such supply, is deemed to be 
made wholly in the course or furtherance of his enterprise. This means that the supply is fully taxable notwithstanding that 
the vendor was not permitted a full input-tax deduction on the acquisition of the goods or services due to their earlier, 
partial non-taxable use. Section 16(3)(h) provides relief in the circumstances, permitting the vendor to make an input tax 
adjustment to recover the portion of the VAT, which he has not deducted as input tax. The deduction is based on the 
percentage that the non-taxable use of the goods or services is of their total use. Section 18A(1) provides that where the 
supply of an enterprise (or part of an enterprise) to a vendor has been zero-rated in terms of s 11(1)(e), and that enterprise 
(or part) was acquired by the vendor wholly or partly for a purpose other than making taxable supplies, the enterprise (or 
part) will be deemed to have been supplied by the vendor by way of a taxable supply in the course of his enterprise. The 
vendor is required to account for output tax on the portion of the cost of the enterprise used for a non-taxable purpose. 
1019 See EM on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 10 of 2009 at 92. 
1020 Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 8-37. 
1021 National Treasury Republic of South Africa Budget Review 2015 25 February 2015 Annexure C: Additional Tax 
Amendments 148. This view is correct because the entity making the disposal or the distribution as contemplated, 
respectively, in ss 44, 45 and 47 of the IT Act, is a ‘company’ whose definition in the IT Act does not include an 
unincorporated body. Section 42 of the IT Act can apply to a ‘person’ as defined in the IT Act, and includes an individual, 
but not an unincorporated body. Furthermore, outside of the VAT Act a partnership is incapable of making an acquisition, 
which is a requirement of, for example, s 42 of the IT Act. In terms of s 42(1)(a), the person who disposes of an asset must 
be issued with, and therefore acquire, an equity share in exchange. As a partnership is not a person in terms of the common 
law, it cannot in any event conclude any contractual agreement envisaged in the IT Act’s restructuring provisions. 
1022 Ibid at Annexure C: Additional Tax Amendments 148. 
1023 In terms of s 41B. 
1024 Section 72 provides that if the Commissioner is satisfied that in consequence of the manner in which a vendor conducts 
his business, difficulties, anomalies, or incongruities have arisen or may arise in regard to the application of any of the 
provisions of the VAT Act, the Commissioner may make an arrangement or decision as to – 
a. the manner in which such provisions shall be applied; or 
b. the calculation or payment of tax, 
in the case of such vendor or any person transacting with such vendor to overcome such difficulties, anomalies, or 
incongruities. In terms of the proviso to s 72, such decision or arrangement should not have the effect of substantially 
reducing or increasing the ultimate liability for tax levied under the VAT Act. In Milner Street Properties (Pty) Ltd v Eckstein 
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The notion of extending the reorganisation relief to partnerships is open to question because certain of 
the transactions contemplated in the provisions of the IT Act, mentioned in section 8(25), can simply 
not apply to partnerships. Section 45 of the IT Act, for example, is applicable to an ‘intra-group 
transaction’.1025 In South African partnership law there is no such phenomena as a group of 
partnerships. This also applies to section 47 of the IT Act which applies to a ‘liquidation distribution’, 
and which also refers to a group of companies. Furthermore, section 42 of the IT Act applies to an 
‘asset-for-share transaction’. Considering how a partnership is formed, assets cannot be disposed of to 
a partnership in exchange for a partner’s share. As I have stated, when a partnership agreement is 
entered into, the partners’ shares accrue to the partners.1026 
 
The legislature has not indicated to which types of partnership-reorganisation transaction section 8(25) 
will apply. In my view, the ‘reorganisation’ of a partnership would typically occur in the case of the 
technical dissolution of a partnership, such as is envisaged in section 51(2). Making section 8(25) 
applicable to a technical dissolution of a partnership could be tautologous, however, as the effect of 
section 51(2) is in any case that supplies between the dissolved and the new partnership are ignored 
for VAT purposes. Section 8(25) similarly deems the supplying and the recipient vendors to be one and 
the same person. 
 
According to Badenhorst, it can be argued that as a supply in terms of section 8(25) is not a taxable 
supply, the VAT on any costs relating to the supply, such as attorney transfer fees, may not be deducted 
as input tax.1027 It is proposed in the EM, however, that VAT on services acquired for the purposes of a 
section 8(25) transaction, will qualify as input tax.1028 Regrettably, no reasons are, given for this 
concession. 
 
As a result of a reorganisation transaction in terms of sections 42 or 45 of the IT Act, where an enterprise 
is supplied to the recipient, the supplier’s enterprise could be terminated. In terms of proviso (i) to the 
definition of ‘enterprise’, anything done in connection with the commencement or termination of an 
enterprise is deemed to be done in the course or furtherance of that enterprise. The section 8(25) 
transaction is, therefore, deemed to be done in the course or furtherance of the supplier’s enterprise. It 
 
Properties (Pty) Ltd [2000] JOL 7403 (N), the court stated that s 72 gives the Commissioner wide power to grant relief against 
anomalies and hardships which the application of the provisions of the VAT Act would cause in particular circumstances. 
The Commissioner would, therefore, be entitled, in an appropriate case, to waive strict compliance with a provision of the 
VAT Act where insistence on a strict application would lead to unnecessary hardship and unforeseen results (at 18). 
1025 Section 45(1)(a) of the IT Act. 
1026 See para 2.6.4 above. 
1027 Badenhorst “VAT on company reorganisations” (2009) March Tax enSight 10. 
1028 EM on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 40 of 2005 at 69. 
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is arguable that the VAT on related costs could be deducted on this basis as they are incurred for a 
taxable purpose.1029 
 
There are no provisions similar to section 8(25), in the Australian GST Act, Canada’s ETA, the UK VAT 
Act, and the New Zealand GST Act which deal with ‘reorganisation’ transactions.1030 
 
4.13 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have dealt with the VAT implications of transactions that typically arise during the 
technical dissolution of a partnership. This phase is characterised by the transfer of partners’ shares 
based on a partner leaving due to death or retirement, for instance, or the admission of a new partner. 
The important question of whether the supply of partners’ shares is subject to VAT, was explored. I 
argued that partners’ shares are owned by, and supplied to, partners, and because partners are 
deemed not to carry on the enterprise of the partnership, the supply of partners’ shares is subject to 
VAT in exceptional circumstances only. 
 
The importance of distinguishing between the two main rights constituting a partner’s share – his 
undivided interest in the jointly owned partnership property, and his right to profit – was highlighted. I 
argued that a partner does not supply his interest in the jointly-held property when he supplies a 
partner’s share, as for VAT purposes, such property is deemed to be owned by the partnership. When 
a partner supplies a partner’s share he is, therefore, only supplying his right to profit. If section 51(2) is 
not applicable, deeming the old and the new partnership to be one partnership, then the dissolved 
partnership supplies the jointly-held property, including the partnership’s enterprise, to the new 
partnership. I argued that both an obligation to pay VAT at fifteen per cent, and a transfer duty liability 
can be avoided if the supply of the partnership’s enterprise is zero rated under section 11(1)(e). 
 
I considered the effect of section 51(2) on transactions between the dissolved and the new partnership, 
and between other persons, and concluded that this provision should not be interpreted so as to 
disregard the supply of partners’ shares and the making of capital contributions to the new partnership 
for VAT purposes. 
 
 
1029 ‘Taxable supply’ is defined in s 1(1) to mean a supply which is chargeable with tax under s 7(1)(a), which levies VAT on 
a supply made in the course or furtherance of a vendor’s enterprise. 
1030 Considering the partnership reorganisation provisions in s 272.1(7) of Canada’s ETA, s 57(2)(e) of New Zealand’s GST 
Act, and s 45(1) of the UK VAT Act, as well as a continuity clause in Australia that can provide for the continuation of a 
partnership in the event of a change of members, in my view, the introduction of a provision similar to s 8(25) which is 
made applicable to partnerships, would, as in the case of South Africa, be tautologous in these GST/VAT jurisdictions. 
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I discussed how the provisions dealing with irrecoverable debts and the non-payment of creditors apply, 
depending on whether the rights and liabilities of the dissolved partnership are transferred to the new 
partnership. I furthermore considered the deduction of VAT on typical transition expenses, and the 
application of the reorganisation provisions of section 8(25) to partnerships. 
 
In the Chapter Five I discuss the VAT treatment of transactions that commonly occur during the general 
dissolution and liquidation of a partnership. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GENERAL DISSOLUTION, LIQUIDATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I consider the VAT implications of a general dissolution and liquidation of a partnership, 
as well as the distribution of partnership assets. After dissolution of the partnership, and unless the 
partners have agreed otherwise, a partner has a right to demand that the partnership be liquidated.1031 
Although the partnership has dissolved, it continues to exist for the purpose of liquidating the partnership 
business.1032 Consequently, so long as there are partnership assets, the partnership remains in 
existence.1033 I am therefore of the opinion, that a partnership which continues to be registered for VAT, 
will not cease to be a ‘person’ for VAT purposes any time prior to its liquidation. There are, however, 
important changes that take place upon dissolution relating to, for example, a partner’s position as 
agent for the partnership, the nature of a partner’s rights, debts between the partnership and the 
partners, and the partnership’s indebtedness to creditors. I discuss the impact that these changes could 
have on the VAT liability of both the partnership and the partners. I further consider the VAT 
consequences of the death of a partner and the transfer of his partner’s share to a legatee or heir. 
 
5.2 General dissolution 
 
5.2.1 The partners’ agency powers 
 
Although the partnership has dissolved, the relationship between the partners is finally terminated only 
once the liquidation of the partnership is complete.1034 The partners, therefore, continue to have a 
relationship after dissolution, even though that relationship is not the same as before.1035 
 
 
1031 See para 4.3 above. 
1032 Lee v Maraisdrif [1976] 3 All SA 53 (A) 58; Du Toit v African Dairies Ltd 1922 TPD 245 at 247. See Kaplan v Turner 1941 
SWA 29 where the court stated at 31, 32 that “…the partnership … continues after dissolution merely for the purposes of 
liquidation” See also Goldberg v Di Meo above at 468; Bamford Law of Partnership 85. 
1033 Du Toit v African Dairies Ltd ibid at 248. 
1034 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 324; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 53; Bamford ibid. According to 
Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 6.29, the dissolution of a partnership does not terminate the relationship between the 
partners, but does change it fundamentally. In Ferreira v Fouche [1949] 1 All SA 130 (T) the court stated at 132, that although 
the partnership ended, it has not been liquidated. Partners can end their partnership agreement, but as far as accountability 
between them and the outside world is concerned, the partnership continues to exist until liquidated. 
1035 Although the partnership has dissolved and its members are technically no longer ‘partners’, in most instances I 
continue to refer to such members as ‘partners’ and not as ‘former partners’. 
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I have discussed1036 how a partner’s power as an agent impacts on the partner’s and the partnership’s 
position for VAT purposes prior to dissolution. In the case of In Re Paarl Bank in Liquidation,1037 the 
court held that upon dissolution the partners’ agency powers cease to exist, save for the purpose of 
liquidating the affairs of the partnership. Any new obligations incurred by a partner’s co-partners after 
dissolution, ought not to bind the partner.1038 Subject to a number of exceptions, all new transactions 
entered into by a partner which are unconnected to the liquidation, or not necessarily consequential to 
transactions which occurred during the existence of the partnership, do not bind his partners but are for 
his own account alone.1039 As a result, partners will be bound if a partner completes a transaction that 
is unfinished at the time of dissolution, but that was entered into prior to dissolution.1040 Partners will 
also be bound if they acquiesce in or adopt a partner’s acts,1041 or if a partner, who for good reason is 
ignorant of the dissolution of the partnership, enters into transactions.1042 
 
It is evident that, after dissolution, a contracting partner has the authority to bind the partnership in 
certain instances only. The partnership is not required to levy VAT on a supply, or be entitled to an input 
tax deduction, where in making the supply or acquisition, the partner acts without authority.1043 The 
partner would, therefore, be acting as principal in his own name, as opposed to making the supply or 
acquisition as agent for the partnership.1044 
 
1036 In para 2.6.2 above. 
1037 (1890-1891) 8 SC 131. 
1038 Ibid at 134. In Bosman v Registrar of Deeds and The Master 1942 CPD 302 at 307, the court held that it is trite law that 
in the case of partnership each partner is an agent for the other partners, and when a partnership is dissolved by death, 
this agency ceases save for the purpose of liquidating the affairs of the partnership. See also Ramdhin et al “Partnership” 
para 315; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 53. 
1039 Ramdhin et al ibid; Williams ibid. According to Pothier A Treatise 116, 117 para 155, the effect of the dissolution of a 
partnership is that from that point onward all contracts which each of the former partners may enter into, will be for his 
own account only, unless they were necessary consequences of the affairs of the partnership. In Birkenruth v Shaw, Hoole 
& Co (1850-1852) 1 Searle 39 at 45, the court stated that retiring partners are not bound by any new contract, or by 
instruments negotiated in the name of the original firm after dissolution. 
1040 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 316; Williams ibid; Pothier ibid at 117 para 155. In R v Levitan 1958 1 SA 639 (T), for example, 
the court assuming that the partnership in this case had dissolved, held that it does not follow that a partner’s authority to 
collect and receive a cheque in payment of a partnership debt had also terminated. This is because a partner’s agency 
continues notwithstanding dissolution, to complete a transaction begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution (at 
147). 
1041 In Birkenruth v Shaw, Hoole & Co (1850-1852) 1 Searle 39, the court agreed with the principle that after dissolution no 
partner can bind the partnership and create new debts. The court found that the partnership in this case had access to the 
bank, and saw that Shaw, who was the partnership’s managing partner, signed the bills in liquidation. The court held that 
the partnership had by its acquiescence, ratified Shaw’s activities. It reasoned that if a party gives a limited authority, and 
after it has been exceeded, acquiesces, he cannot plead limited authority (at 46, 47). 
1042 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 316; Pothier A Treatise 117, 118, para 155. Former partners may, furthermore, be 
estopped from denying the validity of a transaction as against bona fide third parties who have not been warned of the 
dissolution. 
1043 However, if partners are bound by a supply or an acquisition made by a partner, the dissolved partnership, as a separate 
person for VAT purposes, is deemed to make that supply or acquisition. The partnership is, accordingly, liable for output 
tax or entitled to an input-tax deduction, subject to meeting the relevant requirements. 
1044 A partner who is a vendor, for instance, could be liable for VAT on services supplied in terms of a transaction concluded 
after dissolution and without the acquiescence of his former partners. 
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It should be noted, however, that a partner acting alone would not be capable of supplying property 
contributed quoad dominium as principal, in that legal ownership is the basis of accounting for output 
tax (and deducting input tax).1045 Legal ownership of such property remains the joint property of all the 
partners after dissolution.1046 In my view, the ownership of such property can only be supplied by all the 
partners acting together. 
 
Australia and New Zealand’s partnership law is similar to that of South Africa as regards the partners’ 
limited authority to bind one another after dissolution and leading up to the winding up of the 
partnership.1047 It is within the confines of this limited authority that the ATO contends that some or all 
of the partners may continue to carry on the enterprise of the partnership during its winding up.1048 
 
In my view, considering section 272.1(6) of Canada’s ETA, a partner retains his authority to bind the 
partnership, as envisaged in section 272.1(1),1049 until after dissolution and until the moment that the 
partnership’s GST registration is cancelled. Section 272.1(6) provides that where a partnership would, 
but for this provision, be regarded as having ceased to exist, the partnership is deemed not to have 
ceased to exist until its registration has been cancelled. The effect of section 272.1(6) is that the transfer 
of property on the dissolution of the partnership is no different from the transfer of partnership property 
while the partnership is in existence.1050 
 
In terms of New Zealand partnership law, the entry or exit of a partner to or from a partnership results 
in the dissolution of the partnership.1051 However, section 57(2)(e) provides that any change of members 
of the partnership has no effect for purposes of the New Zealand GST Act. The partnership continues 
 
1045 See the discussion in para 3.4.1 on Case T35 (1997) 18 NZTC 8,235. 
1046 See para 4.4 above. 
1047 According to Higgins, after the dissolution of a partnership the authority of each partner to bind the firm continues, 
notwithstanding the dissolution, insofar as is necessary to wind up the affairs of the partnership and to complete 
transactions begun but unfinished at the time of dissolution. See Higgins Law of Partnership 199; Williams Corporations and 
Partnerships para 804. In the case of Australia, in particular, see GSTR 2003/13 para 129. 
1048 GSTR 2003/13 para 131. See also Ward J “GST and the Formation & Dissolution of Partnerships” 5 available at  
http://www.tved.net.au/index.cfm?SimpleDisplay=PaperDisplay.cfm&PaperDisplay=http:// 
www.tved.net.au/PublicPapers/June_2003,_Sound_Education_in_GST,_GST_and_The_Formation___Dissolution_of_Part
nerships.html (date of use: 2 May 2017). 
1049 See para 2.6.2 above. 
1050 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 36; Canadian Bar Association ‘GST/HST Questions for Revenue Canada 2012’ 
available at https://www.cba.org/Sections/Commodity-Tax-Customs-and-Trade/Resources/ Resources/2014/GST-HST-
Questions-for-Revenue-Canada-2012#1 (date of use: 27 August 2018). 
1051 NZIR 3 para 5 “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 14/02, – Income Tax – Entry Of A New Partner Into A Partnership – 
Effect On Continuing Partners” available at https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/9/9/99a8ac84-d23e-4ae6-a3ed-
7c87685d7654/qb1402.pdf (date of use: 12 June 2018). See also Higgins Law of Partnership 181, 182 where reference is 
made to dissolution because of the retirement of a partner; and Williams Corporations and Partnerships in New Zealand 
para 791. 
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to exist for GST purposes, therefore, notwithstanding a change in membership. In my view, partners 
also continue to bind the partnership after its dissolution, as contemplated in section 57(2)(b),1052 based 
on the partnership’s continued existence after dissolution. 
 
This is also the position in the UK, ie, that the partners continue to bind the partnership after dissolution, 
in light of section 45(1) of the UK VAT Act which ensures the continuity of the partnership despite 
changes in its composition.1053 
 
5.2.2 The rights of the partners 
 
5.2.2.1 The fate of the partners’ shares 
 
I have stated previously that a partner owns a partner’s share in terms of the partnership agreement.1054 
After dissolution, however, no provision of the partnership agreement is binding, unless a contrary 
intention appears from the agreement of partnership or the dissolution agreement.1055 
 
There is perhaps an argument to be made that when the partnership dissolves, the partners lose their 
shares in the partnership because the partnership agreement, which is the source of the partners’ rights 
and obligations, has terminated. As the loss of their partners’ shares does not involve a positive act on 
the part of the partners, that loss would constitute the supply of the partners’ shares ‘by operation of 
law’ as envisaged in the definition of ‘supply’.1056 Such a supply could give rise to an output tax liability 
for the partner if the partner’s share was held as part of a separate enterprise carried on by him. 
 
However, considering the nature of a partner’s share – he has an undivided interest in partnership 
property and a right to profit – and that the partners continue to remain co-owners of the partnership 
property after dissolution1057 and share in the profits, as will be seen from the discussion below,1058 in 
 
1052 Section 57(2)(b) provides that any supply of goods or services made in the course of carrying on the partnership’s 
taxable activity is deemed to be supplied by the partnership, and not by any of its members. See para 3.3.1 above. 
1053 See para 4.7 above. 
1054 In para 2.6.4 above. 
1055 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315; Bamford Law of Partnership 87; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 6.33. In 
Rogers v Mathews 1926 TPD 21 at 22, for example, a deed of partnership included a clause providing for certain differences 
or disputes to be referred to arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause ceased to operate when the partnership 
was dissolved by the agreement. 
1056 See the definition of ‘supply’ in s 1(1). ‘Operation of law’ is “a legal outcome that automatically occurs whether or not 
the affected party intends it to.” See Law Dictionary Featuring Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 
available at https://thelawdictionary.org/operation-of-law/ (date of use: 13 April 2018). 
1057 See para 4.4 above. 
1058 In para 5.2.2.2 below. 
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my view the partners do not supply their partners’ shares, consisting of the mentioned rights, when the 
partnership dissolves. 
 
5.2.2.2 The nature of a partner’s rights after dissolution 
 
Although the partnership agreement is no longer binding after dissolution, the partners are not left 
without rights in relation to profits. During the course of the liquidation of the partnership, a partner is 
entitled to expect fairness and good faith from his former partners.1059 
 
Accordingly, partners do not share in profits after dissolution on the basis of a right to profit in the 
partnership agreement which is no longer valid and, therefore, not binding on the partners. Instead, 
they share in the profits by reason of their right to fairness and good faith. This right, dictates that profits 
earned from the partnership business carried on – whether improperly or against the will of the other 
partners – using assets owned jointly by all the partners, must be fairly apportioned between the 
partners. This also applies to transactions that commenced before but were completed after 
dissolution.1060 
 
In my view, any profit distributions made after dissolution would not be subject to VAT because the 
profit share is merely the result of the partners’ entitlement to fairness and good faith, and not in 
exchange for any reciprocally connected supplies made by the partners to the partnership. 
 
 
1059 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 53; Bamford Law of Partnership 
87. In Sempff v Neubauer 1903 TH 262 at 216, the court cited Lindley in his work on the Law of Partnership with approval 
where he stated that: “This obligation to perfect fairness and good faith is, moreover, not confined to persons who actually 
are partners. It extends to persons negotiating for a partnership but between whom no partnership yet exists, and also to 
persons who have dissolved partnership but who have not yet completely wound up and settled the partnership affairs.” 
There are a number of cases which illustrate how the courts have given effect to this right to expect fairness and good faith. 
In Wegner v Surgeson 1910 TPD 571 at 584, for example, the plaintiff and the defendant were former partners. After 
dissolution, the partnership business was carried on by the defendant with assets which belonged partly to the plaintiff and 
partly to the defendant. The licence belonged to the defendant, and the lease to the plaintiff and defendant jointly. The 
court held that the profits were divisible in the proportion which the value of a half interest in the lease bore to the total 
value of the lease and the licence. In Latham and Another v Sher and Another [1974] 4 All SA 102 (W) at 106, the court held 
that where a partnership is dissolved, and one of the partners improperly appropriates and uses for his own benefit, 
property which was a partnership asset, he may be obliged to account to his former partners for their interest and for their 
share in the profits from such use. This is because the former partners own and are entitled to their proportionate share in 
such property. According to the court, this does not mean that the partnership agreement is regarded as extending beyond 
the dissolution to cover the period of such use.  In Ellery v Imhof 1904 TH 170 at 175 the defendant, against the will of the 
plaintiff, continued to carry on the partnership business after the dissolution of the partnership. The court found that the 
defendant had, in fact, been trading with the plaintiff’s capital, and held the plaintiff entitled to a half-share in any accrued 
profits. The court held that on dissolution, one partner is not entitled to take possession of the partnership assets and trade 
with them, and if he does so, he is liable to account for profits. 
1060 In Nash v Muirhead (1909) 26 SC 26 at 34, the court agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to his share of the profits from 
a transaction that was uncompleted at the date of dissolution. 
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There are no GST/VAT provisions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK with regard to 
partners’ shares and profit distributions at the time of the partnership’s dissolution.1061 I concluded1062 
that profit distributions in these jurisdictions are not subject to VAT/GST before the dissolution of the 
partnership. There is no reason why profit distributions would be taxable after dissolution, especially 
considering that no supplies are made by the partners in exchange for such distributions. 
 
5.2.3 Irrecoverable debts 
 
5.2.3.1 Debts between the partnership and the partners 
 
A partner could be indebted to the partnership resulting from a taxable supply made by the partnership 
to the partner for consideration in money, and in respect of which the partnership has accounted for 
output tax. Should the partnership write off any irrecoverable portion of the consideration, the 
partnership would, in terms of section 22(1), be entitled to a deduction of the portion of the irrecoverable 
debt that represents the VAT charged. This would also apply where a partner who is a vendor carrying 
on a separate enterprise, made a taxable supply to the partnership. A question is how any debts 
between the partners and the partnership are affected by the dissolution of the partnership. 
 
The debts of each of the partners to the partnership, or of those of the partnership to each of the 
partners, do not come to an end on dissolution.1063 Section 22(1) is, therefore, not automatically 
triggered when a partnership dissolves. 
 
In McLeod and Shearsmith v Shearsmith,1064 the court held that the obligation to replace what had been 
drawn out to pay for certain land and buildings, in the partnership funds had to be borne in mind in 
calculating the value of the deceased partner’s share. In this case the deceased partner’s capital in the 
partnership greatly exceeded the amount of the indebtedness. Where this is so, the court reasoned, a 
partner’s share is calculated by setting off the amount of the indebtedness against the amount standing 
 
1061 In Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and Canada all partners, including an outgoing partner, continue to share in the 
partnership profits after dissolution if the surviving or continuing partners carry on the partnership’s business after 
dissolution. See Higgins Law of Partnership in Australia and New Zealand 221, 223; Scamell & I’anson Banks Lindley on the 
Law of Partnerships 719. Section 42(1) of the Partnerships Act RSO 1990 c P5 (Canada), applies where any member of a firm 
dies or otherwise ceases to be a partner and the surviving or continuing partners carry on the business of the firm with its 
capital or assets without any final settlement of accounts. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the outgoing 
partner or his estate is entitled to such share of the profits made since the dissolution as is attributable to the use of the 
outgoing partner’s share of the partnership assets, or to interest at the rate of five per cent per annum on the amount of 
his share of the partnership assets. 
1062 In para 2.6.5 above. 
1063 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315. See also Bamford Law of Partnership 100; and Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 53. 
1064 McLeod and Shearsmith v Shearsmith 1938 TPD 87. 
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to his credit after paying off partnership liabilities and advances by partners to the partnership.1065 The 
court held that payment into the partnership funds on a dissolution, is therefore necessary only where 
a partner’s liability to the partnership exceeds what is due to him from the partnership fund, and then 
only to the extent of the excess. It furthermore does not matter how the liability arises, whether it is 
money overdrawn, or capital promised and not paid in, or, as was alleged in this case, capital drawn 
out under a promise to re-deposit it.1066 
 
The liquidation, meaning the sale, of the partnership property is discussed below.1067 It is clear from the 
McLeod case that from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership property, the partnership liabilities 
and advances by partners to the partnership are paid first. Thereafter, any indebtedness of a partner is 
set off against any amounts standing to his credit, for example, amounts debited to his capital and/or 
current account. This setting-off of the partner’s debt constitutes payment.1068 A partner would only be 
required to make payment into the partnership funds to the extent that his liability to the partnership 
exceeds what is due to him by the partnership. 
 
It should be noted that a partner has no right of action against another partner for payment owed to him 
in connection with partnership affairs, unless and until there has been a final and binding settlement of 
the partnership’s accounts and a credit balance remains due to him.1069 
 
As regards a partnership’s indebtedness to a partner, although the court in McLeod confirmed that 
partnership debts, which include advances by partners to the partnership, are repaid first, the process 
of recovery of a partnership’s debt to a partner depends on whether a liquidator has been appointed. In 
Van Tonder v Davids,1070 the court held that where the partners have agreed on a liquidator, the 
liquidator is the only, and the appropriate person to claim the partnership assets.1071 
 
 
1065 Ibid at 93. 
1066 Ibid at 91, 92. In this case the deceased was a member of a partnership. On his death, he and his co-partner held 
undivided shares in certain fixed property on which there were buildings in the process of completion. The property was 
not a partnership asset. The money expended in the purchase of the erf and on the improvements as they existed on the 
deceased’s death, came out of the partnership funds, each partner having drawn £2 375 for that purpose. The appellants 
regarded the deceased as indebted to the partnership, on dissolution, in this sum. However, instead of setting it off against 
the capital standing to his credit in the partnership’s books, they treated his capital as undiminished. 
1067 See para 5.3 above. 
1068 See para 3.5.2 above. 
1069 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 315; Bamford Law of Partnership 100. 
1070 [1975] 3 All SA 544 (C). 
1071 Ibid at 547; The applicant requested the court for an order that the respondent deliver a truck to the manager of a bank 
so that he could divide the partnership assets between the two parties who were the former partners of the dissolved 
partnership. The applicant alleged that the parties agreed to appoint the manager as liquidator. The court dismissed the 
applicant’s request. 
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In Kaplan v Turner,1072 the court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to arrogate to himself the sole right of 
liquidating the partnership estate. The court held further that if the partners cannot agree on the division 
of the assets or the payment of or responsibility for the partnership liabilities, they must either agree on 
the appointment of a liquidator, or ask the court to appoint a liquidator.1073 
 
The partners will, therefore, either agree on how the partnership’s indebtedness to a partner should be 
settled, or a liquidator will be appointed who will be responsible for liquidating the partnership, which 
would include paying debts owed by the partnership to a partner.1074 
 
According to the SARS, a debt will be considered as irrecoverable if the vendor has complied with both 
the following requirements, namely: 
a. the vendor must have done all the necessary entries in his accounting system to record that 
the amount has been written off; and 
b. must have ceased any recovery action taken by himself and have decided to either not take 
any further action, or have handed the debt over to an attorney or debt collector.1075 
 
Unlike an attorney and a debt collector, a liquidator is appointed to liquidate the dissolved 
partnership,1076 and not necessarily because of complications in collecting debt. Therefore, only if the 
liquidator has ceased any recovery action he has taken and decided to either not take any further action, 
or has handed the debt over to an attorney or debt collector, can the partnership’s debt to the partner 
potentially be considered not to be recoverable.1077 
 
As regards a partner’s indebtedness to the partnership, in my opinion, prior to the completion of the 
above process set by law, ie, the liquidation of the partnership assets, the settlement of the partnership’s 
accounts, and the set-off of any mutual indebtedness between the partnership and the partner, a 
partner’s debt to the partnership cannot be considered to have become irrecoverable. The SARS’ 
requirements for a debt to be considered irrecoverable, can only potentially be met thereafter because 
the outcome of this process will confirm whether the partnership will be successful in recovering all or 
part of the partner’s debt. 
 
1072 1941 SWA 29. 
1073 Ibid at 32. 
1074 See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 321; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 6.41, 6.42; Bamford Law of 
Partnership 106 - 108. 
1075 SARS VATNews No 9 - February 1997 available at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/Documents/VATNews-
Archive/LAPD-IntR-VATN-Arc-2013-09%20-%20VATNews%209%20February%201997.pdf (date of use: 2 September 
2018). 
1076 See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 321; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 6.42; and Bamford Law of Partnership 
106 - 108. 
1077 See the above two requirements are set by the SARS for a debt to be considered irrecoverable. 
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Section 22(3) provides that where a vendor: 
a. has made a deduction of input tax in respect of a taxable supply of goods or services made to him; 
and 
b. has, within a period of twelve months, not paid the full consideration in respect of such supply, 
an amount equal to the tax fraction of that portion of the consideration which has not been paid, is 
deemed to be tax charged in respect of a taxable supply. 
 
A partnership or a partner could be faced with a tax liability if its debt to the other party remains unpaid 
for longer than the prescribed twelve-month period. 
 
5.2.3.2 Partnership’s indebtedness to creditors 
 
The next issue concerns the impact which a partnership’s dissolution has on its indebtedness to third-
party creditors. In Essakow v Gundelfinger,1078 the court held that the partnership remains in existence 
in so far as creditors are concerned, until their claims have been discharged despite a dissolution 
agreement having been entered into.1079 As the partnership’s indebtedness remains in existence, 
dissolution will not automatically trigger a section 22(1) deduction for a partnership’s creditor. 
 
There are no GST/VAT provisions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK with respect to debts 
between a partnership and its partners, or between the partnership and creditors at the time of the 
partnership’s dissolution.1080 
 
  
 
1078 1928 TPD 308. 
1079 Ibid at 312. 
1080 Section 39 of the UK Partnership Act, 1890, provides that on the dissolution of a partnership every partner is entitled, 
as against the other partners in the firm, to have the property of the partnership applied in payment of the debts and 
liabilities of the firm, and to have the surplus assets after such payment applied in payment of what may be due to the 
partners, respectively, after deducting what may be due from them as partners to the firm. See Morse Partnership Law 
252 para 7.32. The Partnership Acts applicable in Australia and New Zealand contain the identical provision. See Higgins 
Law of Partnership in Australia and New Zealand 203. The Partnership Acts in Canada contain similar, but not identical, 
provisions. See Haack R “Canada: What Happens To A Partnership's Assets And Liabilities Upon Dissolution?” available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/ 
canada/x/718560/Corporate+Commercial+Law/What+Happens+to+a+Partnerships+Assets+and+Liabilities+upon+Dissolut
ion (date of use: 28 August 2018). I stated in para 4.10 (above) that all these jurisdictions permit a deduction of the 
VAT/GST component of a bad debt written off. In my view, as a partnership’s indebtedness to a partner, and vice versa, as 
well as a partnership’s indebtedness to a creditor, clearly continue to exist on dissolution of the partnership, a claimant 
will only be entitled to a bad-debt deduction once it has been established that the debt is bad – as opposed to 
automatically on dissolution. 
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5.2.4 The status of a partnership’s rights on dissolution 
 
According to the court in Baldinger v Broomberg,1081 there is no general principle that a right granted to 
a partnership ceases when the partnership is dissolved. As a result, the court held that there would 
appear to be no reason in principle why dissolution should terminate a lease to the partnership.1082 In 
Blumberg v Buys and Malkin & Margolis,1083 the court held that the granting of a trading right to a 
partnership for so long a period (nine years in casu), without any limitations, must be regarded as a 
property right of the firm which can be freely ceded to any of the partners upon the dissolution of the 
partnership.1084 Consequently, a lease concluded in favour of a partnership does not automatically 
terminate, and a grant of exclusive trading rights does not lapse on dissolution of a partnership.1085 
 
Considering that the partnership’s rights do not cease on dissolution, there can be no argument that 
such rights are, on dissolution, surrendered by the partnership by operation of law, giving rise to a 
potential VAT liability under section 10(4). 
 
There are no GST/VAT provisions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK which address a 
partnership’s rights at the time of its dissolution. Considering the manner in which partnership assets, 
which should include rights owned by the partnership, are required to be applied in these jurisdictions 
on the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership,1086 it is clear that the rights of the partnership do 
not cease on dissolution. In my view, the position in these jurisdictions should correspond to that in 
South Africa, namely, that such rights are, on dissolution, not surrendered by the partnership so giving 
rise to a potential GST/VAT liability. 
 
  
 
1081 [1949] 3 All SA 219 (C). 
1082 Ibid at 229. 
1083 1908 TS 1175. 
1084 Ibid at 1180. In this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant gave a partnership a right, namely, an undertaking that 
he would not sell or lease any part of a certain property to others for trading purposes. The partnership subsequently 
dissolved. Thereafter, the partnership ceded this right to one of the partners – the plaintiff in the case. One of the arguments 
raised by the defendant, was that the plaintiff could avail himself of the right, because it was a purely personal grant to the 
partnership, and the partnership had been dissolved (at 1179). The court held that all rights which a person possesses can 
be freely ceded, and it is incumbent upon the person who challenges the capacity to cede a right, to show that the parties 
intended that the right granted should not be ceded (at 1180). 
1085 See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 316; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg paras 6.35, 6.36; and Bamford Law of 
Partnership 88. 
1086 See para. 5.2.3.2 above. 
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5.2.5 The death of a partner 
 
The death of any partner dissolves the partnership, but the heirs or executor of the deceased partner 
do not become partners in his stead.1087 The executor of the decedent’s estate is, however, entitled to 
the deceased partner’s share of the partnership assets.1088 In terms of section 46(g), the executor acts 
only in a ‘representative capacity’. The ownership of the partner’s share is, therefore, not transferred to 
the executor. As a result, the executor’s acquisition of the deceased partner’s share holds no VAT 
consequences as the share is not supplied to the executor. The dissolved partnership would 
subsequently be liquidated. The deceased partner’s share in the dissolved partnership can either be 
sold to the surviving partners, as stated above,1089 or it can be transferred to the deceased partner’s 
legatee or heir since the partner’s share is an asset forming part of his estate.1090 
 
If the deceased partner’s share in the dissolved partnership formed part of a separate enterprise he 
carried on, the provisions of section 53 may be applicable. Only in exceptional cases would a partner’s 
share form part of a separate enterprise carried on by him.1091 In terms of section 53(1)(a), where, after 
the death of a partner who is a vendor, an enterprise previously carried on by him continues to be 
carried on by the executor of his estate, or anything is done in connection with the termination of the 
enterprise, the decedent’s estate is deemed to be a vendor in respect of the enterprise. Section 53(1)(a) 
envisages two options available for an executor: he can continue with the deceased partner’ enterprise 
and hold the deceased partner’s share in the dissolved partnership as part of that enterprise; or he can 
terminate the enterprise. 
 
In terms of section 53(1)(b), where section 53(1)(a) applies, the deceased partner and his estate are 
deemed, “as respects the enterprise in question”, to be one and the same person. In my view, the 
deeming of the two entities to be the same ‘person’, has the effect that the decedent’s estate continues 
to carry on the enterprise of the deceased partner under the same VAT registration number. I further 
argue that all goods and services forming part of the enterprise are not supplied by the deceased partner 
 
1087 Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 49. According to Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 312, where the 
partnership contract provides for the partnership to be continued for the benefit of the estate of the deceased partner, his 
executor, if so authorised in the will, concludes a new partnership on behalf of the estate with the remaining partners. See, 
for example. McLeod and Shearsmith v Shearsmith 1938 TPD 87 where, after the death of the deceased partner, the 
partnership business was carried on in partnership between the surviving partner, McLeod, and the executors as trustees. 
The court stated (at 89) that the latter partnership “is clearly not the same partnership as that between McLeod and the 
testator.” 
1088 Bamford Law of Partnership 78. 
1089 In para 4.4 above. The sale of the deceased partner’s share cannot be zero rated in terms of section 11(1)(e) as it cannot, 
on its own, constitute an enterprise or part of an enterprise which is capable of separate operation. The share can, however, 
be supplied as part of an enterprise, which can be zero rated subject the relevant requirements. See para. 4.8.3 above. 
1090 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 289; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 31. 
1091 See para 4.8.3 above. 
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to his estate, and their transfer to the estate is, consequently, not subject to VAT. The SARS agrees 
with this view.1092 
 
Should the executor deregister the estate for VAT, section 8(2) applies and the goods or rights,1093 
including the partner’s share forming part of the assets of the enterprise, are deemed to be supplied by 
the estate in the course of its enterprise immediately before it ceases to be a vendor. Such a deemed 
supply gives rise to an output tax liability for the estate, which in terms section 9(5) will be deemed to 
be made immediately before the decedent’s estate ceases to be a vendor. 
 
Where the decedent’s estate which is a vendor, transfers the deceased partner’s share for no 
consideration to an heir, who is a connected person in relation to the decedent’s estate,1094 section 10(4) 
may apply. This would be the case where the heir would not have been entitled to a full input tax 
deduction if he had paid a consideration for the supply equal to its open- market value. The heir will 
have been denied a full input tax deduction if, for example, he was not a vendor, or even if he was a 
vendor, he did not make the acquisition for a wholly taxable purpose. The executor would be required 
by section 7(a) to levy VAT at the standard rate, on the supply of the partner’s share. Section 10(4) 
deems the supply to be made for consideration in money equal to the open-market value of the supply. 
 
The next issue concerns the ‘open-market value’ of the supply of the deceased partner’s share. The 
‘open-market value’ of a supply of goods or services is defined in the VAT Act as the consideration in 
money which the supply of those goods or services would generally fetch if supplied in similar 
circumstances, at that date, in the Republic, and the supply is freely offered and made between persons 
who are not connected persons.1095 
 
In this instance, the circumstances surrounding the supply of the partner’s share are the transfer of the 
share to a legatee or heir on the death of the partner. In CIR v Estate Whiteaway,1096 the court had to 
decide on the method of valuation of a deceased partner’s share in the partnership. In my view, the 
court advanced a rational and unbiased method of valuation that meets the requirements of an ‘open-
 
1092 The SARS stated in the Guide for Estates VAT 413 para 4.3 available at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/ 
OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-VAT-G06%20-%20VAT%20413%20Guide%20for%20Estates.pdf (date of use: 1 January 2019) that 
an executor may decide temporarily to continue with the deceased vendor’s enterprise if it is in the best interests of the 
estate. In that case, the transfer of goods or services from the deceased to that person’s estate is not regarded as a 
supply as they are deemed to be one and the same person. See also Botes Juta’s Value Added Tax 53-2. 
1093 Section 8(2) does not apply to goods in respect of the acquisition of which by the vendor, a deduction of input tax under 
s 16(3) was denied in terms of s 17(2). Section 8(2), furthermore, applies to rights which are capable of assignment, cession 
or surrender. 
1094 ‘Connected persons’ is defined in s 1(1) to mean a natural person, including the estate of a natural person if such person 
is deceased, and any relative of that natural person, who is a relative as defined in s 1 of the IT Act. 
1095 See the definition of ‘open market value’ in s 1(1) read with s 3(2). 
1096 1933 TPD 486. 
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market value’ for VAT purposes. It held that the following seems to be the proper method: First, the 
partnership’s total liabilities are deducted from the value of the total gross assets of the partnership. 
Second, with this figure in hand, it must be decided what the deceased would be entitled to, which 
depends on what the rights of a partner are. The court held that the partners are co-owners each holding 
a lien over the partnership property. The purpose of the lien is to use the partnership property to 
discharge of the partnership’s debts, with any surplus assets then used to pay what is due to the 
respective partners, after having deducted any amounts the partners owe the partnership.1097 In McLeod 
and Shearsmith v Shearsmith,1098 the court held that although what was said in CIR v Estate Whiteaway 
referred to English law, it is in principle no different from systems based on civil law – which would 
include the South African partnership law – on this specific point.1099 
 
Where the deceased partner’s share is transferred to an heir for no consideration and section 10(4) 
does not apply, section 10(23) provides that the value of the supply is nil. Section 10(4) does not apply 
if the heir is not a connected person in relation to the decedent’s estate, or even if he is a connected 
person, he is a vendor who acquires the partner’s share for a wholly taxable purpose. The supply of the 
partner’s share can be zero rated in terms of section 11(1)(e), if it is supplied as part of an enterprise 
which is capable of separate operation – and, of course, the rest of the provision’s requirements are 
met. 
 
In the case of New Zealand, Cross claims that there is no clear guidance on the GST implications when 
a partner dies. She states, however, that it is arguable that the following GST treatment is justified. The 
partnership terminates on the death of the partner and the executor steps into the shoes of the 
deceased as specified agent of his estate. If the deceased partner was GST-registered in his own right, 
the transfer of the deceased partner’s share to the continuing partner(s) is unlikely to be zero rated. In 
the case of a two-person partnership, if the surviving partner is GST-registered and intends to carry on 
the taxable activity, section 10(3) of the New Zealand GST Act1100 – which would otherwise deem the 
supply to be for market value – does not apply. This is because the surviving partner acquires the share 
for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies, and is entitled to an input tax deduction.1101 
 
As in the case of New Zealand, there are no specific GST/VAT provisions in Australia, Canada, and the 
UK as to the lot of a deceased partner’s share upon the dissolution of a partnership. According to the 
 
1097 Ibid at 500. 
1098 1938 TPD 87. 
1099 Ibid at 91. 
1100 See para 2.6.6 above. 
1101 Section 10(3AB) of the New Zealand GST Act provides that s 10(3A) does not apply to a supply if the recipient acquires 
the supply for no consideration and, from the time of supply, applies the goods or services for the purpose of making taxable 
supplies. 
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ATO, on the death of a partner the deceased partner’s interest in the partnership crystallises as a debt 
due by the partnership to the partner. This crystallisation is of a right that the partner already has, the 
ATO reasons, and is not a new right that is acquired. The crystallisation of the interest in the partnership 
as a debt, results in the extinguishment of the deceased partner’s interest in the partnership. Following 
this extinction, there is an increase in each of the continuing partners' fractional interest in the 
partnership. The ATO contends that this increase is a consequence of the extinction of the deceased 
partner's interest, and does not involve the supply of any new or additional interests in the partnership 
by the partnership.1102 The crystallisation of a deceased partner’s interest, therefore, does not involve 
a supply for the deceased partner’s estate, the partnership, or the individual partners. 
 
The positions in Canada and the UK are similar to that in South Africa. In Canada when a partner dies, 
his estate is generally deemed to continue with the partnership business “as if he had not died”.1103 In 
the UK the representative who takes control of a deceased person’s assets merely acts in a 
representative capacity.1104 In Canada and the UK, a deceased partner’s share is, therefore, not 
supplied to his estate upon his death. I stated that in Canada and the UK the consensus is that, for GST 
purposes, a partner disposes of his share in the partnership.1105 The supply of the deceased partner’s 
share to his heirs or to the continuing partners could, likewise in my view, hold GST/VAT consequences. 
 
5.3 Liquidation and distribution of assets 
 
5.3.1 General 
 
After dissolution the partnership must be liquidated. Thereafter, as stated above,1106 the partnership’s 
creditors must be paid. Any remaining assets must be distributed to the partners, after deducting what 
they owe the partnership.1107 
 
  
 
1102 See GSTR 2003/13 paras 176, 177. 
1103 See Pansieri F “Canada: Goods and Services Tax/ Harmonised Sales Tax (GST/HST) and Death” available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/568038/wills+intestacy+estate+planning/Goods+And+Services+TaxHarmonized+Sale
s+Tax+GSTHST+And+Death (date of use: 28 August 2018). 
1104 See Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 15.1. 
1105 Para 4.8.1 above. 
1106 In para 5.2.3.1 above. 
1107 CIR v Estate Whiteaway1933 TPD 486 at 500; McLeod and Shearsmith v Shearsmith 1938 TPD 87 at 91. In Brighton v 
Clift (2) [1971] 2 All SA 417 (R) at 419, the court held that since it was common cause that the partnership had, through the 
respondent's repudiation, ceased to exist, the applicant was entitled to have the partnership property applied in payment 
of its debts and to have the surplus assets, if any, applied in payment of what may be due to him after deducting what may 
be due by him to the firm. See Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 318; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 55. 
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5.3.2 Liquidation 
 
In Robson v Theron,1108 the court held that where the partnership agreement provides for, or the 
partners subsequently agree upon, the dissolution of the partnership and how it is to be liquidated and 
wound-up, specific performance may be claimed under the actio pro socio. Generally, where there is 
no such agreement, this action may, subject to any stipulation for the duration of the partnership or any 
other relevant stipulations, be brought by a partner to have the partnership liquidated and wound-up. 
The court may then appoint a liquidator to realise the partnership assets for the purpose of liquidating 
partnership debts and to distribute the balance of the partnership assets or their proceeds among the 
partners.1109 Upon dissolution of the partnership, a liquidator may also be appointed by the partners 
jointly.1110 
 
5.3.2.1 Rights and duties of liquidator 
 
In Bockris v Bockris,1111 the court granted an order that a liquidator be appointed to: realise the 
partnership assets, including the goodwill, by public auction or by private agreement, and whether as a 
going concern or otherwise; to collect debts due to the partnership unless the debts are realised by 
sale; to pay the liabilities of the partnership; to prepare a final account between the parties; and to divide 
the assets of the partnership after payment of its liabilities in accordance with the account. In order to 
enable the business to continue, the liquidator is also appointed to act as its manager pending the final 
settlement of the partnership account.1112 According to Ramdhin et al, a liquidator generally has the 
rights, and must perform the duties, as set out in the Bockris case.1113 
 
In my opinion, considering the rights and duties of a liquidator of a partnership – particularly his 
appointment as manager of the partnership business – the liquidator is an agent because he has the 
power to create legal rights and obligations for the partners whom he represents.1114 Section 54, 
therefore, applies to a liquidator in his dealings on behalf of the dissolved partnership. As a result, where 
 
1108 [1978] 2 All SA 264 (A). 
1109 Ibid at 275, 276; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 318; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 55, 56. 
1110 Ramdhin et al ibid at para 320; Williams ibid at 55; Bamford Law of Partnership 105; Benade et al Ondernemingsreg 
para 6.41. 
1111 1910 WLD 182. 
1112 Ibid 184. See also Sherry v Stewart 1903 TH 13 at 15, where the court appointed a liquidator to the dissolved partnership 
with the same rights and duties. 
1113 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 321. See also Bamford Law of Partnership 107; Williams Concise Corporate and 
Partnership Law 49, 56; and Benade et al Ondernemingsreg para 6.42. 
1114 Silke Law of Agency 2. 
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the liquidator makes supplies or acquisitions as agent on behalf of the partnership as principal, those 
supplies or acquisitions are deemed to be made by the dissolved partnership.1115 
 
5.3.2.2 The liquidation of the partnership property 
 
According to the court in Sherry v Stewart,1116 the general rule is that on dissolution the partnership 
property is converted into money by means of sale, and after payment of the partnership debts, the 
proceeds are divided between the partners.1117 In Young v Young,1118 the court confirmed that while it 
will lean to favouring partners who wish to purchase the jointly-owned partnership property, it must 
always have regard to the rights of the other co-owners. Considering the circumstances, the court held 
that the property in question must be sold by public auction.1119 
 
In Robson v Theron,1120 the court found that it was in the circumstances of that matter impossible, 
impracticable, or inequitable for a court, in exercising its equitable discretion, to divide the goodwill 
between the parties or to cause it to be auctioned and to have the proceeds divided between the parties. 
The court held that the practical and equitable solution in the circumstances is for the court to place 
arbitrio judicis,1121 a valuation on the goodwill with due regard to the particular circumstances concerning 
its value at the date of dissolution of the partnership, and to order the one partner to pay the other 
partner half of this value.1122 
 
In terms of the above case law, the jointly-owned partnership property will either be sold, whether by 
the liquidator or at public auction, or be awarded to a partner(s) who will be ordered to pay the other 
partner(s) his share. In terms of proviso (i) to the definition of ‘enterprise’,1123 anything done by the 
liquidator in connection with the termination of the partnership’s enterprise, is deemed to be done in the 
course or furtherance of that enterprise. In my view, as the task of the liquidator is to wind up the 
partnership’s affairs,1124 and his actions will result in the termination of the partnership’s enterprise, the 
supplies he makes – including the liquidation of partnership assets and any in specie distributions made 
to the partners – will be deemed to be done in the course or furtherance of the partnership’s enterprise. 
 
1115 See ss 54(1) and (2). 
1116 1903 TH 13. 
1117 Ibid at 15. Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 322; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 56. 
1118 Young v Young and Others (1918) 39 NPD 460. 
1119 Ibid at 464; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 322; Bamford Law of Partnership 99. 
1120 [1978] 2 All SA 264 (A). 
1121 That is, in the discretion of the judge. 
1122 Robson v Theron [1978] 2 All SA 264 (A) at 278; Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 322; Bamford Law of Partnership 99. 
1123 Section 1(1). 
1124 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 321; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 55; Benade et al 
Ondernemingsreg para 6.42. 
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This accords with the view of the ATO, that realising business assets and in specie distributions to 
partners, as part of winding up a partnership, are made in ‘carrying on an enterprise’ and, therefore, 
potentially subject to GST.1125 The Australian GST Act also specifically includes in the definition of 
‘carrying on an enterprise’, anything done in the course of the commencement or termination of the 
enterprise.1126 
 
The sale of the partnership property could be taxable at the standard rate, subject to compliance with 
section 7(1)(a). Should the liquidator dispose of the partnership’s enterprise as a going concern, the 
supply may be zero rated provided that all the requirements of section 11(1)(e) are met. If the 
partnership property is awarded to one of the partners for no consideration, the value of the supply will, 
in terms of section 10(23), be deemed to be nil.1127 This is, however, subject to section 10(4), which 
deems the supply to be made at open- market value if the property is not acquired by the partner for a 
wholly taxable purpose. 
 
The partnership must, therefore, account for output tax and may deduct input tax on transactions 
concluded by the liquidator in connection with the termination of the partnership’s enterprise, provided 
that the relevant requirements are met.1128 
 
There are no specific legislative provisions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or the UK which regulate 
the GST/VAT implications of the liquidation of a dissolved partnership’s assets. In terms of section 4(1) 
of the UK VAT Act, VAT is charged on a taxable supply of goods or services made in the UK by a 
taxable person in the course of furtherance of any business carried on by him. Section 94(5) of the UK 
VAT Act provides that anything done in connection with the termination of a business, is treated as 
being done in the course or furtherance of that business.1129 The New Zealand GST Act and Canada’s 
ETA have provisions similar to those in Australian and UK legislation regarding supplies made in the 
course of termination of a taxable or commercial activity.1130 In my view, as in the case of South Africa, 
supplies made in the course of the liquidation of the partnership would potentially be subject to 
GST/VAT. 
 
In the case of Canada, a supplier may, in terms of section 167(1) of the Canadian ETA, sell a business 
or part of a business, to a recipient and no GST will be payable on property or services supplied under 
 
1125 GSTR 2003/13 paras 131, 132 and 135. 
1126 Section 195-1. See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-book] Location 49. 
1127 I mentioned in para 2.6.6 above, that a partnership and a member of that partnership are connected persons. 
1128 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1. 
1129 See Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 8.1. 
1130 See s 6(2) of the New Zealand GST Act; McKenzie GST: A Practical Guide [E-book] Location 297; s 123(1) of Canada’s 
ETA; and Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 7,035. 
185 
 
the agreement.1131 The CRA takes the position that “the supply by a partnership of an undivided interest 
in the partnership property” to the partners “would not be considered to be a supply of a business or 
part of a business” and, accordingly, not eligible for relief under subsection 167(1).1132 According to 
Chabot et al, the reason for the CRA’s view is that the partner receiving the undivided interest in the 
assets cannot operate the property on his own, and as a result, one of the conditions under section 167 
has not been met.1133 They, therefore, argue that the election under section 167 does not generally 
apply to the dissolution of partnerships1134 when the dissolved partnership supplies the partnership 
property to the partners. However, Arsenault and Krekelwetz argue that the CRA’s current position may 
still leave the door open to the possibility that where a partnership is dissolved and everything (eg, 
physical property, intangible property, goodwill) is transferred to a single partner, subsection 167(1) 
could still apply.1135 In other words, the single partner would be able to operate a business if all the 
property used to carry on the partnership business, is transferred to him. 
 
5.3.3 Distribution 
 
The partnership capital is a debt due to the partners by the partnership and must, therefore, be repaid 
to the partners after outside creditors and the advances made by partners have been paid.1136 
Depending on the remaining surplus,1137 each partner is repaid pro-rate what he has contributed to the 
partnership capital.1138 The capital is repaid to the partners without interest.1139 The balance of the 
 
1131 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST paras 2,150 and 10,010; CRA “Sale of a Business or Part of a Business” 
GST/HST Memorandum 14-4 December 2010 available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-
publications/publications/14-4/sale-a-business-part-a-business.html (date of use: 28 August 2018). To qualify for this 
treatment, the supplier and the recipient must make a joint election, and certain conditions must be met. These 
conditions include the following: 
a. the business should have been established or carried on by the supplier; 
b. under the agreement for the supply, the recipient should acquire ownership, possession, or use of all or 
substantially all (at least 90%) of the property (based on the fair market value of the property) that can reasonably 
be regarded as being necessary for the recipient to be capable of carrying on the business (or part of the business) 
of the vendor; 
c. if the supplier is registered, the purchaser should also be registered; and 
the election needs to be filed by the purchaser.  
See Chabot ibid. 
1132 CRA GST Headquarters Ruling 11950-3 Transfer of Farmland Upon Dissolution of Partnership (9 March 2004). I extracted 
the information regarding the latter ruling from Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 50.  
1133 Chabot et al EY’s Complete Guide to GST/HST para 10,010. The condition that is not met is that the recipient should be 
capable of carrying on a business with the acquired property. 
1134 Ibid at 793. 
1135 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 50. 
1136 CIR v Estate Whiteaway 1933 TPD 486 at 501; Schlemmer v Viljoen [1958] 2 All SA 309 (T) at 316; McLeod and Shearsmith 
v Shearsmith 1938 TPD 87 at 93; Olivier v Stoop [1978] 1 All SA 482 (T) at 489. 
1137 The surplus that remains after payment of the creditors. 
1138 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 323. It seems to Williams that where partners have so agreed, their contributions are 
repaid to them in full. In the absence of such agreement, the partners are not entitled to repayment in full, and the capital 
contributions must be divided between them. See Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 56. 
1139 Schlemmer v Viljoen [1958] 2 All SA 309 (T) at 316. 
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partnership assets are then divided between the partners, in proportion to the amounts contributed by 
each, or in accordance with the special terms of the contract of partnership.1140 
 
If there is a shortfall, the partners must contribute to the loss in the proportion in which losses are 
shared.1141 In my opinion, the arguments of the ATO concerning the VAT implications of partners 
contributing to a loss, also apply to the VAT Act. A contribution in money would not be subject to VAT 
as money does not constitute ‘goods’ or ‘services’.1142 Should the partner, in contributing to the loss, 
make a supply of goods or services in the course or furtherance of an enterprise carried on by him 
independently of the partnership, the supply is subject to VAT if the requirements of section 7(1)(a) are 
met.1143 The partnership would, in turn, be entitled to deduct the VAT as input tax as the acquisition is 
made for a taxable purpose. The transaction is concluded by the liquidator as part of the termination of 
the partnership enterprise and, therefore, is deemed to be done in the course or furtherance of that 
enterprise.1144 
 
In my view, it is unlikely that the partnership will pay any consideration to the partner, in that the supply 
serves as a contribution to a loss. If no consideration is payable, then it is, moreover, unlikely that 
section 10(4), deeming the supply to be at the market value, would apply. The partnership would 
probably sell the goods or services and apply the proceeds to pay its debts. All these transactions, I 
argue, are part of the termination of the partnership enterprise and, therefore, part of the partnership’s 
enterprise activities. Such acquisitions will, probably, be classified as ‘made for a taxable purpose’. 
 
After payment of the partnership’s liabilities, any surplus assets are first applied to pay any amount due 
to the respective partners – ie before the repayment of capital. As the surplus assets and capital 
contributed quoad dominium form part of the partnership property, and are, therefore, deemed to belong 
to the partnership for VAT purposes, the distribution of the surplus assets and the repayment of capital 
to the partners constitutes supplies made by the partnership to the partners. 
 
The settlement of the partnership’s debt to a partner and the repayment of capital, could take the form 
of a cash payment as the partnership property is generally converted into money. From the partnership’s 
perspective, the supply of the money would not be subject to VAT. 
 
 
1140 Monhaupt v Minister of Finance (1918) 39 NPD 47 at 50. 
1141 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 323; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 56; McLeod and Shearsmith v 
Shearsmith 1938 TPD 87 at 93. 
1142 Money is specifically excluded from the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘services’ in s 1(1); see GSTR 2003/13 para 147. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 See proviso (i) to the definition of ‘enterprise’ in s 1(1); GSTR 2003/13 para 147. 
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In my opinion, VAT should be levied on the settlement of a debt or the repayment of capital, if the 
payment takes the form of a supply of goods or services, and if that supply is made for consideration 
and in the course or furtherance of an enterprise. Arsenault and Kreklewetz’s commentary on the 
Canadian GST – that the transfer of partnership property on dissolution of the partnership is no different 
from the transfer of partnership property while the partnership is in existence – also applies to the VAT 
Act. Accordingly, the supply of such property is subject to VAT at the standard rate, unless it is zero 
rated or exempt.1145 
 
There should, furthermore, be no distinction between a distribution in specie to a partner during the 
partnership’s operation and during its liquidation. The partner’s indebtedness for the in specie 
distribution can be offset, respectively, against any amount due to him, and the amount of capital which 
he is entitled to have repaid to him. The payment for the in specie distribution can, alternatively, be 
structured in the form of a barter, where the partner supplies a service in the form of the surrender of 
his right, respectively, to the amount by which the partnership is indebted to him, and the amount of 
capital to be repaid to him. The nature of the partnership’s VAT liability on the in specie distribution 
should, accordingly, be exactly the same as in the case of an in specie distribution during the 
partnership’s operation. 
 
The ATO also holds the view that an in specie distribution to the partners as part of the final distribution, 
is made by a partnership for consideration.1146 According to the ATO such consideration may be 
represented by: (a) an amount debited to the capital account of the partner; (b) an amount debited to 
the current account of the partner; or (c) a combination of amounts debited to both the partner’s capital 
and current accounts.1147 
 
As stated above,1148 any balance of partnership assets is divided between the partners. This distribution 
is, in my view, not made by the partnership in return for any payment by the partners. 
 
As, after its dissolution, the partnership continues to exist only for the purpose of its liquidation,1149 the 
relationship between the partners is terminated as soon as the liquidation of the partnership has been 
completed.1150 In my view, the termination of the partners’ relationship should bring an end to the limited 
agency powers which the former partners had after dissolution.  
 
 
1145 See Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 36. 
1146 GSTR 2003/13 para 135A. 
1147 Ibid para 135C. 
1148 In para 5.3.3 above. 
1149 See para 5.1 above. 
1150 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 324; Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 57. 
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After the partnership’s liquidation and, therefore, after all the partnership property has been distributed, 
the partnership will cease to carry on an enterprise. In terms of section 24(3), the partnership is required 
to notify the Commissioner of this fact within 21 days of the date of the cessation of the enterprise. The 
Commissioner then cancels the partnership’s registration with effect from the last day of the tax period 
during which the enterprise ceased, or from such other date as he may determine. 
 
The de-registration could trigger the application of section 8(2). It is unlikely, however, that after its 
liquidation the partnership will have any assets on hand as all its assets are distributed as part of the 
liquidation. 
 
There are no specific legislative provisions in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or the UK to regulate 
the GST/VAT implications of the distribution of a dissolved partnership’s assets. I conclude,1151 that 
in specie distributions made by the partnership to partners during the operation of the partnership are 
potentially subject to GST/VAT in these jurisdictions. In my view, there is no reason why in specie 
distributions made after dissolution, and as part of the liquidation of the partnership would not also be 
subject to GST/VAT. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I considered some of the important changes that take place when a partnership 
dissolves, and the VAT consequences occasioned by these changes notwithstanding the partnership’s 
continued existence after dissolution. It was seen, for example, that only in limited circumstances does 
a partner have the authority to bind the partnership and, therefore, to make supplies and acquisitions 
on its behalf. The partners’ rights in relation to partnership property also change, although their interests 
in such property are preserved. 
 
Certain rights, however, continue undisturbed after dissolution. Rights granted to a partnership, debts 
between the partnership and the partners, and the partnership’s indebtedness to creditors, for example, 
do not end when the partnership dissolves. Consequently, dissolution does not result in supplies by the 
partnership in the form of the surrendering of these rights. The irrecoverable, and unpaid, debt 
provisions in section 22 are, likewise, not automatically triggered. 
 
I examined the VAT consequences that ensue when a partner dies and his share in the dissolved 
partnership is transferred to the executor of his estate, and thereafter, to a legatee or heir. 
 
 
1151 In para 3.5.1 above. 
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I further examined the liquidation of the partnership and the VAT treatment of the various transactions 
that take place during this process. This culminated in the consideration of provisions relevant to the 
cessation of the partnership enterprise and consequent deregistration for VAT. 
 
That there are difficulties and uncertainties regarding the application of the provisions of the VAT Act to 
the various transactions encountered during the life of a partnership, should be clear from the discussion 
thus far. Consequently, in the next, and final, chapter I consider possible amendments that can be made 
to the VAT Act to create certainty, by simplifying the provisions that have a bearing on common 
partnership transactions, and by formulating provisions for transactions on which the VAT Act is 
currently silent. I also seek to align my proposed amendments with internationally accepted principles 
inherent in a sound VAT system. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
There is clearly a measure of confusion and uncertainty regarding the VAT implications of many of the 
common partnership transactions. In my view, several factors contribute to this. The VAT Act does not 
specifically provide for the VAT treatment of a number of partnership transactions. Furthermore, the 
current provisions applicable to partnerships, are, in certain respects, vague and therefore difficult to 
interpret and apply. These perplexities are due not solely to the lack and the vagueness of provisions, 
but also to the fact that the application of VAT in the area of partnerships is an inherently difficult 
exercise. As stated above,1152 this is due to the South African legal system’s incorporation of two distinct 
theories of partnership – the ‘entity’ and the ‘aggregate’ theories. The use of deeming rules, and 
importantly, the deeming of a partnership to be a separate person for VAT purposes, add to the 
complexity as it is generally difficult to determine their effect.1153 The uncertainty can also be attributed 
to a lack of understanding of, at least, certain areas of partnership law. 
 
In my view, much can be done to create greater certainty and simplicity. Judging from the comparative 
analyses above, different policy options are clearly available to the legislature. I consider these different 
options and propose amendments to the current provisions, and also propose additional provisions. My 
proposed amendments seek to align with the purpose of the VAT Act and the principles upon which it 
is based, and also to adhere to internationally accepted principles for a sound VAT system. The 
proposed provisions should be phrased simply and clearly to facilitate interpretation and application. 
 
However, legislative provisions have limitations – it is simply not practicable to expect the law to cater 
for every eventuality that may arise during the lifetime of a partnership. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
VAT Act is not to explain the law of partnerships to ease the application of VAT provisions in this area. 
I argue, therefore, that apart from the need to improve the legislative provisions, the SARS should 
provide greater guidance by clarifying certain difficult areas of partnership law through interpretation 
statements, as is done in other jurisdictions, and by explaining how the VAT provisions apply to the 
more common partnership transactions.1154 
 
1152 In para 2.2 above 
1153 See para 2.2.3 above. 
1154 For example the ATO’s GSTR 2003/13; the NZIR’s “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 14/03 – GST – Transfer of Interest 
In A Partnership” available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/7/2/72537cec-da81-407d-ad4f-
e490c9f2213d/qb1403.pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016), and “Questions We’ve Been Asked QB 16/04 –  GST – GST 
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6.2 Guiding principles 
 
The VATCOM Report sets out the principles upon which the VAT Act is based. The intention with the 
enactment of the VAT Act, was to introduce a broad-based, indirect tax on consumption in 
South Africa.1155 A ‘broad-based tax’ is described as a general indirect tax on consumption imposed on 
most goods and certain services, as opposed to a selective tax on specific products.1156 A consumption-
type VAT was proposed.1157 A ‘consumption-type VAT’ imposes tax on supplies to consumers, and 
supplies of capital to businesses, but grants businesses an input credit for the tax paid on capital, so 
that capital goods and inventories are held tax-free.1158 The tax is collected at each stage in the 
production and distribution chain. It is non-cumulative in light of the credit allowed for tax paid in previous 
stages.1159 
 
In order to judge the shift to a VAT system, it was necessary for VATCOM to evaluate General Sales 
Tax and VAT against the broad principles forming the basis of fiscal policy, including neutrality, and 
simplicity.1160 In terms of the neutrality principle, indirect taxes should be neutral as regards the choice 
 
Treatment Of Partnership Capital Contributions” available at http://www.ird. govt.nz/resources/3/7/3716fa51-a2ec-42ac-
b692-083ecb04679c/QB1604.pdf (date of use: 8 December 2016); the CRA Policy Statement P-244. 
1155 VATCOM Report at 3. 
1156Ibid. See CSARS v Marshall NO (816/2015) [2016] ZASCA 158, where the court stated (para 16) that VAT is a broad-
based indirect tax applicable in respect of a wide range of goods and services supplied by vendors within the Republic; 
Bird et al argue that on the whole, as world experience suggests, VAT is definitely the economically preferable way in 
which to impose a broad-based consumption tax. See Bird RM, Gendron P & Rotman JL “VAT Revisited A New Look at the 
Value Added Tax in Developing and Transitional Countries” 148 available at http://citeseerx. ist.psu. 
edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.627.8693 (date of use: 20 August 2018). 
1157 VATCOM Report at 3. In CSARS v Marshall NO ibid the court stated (para 16) that the liability to charge VAT arises each 
time a taxable transaction is carried out by a vendor and does not depend on the profitability or outcome of the transaction. 
This is because VAT is not a tax on business profits or turnover, but on consumption. 
1158 VATCOM Report at 4. In CSARS v Marshall NO ibid at para 17, the court stated that a registered vendor pays VAT, but 
the amount paid is ultimately passed on to the end consumer. Each time a vendor invoices a customer, the vendor claims 
a credit for the VAT previously invoiced to it. The VAT paid by the vendor is deducted from the amount of tax charged 
and, ultimately, the vendor is liable only for the difference between its output tax and the consumer’s input tax. VAT is 
intended to tax “domestic consumption, in particular, including that from imports”. See Bird RM, Gendron P & Rotman JL 
“VAT Revisited: A New Look at the Value Added Tax in Developing and Transitional Countries” 23 available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.627.8693 (date of use: 20 August 2018). 
1159 VATCOM Report at 4. See the EM on the Value-Added Tax Bill, 1991, where the same points are made with regard to 
VAT being levied at every point in the chain of production and distribution, and the system of tax credits which prevents 
escalation of the tax (para 1). According to Bird et al, a definitive statement defines a ‘value added tax’ as “a broad-based 
tax levied at multiple stages of production with—crucially—taxes on inputs credited against taxes on output. That is, while 
sellers are required to charge the tax on all their sales, they can also claim a credit for taxes that they have been charged 
on their inputs.” See Bird RM, Gendron P & Rotman JL ibid at 8. By withholding VAT at each stage in the chain of production, 
it both achieves the goal of taxing only consumption and, if evaded at the final retail stage, forgoes only that part of the 
potential tax base consisting of the retail margin (ibid at 148). 
1160 Ibid at 7. Note that the Katz Commission of Inquiry into Taxation, and the Franzsen Commission of Inquiry into 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in South Africa, failed to address the issue of VAT on partnership transactions. See the Ninth 
Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa available at 
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of production and distribution channels. The same amount of tax should be paid irrespective of the 
channel used.1161 
 
South Africa is not an OECD member state,1162 but it is one of the countries that has endorsed the 
OECD guidelines on VAT, and, in the main, abides by these guidelines.1163 These OECD guidelines 
describe the core features of VAT, but, it must be said, focus in particular on their application to 
international trade.1164 VATCOM and the OECD agree on the purpose of, respectively, the VAT Act, 
and VAT/GST systems internationally. 
 
According to the OECD, the overarching purpose of a VAT is to impose a broad-based tax on 
consumption,1165 which corresponds to the proclaimed purpose of the VAT Act. In terms of a broad-
based tax, according to the OECD, VAT is not targeted at specific forms of consumption1166 and is a 
tax on final consumption by households. This means that the burden of VAT should not rest on 
business.1167 
 
Although the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions1168 were articulated in the context of taxation of 
electronic commerce, the generally accepted principles of tax policy applicable to consumption taxes 
that were welcomed, are broadly applicable to VAT systems in both domestic and international trade.1169 
These generally accepted principles of tax policy are the following. 
 
a. Neutrality: Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of commerce. 
Taxpayers in similar situations and carrying out similar transactions, should be subject to similar 
levels of taxation.1170 Furthermore, the full right to deduct input tax through the supply chain, except 
 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/katz/9.pdf (date of use: 2 September 2018), and South Africa: Franzsen 
Commission of Inquiry into Monetary and Fiscal Policy in South Africa. 
1161 VATCOM Report at 4. 
1162 Olivier & Honiball International Tax 311. 
1163 Malony M “OECD’s Guidelines on VAT get extensive support” available at https://www.meridianglobal 
services.com/blog/2014/05/26/OECDs-guidelines-on-VAT-get-extensive-support (date of use: 18 March 2018). South 
Africa is one of five key partners to the OECD, along with Brazil, China, India and Indonesia. Key partners contribute to the 
OECD's work in a sustained and comprehensive manner. OECD “South Africa and the OCED” available at 
http://www.oecd.org/global-relations/keypartners/south-africa-and-oecd.htm (date of use: 8 January 2019). 
1164 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development International VAT/GST Guidelines (OECD 2015) para 1.1. 
1165 Ibid at para 1.2. 
1166 Ibid at para 1.3. 
1167 Ibid at para 1.4. This is in line with the EM on the Value-Added Tax Bill, 1991, where it is stated (para 1) that the burden 
of VAT falls on the end-user or end-consumer.  
1168 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions 
(OECD 1998). 
1169 OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines para 1.16. 
1170 Ibid. 
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by the final consumer, ensures the neutrality of the tax, whatever the nature of the product, the 
structure of the distribution chain, or the means used for its delivery.1171 
b. Efficiency: Compliance costs for businesses, and administrative costs for the tax authorities, 
should as far as possible be minimised.1172 
c. Certainty and simplicity: The tax rules should be clear and simple to understand so that taxpayers 
can anticipate the tax consequences in advance of a transaction, including knowing when, where, 
and how the tax is to be accounted.1173 
d. Flexibility: The systems for taxation should be flexible and dynamic to ensure that they keep pace 
with technological and commercial developments.1174 
 
When contemplating whether a provision in the VAT Act needs to be amended, or whether a new 
provision should be added, there are a number of issues to consider. It must be determined whether 
the current VAT treatment of the relevant transaction is ideal. If so, is the relevant provision sufficiently 
clear, or should improvements be made to the wording, or a new provision be added in order to clarify 
what was intended? If the current VAT treatment is not ideal, what should the VAT Act provide and how 
 
1171 Ibid at para 1.7. 
1172 Ibid at para 1.16. 
1173 Ibid. The successful implementation of VAT requires the prior satisfaction of a number of conditions, including for 
example, simple, clear and stable tax laws. See Bird RM, Gendron P & Rotman JL “VAT Revisited: A New Look at the Value 
Added Tax in Developing and Transitional Countries” 120 available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.627.8693 (date of use: 20 August 2018). Gendron refers to a 
very important development in 2012 when Canada's Department of Finance examined the GST/ HST treatment of 
financial services. The examination was to follow the principle of broad revenue neutrality as well as the general tax 
policy principles of efficiency, fairness, and simplicity. See Gendron (2016) 64/2 Canadian Tax Journal 413. 
1174 OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines para 1.16. In my view, the OECD’s generally accepted principles of tax policy 
are broadly in consonance with especially the following of Adam Smith’s canons with regard to taxes in general, and those 
proposed by Johan Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, listed further below: 
1. Canon of Equality 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in 
proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of the state. 
2. Canons of Certainty and Simplicity 
The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner 
of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. 
3. Canon of Economy 
Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible 
over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. (Smith A Wealth of Nations digital ed (MetaLibri 
2007) [PDF file] at 640). 
The Canon of Economy means that the cost of collection should be as small as possible. See Mundra N “Adam Smith's 
Canons of Taxation” available at https://tax-taxes.knoji.com/adam-smiths-canons-of-taxation/ (date of use: 2 September 
2018). According to Wagner and Harris, a few years before Adam Smith, von Justi described six canons in his treatise on 
Natur und Wesen der Staaten. Justi’s formulation of tax canons were as follows:  
1. Taxes should be levied in proportion to property, while bearing equally upon all those who possess the same amount of 
property. 2. Tax obligations should be transparently clear to everyone. 3. Taxes should be convenient and economical, for 
both taxpayers and the state. 4. A tax should not deprive a taxpayer of necessaries or cause to reduce his capital to pay the 
tax. 5. A tax should neither harm the welfare of the state and its subjects nor violate the civil liberties of the subjects. 6. A 
tax should be compatible with the form of government. See Wagner & Harris Fiscal Sociology 140. 
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should the new provision ideally be phrased? Furthermore, if the application of VAT in certain areas is 
difficult or unclear for whatever reason, should clarification be sought through legislative amendment, 
or is it preferable for the SARS to issue an interpretation statement to explain the VAT implications? In 
my view, an interpretation statement is more desirable if there is uncertainty regarding the partnership 
law that bears upon the nature of the transaction.1175 
 
6.3 The VAT consequences of partner contributions 
 
6.3.1 The current VAT treatment 
 
I have stated that the VAT Act does not specifically deal with the VAT treatment of partner contributions 
to a partnership1176 which depend on a number of arguments – for example, that a partner can make 
supplies to the partnership and vice versa,1177 and that a partner’s contribution can be subject to 
VAT.1178 In my view, although these conclusions are perhaps not obvious judging from the reasoning 
building up to each conclusion, no clarifying legislative amendments are required. The SARS can 
provide guidance, however, by means of an interpretation statement setting out its views, so that all 
these points are clear to users of the VAT Act. 
 
As regards whether contributions are made for consideration, I have argued that the New Zealand 
requirement of ‘enforceable reciprocal obligations’ should be adopted for the VAT Act.1179 There are a 
variety of views on the nature of the connection required in order for a payment to constitute 
‘consideration’ for a supply.1180 The SARS’s view that a ‘sufficient nexus’ is required,1181 is vague and 
the VAT jurisdictions I have considered have differently worded provisions and tests for the required 
link.1182 
 
I also needed to consider when obligations are reciprocal under South African law, and this necessitated 
an investigation of the law of obligations, and contract law in particular.1183 This also demanded a 
consideration of the relevant features of a contract of partnership and the meaning of a reciprocal 
 
1175 Note that the SARS Interpretation Notes are not binding on the courts, but carry persuasive value. See para 2.6.4.1 
above. 
1176 See para 2.6 above. 
1177 See para 2.3 above. 
1178 See para 2.6.1 above. 
1179 See para 2.6.5 above. 
1180 See para 2.6.4 above. 
1181 Ibid. 
1182 Ibid. 
1183 See para 2.6.5 above. 
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contract.1184 After considering all these matters, I concluded that a partner’s share and any profit 
distributions, are not reciprocally connected and, therefore, not ‘consideration’ for a partner’s 
contribution. As a result, a partner does not make his required contribution to the partnership in 
exchange for consideration, save where the partners agree that the partner is to receive a specific 
payment for his contribution.1185 
 
This conclusion is, in my view, not obvious and even debatable, considering that the answer depends 
on the meaning ascribed to the phrase “in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of”, in the 
definition of ‘consideration’,1186 which is not defined in the VAT Act. There is no guarantee that the 
South African courts will adopt the New Zealand courts’ and the NZRA’s requirement of ‘enforceable 
reciprocal obligations’ to determine whether a sufficient connection exists between a partner’s 
contribution and a partner’s share, in order for the one to constitute consideration for the other. 
Moreover, the answer to the question is dependent on a proper understanding of the nature of a 
partnership contract, which I concluded is not a reciprocal contract.1187 In addition, some of the 
VAT/GST jurisdictions do not agree on whether capital contributions and partners’ shares are given in 
exchange, although the relevant legislative provisions in the jurisdictions I have considered are 
different.1188 
 
I concluded that when a partnership agreement is entered into, the partners’ shares simply accrue to 
the partners.1189 The partners’ shares are, therefore, not supplied to the partners when the partnership 
is formed. I am of the opinion, however, that it is not unreasonable to hold the view that partner’s shares 
are supplied to the partners on formation, because of a partnership’s status as a person for VAT 
purposes, and, therefore, its ability to make supplies. The VAT Act should clarify the current status, 
unless the VAT Act is amended to provide for an alternative VAT treatment of partner contributions. I 
address this below.1190 
 
In my view, this uncertainty constitutes a violation of the OECD’s policy of certainty and simplicity, and 
needs to be tidied up by means of legislative reform. One option is to add a provision clarifying the 
current position. I therefore propose that the following provisions be inserted in the VAT Act: 
 
 
1184 Ibid. 
1185 Ibid. 
1186 See s 1(1). 
1187 See para 2.6.5 above. 
1188 See para 2.6.4 above. 
1189 See para 2.8 above. 
1190 See paras 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 above. 
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a. partners’ shares that come into existence upon the formation of a partnership, are not received 
by the partners by means of a ‘supply’ as defined in section 1(1);1191 and 
b. a partner’s share, and any profit distributions, do not constitute ‘consideration’, as defined in 
section 1(1), for a partner’s capital contribution to the partnership, excluding a specific payment 
made for that contribution.1192 
 
6.3.2 Whether partner contributions should be subject to VAT 
 
I now consider whether the status quo should be maintained – ie, subjecting partner contributions that 
meet the requirements of section 7(1)(a), to VAT. I earlier referred to the ECJ case of KapHag,1193 
where it was held that the entry of a new partner into a partnership in consideration for a contribution in 
cash, does not constitute an economic activity on the part of the partner within the meaning of the 
Sixth Directive. According to van Doesum, although the ECJ has delivered various judgments on 
contributions in cash to partnerships, it remains unclear whether a contribution in kind is a taxable 
supply under current European VAT law.1194 In van Doesum’s view, there are compelling arguments to 
be made for the view that a contribution in kind to a partnership is not a taxable supply under the 
European VAT law.1195 The question is whether the example of the European VAT law should be 
adopted for the VAT Act. This can be achieved by specifically deeming partner contributions not to be 
subject to VAT, even if the contribution is made in the course or furtherance of the partner’s enterprise 
and for consideration. 
 
Van Doesum considers what the preferred VAT treatment of contributions to partnerships is under 
European VAT law, by testing it against the fundamental principles of European VAT law as 
acknowledged by the ECJ.1196 He states that it can be argued that the legal character of VAT – which 
is the principle that VAT aims at taxing only the final consumer1197 – and the principle that VAT must be 
proportional to price, demand that contributions in kind be treated as taxable transactions.1198 He points 
out that if the contributing partner can deduct the VAT on the costs of the goods or services he 
contributes, the partnership obtains such goods or services without the burden of VAT.1199 He further 
 
1191 The proposed new provision must be inserted into the VAT Act as part of the definition of “supply” in s 1, instead of s 8 
which is headed: “Certain supplies of goods or services deemed to be made or not made” (my underlining). This provision 
would not be a deeming provision, but would serve to clarify the current position under the VAT Act. 
1192 The proposed new provision must be inserted into the VAT Act as part of the definition of ‘consideration’ in s 1. 
1193 See para 2.6.3 above. 
1194 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 259. 
1195 Ibid at 266. 
1196 Ibid at 259. 
1197 Ibid at 269. 
1198 Ibid at 270. 
1199 Ibid. 
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argues that not taxing a contribution in kind also infringes the principle of neutrality, because of the 
inequality which arises when compared to the ordinary supply of goods or services for consideration.1200 
 
Not subjecting partner contributions to VAT, would similarly be contrary to VATCOM and the OECD’s 
intention that VAT should be a broad-based, neutral tax on consumption. Partner contributions should, 
therefore, be taxable like most other goods and services. If the contributions are not taxable, the 
relevant acquisitions would not be directly and immediately linked to the making of taxable supplies and 
the partner would probably not be entitled to deduct the VAT on them as input tax.1201 This would result 
in the burden of the VAT resting on a ‘business’. In my view, these considerations favour continuing 
with current VAT treatment of partner contributions. 
 
6.3.3 Whether contributions of labour should be taxable 
 
Notwithstanding my conclusion that partner contributions should be subject to VAT provided that the 
relevant requirements are met,1202 a question as to whether partners’ contributions of labour, in 
particular, should be excluded from VAT arises. In my view, there is merit in the arguments for such an 
exclusion, as well as legislative precedent which supports it. I have referred to section 272.1(1) of 
Canada’s ETA1203 which provides that, “anything done by a person as a member of a partnership is 
deemed to have been done by the partnership in the course of the partnership’s activities and not to 
have been done by the person.” 
 
I argue that where a partner supplies services to a client as agent on behalf of the partnership, both the 
partner and the partnership could incur VAT liability.1204 The partnership may be required to account for 
output tax on the partner’s supply made as agent for the partnership, whereas the partner may be 
required to account for output tax on his contribution of labour to the partnership. Clearly, the same 
activity – ie, the partner rendering services to a client – gives rise to a VAT liability for two separate 
persons. 
 
A VAT liability for two separate persons on the basis of a single performance, is not abnormal 
considering the New Zealand Court of Appeal case Suzuki New Zealand Ltd v CIR.1205 The facts were 
that one fault sometimes could and did stimulate repair by SNZ both under its warranty to the customer, 
 
1200 Ibid. 
1201 See ITC 1744 in para 4.11 above. 
1202 See s 7(1)(a). 
1203 See para 3.3.1 above. 
1204 See para 2.6.2 above. 
1205 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,096. 
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and at SMC's behest to cover warranty breach by SMC.1206 The court held that this is simply an instance 
of the common enough situation in which performance obligations under two separate contracts with 
different counter-parties overlap, with the result that performance of an obligation under one contract, 
also happens to constitute performance of an obligation under another. In such a case, the court held, 
a supply can simultaneously occur for GST purposes under both contracts.1207 
 
In my view, it can be argued that this ‘double’ VAT liability violates the OECD principles of neutrality 
and efficiency. 
 
The distinction made, for VAT purposes, between an employee’s supply of services in the course of his 
employment, and a partner’s supply of services on behalf the partnership, is perhaps questionable. 
Proviso (iii)(aa) to the definition of ‘enterprise’1208 provides that the rendering of services by an employee 
to his employer in the course of his employment,1209 is not deemed to be the carrying on of an 
enterprise.1210 This only applies to the extent that ‘remuneration’1211 is paid to such employee.1212 As a 
result, an employee is not considered to be carrying on an enterprise and is, therefore, not required to 
levy VAT on the remuneration he receives. 
 
Admittedly, a partner and an employee are not exactly the same, which probably justifies their different 
treatment under the VAT Act. Partners have the power to act as each other’s agents. Whilst an agent 
has authority to make contracts between his principal and third parties, a servant is employed to carry 
out his master’s orders.1213 Furthermore, in terms of the common law, a partner cannot be an employee 
of the partnership since a person cannot contract with himself.1214 
 
The position of a partner and an employee are, however, similar in other respects. It may happen that 
for some purposes a servant or employee is vested with authority to contract. The employee is then 
pro hac vice1215 an agent.1216 Therefore, both a partner and an employee could be acting as agent on 
behalf of a partnership and an employer, respectively. It was stated above1217 that it is a naturale of 
 
1206 See the discussion of the New Zealand High Court decision in CIR v Suzuki New Zealand Limited in para 2.6.4.1 above. 
1207 Ibid at para 23. 
1208 Section 1(1). 
1209 Or the rendering of services by the holder of an office in performing the duties of his office. 
1210 Proviso (iii)(bb) to the definition of ‘enterprise’ states that subparagraph (aa) does not apply in relation to any 
employment or office accepted by a person in carrying on an enterprise carried on by him independently of the employer 
or concern by whom the amount of remuneration is paid. 
1211 Remuneration as contemplated in the definition of ‘remuneration’ in para 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the IT Act. 
1212 See proviso (iii)(bb) to the definition of ‘enterprise’. 
1213 Silke Law of Agency 17. 
1214 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 279; Scamell & I’anson Banks Lindley on the Law of Partnerships 34. 
1215 For or on this occasion only. 
1216 Silke Law of Agency 17. 
1217 See para 3.3.2 above. 
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partnership that every partner has the authority to conclude transactions within the scope of the 
partnership’s business and, accordingly, act as agent for his co-partners. The partners can, therefore, 
agree that a particular partner’s agency powers be excluded, although such a partner could, logically, 
continue to render services for the partnership in the same way that an employee would for his 
employer. 
 
In my view, the principle of neutrality is violated, because despite the ‘similarities’ between a partner 
and employee, they are treated differently under the VAT Act. It must be noted that the neutrality 
principle only requires that taxpayers in ‘similar’ situations carrying out ‘similar’ transactions should be 
treated similarly. A partner could be required, whilst an employee is not required, to account for VAT on 
the supply of services on behalf of, respectively, a partnership or an employer. Conversely, however, 
not taxing partner contributions also violates the neutrality principle, considering that supplies of other 
goods or services for consideration are generally taxed.1218 
 
It is, furthermore, arguable that the levying of VAT on a partner’s contribution of labour also potentially 
violates the principle of efficiency. Should the partnership make taxable supplies only, it would in any 
case be entitled to deduct any VAT levied on a partner’s supply of services as input tax, resulting in a 
net nil liability and, therefore, no gain to the fiscus. If section 10(4) does not apply and so deem the 
consideration for the supply to be its open-market value, the value of the supply would be deemed to 
be nil.1219 The fiscus could gain, however, if section 10(4) applies – ie, the supply is made for no 
consideration,1220 and the partnership is not exclusively involved in the making of taxable supplies. The 
partnership would be denied an input tax deduction to the extent of its non-taxable use of the supply.1221 
To the extent that a partner’s supply would not result in a gain for the fiscus, the requirement that he 
levy VAT on his services where the requirements of section 7(1)(a) are met, results in unnecessary 
compliance costs for partners and partnerships, and administrative costs for the SARS. This is because 
the partner must register separately for VAT, and the partner and the partnership respectively, must 
account for output and input tax. 
 
Arsenault and Kreklewetz contend that one of the most important implications of section 272.1(1) of 
Canada’s ETA, to which I referred above,1222 is the extent to which it can be used to shelter a partner’s 
‘services’ to the partnership from GST.1223 In other words, a partner could be supplying services to the 
partnership as a third-party supplier, and falsely claim to be acting as a member of the partnership in 
 
1218 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 270. 
1219 Section 10(23). 
1220 Or for a consideration which is less than its open market value. 
1221 See the definition of ‘input tax’ in s 1(1) read with s 17(1). 
1222 See para 3.3.1 above. 
1223 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 45. 
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order to avoid GST registration and having to account for GST. This problem is similar to the difficulty 
experienced under the South African VAT Act in distinguishing between a payment made as 
consideration for a partner’s supply, and a distributive share of profits.1224 
 
The issue discussed by the CRA in CRA Policy Statement P-244, is the interpretation of the phrase 
“anything done by a person as a member of a partnership” in section 272.1(1).1225 The policy statement 
lists three principal factors which the CRA proposes to apply in order to make this determination, 
namely: the terms of the partnership agreement; the nature of the action taken by the partner; and 
whether the partner is performing the activity only for the partnership, or as a separate business.1226 
Regarding the terms of the partnership agreement, a relevant question is whether the partner receives 
a separate consideration for the supply.1227 
 
In my view, judging from the third example given by the CRA of how the criteria in CRA Policy Statement 
P-244 should be applied, the CRA favours whether a separate consideration is paid as a very important 
indicator; perhaps even as the decisive indicator. The following factual scenario is given under example 
3: 
A partnership is engaged exclusively in a logging business. One of the partners, Mr. T, is an accountant 
who operates an accounting business and is registered for GST/HST purposes. Under the written 
partnership agreement. Mr. T contributes to the partnership and receives partnership profits in an equal 
proportion with the other partners. Also under the partnership agreement. Mr. T provides accounting 
services to the partnership and is paid a monthly fee based on his normal rate per hour for those services. 
Mr T’s conduct in providing the accounting services and invoicing for those services is consistent with the 
terms of the written partnership agreement. (Emphasis supplied.) 
 
Notwithstanding that the accounting services are included in the written partnership agreement, the 
CRA argues that as T is receiving a separate fee for the accounting services, and that he is carrying on 
a separate accounting business, he is providing the services otherwise than in the course of the 
partnership’s activities. Section 272.1(1) is, therefore, not applicable, and GST must be levied on the 
consideration for the supply.1228 
 
Considering the CRA’s interpretation of section 272.1(1), the CRA’s views on when GST should be 
applied to a partner’s supply of services to a partnership, are very similar to the treatment of partner 
 
1224 I argue that if the payment is consideration, then the supply would be subject to VAT, subject to the relevant 
requirements being met. If, however, the payment is a profit distribution then it would not be vatable. See para 3.2.3 above. 
1225 CRA Policy Statement P-244 at 1. 
1226 Ibid at 1 – 2. 
1227 Ibid at 2. 
1228 Ibid at 5; s 272.1(3) applies instead. This provision deals with the situation where a partner supplies property or a service 
to the partnership otherwise than in the course of the partnership’s activities. 
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contributions under the VAT Act.1229 This is despite the VAT Act not having a provision similar to 
section 272.1(1). Admittedly, in the example, the CRA does not only rely on the partner receiving a 
separate consideration for his services. It gives as an additional reason that the partner carries on a 
separate accounting business to override the consideration that he is required, in terms of the 
partnership agreement, to render the services. It is not clear from the example how much weight the 
CRA attaches to the various factors, and whether the CRA would have come to the same conclusion 
had the partner not carried on a separate accounting business. In other words, it is not clear whether 
the payment of a separate consideration is a decisive factor that will, at least according to the CRA, on 
its own trump the terms of the partnership agreement which require the partner to render the services. 
 
Arsenault and Kreklewetz’s concern with CRA Policy Statement P-244, is the lack of emphasis on the 
legal relationships created by the parties, which is normally determined from the written partnership 
agreement.1230 They argue that the responsibilities of the partners as set out in the partnership 
agreement, should be paramount in deciding whether a partner’s actions are ‘as a member of the 
partnership’. In essence, if the partner’s actions are included in the partnership agreement, the partner 
should be taken to be acting as a member of the partnership in that respect.1231 
 
This is also true for South Africa considering, firstly, that whether a supply constitutes a contribution 
depends on the terms of the partnership agreement because it is an essentialia of a contract of 
partnership that each of the partners bring something into the partnership. Secondly, the fundamental 
object of interpreting a contact is to ascertain and give effect to the common intention of the parties.1232 
If the partnership contract provides that a partner is required to contribute the relevant services to the 
partnership, then it can hardly be denied that when he supplies those services to the partnership, he is 
doing so in accordance with the partnership contract. Whether that partner only receives profit 
distributions, or a separate payment, is irrelevant. As stated above,1233 in terms of South African 
partnership law, it is a naturale of the partnership agreement that a partner is not entitled to 
compensation for his contribution. The partners may, therefore, specifically agree that a partner is 
entitled to a separate payment for services rendered. The fact that he receives a separate payment for 
his services does not in itself mean that he is not supplying the services in terms of the partnership 
contract. 
 
1229 I stated in para 3.2.3 above, that if the partnership’s payment to a partner in return for his supply to the partnership is 
consideration, then the partner’s supply would be subject to VAT if it is made in the course or furtherance of his enterprise. 
1230 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 44. 
1231 Ibid. Van Doesum, agreeing that it may not always be clear in what capacity a partner acts, also argues that the 
arrangements between the parties involved should be conclusive. The obligations and powers in the partnership agreement 
are, therefore, the primary indication for the capacity in which a partner acts. See van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 263. 
1232 Joubert “Contract” para 351. 
1233 See para 2.6.5 above. 
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Moreover, in terms of the common law, if labour is contributed, it need not be made available exclusively 
to the partnership.1234 Therefore, that a partner supplies labour to both the partnership and to a third 
party, does not mean that his supply to the partnership is a third-party supply and not a contribution. 
 
Should a provision similar to section 272.1(1) be adopted in the VAT Act, one could argue that whether 
a partner incurs VAT liability on services supplied to the partnership, subject to meeting the relevant 
requirements, would simply depend on whether the services are specified in the partnership contract. 
This makes for easy tax planning. By simply including the services in the partnership contract, a 
potential VAT liability is avoided. However, in my view, this would be a clear violation of the neutrality 
principle. If two partners render identical services to the partnership, and they receive equal 
remuneration, and only one of the partners’ services are included in the partnership contract, the one 
partner could incur VAT liability, while the other does not. 
 
Perhaps the CRA is aware of what I perceive to be the shortcomings of section 272.1(1), and therefore 
accords the provision an interpretation that is somewhat more acceptable. As stated above,1235 the 
CRA’s interpretation of section 272.1(1) is very similar to the treatment of partner contributions under 
the VAT Act. 
 
I am of the view that a provision such as section 272.1(1) should not be adopted for the VAT Act. The 
ease with which VAT liability on a partner’s supply of services to the partnership can be avoided, 
militates against adopting a similar provision. 
 
As regards the violation of the neutrality principle, van Doesum argues that it is more harmful to the 
functioning of the European VAT system to treat contributions differently from supplies for 
consideration, than to treat contributions differently from other forms of investment. He reasons that 
VAT is a tax on transactions and not on investments, and that inequalities in relation to transactions 
should outweigh inequalities in relation to other forms of investment.1236 I agree with van Doesum’s 
argument because, in the case of the South African VAT Act, there would be a broader violation of the 
neutrality principle were partner contributions not taxable, as it would be treated differently to supplies 
 
1234 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 263. In V (also known as L) v De Wet NO [1953] 2 All SA 68 (O) the issue was whether 
a partnership existed between the applicant and the deceased prior to his death. The applicant and the deceased lived 
continuously as a man and wife for 21 years and two children were born from the relationship. The deceased was a married 
man living apart from his lawful wife. The partnership was one of a painting and decorating contractor. The court held 
that a partnership had existed between the applicant and the deceased despite the applicant contributing labour to 
the partnership, by doing all the office and clerical work, but in addition to this work and separate from the 
partnership, the applicant also attended to all the household duties attendant on raising the two children (at 72). 
1235 See under this sub-heading. 
1236 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 270. 
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made for a consideration in general. Should partner contributions of labour and employee services be 
sufficiently comparable, as I argue above,1237 the infringement of the neutrality principle would be limited 
and, therefore, less serious. 
 
I am also not in favour of the adoption of an amended version of section 272.1(1) for the VAT Act. Such 
an amendment will effectively provide that a partner’s contribution of labour is excluded from VAT, if 
the requirement to provide the labour is included in the partnership contract, and if the labour is not 
separately remunerated. Currently, the determining factor as to whether a partner is required to levy 
VAT on his contributions, including on the supply of services, is in any case whether the partner is paid 
a separate consideration for the services, instead of receiving profit distributions alone. 
 
6.3.4 Partners’ shares and company shares 
 
6.3.4.1 Whether partner shares should be treated the same as company shares 
 
An alternative is to subject a partner’s share to the same VAT treatment as a company share. Company 
shares are issued by the company1238 in return for a consideration,1239 and their issue and transfer are 
exempt from VAT.1240 Apart from exempting the supply of a partner’s share, parity between company 
and partners’ shares also requires that the partnership be regarded as issuing the partners’ shares, and 
that the capital contribution made by a partner be deemed a consideration for the partner’s share, in 
the same manner that the share issue price is consideration for the issue of a company share. 
 
In my view, Advocate-General Jacobs’s observations in the Kretztechnik case1241 on the similarity 
between the issue of a partner’s share and a company share, also hold true for South Africa. He states 
that both a holding in a partnership and a share in a limited company involve part-ownership of the 
entity concerned, and thus, indirectly, of its assets.1242 He argues that the issue of new shares in 
exchange for cash, which will increase a company's capital, is closely comparable in economic terms, 
to the admission of a new partner in exchange for a cash contribution to a partnership's assets.1243 
According to van Doesum, the ECJ does not distinguish between the admission of a partner to a 
 
1237 See under this sub-heading. 
1238 See Delport et al Henochsberg 157, 158; Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed 197. 
1239 Delport ibid at 178, 178(1), 178(2). 
1240 Section 12(a) provides that the supply of any financial services is exempt from VAT. In terms of s 2(1)(d) the issue, 
allotment, or transfer of ownership of an equity security is deemed to be a financial service. ‘Equity security’ is defined in s 
2(2)(iv) as meaning, inter alia, an interest in or right to a share in the capital of a juristic person. A ‘juristic person’ includes 
a company. See Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 395 - 399; Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law 28. 
1241 The Kretztechnik case C-465/03 26 May 2005. See para 2.8 above. 
1242 Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in the Kretztechnik case at para 44. 
1243 Ibid. 
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partnership in consideration of a payment of a contribution in cash, and the issue of shares in a 
company.1244 
 
Both a partnership and a ‘company’ are included in the definition of ‘person’.1245 I argue that the deeming 
of a partnership to be a person for VAT purposes, implies that a partnership, like a juristic person, is 
endowed with the capacity to acquire rights and incur obligations.1246 The members of a company pay 
an amount to the company when they subscribe for shares. This money forms part of the company’s 
share capital and is owned by the company.1247 In the case of a partnership, the capital contribution 
which a partner is required to make, is subject to the risks of the partnership business.1248 
 
A member owns a share in the company, which consists of a bundle of personal rights entitling the 
holder to a certain interest in the company, its assets, and its dividends.1249 A partner’s share, like a 
company share, entitles a partner to an interest in the partnership property and to profits.1250 
 
In terms of the Australian GST Act,1251 Canada’s ETA,1252 the UK’s VAT Act,1253 and the EU’s Council 
Directive,1254 the issuing and transfer of a partner’s share are exempt from VAT/GST. Judging from the 
provisions in these foreign VAT/GST jurisdictions, the issuing or supply of a partner’s share is regarded 
as a financial service. 
 
The different VAT treatment of a partner’s share and a company share under the VAT Act violates the 
neutrality principle considering the marked similarity of the two types of interest. However, neutrality 
 
1244 Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 264. See the Kretztechnik case ibid at paras 23 - 25. 
1245 ‘Person’ is defined in s 1(1) as including a ‘company’, which is defined in s 1(1) as meaning a company as defined in the 
IT Act. The IT Act defines ‘company’ in paragraph (a) of its definition in s 1 as meaning, amongst others, a company 
incorporated by or under a law in force in the Republic. 
1246 See para 2.3 above. 
1247 Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 119; Van Dorsten South African Business Entities 131 para 3.8.5. 
1248 See para 2.3 above. 
1249 See para 4.8.2 above. 
1250 See para. 2.6.3 above. 
1251 In terms of s 40-5(1) a financial supply is input taxed. Section 40-5(2) provides that a financial supply has the meaning 
given by the regulations. Subdivision 40-A of the regulations deals with financial supplies. Under sub-regulation 40-5.09(1), 
the provision, acquisition, or disposal of an interest in or under securities, including the capital of a partnership, is a financial 
supply if certain requirements are met. 
1252 Section 123(1)(d) defines a ‘financial instrument’ as, inter alia, an interest in a partnership. ‘Financial service’ is defined 
in s 123(1)(d) as meaning “the issue, granting, allotment, acceptance, endorsement, renewal, processing, variation, transfer 
of ownership or repayment of a financial instrument.” The supply of an interest in a partnership is exempt under Schedule 
V to Canada’s ETA. 
1253 See Hemmingsley & Rudling Tolley’s Value Added Tax para 23.17; UK Government VAT Guide (VAT Notice 700) para 
29.4.10 available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/vat-guide-notice-700 (date of use: 30 August 2018). 
1254 In terms of art 135(1)(f), transactions, including negotiation but not management or safekeeping, in shares, interests in 
companies or associations, debentures, and other securities are exempt from VAT. Partner shares are included in the 
interests envisaged in article 135(1)(f). See Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 263. Note that the EU’s Council Directive is 
riddled with VAT exemptions, but they are not relevant to the VAT treatment of partnership transactions. 
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also calls for VAT on the value of financial intermediation services, except for capital amounts, so that 
all economic activities are treated equally.1255 There are, nevertheless, arguments both for and against 
the exemption of financial services.1256 
 
The question is how the proposed provisions, which would align the VAT treatment of partners’ shares 
with that of company shares, should be worded. In the case of Australia, the ATO is of the view that the 
interests which the partners acquire on formation of a partnership constitute consideration for the 
partners’ capital contributions and the mutual obligations that each partner undertakes.1257 This is not 
explicitly addressed in the Australian GST Act, but is inferred by the ATO from relevant provisions. The 
ATO also argues that the better view is that the interests in a partnership are supplied by the partnership 
and not by the partners to each other.1258 It reasons that “the partnership entity creates an interest in 
the partnership in making the supply of that interest”. This view, the ATO contends, arises from the 
acceptance of a partnership as an entity, and “the fact that partners may act in the capacity of 
partners”.1259 In supplying the interest to the partner, the partnership makes a financial supply which is 
input- taxed.1260 
 
1255 According to Bird, equity is always and everywhere a central issue in taxation. He argues that equity, with efficiency 
and administrability, is one of the three principle objectives of designing any tax system. One approach to equity issues, is 
to consider the details of exactly how different taxes impose burdens on taxpayers who are in the same and different 
economic circumstances. (Bird M “Value-Added Taxes in Developing and Transitional Countries: Lessons and Questions” 
available at https://epdf.pub/download/the-vat-in-developing-and-transitional-countries.html (date of use: 19 August 
2019) 19, 20) 
1256 As taxing the use of capital may be damaging to an economy, financial services are generally exempt from 
consumption taxes.. See Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International: 2003 Vol LXXXVIII b: Consumption Taxation and Financial 
Services (IFA cahiers) (Kluwer Law International, International Fiscal Association (IFA) 2003) 30 (hereafter Cahiers). 
According to Bird et al, two reasons are used to justify the exemption of financial services from VAT. First, it may be 
argued that the consumption of financial services should not be taxed in the first place. However, they contend, contrary 
to this argument, that the basic logic of VAT would seem to imply that household consumption of financial services should 
fall into the VAT net since the production of such services consumes real resources, and hence adds value. Secondly, the 
outputs from financial services activity are so difficult to tax for a variety of reasons, that it is preferable to sacrifice taxing 
household consumption and instead settle for simply collecting some VAT revenues on inputs used by registered traders 
along the supply chain. The major difficulty is identifying the intermediation service element that is part of a margin or 
spread. Under the system found in most VAT countries, financial services are untaxed, but input VAT incurred by suppliers 
of financial services cannot, for the most part, be recovered. See Bird RM, Gendron P and Rotman JL “VAT Revisited A 
New Look at the Value Added Tax in Developing and Transitional Countries” 69, 70 available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.627.8693 (date of use: 20 August 2018). The disallowance of 
an input credit in the case of an exempt supply will also reduce the neutrality of the VAT, as producers may be induced to 
purchase other inputs. See Van Oordt A quantitative measurement of policy options to inform value-added tax reform in 
South Africa (PhD thesis University of Pretoria 2015) at 53. NB om te noem dat in SA is die exemption minimaal. Die lys 
van welke finans dienste belasbaar is, is baie lank. Daarom het SA wel input claims op Fin dienste, maar die input is 
apportioned.  In New Zeeland is daar weer ‘n ‘limited input credit’ om te verhoed dat die ‘inputs’ wat nie geëis kan word 
nie, cascade na die verbruiker toe.  
1257 See GSTR 2003/13 paras 32, 58 and 59. 
1258 GSTR 2003/13 para 55. 
1259 Ibid at para 56. 
1260 Ibid at paras 36, 56. If a supply is ‘input taxed’, no GST is payable on it, but the supplier normally cannot claim input tax 
credits for the GST payable on its business inputs relating to that supply. See McCouat Australian Master GST Guide [E-
book] Location 19. 
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The ATO argues that although the partnership interests are supplied by the partners, they are deemed 
by section 184-5(1) of the Australian GST Act, to be supplied by the partnership, including at the 
formation of the partnership. Section 184-5(1) provides that supplies and acquisitions made by or on 
behalf of partners in their capacity as partners, are treated as supplies and acquisitions by the 
partnership.1261 I argue that the ATO’s reliance on section 184-5(1) is questionable since a partner does 
not act in his capacity as partner representing the partnership when he enters into a partnership 
agreement.1262 Considering Arsenault and Kreklewetz’s commentary on section 272.1(1) of Canada’s 
ETA below,1263 which is similar to section 184-5(1),1264 they support my view. Furthermore, the 
relevance to the ATO of a partnership being an entity is that the partnership is capable of making 
supplies, including the issuing of the partner’s shares at the formation stage. 
 
I stated that in the case of Canada, Arsenault and Kreklewetz claim that the CRA’s position is that the 
making of a capital contribution to a partnership is not included under section 272.1(1) of Canada’s 
ETA. Rather, it is characterised as a supply by the partner to the partnership in exchange for an exempt 
partnership interest.1265 They contend that to the extent that the partners are seen to obtain an interest 
in the partnership from the partnership’s formation, or in return for their contribution of property, the 
supply of that interest is an exempt supply of a financial service.1266 The partnership interest, they state, 
is issued from the partnership to the partner. They argue that this follows from the definitions of ‘financial 
instrument’, ‘financial service’, and the general exemption for supplies of financial services in Schedule 
V to the ETA.1267 The argument is that insofar as ‘the issue’ of an interest in a partnership is a ‘financial 
service’,1268 it is only the partnership which can be presumed to issue that interest. 
 
In my view it should be apparent from the above discussion, that both the Australian GST Act and 
Canada’s ETA are not entirely clear that a partner’s capital contribution is made in exchange for a 
partner’s share, and that such partner’s share is issued, and therefore supplied, by the partnership to 
the partner on the partnership’s formation. If this is what the VAT Act should ideally provide, then, unlike 
Australia and Canada, this must be expressly and clearly stated for the sake of certainty and simplicity. 
 
  
 
1261 GSTR 2003/13 para 28. See para 2.8 above where s 184-5(1) is cited, and also see para 3.3.1 above. 
1262 See para 2.8 above. 
1263 See under this sub-heading. 
1264 See para 2.6.2 above. 
1265 See para 2.6.5 above. 
1266 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 27. 
1267 Ibid. 
1268 See the definitions of ‘financial instrument’ and ‘financial service’ in s 123(1)(d). 
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6.3.4.2 Implications of treating partners’ shares the same as company shares 
 
I now consider what the impact is of deeming the partners’ shares as issued by the partnership in return 
for the partner’s capital contribution, and of exempting the issue and transfer of partners’ shares from 
VAT. 
 
I argue that if the issue of a partner’s share is deemed to be received by a partner as consideration for 
making his contribution, this would have no bearing on whether his contribution is taxable. If the 
contribution is made by the partner in the course or furtherance of carrying on an enterprise it is taxable, 
regardless of whether or not the supply of the partner’s share to the partner is exempt. As a partner’s 
share is consideration that is not in money, the open-market value of the share would, in terms of 
section 10(4), be the consideration for the partner’s contribution. 
 
A question arising is whether any VAT levied on the partner’s contribution is deductible as input tax by 
the partnership. According to the ATO, it has been suggested that when a partnership acquires an in-
kind capital contribution, the acquisition is either not for, or only partly for, a creditable purpose because 
it relates to the supply of a partnership interest which is input taxed.1269 The ATO argues, however, that 
although the in-kind contribution is consideration for the supply of the partnership interest, the 
acquisition relates to the actual operation of the partnership and, therefore, to the making of supplies 
by the partnership in the course of its ordinary or general business. Any claim for input tax credits is, 
accordingly, determined by reference to the use of the in-kind capital contribution in the partnership’s 
business activities, and qualifies as a creditable acquisition provided that the relevant requirements are 
met.1270 
 
This argument would also be true for the VAT Act should it provide that the contribution is consideration 
for the partner’s share supplied by the partnership. Input tax is deductible if the relevant goods or 
services are acquired for a taxable purpose.1271 I agree with the ATO, that the contribution is not 
acquired by the partnership for issuing the partner’s share, but for whatever purpose the partnership 
has in mind with the contribution. 
 
If the supply of a partner’s share is exempt from VAT, a valid concern is how the exemption affects the 
deduction by the partnership (or a partner) of the VAT on accompanying expenses as input tax, since, 
 
1269 GSTR 2003/13 para 66. 
1270 Section 11-5 of the Australian GST Act provides that: “You make a creditable acquisition if: (a) you acquire anything 
solely or partly for a creditable purpose; and (b) the supply of the thing to you is a taxable supply; and (c) you provide, or 
are liable to provide, consideration for the supply; and (d) you are registered, or required to be registered”. See GSTR 
2003/13 para 67. 
1271 See ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1(1). 
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according to VATCOM, VAT is intended to burden only the private consumer.1272 Reference is made 
above to ITC 1744,1273 where the court held that the appellant was not entitled to deduct the VAT levied 
on services directly and immediately linked to the issue of shares, which are exempt.1274 Therefore, 
VAT incurred on any expenses directly and immediately linked to the issue of the partners’ shares, 
would not be deductible as input tax by the partnership. This means that the VAT burden rests on a 
‘business’. 
 
According to VATCOM, exemption is beneficial if the vendor’s clients are wholly or principally end-
consumers, but not if they are vendors.1275 Breaking the VAT chain in the business sector increases 
prices as the costs of the vendor making exempt supplies are increased by the tax on inputs he must 
bear. He increases the price of his supplies to recover these additional costs. When the exempt goods 
or services are supplied to another vendor, the other vendor pays a price which includes the first 
vendor’s tax on inputs. If the second vendor applies these goods or services to make taxable supplies, 
he builds the first vendor’s input tax into his price, resulting in double taxation.1276 
 
The VAT on inputs which the partnership cannot deduct because of the exempt issue of the partners’ 
shares, can be included in the prices of goods or services supplied by the partnership. This 
disadvantages clients who are vendors.1277 In my view, this exemption will have a limited impact in 
terms of VAT-cascading in that the issuing of partners’ shares is uncommon, and the VAT on 
accompanying costs will also be minimal. The non-deductible VAT can, alternatively, be included in the 
price paid for the partner’s share.1278 This is not expected to result in VAT-cascading because it is 
unlikely that a partner’s share will be on-supplied by a partner as part of an enterprise activity.1279 
 
 
1272 VATCOM Report at 4. According to Bird et al, most broad-based consumption taxes in the world (eg, New Zealand’s 
GST) come close to including most final (private) consumption in the tax base. See Bird RM, Gendron P & Rotman JL “VAT 
Revisited A New Look at the Value Added Tax in Developing and Transitional Countries” 91 available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.627.8693 (date of use: 20 August 2018) 
1273 ITC 1744. See para 4.11 above. 
1274 That is, in terms of s 12(a), read with s 2(1). 
1275 Note, however, that exemption in the context of VAT does not mean ‘tax free’, as exempt suppliers incur VAT on 
taxable purchases, whilst they do not receive input tax credits as do taxable suppliers. See Smart M and Bird R “VAT in a 
federal System: Lessons from Canada” available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=2115622 (date 
of use: 28 August 2018). 
 
1276 VATCOM Report 6. This is also referred to as cascading of VAT because the ‘hidden’ VAT becomes part of the cost of 
the product. See Cahiers at 31. 
1277 Where VAT cascades through the system, such VAT can be incorporated in the price of exempt supplies. See Bird RM 
“The GST/HST: Creating an Integrated Sales Tax in a Federal Country” International Center for Public Policy Working Paper 
12-21 April 2012 at 6. 
1278 See the discussion on Skatteverket v AB SKF in para 4.11 above. 
1279 See para 4.8.3 above. 
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Furthermore, I argue that, assuming that the partnership holds the partners’ shares and that it supplies 
those shares to the partners upon the establishment of the partnership, those supplies will probably not 
be made in the course or furtherance of carrying on an enterprise.1280 In the unlikely event that the 
supply of the shares is made as part of an enterprise activity – eg, the partnership trades in partner’s 
shares – the supply could be subject to VAT,1281 and the proposed exemption would only then apply. In 
order for an exemption to apply, the requirements of section 7(1)(a), including the enterprise 
requirement, must be met. The point is that the proposed exemption would, in all likelihood, rarely apply. 
This would, however, not reduce the possibility of VAT-cascading. If a partner’s share is not issued as 
part of an enterprise activity, the share issue is not subject to VAT and the VAT incurred on any 
attendant expenses cannot be deducted. In terms of the De Beers case, which I discuss above,1282 VAT 
on expenses incurred as part of a non-enterprise activity, is not deductible as input tax. 
 
The exemption of the issue of partners’ shares could create administrative and compliance difficulties, 
in that it would result in the partnership having both taxable and exempt supplies.1283 This violates the 
efficiency principle. The partnership might be required to apportion the VAT on its overheads between 
that portion which is deductible as input tax, and that portion which is not deductible.1284 As the issuing 
of partners’ shares will, most likely, not be undertaken regularly, it is worth noting that where the 
intended use of overheads is at least 95 per cent, it is deemed to have been acquired solely for the 
purpose of making taxable supplies, and, the VAT it attracts need not be apportioned.1285 
 
In my view, when considering whether to subject partners’ shares to the same VAT treatment as 
company shares, the adherence to the neutrality principle outweighs the adverse consequences of 
VAT-cascading and the burdening of businesses with VAT. There is no justification for granting 
partnerships a more favourable VAT dispensation than companies with regard to the issuing and 
transfer of ownership interests. 
 
The question at the heart of the appeal in CSARS v Marshall NO1286 was whether the aero-medical 
services supplied by the respondent to provincial health departments, were a ‘deemed supply’ of 
services as contemplated in section 8(5),1287 and whether payments received for the services thus 
 
1280 See para 2.8 above. 
1281 See para 4.8.3 above. 
1282 See para 2.6.3 above. 
1283 VATCOM Report 6. 
1284 See the definition of ‘input tax’ in s 1(1) read with s 17(1). 
1285 Proviso (i) to s 17(1). 
1286 CSARS v Marshall NO (816/2015) [2016] ZASCA 158. 
1287 Section 8(5) provides that a designated entity shall be deemed to supply services to any public authority or municipality 
to the extent of any payment made by the public authority or municipality concerned to or on behalf of that designated 
entity in the course or furtherance of an enterprise carried on by that designated entity. 
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qualified to be zero rated under section 11(2)(n).1288 The court agreed with the Commissioner for the 
SARS who argued that the services rendered by the Trust to the provincial health departments, were 
‘actual’ services rather than ‘deemed’ services. The court held that the services, therefore, fell outside 
the provisions of section 8(5) and were subject to VAT at the standard rate in terms of section 7(1)(a). 
The Commissioner argued, further, that section 8(5) only applies to instances where designated entities 
received payments which were not made in consideration for the actual supply of goods and 
services.1289 Therefore, as I argue that partners’ shares received on a partnership’s formation are not 
supplied to the partners,1290 a new provision must specifically ‘deem’ the partner’s share to be issued 
and, therefore, supplied by the partnership to the partners when the partnership is established. 
 
I propose, as an alternative to clarifying the current position, that the following new provisions be 
inserted in the VAT Act: 
 
a. When a new partnership is formed, the partnership is deemed to supply a partner’s share to 
each member of that partnership.1291 
b. The contributions made by the members to the partnership, in terms of the partnership 
agreement, are deemed to be consideration for that partner’s share.1292 
c. The issue and supply of a partner’s share is deemed to be a financial service.1293 
 
6.4 Definition of a partner’s share 
 
I argue that whilst in terms of the common law, a partner disposes of his undivided interest in the jointly 
owned partnership property when supplying a partner’s share, this is not true for VAT purposes as only 
the partnership, which is the deemed owner, is capable of supplying the ownership of partnership 
property.1294 A question which arises is whether the term ‘partner’s share’ should, for the purposes of 
the VAT Act, retain its common-law meaning.1295 In my opinion, the definition of ‘partner’s share’ must 
be in line with how the supply of a partner’s share is viewed from a VAT perspective. 
 
 
1288 Section 11(2)(n) zero rates services which comprise the carrying on by a welfare organisation of the activities referred 
to in the definition of ‘welfare organisation’ in s 1, and to the extent that any payment in respect of those services is made, 
in terms of s 8(5), those services shall be deemed to be supplied by that organisation to a public authority or municipality. 
1289 CSARS v Marshall NO (816/2015) [2016] ZASCA 158 at para 7. 
1290 See para 2.8 above. 
1291 This provision must preferably be inserted in s 8 which deals with deemed supplies. 
1292 This provision must preferably be inserted into s 10, which deals with the value of supplies. 
1293 This provision must be inserted into s 2(1), which defines ‘financial services’. This would have the effect that the supply 
of a partner’s share is, in terms of s 12(a), exempt from VAT. 
1294 See para 4.8.2 above. 
1295 A partner’s share denotes both the partner’s interest in the partnership property such as profits when they are due,  
and his interest in jointly owned partnership property. See para 2.6.3 above. 
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According to Arsenault and Kreklewetz, while Canada’s ETA clearly deems a partnership to be a 
separate person, it is not clear on deeming a partner’s interest in the underlying capital of a partnership 
as ‘nothing’ for GST purposes.1296 They maintain that although this is likely the intended result, it is not 
as certain as it might be, because it appears to rely solely on the partnership’s status as a ‘person’.1297 
They argue that while Canada’s ETA has defined an ‘interest in a partnership’ as a ‘financial 
instrument’,1298 it probably should have added a provision clarifying just what an ‘interest in a 
partnership’ is, which is not self-evident.1299 They suggest that a deeming provision be added to clarify 
that for GST purposes, it is not appropriate to regard the property interests that a partner has in 
partnership property to exist1300 as the partnership property is deemed to be owned by the partnership. 
 
My conclusion – that for VAT purposes, jointly-owned partnership property is deemed to be owned by 
the partnership1301 – is also based solely on the VAT Act’s deeming of a partnership to be a person. 
Express provision for this can be included in the VAT Act to create greater certainty as argued by 
Arsenault and Kreklewetz. Such jointly-owned partnership property would include contributions made 
quoad dominium and all other partnership property owned jointly by the partners.1302 
 
Based on the above, I argue that when a partner disposes of his partner’s share, the component of the 
supply that consists of his interest in the jointly-owned partnership property, should not be recognised 
as a supply for VAT purposes. Consequently, when a partner’s share is supplied, the partner should 
only be considered to be supplying that portion of the share that consists of his right to claim a 
proportionate share of the partnership assets when this portion is due. The court expounded on the 
nature of the latter right in Sacks v CIR.1303 According to the court, after the lapse of fixed periods and 
with the concurrence of the partners, a partner is entitled to claim a separate, determinable share of the 
partnership profits. A partner also acquires a right to a determinable amount when the partnership 
agreement terminates, for example, by dissolution.1304 I explained that on liquidation, and depending 
on whether there is a remaining surplus, each partner is repaid pro rata what he has contributed to the 
partnership capital.1305 The balance of the partnership assets is then divided between the partners. 
Therefore, the portion of a partner’s share that can be supplied by a partner consists of his right to a 
 
1296 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 35. 
1297 Ibid at 26. 
1298 In s 123(1) of Canada’s ETA. 
1299 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 35, 36. 
1300 Ibid at 35. 
1301 See paras 2.7 and 5.3.3 above. 
1302 See para 3.3.1 above. 
1303 1946 AD 31. 
1304 Ibid at 40. 
1305 See para 5.3.3 above. If so agreed by the partners, partnership capital can also be withdrawn by the partners during the 
operation of the partnership. See para 3.2.1 above. 
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proportionate share in the partnership profits, and on liquidation, his right to a return of the capital he 
contributed together with his share of any surplus partnership assets. 
 
In terms of the Australian GST Act, a ‘financial supply’ is input taxed1306 and it has the meaning given it 
by the Regulations.1307 Sub-regulation 40-5.09(1) of the Regulations provides that the provision, 
acquisition, or disposal of an interest mentioned in sub-regulation 40-5.09(3), is a financial supply if 
certain requirements are met. Item 10 in the table in sub-regulation 40-5.09(3) includes ‘the capital of a 
partnership’ as securities.1308 Part 8 of Schedule 7 to the Regulations includes ‘interests in a partnership’ 
as an example for item 10. 
 
As both ‘the capital of a partnership’ and ‘interests in a partnership’ are mentioned in the Regulations, 
the ATO considers it important to understand the meaning of these two phrases for the purpose of 
applying the GST provisions.1309 On the basis of Australia’s common law, the ATO argues that an 
interest in ‘the capital of a partnership’ can be regarded, for the purposes of item 10, as a reference to 
the amounts ventured by the partners, which is commonly represented by the balance in the partner’s 
capital account.1310 Alternatively, the inclusion of ‘interests in a partnership’ in the examples, indicates 
a legislative intent that the expression ‘capital of a partnership’ be interpreted widely1311to cover all the 
interests that a partner acquires from the partnership.1312 This includes a partner’s right to a proportion 
of the net assets of the partnership.1313 
 
The ATO argues that if the expression ‘the capital of a partnership’ is interpreted narrowly, it gives rise 
to an absurd result, in that what is regarded as an element of other interests in a partnership – ie, an 
interest in the capital of a partnership – would fall within the ambit of item 10, whereas the interest in 
the partnership itself, would not. The ATO therefore, favours the wider meaning.1314 
 
Section 123(1)(d) of Canada’s ETA defines a ‘financial instrument’ to mean, inter alia, ‘an interest in a 
partnership’ or ‘any right in respect of such an interest’. Article 135(1)(f) of the EU’s Council Directive 
provides that transactions in ‘interests’ in associations, which includes partnerships,1315 are exempt from 
 
1306 Section 40-5(1). 
1307 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999 Statutory Rules No 245 1999 made under the A New Tax 
System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (the Regulations); s 40-5(2). 
1308 See para (d). 
1309 GSTR 2003/13 para 40. 
1310 Ibid para 44. 
1311 Ibid para 47. 
1312 Ibid para 48. 
1313 Ibid para 47. 
1314 GSTR 2003/13 para 49. 
1315 See Van Doesum 2010-6 EC Tax Review 263. 
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VAT. These provisions are not specific on exactly what these interests entail, although the use of 
‘interest’, in my view, implies that all of a partner’s interests in a partnership are included – ie, both his 
capital contribution and his proportionate share in the net assets of the partnership. 
 
I am of the view that the term ‘partner’s share’1316 should be used when referring to a partner’s interest 
in a partnership. However, in line with Arsenault and Kreklewetz’s suggestion, the term should be 
defined to clarify which of the partner’s rights are covered by the term. I argue that, based on the 
Australian experience, the definition of ‘partner’s share’ should not only refer to, for example, a partner’s 
right to profit or capital, but that all the partner’s relevant interests in the partnership should be included. 
 
Based on the above, I propose that the following definition of a ‘partner’s share’ be inserted into the 
VAT Act: 
 
a. a partner’s share means a partner’s right to claim a specific portion of the partnership assets 
when this portion is due, but excludes that partner’s undivided interest in jointly- owned 
partnership property.1317 
 
This would align the issuing and transfer of a partner’s share with that of a company share. A company 
is likewise a separate entity distinct from its shareholders, and its property, therefore, vests in the 
company not in its shareholders.1318 
 
6.5 Goods or services “applied” by the partnership 
 
I argue that a partnership would be ‘applying’ goods or services, as envisaged in section 18(4), where 
the goods or services constitute jointly-owned partnership property, or where the partnership has been 
granted only the right to use the goods or services.1319 I pointed out that section 18(4) provides that the 
“goods or services shall be deemed to be supplied” to the partnership, but that it is not specified whether 
either the ownership or the use of the goods or services is deemed to be so supplied.1320 I further argue 
that the goods or services are deemed, by section 18(4), to become jointly-owned partnership property, 
even if the partnership has only their use.1321 In my view, if VAT is not levied on the partnership’s return 
 
1316 Ramdhin et al “Partnership” para 279, use this term to describe all a partner’s interests in a partnership. 
1317 This provision must be inserted in s 2(2) which defines various terms used in s 2(1). 
1318 See para 4.8.2 above. 
1319 See para 2.7 above. 
1320 Ibid. 
1321 Ibid. 
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of the goods or services to the partner, it would result in no VAT being levied on a partner’s private 
consumption, which would undermine the purpose of the VAT Act. 1322 
 
I suggest that all these uncertainties may be ascribed to the absence of a provision that simply states 
– borrowing from the wording of section 8(2) – that the relevant goods or services are deemed to ‘form 
part of the assets’ of the partnership’s enterprise. I propose, therefore, that this qualification be inserted 
in section 18(4).1323 This would imply that when the goods or services are applied by the partnership, 
the partnership would acquire the ownership thereof, and upon their return to the partner, the 
partnership would ‘supply’ such ownership back to the partner. 
 
6.6 Partnership reimbursing partner’s expenses 
 
I argue1324 that where a partner incurs expenses that are reimbursed by the partnership, the partnership 
is entitled to an input tax deduction where the partner acted as agent in acquiring the goods or services 
on behalf of the partnership.1325 The partner makes an acquisition as agent if he and the third party 
intended that the obligation, created by the contract which they concluded, will be incurred by the 
partnership.1326 I further argue that the partnership could qualify for a section 18(4) deduction, where a 
partner acquires goods or services as principal.1327 To be eligible for the deduction, the partner must 
supply the ownership or use of the goods or services to the partnership, which is required to apply them 
for a taxable purpose.1328 I also argue that the partnership would not be entitled to a section 18(4) 
deduction where, instead of the partner on-supplying the goods or services to the partnership, he merely 
uses them for the purpose or benefit of the partnership’s business.1329 
 
I pointed out that in Australia and Canada, the requirements for a deduction by a partnership, of 
expenses incurred by partners who are reimbursed by the partnership, are less onerous. It is not 
required that the partnership incur the relevant contractual obligation.1330 This is also the position of the 
NZIR in relation to employee expenses reimbursed by the employer.1331 Therefore, the expenses 
reimbursed must relate directly to the partners’ activities as partners of the partnership (in the case of 
Australia); that the acquisition is consumed, used, or supplied in the course of activities of the 
 
1322 Ibid. 
1323 I suggest that this proposed provision be inserted as a proviso to s 18(4). 
1324 In para 3.4.4 above. 
1325 All the requirements of the definition of ‘input tax’ in s 1(1) must, of course, be met. 
1326 See para 3.3.2 above. 
1327 See para 3.4.2 above. 
1328 See para 2.7 above. 
1329 See para 3.4.4 above. 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 Ibid. 
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partnership (in the case of Canada); or that the expense was incurred by the employee in the course of 
the employer’s business (in the case of New Zealand).1332 
 
The question arising is whether the VAT Act should be amended to align the rules on the deductibility 
of VAT on reimbursed expenses for partnerships, with those of the above GST jurisdictions. 
 
Given that the VAT Act, as a rule, only allows input tax deductions in respect of goods and services 
made to a vendor,1333 it should be amended to include a concession for partnerships, amongst others. 
I argue that not permitting a partnership an input tax deduction related to a reimbursement of a partner’s 
expense incurred for the benefit, or in the course of, the partnership’s enterprise, is contrary to the 
principle that the VAT burden should not rest on businesses and may result in cascading of the VAT. 
Although the expense is incurred personally by the partner, it may nonetheless be for a taxable purpose. 
 
It can also be argued that the OECD’s principle of flexibility is violated. In my view, the VAT Act should 
acknowledge the commercial reality that partners do incur expenses in their own name, but for the 
benefit of the partnership’s business. By denying such a deduction the proverbial ‘tax tail’ would be 
wagging the ‘commercial dog’ as partnerships would be coerced into doing business in a particular way. 
Furthermore, there is strong foreign precedent from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand for permitting 
such deductions. To counter possible tax avoidance, the deduction can be allowed subject to strict 
requirements – eg, the partnership must be in possession of the tax invoice issued to the partner; the 
partnership only qualifies for the deduction once the partner has been reimbursed; or the deduction can 
be claimed only once.1334 
 
I suggest that the following provisions be inserted into the VAT Act: 
 
a. Where a partnership reimburses a partner for an expense that he incurs that is directly related 
to his activities as a partner in the partnership, the reimbursement is deemed to be consideration 
for an acquisition of goods or services made by the partnership from the partner. 
b. The partnership would not be entitled to an input tax deduction relating to the expense referred 
to in paragraph (a) above if: 
(i) The partnership is entitled to an input tax deduction relating to the expense, under any 
other provision of the VAT Act. 
(ii) The partner is entitled to an input tax deduction for acquiring the goods or services in 
incurring the expense. 
 
1332 Ibid. 
1333 See ‘input tax’ in s 1(1). 
1334 See para 3.4.4 above. 
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(iii) The partnership would not have been entitled to an input tax deduction had the 
partnership made the acquisition of the goods or services, or 
(iv) The partnership is in possession of the tax invoice for the expense.1335 
 
6.7 Distributions to partners 
 
I argue that a partner’s debt arising from an in specie distribution can be offset against the partnership’s 
indebtedness to the partner.1336 I also argue that the payment for an in specie distribution can, 
alternatively, be structured in the form of a barter.1337 An understanding of partnership law is required 
to know what payment options are available to a partner to pay for the distribution – eg, an amount of 
capital which the partner is entitled to withdraw, or an amount of profit share due to the partner.1338 
Apart from partnership law, in my view the VAT treatment of set off and barter transactions is, each in 
its own right, complicated areas. Therefore, the difficulty does not lie in any deficiency in the VAT 
provisions dealing with partnerships. I argue that the purpose of the VAT Act is not to explain the law 
of partnership to ease the application of VAT,1339 and that this is one of the areas of partnership law on 
which the SARS can provide clarity by means of an interpretation statement. An amendment to the VAT 
Act is, therefore, not warranted. 
 
I do not favour adopting a provision in the VAT Act similar to section 272.1(4) of Canada’s ETA, which 
deems a partnership’s distribution to a partner to be made at the market value.1340 For the sake of 
neutrality, partnership distributions should be subject to the same general treatment as other supplies, 
namely that the amount upon which VAT is levied is the amount received for the supply.1341 There is no 
reason for ‘deeming’ a consideration if there is an ‘actual’ consideration.1342 
 
  
 
1335 I suggest that this proposed provision be inserted into the VAT Act as a new subsection under s 51. 
1336 See para 3.5.2. 
1337 Ibid. 
1338 Ibid. 
1339 See para 6.1 above. 
1340 See para 3.5.2 above. 
1341 Section 10(2) provides that the value to be placed on a supply of goods or services shall, save as otherwise provided in 
this section, be the amount of the consideration for such supply. 
1342 Should the distribution be made for no consideration, or for consideration below the market value, then s 10(4) which 
would deem the distribution to be made at the market value could apply; In the South Atlantic Jazz Festival-case (see 
para 3.5.2) the court held that as the transactions in question were barter transactions, the value of the goods and services 
supplied by the sponsors was, in terms of section 10(3)(b) of the VAT Act, the open-market value of the consideration 
received in return for the supply As a result, where an in specie distribution is structured as a barter, the value of the goods 
and services supplied by the partnership and the partner is the open-market value of the consideration each party receives 
in return. 
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6.8 Technical dissolution of a partnership 
 
In Chapter Four I discussed the VAT implications of transactions relating to the technical dissolution of 
a partnership, including the transfer of the partnership assets from the old to the new partnership,1343 
the transfer and acquisition of a partner’s share in the context of the retirement or death of a partner, 
the admission of a new partner, etcetera.1344 In my view, an understanding of the partnership law 
applicable to these areas, is required in order to apply the relevant VAT provisions. For example, it is 
important to know what may potentially happen to the partner’s share of a partner who retires or dies; 
how the new partnership arises between the remaining partners; the options available to a newly-
admitted partner – either to purchase an ownership interest in the partnership property of the dissolved 
partnership, or to make a contribution to the new partnership, etcetera. I am of the opinion that the 
application of VAT in these areas can be clarified by the SARS by means of an interpretation statement 
as it is not the purpose of the VAT Act to explain the law of partnership.1345 What is important from a 
purely VAT perspective, however, is my proposal for the insertion of a definition of ‘partner’s share’.1346 
This is because the technical dissolution of a partnership is accompanied by the transfer and acquisition 
of partners’ shares, which would always exclude the partners’ undivided interests in the jointly-owned 
partnership property. 
 
6.9 The dissolved and new partnership deemed to be one person 
 
I discussed the impact of section 51(2) which applies when a dissolved partnership’s business is 
continued by a new partnership.1347 I argue1348 that the effect of section 51(2) is limited to disregarding 
supplies between the dissolved and the new partnership, but not supplies between other persons. 
 
I have referred to section 272.1(7) of Canada’s ETA, which also provides that the new partnership is a 
continuation of the predecessor partnership, and the difference of view between the CRA and 
commentators regarding the impact of this provision.1349 The debate centres on whether, not only the 
membership change, but also the mechanism used to achieve that change – the supply of a partner’s 
share and all other related transactions – should be ignored and, therefore, have no VAT 
consequences. Arsenault and Kreklewetz aver that certain commentators appear to suggest that 
 
1343 See paras 4.7, 4.8.2 and 4.9 above. 
1344 See para 4.4 above. 
1345 See para 6.1 above. 
1346 See para 6.4 above. 
1347 See para 4.7 above. 
1348 Ibid. 
1349 Ibid. 
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section 272.1(7) may be inadequate given the absence of a provision which deems that there is no 
supply of assets by the dissolved partnership to the partners or to the new partnership.1350 
 
According to Cross, section 57(2)(e) of New Zealand’s GST Act is unclear. She claims further that the 
NZIR has not issued a written statement as to how it approaches the application of the provision.1351 
The Commissioner of the NZIR, however, favours the recognition of changes of membership interests 
for VAT purposes, notwithstanding section 57(2)(e) providing that “any change of members of that body 
shall have no effect for the purposes of this Act”. I have set out the Commissioner’s argument, which, 
in essence, is that a change of members is not necessarily equal to a change in membership interest, 
and to disregard a change of members, does not mean that a change in membership interest should 
also be disregarded.1352 
 
There is clearly a measure of uncertainty regarding the impact of sections 272.1(7), 57(2)(e), and 51(2). 
Considering the relative complexity of the Commissioner of the NZIR’s argument on the effect of 
section 57(2)(e), in my view the mere deeming of a dissolved and a new partnership to be one person 
does not create adequate certainty. 
 
I argue that section 51(2) requires an amendment which makes it clear that only supplies between the 
dissolved and the new partnership, which relate to the transition to the new partnership, are deemed 
not to be supplies, and therefore, not subject to VAT. Supplies between other persons, including 
supplies between partners (or former partners), and between partners and the dissolved or the new 
partnership, should be recognised, and their VAT treatment must, therefore, follow the normal VAT 
rules. I propose that the latter portion of section 51(2) be amended by the deletion of, 
 
… the dissolved partnership … and the new partnership … shall … be deemed to be one and the same 
partnership … 
 
and the insertion of, 
 
… the dissolved partnership … and the new partnership … shall … be deemed to be one and the same 
partnership and only any goods or services that are supplied by the dissolved partnership to the new 
partnership are deemed not to be supplies… 
 
 
1350 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 52. 
1351 Cross New Zealand Master Tax Guide 974 para 23-110. 
1352 See para 4.7 above. 
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This amendment should make it clear that the deeming of the two entities to be one has no bearing on 
any other supplies.1353 
 
I further argue that where section 51(2) applies, the various transfers of ownership in the jointly-owned 
partnership property during the transition from the dissolved to the new partnership, are not regarded 
as supplies and, consequently, have no VAT implications.1354 The question arising is whether this 
interpretation is reasonably straightforward, or whether any clarifying amendments are required. 
 
In the case of Canada, Arsenault and Kreklewetz argue that legislative reform may not be necessary if 
it is already sufficiently clear that the ownership of the partnership property would, for GST purposes, 
remain unchanged throughout since one cannot transfer something to oneself. The relevant factors 
they consider are: that a partnership has a separate legal status for GST purposes; that section 272.1(7) 
deems the new partnership to be the same person as the old partnership; and that the ownership of the 
partnership property lies with the partnership while the partners own only a ‘financial instrument’ known 
as the ‘partnership interest’.1355 
 
All the factors mentioned by Arsenault and Kreklewetz are also true for the VAT Act, save for the 
definition of ‘partner’s share’ (or ‘partnership interest’ in the case of Canada), which I propose should 
be added.1356 The specific exclusion of a partner’s undivided interest in jointly- owned partnership 
property from the proposed definition of ‘partner’s share’, should place it beyond doubt that the supply 
of a partner’s share does not affect the ownership of such partnership property, which remains with the 
partnership. Moreover, as the old and new partnerships are deemed1357 to be the same partnership 
and, therefore, the same person, the jointly owned partnership property is not supplied for VAT 
purposes. 
 
6.10 The deductibility of VAT on pre-formation and pre-business expenses 
 
I have also referred to section 19 which allows for the deduction of VAT levied on the acquisition of 
goods or services for or on behalf a company, but only before the incorporation of that company.1358 I 
 
1353 In the case of the technical dissolution of a partnership, a new partnership is established (see para 4.1 above). There is 
no legal fiction in the common law, which deems the old and the new partnership to be one and the same partnership. 
Section 51(2), although in need of some refining as argued, deems the two entities to be one person, subject to meeting 
the relevant requirements. Although a (legislative) deeming provision comes with inherent difficulties (see paras 1.1 and 
2.3.3), it is the mechanism used in our law to create a legal fiction. 
1354 Ibid. 
1355 Arsenault & Kreklewetz “Partnerships” 52. 
1356 See para 6.4 above. 
1357 By s 51(2). 
1358 See para 2.9 above. 
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pointed out that relief under section 19 expressly applies only to companies, and is, therefore, not 
available to partnerships. I argue that while section 19 permits an input tax deduction on goods or 
services acquired on behalf of a company before its incorporation, section 18(4)(b) does not allow a 
deduction related to acquisitions made before the establishment of a partnership. As a result, a 
partnership is not allowed a deduction in relation to pre-formation expenses, but only on expenses 
incurred before the commencement of business.1359 
 
In my view, the different criteria applied for the deductibility of VAT on pre-incorporation expenses and 
pre-formation expenses, in the case of a company and a partnership, respectively, violate the neutrality 
principle. The differences between a company and a partnership are significantly reduced by deeming 
a partnership to be a ‘person’, and there is no reason to place a company in a more favourable position 
than a partnership. 
 
I consider that, notwithstanding that section 19 corresponds to international legislative precedent, this 
provision should be amended to extend the relief to partnerships, amongst others. The strict conditions 
in section 19, slightly adjusted for partnerships, would ensure that deductions are only be permitted in 
relation to goods and services applied in the partnership’s enterprise when it is established that: 
 
a. the goods or services are acquired in connection with the formation of the partnership; 
b. the person who incurred the expense has been reimbursed by the partnership; 
c. the goods or services are acquired for the purpose of an enterprise to be carried on by the 
partnership, and have not been used for any purpose other than carrying on such enterprise; and 
d. the partnership is in possession of the tax invoice for the expense.1360 
 
6.11 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have proposed both amendments to current provisions and new provisions for the VAT 
Act. These are in line with what the VAT Act seeks to achieve, and the commonly- accepted principles 
of a sound VAT system. My proposed amendments are primarily aimed at clarifying and simplifying the 
law. The proposed amendment to section 51(2), for example, makes it clear that only supplies between 
the dissolved and new partnerships are disregarded. An important addition I propose, is the insertion 
of a definition of ‘partner’s share’, which will exclude interests in jointly-owned partnership property 
which, for VAT purposes, vests in the partnership. I have also proposed changes to the law, for 
example, my recommendation that, in the interests of neutrality, the VAT treatment of partners’ shares 
 
1359 Ibid. 
1360 See s 19. 
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be aligned with that for company shares. An important implication of this proposal is that the making of 
capital contributions and the receipt of partner shares on the commencement of a partnership, will be 
regarded as having been received in exchange, and therefore as consideration for, one another. I 
further propose that the requirements for the deduction of VAT related to partnership reimbursement of 
a partner’s expenses, be relaxed so that the burden of the VAT does not rest on a business. I identified 
those areas which do not warrant amendments to the law, but ideally require an interpretation statement 
from the SARS. An interpretation statement would facilitate the application of VAT provisions by 
explaining difficult areas of partnership law – eg, transactions related to the technical dissolution of a 
partnership. In my view, these proposed amendments to the law, coupled with interpretation 
statements, will bring much needed clarity to the complex area of VAT on common partnership 
transactions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When considering the VAT treatment of common partnership transactions, I determined the nature of 
the particular transaction in terms of the common law relating to partnerships. I also considered whether 
the VAT character of the transactions differs from its common-law character in view of the deeming of 
a partnership to be a ‘person’1361 and other provisions in the VAT Act that have a bearing on the 
transaction, especially section 51. Only once I had established the nature of the transaction for VAT 
purposes – whether in keeping with or differing from the common law – did I apply the relevant 
provisions of the VAT Act to determine the VAT implications of the transaction. 
 
I then highlighted certain of my more important arguments. In Chapter Two, I deal with the VAT 
implications of transactions relating to the formation of a partnership. I maintain that the deeming of a 
partnership to be a person, implies that for VAT purposes it is capable of making supplies and 
acquisitions, carrying on an enterprise, and registering for VAT as a single person.1362 I argue that in 
terms the VAT Act, a partner can make supplies to the partnership and vice versa. These arguments 
correspond to what the consensus view is in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK (hereafter, 
the other jurisdictions) on how GST/VAT applies to these transactions. In my view, what is supplied or 
acquired by the body of persons who make up the partnership, within the course and scope of its 
common purpose is, for VAT purposes, supplied or acquired by the partnership as a separate 
person.1363 
 
I contend that a partner’s contribution to the partnership is subject to VAT if it meets all the requirements 
of section 7(1)(a), especially if the contribution is made for consideration.1364 In my opinion, a partner’s 
share and any profit distributions are not reciprocally connected and, therefore, do not qualify as 
consideration for a partner’s contribution. As a result, a partner does not make his contribution to the 
partnership in exchange for consideration, save where the partners agree that he is to receive a specific 
payment for that contribution.1365 I argue that the partners could wish to claim that a payment is a profit 
distribution and not consideration, in order to ‘shelter’ the supply from VAT.1366 The other jurisdictions, 
 
1361 See Chapter One. 
1362 See para 2.3 above. 
1363Ibid. 
1364 See para 2.6.1 above. 
1365 See para 2.6.5 above. 
1366 See para 3.2.3 above. 
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save for the UK,1367 are unanimous in the view that a partner’s contribution can be subject to GST/VAT. 
The position in Australia and Canada differ from that in South Africa in that a partner’s capital 
contribution and his partner’s share are regarded as consideration for one another.1368 
 
I further conclude that the partners’ shares are not supplied to the partners when the partnership is 
formed, which reflects the position in New Zealand. However, in Australia and Canada the agreed view 
is that the partners’ shares are issued to the partners upon formation of the partnership.1369 
 
Considering a partner’s agency powers, I agree with the view that a partner’s contribution to the 
partnership may simultaneously serve as a supply on behalf of the partnership to a third party, and by 
carrying out that task, as an in-kind contribution of labour to the partnership which gives rise to a 
potential VAT liability for both the partnership and the partner.1370 The acts of the partner as agent of 
the partnership are, furthermore, attributed to the partnership. The partnership must, accordingly, 
account for output and input tax on the supplies and acquisitions made by the partner as agent. These 
transactions are subject to the same GST/VAT treatment in New Zealand and the UK. The position in 
Canada is that a partner is not required to account for GST on the supply of agency services to the 
partnership.1371 Although the relevant Australian and Canadian provisions are similar,1372 in my view, 
the GST treatment in Australia corresponds to that of South Africa.1373 
 
I support the argument that a partnership will only be in a position to ‘apply’ goods or services that have 
been acquired by a partner, and be permitted a deduction under section 18(4), if the partner contributed 
either the ownership or the use of such goods or services to the partnership. The goods or services are 
deemed by section 18(4), to be jointly-owned partnership property, resulting in potential VAT liability on 
their return to the partner.1374 
 
I argue that a partnership is not permitted a deduction in relation to pre-formation expenses, but only 
for expenses incurred prior to the commencement of business. This is also the position in the other 
jurisdictions.1375 
 
 
1367 The position in the UK is that the entry of a new partner into a partnership in consideration for a contribution in cash 
or in kind, is not a taxable supply. See para 2.6.5 above. 
1368 See para 2.6.5 above. 
1369 See para 2.8 above. 
1370 See para 2.6.2 above. 
1371 Ibid. 
1372 That is s 184-5(1) of the Australian GST Act and s 272.1(1) of Canada’s ETA. 
1373 See para 2.6.2 above. 
1374 See para 2.7 above. 
1375 See para 2.9 above. 
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In Chapter Three I discuss the operation of a partnership. I argue that, subject to section 18(4), a 
partnership can only supply or acquire an item if it supplies or acquires the ownership of that item (ie, 
in the case of a ‘purchase’), even though the item forms part of its taxable activity. The other jurisdictions 
concur in this view.1376 
 
I argue that a contracting partner makes an acquisition as agent on behalf of the partnership, he and 
the third party intend that the obligation created by the contract is incurred by the partnership. Even 
though a contract may be for the benefit of the partnership, it will not be liable if the contracting partner 
and the third party intended the obligation to be incurred personally by the partner. Australia, Canada, 
and the UK agree with South Africa’s approach. In New Zealand, however, a partnership is permitted a 
deduction not only when it is in a contractual relationship with the supplier, but also where a partner 
incurs an expense in the course of the partnership business.1377 
 
I argue that an in specie distribution by a partnership to a partner can be subject to VAT, and deal with 
the VAT treatment of the transaction, on the basis of whether payment for the distribution is by means 
of set off or barter. Such in specie distributions are also potentially taxable in the other jurisdictions.1378 
 
I consider the VAT consequences of a partnership permitting a partner to use partnership property for 
private purposes, which creates an opportunity for VAT abuse. I conclude that this could result in a VAT 
charge for the partnership, either in terms of section 7(1)(a), or in the form of a change in use adjustment 
in terms of section 18(2). The GST/VAT consequences can also potentially ensue, in these 
circumstances, in the other jurisdictions.1379 
 
In Chapter Four, I deal with VAT on transactions related to the technical dissolution of a partnership. I 
consider the impact of section 51(2), and argue that the jointly-owned partnership property is deemed 
to belong to the partnership, and that the dissolved and the new partnerships are deemed to be the 
same person. The various transfers of ownership in such property under general law, are not regarded 
as supplies and, consequently, hold no VAT implications. I argue that the fact that supplies between 
the old and the new partnership are disregarded, obviously does not mean that supplies between other 
persons should not be recognised.1380 This is the view in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. In 
Canada, there is criticism of the view of the CRA that the supply of property from the predecessor 
 
1376 See paras 3.3.1, 3.4.1 above. 
1377 See para 3.4.3 above. 
1378 See para 3.5.2 above. 
1379 See para 3.6 above. 
1380 See para 4.7 above. 
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partnership to the new partnership should be recognised for GST purposes, despite these entities being 
deemed to be the same partnership.1381 
 
I maintain that if section 51(2) does not apply, it is possible for the key requirements in section 11(1)(e) 
to be met, which would zero rate the transfer of the partnership business from the dissolved to the new 
partnership. In the other jurisdictions it is also recognised that there can be a transfer of a going concern 
in these circumstances, although the GST/VAT treatment of such a transfer is not always the same. In 
the UK, for example, the transfer of a business as a going concern falls outside the scope of VAT.1382 
 
I also consider the VAT implications of transactions involving partners’ shares supplied by the partners 
after the formation of the partnership.1383 The supply of a partner’s share could be subject to VAT, 
although it would be uncommon, in my view, for a partner to hold his share as part of an enterprise.1384 
As the jointly-owned partnership property is owned by the partnership, I argue that when a partner 
disposes of his partner’s share, the component of the supply that consists of his interest in such 
property, should not be recognised as a supply for VAT purposes. A partner’s right to profit, however, 
unlike jointly-owned partnership property, is not deemed to be owned by the partnership. As a result, 
the partner, rather than the partnership, can supply the ownership of the right to profit. This is also the 
position in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, and according to one view, also the likely stance in 
Canada.1385 
 
I question the proposed extension of the reorganisation relief in section 8(25) to partnerships in that 
certain of the transactions contemplated in the relevant provisions of the IT Act can simply not apply to 
partnerships. The other jurisdictions do not have a provision similar to section 8(25).1386 
 
In Chapter Five I deal with the VAT treatment of transactions related to the liquidation of a partnership 
and the distribution of its assets. I consider the VAT implications of some of the important changes that 
take place after dissolution. For example, partners share in profits after dissolution by virtue of their 
right to fairness and good faith. I argue that any profit distributions made after dissolution, would not be 
subject to VAT because the profit share is merely the result of the partners’ entitlement to fairness and 
good faith, and not in exchange for any reciprocally connected supplies made by the partners to the 
partnership. This is also likely the view in other jurisdictions.1387 
 
1381 Ibid. 
1382 See para 4.9 above. 
1383 See para 4.8.1 above. 
1384 See para 4.8.3 above. 
1385 See para 4.8.2 above. 
1386 See para 4.12 above. 
1387 See para 5.2.2.2 above. 
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I further argue that the debts of each of the partners to the partnership, or of those of the partnership to 
each of the partners, do not come to an end on dissolution. Section 22(1) would, therefore, not 
automatically be triggered when a partnership dissolves.1388 As the partnership’s indebtedness remains 
in existence, dissolution will also not automatically trigger a section 22(1) deduction for a partnership’s 
creditor.1389 Considering that the partnership’s rights do not cease on dissolution, there can be no 
argument that such rights are, on dissolution, surrendered by the partnership by operation of law. This 
gives rise to a potential VAT liability. This should also be the position in the other jurisdictions.1390 
 
I discuss the VAT consequences of the sale or transfer of a partner’s share to an heir following the 
partner’s death. In the absence of specific provisions in the VAT Act, I conclude that this matter is 
adequately dealt with by the general provisions; in particular, by sections 46(g) and 53. The position in 
the other jurisdictions corresponds to that in South Africa.1391 
 
As regards the liquidation of the partnership, I argue that as the function of the liquidator is to wind up 
the partnership’s affairs, and as his actions result in the termination of the partnership’s enterprise, the 
supplies he makes will be deemed to be made in the course or furtherance of the partnership’s 
enterprise.1392 Any surplus assets will be applied in payment of what may be due to the respective 
partners, including the repayment of capital.1393 In my view, there should be no difference between a 
distribution in specie to a partner during the partnership’s operation and its liquidation.1394 This is also 
the view propagated by the ATO, and is likewise the position in Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.1395 
 
In Chapter Six I propose amendments to the VAT Act, and that certain aspects of the VAT relating to 
partnership transactions be clarified by the SARS in an interpretation statement, primarily for the sake 
of certainty and simplicity. 
 
Although I favour maintaining the status quo in which capital contributions made as part of a partner’s 
enterprise activity are subject to VAT,1396 I propose that provisions be inserted in the VAT Act to clarify 
certain important aspects regarding the receipt of a partner’s share and a partner’s contribution during 
 
1388 See para 5.2.3.1 above. 
1389 See para 5.2.3.2 above. 
1390 Ibid. 
1391 See para 5.2.4 above. 
1392 See para 5.3.2.2 above. 
1393 See para 5.3.3 above. 
1394 Ibid. 
1395 Ibid. 
1396 See para 6.3.2 above. 
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the formation stage.1397 I also hold the view that partners’ contributions of labour, in particular, should 
not be excluded from VAT because this would violate the neutrality principle.1398 
 
I argue that the different VAT treatment of a partner’s share and a company share under the VAT Act, 
violates the neutrality principle considering the close similarities between the two types of interest. I 
therefore propose that a partner’s share be subjected to the same VAT treatment as a company 
share.1399 I also propose that a definition of ‘partner’s share’ be included in the VAT Act to clarify that 
when a partner’s share is supplied, the partner should only be regarded as supplying his right to claim 
a specific portion of the partnership assets when this portion is due, which includes his right to profit.1400 
 
Furthermore, the uncertainties surrounding section 18(4) can be clarified by an amendment which 
simply provides that the goods or services applied by the partnership, are deemed to ‘form part of the 
assets’ of the partnership. This ensures, by implication, that the partnership acquires ownership in such 
goods or services.1401 
 
I argue that, subject to strict conditions, a partnership be permitted an input tax deduction related to a 
reimbursement of an expense incurred personally by a partner, but for the benefit or in the course of 
the partnership’s enterprise. This avoids the VAT burden falling to a business and upholds the principle 
of flexibility.1402 
 
I am of the view that the VAT treatment of a partnership’s distribution to a partner, where the payment 
therefor is either by offset or barter, is another area in which the SARS can provide clarity by issuing an 
interpretation statement. The amendment of the VAT Act in this regard, is therefore unwarranted.1403 
 
I further maintain that an understanding of partnership law is a prerequisite for a proper appreciation of 
the VAT implications of transactions related to the technical dissolution of a partnership. I argue, 
therefore, that the application of VAT in these areas can be clarified by the SARS by means of an 
interpretation statement.1404 
 
 
1397 See para 6.3.1 above. 
1398 See para 6.3.3 above. 
1399 See para 6.3.4.1 above. 
1400 See para 6.4 above. 
1401 See para 6.5 above. 
1402 See para 6.6 above. 
1403 See para 6.7 above. 
1404 See para 6.8 above. 
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Section 51(2), in my view, requires an amendment to clarify that only supplies between the dissolved 
and the new partnership which relate to the transition to the new partnership, should be deemed not to 
be supplies, and therefore not subject to VAT. This amendment should make it clear that the deeming 
of the two entities to be one does not have a bearing on supplies between other entities.1405 
 
For the sake of upholding the neutrality principle, I argue that given the similarity between companies 
and partnerships for VAT purposes, and subject to requirements, partnerships should also be permitted 
to deduct VAT on pre-formation expenses.1406 
 
The implementation of these proposals would, to my mind, result in greater certainty in the VAT 
treatment of common partnership transactions. It would also align the South African VAT Act with the 
accepted principles which characterise an effective VAT system. 
 
Further Research Opportunities 
 
I discuss1407 the possible zero rating of a partner’s contribution of services in terms of section 11(2)(l). 
To qualify for zero rating it is, amongst others, required that the partnership must not be resident in, and 
that the partnership or ‘any other person’ must not be present in the Republic at the time the services 
are rendered. It might be difficult to determine the residency of a partnership which has both resident 
and non-resident partners, and to determine whether a partnership is present in the Republic as 
contemplated in section 11(2)(l). It is also not clear what sort of a presence is required by this provision 
– legal, economic, or physical – and how a partnership would fulfil whatever presence is envisaged. If 
‘any other person’ is a resident partner, the question is whether his presence in the Republic would 
invariably disqualify the services from being zero rated, or whether there would still be scope for zero 
rating. 
 
The VAT Act contains no explicit ‘place of supply’ rules.1408 Consequently, issues that require further 
research, especially where a partnership is involved in cross-border trade, are for example, the location 
where a partnership carries on its ‘enterprise or activity’ as envisaged in the definition of ‘enterprise’;1409 
how to establish whether “services are physically rendered elsewhere than in the Republic” by a 
partnership as contemplated in section 11(2)(k); and also whether “services are utilized or consumed 
in the Republic” by a partnership as required by the definition of ‘imported services’.1410 
 
1405 See para 6.9 above. 
1406 See para 6.10 above. 
1407 In para 2.6.5 above. 
1408 Davis Tax Committee First Interim Report on Value-Added Tax July 2015 at 9. 
1409 Section 1(1). 
1410 Ibid. 
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